Populism in New Media: The Online Presidential Campaign Discourse in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Populism is often seen as a tactic, strategy and method of campaigning in political communication that exploits political discourse. Populism plays a vital role in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. Various research has been carried out to understand the practice of populism. However, few have explained the way social media and online news in populist communication practices relate to the discourse of the online presidential campaign. This research aims to understand the pattern of the use of populist discourse in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election in online news and social media. The study employed Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that focuses on social identity construction and the relation of populist discourse practices. Data for the study were obtained from online news from January 15 to February 14, 2019. A total of 81 news articles from online news and 576,782 entries that are disseminated in Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube were analyzed by using Nvivo and web crawlers. This research finds that, first, political discourse and populist discourse are amplified by online news coverage and extended in the social media; second, online news does not engage in producing populist discourse but echoes the populist discourse by citing politician's populist utterance. In conclusion, populist keywords and concepts like infrastructure, food, energy, and radical become a hegemonic discourse in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. There are two important contributions of this study on populist discourse in Indonesia's 2019 election campaign. One, the knowledge of the pattern of the distribution

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of populist discourse. Two, the understanding about the use of populist discourse in social media and online news.

Keywords: Political Discourse; CDA; Populism; New Media; Indonesia

INTRODUCTION

Populism is a contemporary phenomenon which is present in various forms in politics. Populism can be interpreted as tactics, strategies, and methods in political communication (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Waisbord & Amado, 2017). In other words, populism is a method and campaign strategy in politics that manipulates political and public issues. Furthermore, populism can be seen as an ideology that follows an antagonistic frame of three elements. They are the people, the elite and the general will (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The term "the people" is often used in a combination with three meanings: "the people as sovereign, as the common people, and as the nation" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 9). It also refers to the national community, which is defined as citizenship or in ethnic terms (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). "The elite" is related to political power, socioeconomic status, and nationality, which are also agents of strength consisting not just politics and moral power, but also cultural and intellectual power. "The elite" wants politics to be an exclusive or "a dominant elite affair" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 7). It is defined on the basis of power, including the majority of people who hold "leading positions in politics, economics, the media, and art" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 12). Finally, "general will" refers to "common sense." The purpose of "general will" is to "combine different demands and to identify common enemies" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 16).

These three elements (the people, the elite and the general will) depend on the political context of a country. The study of populism has gained momentum due to the global interest in populism in political communications. Past studies on populism include political maneuver (Traverso, 2019), online communication (Engesser et al, 2017), media coverage (Blasnig et al, 2018), qualitative text analysis in a single media (Engesser et al., 2017; Kramer, 2017), and political discourse (Wodak, 2019).

In 2019, the Republic of Indonesia held a presidential election, which is the most significant contestation in the change of government in Indonesia. This 2019 election is the first media-savvy Indonesia's presidential election when the distribution and consumption of discourse were significantly determined by digital platforms. Contestations and battles of populist discourses are a foundational problem in Indonesia due to the compression of presidential candidacy from more than two candidates to only two. This is because of the minimum vote acquisition threshold of political parties in the general election to determine the number of winning seats in the House of Representatives. This foundational factor has resulted in the emerging dichotomy among the people and encouraged populist practices in both candidates. Moreover, the apparent rise of religious conservatism (Hadiz & Robinson, 2017), decentralized corruptions, personalist politics in the regions and structural problems are also additional basic reasons behind the emerging populism in Indonesia (Kimura, 2017).

Populist discourse receives more attention than ordinary political discourse because populism politics has a structure that aligns with the stages of analysis required in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), particularly Norman Fairclough's CDA model. Nor Fariza Mohd. Nor and Jamaluddin Aziz (2010, p. 72) aver that "CDA is useful in analyzing interactions in contexts that involve power asymmetry", which is often reflected in electoral campaigns. Moreover, the research trends on text, discourse, and populism are dominated by interdisciplinary works in the fields of language, communications, and politics. From the aspect of technological novelty, the new media has contributed towards a new paradigm in critical

discourse analysis (CDA). New media is a combination of computing and information technology, communication networks, and digitized media and information content. Flew (2005) defines it as "a media convergence, digital networks, global reach, interactivity, and many-to-many communications flow" (p. XV). In this research, social media and online news are part of new media.

Fairclough's CDA model comprises of three levels: micro (linguistic, symbolic, textual analysis), meso (how a text is produced, reproduced, and consumed), and macro (power relations between a text and certain ideology) (Fairclough, 1995a), which are compatible with the practice of populist communication that originated from political opportunity (ideology), discursive opportunity (text content), and media opportunity (text reproduction) (Engesser et al, 2017). In other words, CDA and populism similarly have three horizons: micro, meso, and macro. Interestingly, Fairclough's (2001) critical discourse analysis came about before the advent of new media. This gap undoubtedly gives significance to the means of analysis between traditional and new media. In the era of traditional media, CDA's meso layer was based on social interaction that tended to be closed, which is similar to interaction in the era of the network society. The advent of new media also re-deconstructed what texts are, what kind of sociocultural relations envelopes texts, and how society understands texts.

The online news and social media, as an interrelated preferred media for people to acquire political information, meet the interest of populist politicians in disseminating their power. Thus, it has yet to be comprehended in terms of the changes in discourse practice and sociocultural practice in new media, specifically online news and social media in the Indonesian context. Much research on populism (For example Engesser et al. (2017)) is done using social media as their data and Fairclough's CDA as the framework. However, this paper uses not only social media (such as Facebook), but also online news and political actors in explaining populist discourse.

