Revealing the Propaganda of Communication between The Islamic Fundamentalism Activists of the Middle East and Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This study reviews issues mainly related to propaganda strategies through media and the transmission of messages sustaining the Islamic fundamentalism activists' agenda in the Middle East and Indonesia. Media plays a significant role in supporting the Muslim fundamentalists' activities in both the Middle Eastern regional areas to the Asiatic countries, including Indonesia. This is an attempt to discover the underlying psycho-religious-social factors in the Islamic group of Radical-Fundamentalist Movements. This is completed by using a technical model of inductive thinking through exposing the collected data and the previous study results to draw general conclusion under the socio-religious psychology perspective of Peter Neumann as the analytical approach to reveal common underlying factors of people committing radical acts. The phenomenon of radical terrorist trips from the Middle Eastern countries to Indonesia, the occurring radicalization both in different regional areas has never undergone linear process, even tend to be a complex phenomenon. Through Internet media propaganda, Islamic radical-fundamentalist groups have been able to draw the sympathy of Muslims from various countries to jointly carry out *jihad*. Fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, proved to be no longer just local movements in Iraq and Syria, but have turned to be transnational movements. In the process of radicalization, the internet successfully facilitates the Muslim fundamentalist groups to transmitting and developing various narratives on religious life enjoyment under the auspices of the *Khilafah* which apply a single Islamic law-based state, in addition to position the Western countries as the real enemy to be fought.

Keywords: *Al-Qaeda, radical fundamentalists, the Middle Eastern, Indonesia, propaganda.*

INTRODUCTION

Recently in Indonesia, there have been a growing number of radical issues among which are generally inspired by radical fundamentalist groups of organizations claiming themselves al-Qaeda and ISIS, both of which are always a global issue. The emergence of this group is a format of global resistance of Islamic radical groups against world injustice. This is linked to the discriminatory policies of the world leaders concerning the social and humanitarian crisis in Palestine, socioeconomic disparities in Muslim countries and even the expansion of Western cultures are perceived as a greater destructive influence against the Islamic values such as hedonism and materialism. The Muslim world leaders seem to be powerless and subservient to the West. Such an issue quickly spread throughout the world through virtual networks, social media, internet mail and even all forms of electronic information media, is a concrete tool in coordinating and transmitting messages of resistance not only happened in Islamic countries but in Western countries as well, which was a result of the policies of those countries provide protection to resistance groups that flee from their respective countries (Parolin, 2010, p.3).

The terms such as 'fundamentalist Islam' or 'militant Islam' have been mostly feeling as the threats to the West, which has been occurring for nearly two decades ago. Initially, Ayatollah Khomeini's call to the United States as The Great Satan, the shout of

'Death to America!', The condemnation of Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses, and Saddam Hussein's call for *jihad* against foreign infidels have reinforced the image of Islam as a militant, expansionist, anti-American, and rigorously attempt to fight against the West. Thus, 'fundamentalist Islam' is often regarded as the greatest threat to the regional stability of the Middle East in particular and the wider Western interests in the Islamic world (Pipes, 1986). The term "Islamic fundamentalism" has been raised by the press against contemporary Islamic awakening movements such as Hamas, Hizbullah, *al-Ikhwanul Muslimin*, Islamic congregation, and *Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islamy*. The term 'fundamentalism' was allegedly expressed by mass media against the contemporary Islamic awakening movements, in addition to aims at providing a 'negative' picture of their various activities, and bringing down their 'credibility' to the world's attention (Primamorista, 1999).

The bias between news and propaganda is quite vulnerable to hit society in today's information age. It is gaining momentum as the internet becomes easier and cheaper to access the public. Harold D. Lasswell (cited in Wilcox, 2005) mentions that propaganda is merely about the control of opinions which is created through meaningful symbols, or conveyed a concrete and accurate opinions, through story, image, or other forms which commonly used in social communication. Lasswell adds that propaganda is a technique for influencing human activities by manipulating representations.

Arendt's (1995) conception of the function of propaganda, specifically placed the term in the context of a totalitarian state, as designated by the Nazi Hitler and Stalin's governments in the Soviet Union. For Arendt (1995) it is crystal clear that propaganda holds political function in maintaining a power, since propaganda and terror are carried out in turn; if propaganda has been deemed ineffective, then the function of terror is more advanced, while propaganda will be very successful if it being placed within the framework of an already atomized society, alienated from other groups of society, then the constantly exhaling messages may shake beliefs, and making the individual have no strong point of view about anything, and tend to believe in what is being said in the propaganda messages (Arendt, 1995).