In the presidential election, the dominance of political information is key to the election victory. In other words, the dominant political information in political discourses produces populist discourses. The virtual media audience, as a result, will be influenced to vote. In its most recent development, critical discourse analysis research on populism has been in the increase involving a single piece political content of a politician (Sengul, 2019; Kramer, 2017), colossal content analysis which carries out several preferred political texts (Engesser, 2017), measurement of the intensity of populist trajectory in a specific range of period (Hameleers & Vligenthart, 2019; Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019), discourse circulation in multiple media (Blasnig et al, 2018) and the prospect discourse orientation (Zappetini & Krzyżanowski, 2019).

The objectives of the research are to identify the pattern of the distribution of populist discourse and to explain the use of online populist discourse on online news and social media in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. Populist online communication refers to an online-based direct communication that conveys populist characteristics: ostracizing the others, anti-elite, people centric, emphasizing popular sovereignty, exclusion of the others, and intensification of self-charisma by politicians to the people (Engesser et al, 2017). Each of these populist characteristics is rooted in various accounts of political elements. Ostracizing and exclusion of the others, people centrism and emphasizing popular sovereignty might be related to the political and sociological configuration of a particular country. For example, the discourse on infrastructure for the people and radicalism is present in Indonesian context. Through these two populist discourses, the two candidates are able to build their political image.

Related to this political image is self-charisma. Margiansyah (2019) noted that Jokowi constructs his charisma as a secular technocratic-nationalist leader and defends his Muslim voters, which is represented by an organization called Nahdlatul Ulama, that is, an Islamic organization in Indonesia as main Islamic political signification. Populist online

communication is operated by political opportunity, or a governmental model of a country, and by discursive opportunity, where politicians draw disruptive messages reference based on the collective discourse of the people (Engesser et al, 2017). Following this vein, this research asks: 1) How is political discourse of online populist communication in online news and social media in the presidential campaign in Indonesia distributed? 2) How do social media and online news utilize the populist discourse in the 2019 presidential campaign in Indonesia?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Discourse is associated with popular speech of various other types of discourses (Fairclough, 1992). This means that political discourse is a compilation of very popular texts in the field of politics such as the ones related to the general election. Political discourse on social media has its own distinctive characteristics in comparison to discourse on online news. For instance, social media is used for emancipatory and political information disclosure purposes. Paradoxically, texts and discourse on social media also have a bad influence as they create political hegemony. For example, political hegemony through populist discourses and news. Such paradox is inherently present in hybrid media system (Miranda, Young & Yetgin, 2016). This echoes Abduljalil, Noraini Ibrahim and Nor Fariza Mohd Nor's (2014) finding that political and religious discourses construct relational meaning. In effect, political and religious discourses in new media tend to be difficult to identify in terms of meaning and purpose. They move, spread, and disappear instantaneously. This is even more so with political discourses and texts that are continuously circulating on social media. This is because the online news is fluid and interactive, so the meaning and purpose of discourse are difficult to identify.

Studies that look at the relationship among texts, discourse, and populism have become a trend in various parts of the world, particularly in Western countries. These studies tend to focus on the political actors or discourses conveyed by politicians. Sengul (2019), for instance, studied the political communication of right-wing populism in Australia by analyzing a speech delivered by Pauline Hanson on December 14, 2016 and limited his research to verbal communication. Through a critical discourse analysis approach, Sengul's research (2019) explains a holistic political communication by showing how Pauline Hanson used discursive strategies and linguistic tools to achieve her political goals. An earlier study, which was conducted by Engesser et al. (2017) examined various social media accounts of 50 politicians in four countries: Italy, England, Czech, and Austria. Essentially, the studies carried out by Sengul (2019) and Engesser et al. (2017) identified the attributes of populist communication in verbal and online practice. Both focused on the populist quality of political speech.

Another research on populism is conducted by Schmuck and Hameelers (2019). They began with the assumption that there were differences in the intensity of populist communication between the period approaching an election and the post-election. Using data from Facebook statuses and tweets of politicians in the Netherlands and Austria, Schmuck and Hameleers (2019) identified elements of populist political communication such as rhetoric and negative emotions. Their research shows that populist communication is more prevalent in SNS (Social Network Services) communication by right-wing populists. They also found that left-wing populists and political actors tend to use populist communication before, rather than after the election itself. In sum, past studies on discourse and populism highlighted the increasing use of populist communication as a periodical pattern of the emerging election in their respective countries.

In this vein, it can be said that topics formed on social media promote populism. Engesser et al.'s (2017) research on populism on social media found how politicians used Facebook and Twitter for populist purposes. The study used qualitative textual analysis and was carried out in four countries namely Austria, Italy, Switzerland and the UK. Engesser et

al. (2017) found that populism manifested itself in fragmented forms on social media. Engesser et al. (2017) found three reasons why politicians can spread populist ideologies in a fragmented form. First, politicians have the goal to reduce the complexity of ideology. Second, politicians can keep the populist ideology ambiguous. Third, fragmented populism is easier than mature ideology (Engesser et al, 2017). The research also shows that social media provides space for populist actors to articulate their ideology, political messages and populist messages. The contribution of Engesser et al.'s (2017) research is the conceptualization and measurement of populism. Besides Engesser et al. (2017), Kramer (2017) focuses on internet functions and forms of right-wing populism to investigate how the Internet is used and its contribution to populism. Kramer (2017) also discusses online communication from leaders or organizations, concluding that the Internet can sharpen the image and ideology of right-wing populism.

Apart from studies on social media, research on populism also examines speech texts. A research conducted by Sengul (2019), for instance, examines speech texts from right-wing populism or populist discourse in Australia. He used critical discourse analysis in political communication research in a case study of the inaugural speech of Australian Senator Pauline Hanson in 2016. His research reported how Hanson used discursive strategies and linguistic tools to achieve her political goals. Sengul's research (2019) contributed to the understanding of the practice of populism with the use a qualitative and critical approach (Sengul, 2019).

In Indonesia, research on populism was conducted by Margiansyah (2019). Who analyzes the transformation of populism in two different elections in Indonesia by describing patterns of populism in the process of political contestation and the factors that led to the return of political populism in Indonesia. The research found that political populism was only used as an instrument to serve the interests of the elite and oligarchy.

A study by Muller (2019) reveals that populism is supported by two main foundations, namely historical foundation and cultural foundation. These foundations subsequently determine the narrative, discourse structure, and game structure (Muller, 2019). The historical foundation refers to a country's historical journey, whereas cultural foundation refers to the dynamics of social composition within socio-cultural life. Through the two foundations, the processes of classifying in-group/out-group, the commoner, and the elite have a place within social practices in society.

METHODOLOGY

DATA COLLECTION

Online news data were taken from online news agencies' websites by using Google, Bing, and yahoo search engines. A total number of 81 online political news based on selected keywords (politics and presidential election) in three online news agencies from January to February 2019 were chosen as the sample. The time frame from January and February is the most appropriate as the campaign teams of the presidential candidates conducted campaign activities before the election day in April 2019. Subsequently, a combination of manual coding using content analysis and automatic coding using Nvivo qualitative data analysis software was done. Nvivo is only used for tracking words and texts. Whereas hashtags (#) is identified manually. However, this study does not focus on the hashtag and its frequency. Online news is limited to news from *kompas.com, sindonews.com, and tempo.com,* between the month of January and February of 2019. The three online news agencies are the largest online news networks in Indonesia that provide political news about the presidential election (Purnama, 2018))

Social media data were collected by using web crawlers, in which 576,782 volumes of total conversation data on social media were obtained from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. Web crawlers are the program of data crawling that investigates and searches the

contents on the Web. In collecting data from online news and social media, the following keywords were used: *pemilihan presiden*/presidential selection, Jokowi (abbreviation for Joko Widodo the incumbent candidate), Prabowo (challenger candidate), *infrastruktur*/infrastructure, *pangan*/food, *energy*/energy, *lingkungan hidup*/environment, *hukum*/law, *korupsi*/corruption, *sumber daya alam*/natural resource, *nasionalisme*/nationalism, and *agama*/religion. These keywords derived from debates on online news and social media.

The data for this research is selected according to two criteria: (1) The theme of Indonesian presidential election and (2) The data set using keywords; then using Nvivo software (see Figure 1). The period of data collection was from January 2019 to February 2019.

FIGURE 1. Data set using keywords and Nvivo Analysis

The contestations of contents and discourses tended to be more intense on online news and social media compared to conventional media channels like radio, newspaper, magazine or print media. Based on the results of a survey in 2019 from the Association of Indonesian Internet Service Providers (APJII), the number of internet users in Indonesia is 171.17 million. The data on social media users in Indonesia, according to Hootsuite data (Dwi, 2019), reached 150 million users (https://andi.link/hootsuite-we-are-social-indonesian-digital-report-2019/). In another survey, internet users are the highest (44%), compared to the radio (37%), newspapers (7%), tabloids and magazines (3%) (Based on Nielsen's survey in 2019/ https://www.nielsen.com/id/en/press-releases/2017/the-new-trends-amongstindonesian netizen/)

DATA ANALYSIS

The collected data were subsequently arranged into documents by using categorizations consisting of themes, keywords, wordlist, and data period. Then they are analyzed using the NVivo software and Fairclough's (2001) critical discourse analysis to show the dominant populist discourse. The data analysis aims to identify ideology, discourse, and power relations in the texts (Fairclough, 2013). For instance, through an exploration of the distribution of texts and discourse, we found the ideology of nationalism and new developmentalism, power relations, and populist discourse that are dominant in the 2019 presidential election. The focus

on ideology is in line with the main purpose of the CDA. The stages of critical discourse analysis include textual analysis, contextual analysis, and interpretation (Fairclough, 2001).

First, textual analysis. This stage involves qualitative textual analysis to examine discursive use by looking at texts, words, and discourses in social media and online news. For instance, the discourse on infrastructure. Textual analysis begins with finding words related to infrastructure, themes, sub-themes, and grammatical elements of the text. Meanwhile, themes are selected in two ways. One, tracking using Nvivo and Web Crawler. Two, basing on debates set by Indonesia's General Elections Commission and the discussions on social media and online news. The first stage also involves looking at the wording and the process of discursive and linguistic searches in new media using NVivo software. This is done by looking at the wordlist and the theme derived from the discourse. All news from three online news agencies are processed using Nvivo software for the frequency of words, sub-themes, and themes. Data reduction from word lists and themes is based on the main discourses namely infrastructure, food, energy, and religion and then exported to an Excel format.

For example, words and phrases in general reporting on infrastructure news are reduced to themes and sub-themes based on candidature debates, that is, themes of debates as proposed by Indonesia's General Elections Commission and based on word lists on online news. Words and phrases about infrastructure acceleration, infrastructure advancement, infrastructure development, infrastructure not in favor of the people, toll roads, land acquisition conflicts, costly infrastructure, and budget efficiency are the results of data reduction.