In the article "The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremist", Bruce Hoffman (2006) tries to explain the impact of Internet use by radical groups in disseminating information of radicalism. The Internet provides an effective means for radical groups to promote "global dialectics" where awakening, awareness, activism and radicalism can be stimulated at the local level and mobilization to a wider process through protests and dissent. Dorothy E. Denning of Georgetown University once said, "the radicalists can optimally reach each other by using the internet to promote radicalism agenda. Members and followers can come from different geographical regions on the internet and they can seek to influence foreign policy anywhere in the world" (Hoffman, 2006).

Many relevant studies of cross-perspective propaganda have been linked to typical means of communication associated with propaganda, such as propaganda in the domain of war (Scriver, 2015), Propaganda and Public Relations (Scenne & More, 2015), Propaganda and Government Policy (Gelders & Ihlen, 2010; White & Radic, 2014), Propaganda and Mass Media (Myers, 2015). Propaganda in the religious domain with its relation to extremism (Galloway, 2016; Robinson, 2017), propaganda of extremists through social networks (Ferrara, 2017). This study highlights the Islamic fundamentalists propaganda strategy in controlling mass communication to launch and promote radical groups' agenda to various parts of the world, particularly between the Middle East and

Indonesia. The underlying reasons in conducting this study have been since the media, especially the internet plays a significant role in sustaining the fundamentalists' actions in preventing them from the government's control.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a descriptive-qualitative approach to review the texts of news from literature studies related to propaganda strategies and the transmission of messages of radical fundamentalists' agenda in the Middle East and Indonesia. This study has attempted to discover the underlying psycho-religious-social factors of the Islamic group of Radical-Fundamentalist Movements. This article is completed and written by using a technical model of inductive thinking through exposing the collected data and the previous study results to draw general conclusions under the socio-religious psychology perspective of Peter Neumann as the analytical approach to reveal common underlying factors bridging out the radical actions both which happening in the Asiatic regional especially Indonesia and Middle Eastern countries.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

a) Fundamentalism and Terrorism

There are three theories about terrorism in the Islamic world (Hellmich, 2005). First, terrorism in the Islamic world is not driven by an ideology. This is the conclusion of the Pentagon intelligence team. Second, terrorism in the Islamic world is underlined by an ideology, the so called Wahhabism (Hellmich, 2008). Wahhabism is used as a terrorist ideology in its most radical and militant interpretation (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006), derived from the revolutionary thinking of the main figures of *Salafi-Jihadi*. Third, terrorism in the Islamic world misuses religion and is wrong in interpreting the Qur'an (Hellmich, 2008). The second and third theories are more or less the same, assuming that terrorism is based on a false ideology. The latter two theories called vertical approaches (Roy, 2008).

The linkage between the ideology of Salafi-Jihadi and terrorism, according to Hellmich (2008), is believed by researchers such as Stephen Schwartz who argues that terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and his followers are Wahabi followers, puritanical Islamic variants, extreme Islamic-Fascist sect and intolerant (Hellmich, 2008). Other researchers, such as Speckhard & Akhmedova (2006), argue that Wahhabism is used as a terrorist ideology, in its most radical and militant interpretations, even in Russia the Wahabi word is synonymous with terrorists (Speckhard & Akmedova, 2006).

Furthermore, Wiktorowicz and Kaltner (2003), believes that at the level of doctrine, the terrorist ideology comes from within Islamic extremism in general and specifically from the ideological content of revolutionary thinking of the main figures of the Salafi-Jihadi (Wiktorowicz & Kaltner, 2003). The radical Salafi movement emphasizes the importance of violent methods of enforcing Islam. This radical Salafi group argues that it is an obligation in Islam to bring down leaders who do not properly follow and apply Islam. This Salafi group is known as the *jihadi* group. They do not reject other methods, such as *da'wah*, religious advice, and nonviolence, but instead more prefer the violence (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006).

b) Media and the Muslim Fundamentalist Message Transmission

Addressing the ideological, doctrinal, and varying ideological, terrorist roots of terrorism requires a variety of ways involving multiple roles of the various elements of the relevant national forces. Elements of national strength which, should synergize each other in interpreting texts, printing, publishers, media, both print or online and others. Each move in the field of their own experts, which is undertaken to establish a comprehensive integral strength, without it, then, the eradication of terrorism, both from within and from abroad remains difficult to be realized in the concept of asymmetrical warfare (Thornton, 2007).

It is indeed significant, the important role of information in the religious fundamentalist movements, which is in line with a popular proverb by Alvin Toffler that "whoever controls the information will dominate the world in *terra incognita* (unknown territory). The proverb is reinforced by the technological advances of increasingly crucial and broadly impacted and used as a force (Arreguin-Toft, 2001).