The second stage is contextual analysis, wherein the researchers describe the context of the discourses examined including the presidential election context. The application of context in the analysis starts from observing the time, place, and context of events in the presidential election. For contextual analysis, space/place, time, and events of populist discourse are introduced as the main points. This stage also determines the discourse category, namely, dominant discourse, populist discourse, and peripheral discourse. At this stage, word frequency, sub-themes and theme that appear are based on the context of time and space before and after the presidential election campaign. Then the most powerful populist discourse is sought. For example, populist discourse about infrastructure is sought through word frequency on online news and conversations on social media. Then they are arranged based on themes and sub-themes that appear in the context of time and space during the presidential election campaign.

The final stage is interpretation. Interpretation in critical discourse analysis is more of a reflective interpretation. For example, the discourse on infrastructure in presidential elections is reflected and interpreted based on the elements of populism (i.e. the people, the elite, and general will). Then, the power relations and ideology behind the discourse of infrastructure, namely the ideology of new developmentalism, are examined. Figure 2 shows the flow chart of the research procedure.

FIGURE 2. Flow Chart of Research Procedure

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This section discusses how populist discourse in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election through online news and social media is distributed in social media and online news. This study finds that in the discourse of populism, it is important to identify and analyze the pattern regarding the distribution of populist discourse. This study reveals that the discourse in new media is distributed across various forms and communication media. This finding is based on social media data, description, and text distribution, using web crawling methods and data from online news using Nvivo software. In addition, an analysis of discursive practice and sociocultural practice is carried out to reveal that the text is associated with social conditions in the production, consumption of texts, and the social context of the discourse. The finding addresses the research's aim that is to understand the pattern with regards to the use of populist discourse in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election in online news and social media.

The dimensions of the text are explored in the "Distribution of Political Discourses on Social Media and Online News" section. Whereas discursive practice (interpretation) and sociocultural practices (social analysis) are explained in the "Populist Discourse" section.

DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSES ON SOCIAL MEDIA AND ONLINE NEWS

In the new media era, populism in social media and online news has become one of the strengths in political communication, particularly so with regards to the power of distribution and consumption. The level of production and distribution is related to communicators and the media industry. Whereas the level of consumption is related to voters and virtual audiences. Likewise, discourse becomes a strategic force in politics, especially political contestation in the new media space. In Table 1, it is clearly shown that Twitter ranks the highest among other social media platforms in terms of discourses on politics, particularly about infrastructure, energy, and food. Twitter prevails over online news including other social media platforms, i.e. Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. This is due to Twitter's ability to distribute information at extremely fast speed with micro-sized messages and easy access. Speed of information, distribution, and ease of access are some of the features promised by new media (Lister, 2009). Based on the data of conversation volume shown in Table 1, it is clear how the texts and discourses used in the political world are distributed. Table 1 is data obtained using web

crawling (data crawling in collaboration with Media Kernels Indonesia). Table 1 is part of the text dimensions (description) in the Fairclough's (1995a) CDA.

TABLE 1. Data of Conversation Volume on Infrastructure, Energy, and Food

No	Discursive Issues	Facebook	Instagram	Twitter	YouTube	Total
1	Infrastructure (Prabowo-Sandi)	2.958	2.739	52.619	133	63.285
2	Infrastructure (Jokowi-Ma'ruf)	10.031	6.452	213.712	434	244.403
3	Energy (Prabowo-Sandi)	1.045	695	14.002	19	18.044
4	Energy (Jokowi-Ma'ruf)	4.689	787	24.856	36	33.783
5	Food (Prabowo-Sandi)	3.067	6.812	117.016	437	132.792
6	Food (Jokowi-Ma'ruf)	3.912	2.407	107.622	302	120.940

Source: Media Kernels Indonesia (2019)

As shown in Table 1, the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin candidate pair has dominant control in nearly all the conversations on social media, except for the discourse about food, which is trending more on Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. The highest number of conversation volume with a total of 244,403 conversations is the political discourse related to the keyword "Infrastructure". This shows how political discourse has hegemonized the audience's political concerns and interests by framing the issue based on the politicians' political interest. The graphics presented in Figure 3 to Figure 5 provide descriptions concerning voters' and virtual audiences' competition in controlling political discourses. The greatest number of conversations and discussions by voters would mean that the virtual audiences can control political discourse. Graphics are obtained from web crawlers, in collaboration with Media Kernels Indonesia. Media Kernels Indonesia focuses on utilizing language processing technology to provide innovative solutions in text mining.


FIGURE 3. Trend of Total Mentions (Infrastructure) in All Media Types


FIGURE 4. Trend of Total Mentions (Energy) in All Media Types

FIGURE 5. Trend of Total Mentions (Food) in All Media Types

Figures 3, 4 and 5 show that Jokowi tends to dominate the total mentions, especially regarding infrastructure. The figures show a trend data from January to February 2019 as the period is the most appropriate time frame when the presidential candidate's campaign team carried out campaign activities before the election day in April 2019.

The trends shown in the three figures (3, 4 and 5) are data sets on new media. The data reached their peak at the end of a debate of the 2019 Indonesian presidential candidates that was held on April 13, 2019. The conversation volume and the distribution of content on social media occur in nearly all topics of conversation, namely infrastructure, energy, and food. This is related to CDA at the level of the text and its distribution. In some cases, statements made by netizens on social media were even presented as a news source on online news. During the political campaign period, political discourses functioned concurrently as the mediation of candidates' discourse and public discourse. For example, the discourse on infrastructure, energy, and food that started as public discourse was then used in the election candidate's political discourse. For instance, on infrastructure. "Infrastructure" discourse was initially discussed by the public through public space and social media, but towards the presidential election, infrastructure discourse became a political discourse used by buzzers and politicians. Besides, the change in infrastructure discourse into political discourse was caused by the General Elections Commission, when it selected infrastructure discourse to be the theme of the presidential election debate. Table 2 shows the political discourses found based on the themes from online news, i.e. *kompas.com*, *sindonews.com* and *tempo.com*. Themes are tracked based on debate themes proposed by Indonesia's General Elections Commission and based on the discussion on social media and online news.

TABLE 2. Political Discourses on Online news

Political Discourse	References Coded	Coverage
Infrastructure	289	1,16%
Food	241	0,59%
Energy	198	0,55%
Religion	71	0,28%

Based on table 2, political discourses on infrastructure, food, energy and religion were dominant compared to discourses on environment and nationalism, which were only peripheral discourses on online news. Political discourses about infrastructure, energy, and food found on online news were further divided into sub-themes as shown in Table 3:

TABLE 3. Themes and Specifics on Online news

Themes	Specifics/Subthemes
Infrastructure	Toll road, land acquisition conflict, costly infrastructure, budget efficiency, environment
Energy	Natural resource, renewable energy, control of energy, mineral resource, oil and gas, eco-friendly energy
Food	Food self-sufficiency, affordable prices, food availability, food security, import
Religion	Religion, radical, terrorism, deviant religious understanding.

Discourses on infrastructure, energy, and food identified on online news agencies were basically responses to the other two texts, namely texts found on social media and texts originating from political actors. For instance, the conversation on infrastructure on social media from January to February 2019. The conversation was started by the social media users and picked up by the online news. This means that online news as political thread did not play its role independently, but were interconnected with political discourses constructed by virtual audiences and actors (politicians and buzzer) on social media. Nevertheless, political discourse developed by political actors tends to be populist.

Populist elements (i.e the people, elite, general will) are interrelated, especially in the context of new media. Populist discourse in new media is shaped by the frequency and theme of discourse. Frequencies and themes are designed, produced, and distributed by elites and the people. The elite is not only a political elite, but also a media elite, in this case, online news. The people include a virtual audience on social media. Meanwhile, in new media, the general will becomes fluid and is part of populist content. On the one hand, trends in populist discourse become more visible during the general election period, as observed in elections held in other countries (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). On the other hand, the excessive distribution of discourse on various online news platforms also shows that both candidates have succeeded in building a populist discourse as well as a political atmosphere. In this political context, the two presidential candidates gave massive strategic discourse (i.e. relevant discourses on infrastructure, food, energy, and religion) that were eventually consumed by virtual audiences.

The production of words, texts, and discourses on social media often begins with a game of hashtags (#). Hashtag has transformed from its initial purposes as a form of organizing statements and documents to becoming a new force in the production and distribution of text and discourse. Further, we argue that hashtag has taken place as an instrument to bolden the discursive position of a statement that might be useful to add a subheading for the hashtag. This implies that words, texts, and discourses are dynamic and open in nature, particularly in terms of meaning.

In the context of the 2019 general election in Indonesia, numerous hashtags were produced to gain political support. As examples, the hashtags *#2019PresidenBaru* / #2019NewPresident, *#Jokowi2Periode* / #Jokowi2Terms, *#ekomoninasional* / #nationaleconomy, *#infrastruktur* / #infrastructure, *#PestaDemokrasi* / #DemocraticFiesta, *#Pilpres* / #PresidentialElection were much discussed by virtual audiences on social media. However, out of the many hashtags produced, there was one text and discourse that consistently appeared in the general election in Indonesia, i.e. #infrastructure. The emergence of texts and discourse on infrastructure was also indicated by hashtags such as: *#pemilu* / #generalelection, *#infrastruktur* / #infrastructure, *#listrik* / #electricity, *#pembangunan* / #development. Besides, there were also the following hashtags: *#2019TetapJokowi* / #2019StillJokowi, *#infrastruktur* / #infrastructure, *#JokowiLagi* / #JokowiAgain, *#pelabuhan* / #harbor, *#ekonomi* / #economy, *#jalantol* / #tollroad, *#bandara* / #airport, and *#jalan*, / #road.

Texts and discourse about infrastructure in social media tend to refer to the meaning of physical infrastructure, which is interpreted as the meaning of physical development such as toll roads, airports, ports, bridges, etc. Meanwhile, other meanings of infrastructure are linked

to education, health, and national defense, which are less prominent in the texts and discourses produced and consumed on social media.

The distribution of text and discourse encourages virtual audiences to discuss the personality of the candidates and the programs they are involved in. Consequently, the candidates' image would be enhanced. In other words, text, discourse, and image can increase the electability of the candidate. In politics, the image becomes one of the important forces to get the voters. The image in politics is the perception of a candidate's personal identity. Without an image, candidates will not be known by the public and the opportunity to win the general election becomes more difficult. In shaping the candidate's image, the image is built not only by general discourse but also populist discourse, which can get the attention of virtual audiences or voters. The following are the findings and discussion of populist discourse.

POPULIST DISCOURSE

In this study, populist discourses were identified and divided into 4 (four) categories, i.e. infrastructure, food, energy, and religion. These populist discourses were not determined based on the amount of conversational volume or the amount of online news. They were instead determined based on texts of political actors that were propagated during the campaign period. The discourse on infrastructure, food, energy, and religion was originally a discussion in the public sphere by "the people". However, during the presidential election, the discourse was taken by "the elite" and changed to "pseudo general will". "General will" becomes fluid and is contested by "the people" and "the elite". "The people" encourages discourse on infrastructure to focus on the interests of the people, not the elite. For instance, the text and discourse on "infrastructure should be for the people, not the people for infrastructure". In addition, in the "general will" aspect, there are discourses about land acquisition conflicts, costly infrastructure, budget efficiency, infrastructure, and environmental problems.

In contrast to infrastructure discourse, the religious discourse has quite significant differences. For example, populist discourse varies from radicalism, terrorism and to a deviant religious understanding. Texts and discourses about radicalism are positioned as discourses that reinforce the discourse of nationalism. Moreover, "the elite" encourages and reinforces the discourse of radicalism and positions the concerns of the elite as national engagements. The consequence of this positioning, i.e. the position of candidates, is the placing the elite's interests above the interests of the people.

This can be observed from the populist pattern in Indonesia - particularly during the 2019 Election - between the two Indonesian presidential candidates, which on the one hand, both started off with the spirit of nationalism. However, on the other hand, both latterly exhibited exclusivity of two differing Islamic expressions. For example, Islamic traditionalist and conservative Islam. The antagonistic impetus did not start off with a contestation of national historical identity, but with a contestation between traditionalist Islam and conservative Islam.

TERORISM AND RADICALISM DISCOURSE: GENRE, SENTENCE & WORD LEVEL

At the genre level, news on radicals in *tempo.com* belongs to the category of the 'hard news' genre. Genre is a particular usage of language which "participates in, and constitutes, part of a particular social practice" (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 56). Most CDA researchers interpret genres as 'types' or 'kinds' of texts and 'situational context'. The genre of "hard news" in reporting on radicals, related them to the political situation and the context of the general election which is associated with radical issues and terrorism. The emphasis of CDA lies in "the connection of genres to social situations or activities" (Fairclough, 2001, p 123).

At the sentence level, sentences about terrorism and radicalism become the entrance into the analysis of religious discourse. At this level, the issue of terrorism and radicalism is illustrated with regards to the state ideological approach and religious approach. This is exemplified in the following sentences:

> Jokowi-Ma'ruf will increase integrated efforts to tackle **terrorism**, starting from increasing understanding of **state ideology** to reduce **radicalism**.   (*Sindonews.com*, January 18, 2019)

> Resolving the problem of **terrorism** through **religious** approaches and **army investment.**
> (*Tempo.co,* January 18, 2019)

Furthermore, power relations were found between the candidates and the state apparatuses or the agent of the state such as the police. This is especially true in sentences and discourses about terrorism and radicalism.

> **Jokowi's policies** have supported the performance of the **police** in dealing with **terrorism**.
> (*Sindonews.com,* January 18, 2019)

> **The police** are still predicting that **terrorism and radicalism** remain the potential to become a major disruption to public security and order in 2019.   (*Sindonews.com*, 18 January 2019)

Moreover, power articulation in populist discourse in online news can be seen via Ma'ruf Amin's speech in the first turn of the presidential debate:

> Therefore, his method has **radical**ized him. If it is because of a **deviant religious understanding**, then they have to be doctrinated, it is how we correct his **deviant religious understanding**.   (*Tempo.co,* January 18, 2019)

At the word level, two key concepts that function as a power relation in the populist discourse on religion is the word *radikal*/radical and *suatu paham keagamaan yang menyimpang*/a deviant religious doctrine. Between the two key concepts, word *radikal/*radical is the main resonance. This is due to the fact that in the Indonesian context, the word *radikal/*radical had undergone a deconstruction of meaning along with the occurring of contestation of power. On the contrary, within the context of the 2019 presidential election, the deconstruction of the word '*radikal/*radical*'* has a broad scope of meaning: starting from '*radikal/*radical*'* as being associated with an excessively defensive attitude (in the context of religious conservatism), up to '*radikal/*radical*'* defined as destructive as used in the context of terrorism. The word '*radikal/*radical*'* also has a fluid connotation. For instance, for Nahdlatul Ulama, the word '*radikal/*radical' has a negative connotation because of their colloquial usage of word ''*radikal/*radical*'* to mark those who have religious commitment against the Republic of Indonesia. However, for conservative Islamic groups, the word '*radikal/*radical' is a signifier and recognition from 'the others,' or Nahdlatul Ulama, or any pro-incumbent citizens. The conservative Islamic groups consider the word '*radikal/*radical*'* as having a positive connotation in the sense of religious totality.

Another key concept mentioned above, "*suatu paham keagamaan yang menyimpang"/* deviant religious understanding, sets the demarcation line between 'the people' and 'the others' of incumbent's version. Accordingly, *paham keagamaan yang menyimpang*/deviant religious understanding and *meluruskan*/to straighten are expressions of the people's will of power towards the others. Aspects of nationalism in populist discourse often overlap, and as a consequence, the practice of populism is always overshadowed by exclusively nationalist-based attitudes (Caiani & Kröll, 2017). This, of course, stands in contrast to the Indonesian case. Although anti-foreign sentiment is observed in Indonesia, their emergence is not solely

due to extreme nationalism. It is instead a result of the extension of religious claims. The element in populism depends on the political opportunity and discursive opportunity (Engesser, et al, 2017). Political opportunity refers to the political system and the configuration of the elites' position of power in a certain country, whereas discursive opportunity refers to discourses that are rooted in a nation's historical and cultural contexts. In other words, the political structure of populism is established based on the power structure of the elite and the historical or cultural features of the people. In the context of the findings of this study, religious discourse is a discourse rooted in the historical and cultural context of Indonesia, which is the people. The power relation in religious discourse can also be seen from the discourse about radicals that are spread in online news and social media, such as the findings of the data that have been described above.

There are at least three approaches from this populism political structure, namely: (1) discursive, that is, a unification of a homogenous aspiration from a heterogeneous society (Laclau, 2005); (2) ideational, i.e. it emphasizes rhetoric, ideas, and maneuvers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017); (3) Multiclass/organizational, i.e. based on structural political economy (Hadiz & Robinson, 2017). Each approach influences the orientation of populist communication. Communication orientation is the construction of problem, preposition of resolving the problem, and the call to conduct certain action developed by the populist actor for the unsullied public (Caiani & Kröll, 2017). For instance, when Prabowo says:

> A lot of **infrastructures** are done in a hurry. This has resulted in many **inefficient infrastructure projects**, which have losses and are even very difficult to pay, so this is the **problem with infrastructure**, it must be for the people**, not the people for infrastructure**, but cannot be used.   (*Kompas.com,* February 14, 2019)

INFRASTRUCTURE DISCOURSE: GENRE, SENTENCE & WORD LEVEL

At the genre level, news about infrastructure on *Kompas.com* is categorized as a hard news genre. In reporting on infrastructure, *Kompas.com* provides both forms of 'hard news' and 'soft news' genres. Hard news about infrastructure in *kompas.com* has information directly disseminated to the public and in the form of straight news. Meanwhile, soft news about infrastructure is packaged in the form of entertainment and human-interest news. (Rolnicki, Tate & Taylor, 2008). At the sentence level, the dominant and noticeable topics, themes, and sentences of conversations on social media were about infrastructure acceleration, infrastructure advancement, infrastructure development, infrastructure not in favor of the people, toll road, land acquisition conflicts, costly infrastructure, and budget efficiency (See table 3, description of themes and specifics on online news). The incumbent and the opposition had different definitions of infrastructure. To the opposition, infrastructure is defined as rural economic development, including farmers' and fishermen's economy. As an example, the following statement is from the opposition team:

> Dian Fatwa, Prabowo's campaign team (Badan Pemenangan Nasional – BPN) member, stated that the infrastructure she meant are **infrastructures that develop rural economy, small scale economy, farmer's economy, and fisherman's economy.**   (tempo.co, January 23, 2019)

In addition, the narrative and discourse on infrastructure constructed are referred to as a narrative of infrastructure that is efficient, people-centric, cheap, does not become a burden to the state, and built for the people (Refer Table 1 and 2).

"there are numerous **inefficient infrastructure** projects that are at a loss and are even very difficult to pay, so this is the problem, **infrastructure should be for the people, not the people for infrastructure**".   (*Kompas.com,* February 17, 2019)

According to Ahmad Riza Patria, **the costly toll road** tariff indicates that **infrastructures** were built without a comprehensive economic consideration so there is no multiplier effect.
(*tempo.co.id,* February 15, 2019)

In the contestation on social media and online news, the incumbent continuously builds hegemonic discourse about infrastructure. This is because it highlighted the incumbent's work outcomes and achievements during his first term, and it is considered as one of the incumbent's strong points in gaining sympathy and supports from the voters.

The incumbent, for instance, said that he will convey the government's achievements, in **food, energy, infrastructure. Concerning infrastructure**, we stated what has been done. Concerning the issue of **energy** also I will convey what we are doing. **Food**, and the data we have will be conveyed," he said.   (*sindonews.com,* April 17, 2019)

The incumbent is leading in the **infrastructure sector**, as well as in the natural resource segment. The reason is that the incumbent was able to construct 3,432 kilometers of national road and 941 kilometers of **toll road**.   (*Tempo.co,* February 13, 2019)

Discourse on *infrastruktur untuk rakyat, bukan rakyat untuk infrastruktur*/'infrastructure for the people, not the people for infrastructure' prevails here. At the word level, the word *rakyat*/the people in political campaigns may be defined as a group in a certain social class, but it could also be regarded as a group affiliated to one of the presidential candidates. Such class disconnectedness would lead to a different story if it were not isolated from discourses of text relating to word of *infrastruktur*/infrastructure, such as: word *tenaga kerja*/labour and *lapangan kerja/*employment field. For example, if it were mixed with issues on social media about foreign labour, or dominance of foreigners over economic circulation in Indonesia. The word *rakyat*/the people that was initially defined within the limit of a group of particular social class, may change definition into national identity or religious identity on account of discourses. This can be illustrated in Table 4 below. The category is based on the elaboration of findings on "the people" and "the elite" domains, word, texts, sentence, themes, sub-themes, and discourses.

TABLE 4. Discursive Opportunity Structure between Jokowi and Prabowo

		Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin	Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno
Political opportunity structure		-Nationalist -Incumbent	-Nationalist -Opposition
Mass Based Discursive opportunity structure	The Elite's Domain	-Traditionalist Islam -Infrastructure Acceleration -Environment -Energy & Food -Terrorism	-Conservative Islam -Anti Import -Anti Foreign -Energy & Food -Strengthened Security -Infrastructure is not in favor of the people
	The People's Domain	-Infrastructure Advancement -Radicalism -State Integrity (NKRI)	- Islam's Triumph -Anti China -Economic exclusion
Ethos Persona		Technocratic quasi Nationalist-Religious	Patriotic quasi Nationalist

Table 4 illustrates the structure of populism of both candidates. For Jokowi-Ma'ruf 'the people' refers to Islamic traditionalists and secular citizens. Both candidates have different segmentation. To generate political resonance, both candidates have to comprehend the discursive opportunity and political opportunity. Jokowi-Ma'ruf perpetrates 'infrastructure acceleration', 'environment', 'energy and food', and 'terrorism' as main discursive points to emphasize the political imagination of progressiveness, pro-establishment, and nationalism. In contrast, Prabowo-Sandi aims to illuminate the imagination of anti-establishment, nation-centrist and sovereignty by employing anti-import, anti-foreign, energy and food sovereignty, and national security as a discursive catalyst. Further, Prabowo-Sandi pointed out the idea of 'infrastructure not in favor of the people' to provide alternative discourse and to fight the established discursive forces of the incumbents.

The fluidity of populism emerged at the intersection of one text over another. The characteristic of populism as fluid means that key concepts can be interpreted differently or arbitrarily by each candidature in a certain political opportunity structure. For example, Jokowi-Ma'ruf defines 'the people' as consisting of Islamic Traditionalists, while Prabowo-Sandi sets out the notion of 'the people' as Islamic Conservatism. Meanwhile, the secular citizens are engaged in the 'national' discursive offered by both candidates. Jokowi-Ma'ruf settles 'nationality' on a progressive and technocratic-future oriented discursive account. While Prabowo-Sandi refers to 'nationality' as a total sovereign without foreign aid. Such discursive and political configuration provides people with a whole set of alternative junctions to grasp and comprehend a particular text, as well as demonstrated by the word *radikal/*radical.

The discursive contestation of the two candidates is the result of their imagined stance as people centrist leaders. Although, it is undeniable that such stance is conflicted with each other due to their arbitrary definition of 'the people.' To extend the expression 'the general will of the people,' both candidates inscribed their discourse in a national, religious and pro-class escalation as the main populist discursive framework. For instance, the discourse about infrastructure for the people. The two candidates defined "the people" in different ways. Inside the sub-theme, Prabowo uses the discourse related to "infrastructure costly" and "budget efficiency" in relation to the people. Moreover, toll road construction is interpreted as a struggle for the people. The incumbent, Jokowi, on the other hand, relegated the role of the people merely as the benefactors of his development program.

Texts and discourses on infrastructure, food, energy, and religion are positioned as a contestation tool in Indonesia's 2019 presidential elections. However, these texts and discourses are not only in the concerns of the presidential election but also in the interest of the ideology of new developmentalism and they tend to negate marginalized people's discourse. Developmentalism is both a thought and ideology, which makes development a strategy to achieve economic prosperity. The questions that have arisen from this include - the development for whom? Is it micro or macroeconomic? And, Is the development for the country, market, or people?

CONCLUSION

In Indonesia's 2019 presidential election, political discourse and populist discourse are created by outstanding coverage by social media and amplified by online news. Social media exceed online news in terms of the distribution of discourse regardless of spatial and temporal limitations. The distribution of political discourse, which is disseminated across multiple platforms including twitter, FB, etc., was dominant in the context of discursive consumption for the audiences. It has also taken an important role in determining the spread of the power of both presidential candidates. The use of social media can also intensify the discourse of

populism in a short time. This is due to the emergence of discursive stimulation such as presidential debates and virtual space debates about "infrastructure", "food", "energy" and "religion" discourses. That happens when "the people", "the elite" and "general will" jointly discuss the discourse, eventually turning it into a hegemonic discourse. Besides, the discursive dissemination of key concepts on social media takes political alignments through the role of hashtag. Hashtag sets out the demarcation of a group of people and strengthens the stand of a particular discursive exchange.

Online news did not directly engage in producing populist discourse but echoes the populist discourse by citing politician's populist utterance. The diverse populist backgrounds of the two candidates have led to discursive practices in online news and social media occurring in different political and social structures. The political and discursive opportunities of both candidates affect the way how a particular news is served and consumed by a specific audience. Populist characteristics such as ostracizing others, people centrism, strengthening self-charisma, etc. are merged and inscribed into news as a pervasive discursive site. In contrast to the past research using textual analysis (Sengul, 2019; Kramer 2017, Engesser et al, 2017) or longitudinal discursive research (Hameleers & Vligenthart, 2019; Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019), or discursive research based on media comparison (Blasnig et al, 2018), or discursive trajectory forecasting (Zappetini & Krzyżanowski, 2019), in which populist contents in various online media or offline media within or without specific periods were addressed by assessing their populist quality, the finding of this research points out that the characteristic of populism lurks in the fluidity of populist discourse spread across social media coverage and amplified by online news. This research contributes by pointing out how the fluid characteristic of populism and the omnipresent digital media stand as the current political challenge. The present research is limited to a small set of keywords in a particular political context. The study has a number of limitations of which among them is that it has not examined the political economy of online news including the ownership of the online news agencies. Further research on new media, discourse, and politics can be done in other perspectives such as the political economy of new media, including structuration and spatialization of online news in a political context.

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