Gabriel Weimann in "The New Terror on the Internet: The New Challenges" found that in 1998 on the internet it was estimated that there were only 12 terrorist group sites. But in 2003 it reached 2,650 sites of terrorist groups, and by 2014 there were more than 9,800 sites (Weimann, 2016). From the fact of the development of such internet sites, the patterns that terrorist groups mostly do today as described by Agus Surya Bakti (2016) is the spread of ideology through website facilities; utilization of interaction and communication media features such as forums and chat rooms, as well as the use of interactive propaganda media such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Weimann's findings, followed by in-depth research by Terrorism Experts and Internet Maura Conway (2006) published in "Terrorist Use of the Internet and Fighting Back". Conway (2006) in his findings notes that there are five things that are most significant in understanding how terrorist groups use the Internet for political purposes: Information provision, financing, networking, recruitment, and information gathering. Thus, the internet does not merely serve as a propaganda medium, but further becomes an instrument of action within terrorism itself.

The link between terrorism and the Internet, as the research report published by RAND Institute found that the Internet is in line with acts of terrorism that depart from five important hypotheses, among others: *first*, the internet creates more opportunities for its users to become radical; *second*, the Internet serves as an "echo chamber" in which individuals can find supporters for their ideas and can be disseminated to other individuals who share the same idea; *third*, the Internet can accelerate with the process of radicalization; *fourth*, the Internet embodies the process of radicalization without the need for physical contact, and the fifth, the Internet increases the chance to self-radicalizion.

Based on various research above, matters related to how the internet and terrorists play a significant role in making users become radical to be interesting to study. This is certainly motivated by the widespread use of the internet amid the flow of modernism, especially among the young generations. We literally cannot turn a blind eye, when a group of young people become part of a global terrorist network group because of their expertise in operating the internet.

c)   The Propaganda of Information through Social Media

The new model of terrorism propaganda through radicalization on the internet using social media as al-Qaeda did, for example, spawned a new challenge to the state security model. The state is also required to manouver in different methods of handling in order to defend

the internet from terrorist propaganda. The writer identifies that the online propaganda and recruitment systems have been strategically carried out by terrorist groups since the event of 9/11 (Yang Hui, 2010; Alarid, 2013; Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). This view at least gave birth to a term "online radicalization" sticking out to the public. Mass media and terrorists share the same interests, terrorists make up and utilize their media strategies, while on the other hand, the media places their important roles providing a way for the terrorist groups' activities. Terrorist and media relations are part of the general conception of information operations that include: agitation, propaganda, indoctrination, and internal and external focus of terrorist information operations.

Online radicalization by definition is the process by which individuals through online activities interact using various internet facilities, to accept the perception that violence is the right method to resolve social and political conflicts (Peresin, 2014). Internet facilities in social media forms where social networking, websites / blogs and means of personal communication and groups such as chat rooms become effective tools for fundamentalists in radicalizing internet users. Terrorist groups recognize that the role of information-related media are crucial in their struggle against hegemony and universalization (Mubah, 2012). A series of radical activities are often carried out through the media, inter alia acts or intrusions or attacks that can damage or harm everything, thus threatening the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system and information through propaganda and other forms. Propaganda through mass media has been recognized as an effective force and can be exploited by terrorist groups as a force in spreading the message of their political struggle (Hutchinson, 2001).

Muwaffaq Al-Jamal, Head of Hizbullah Information Center said that information is one of the most important weapons and inseparable parts of any war or battle with the enemy. This was reinforced by Abd's statement. Al-Rahman al-Rashid, al-Qaeda Spokesman that his group has succeeded in disseminating the significance of 911 attacks around the world. The strongest reason for the use of mass media in achieving the objectives and interests of terrorist groups is to manage the interpretation of their attacks, their meaning and symbolism, both in disseminating information, the reporting of policies and strategies, as well as the steps taken by the leaders of the terrorist groups and introducing the goals and motives which they do.

Alarid (2013) discusses the findings of the Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) where the Internet has facilitated the vital dialogue between extreme ideas and deep curiosity thinking to occupy a virtual space where such real-world infiltration is difficult. In the case of post-Iraq, for example, chat rooms functioned to replace mosques and community centers, to coffee as a recruitment space for militants. In addition to social media, the Internet also facilitates the means of distributing jihad materials in the form of magazines, such as Inspire magazine, Al Qaeda's online magazine. Even marathon bombers in Boston in 2013 Tamerlan and Dzohkar Tsarnaev's brothers actually mention that they got the science from Inspire magazine in making bombs History Saved (TheWeek.co.uk, 2013).

The terrorist group's awareness of the mass media usage strategy largely determines their success in carrying out missions, in addition to improving group morale, in addition to being a multi-level strategy for dealing with and obtaining multi-aided supporters simultaneously with the goal of merging members. The recruitment of terrorist members is directed at the sympathizers and potential of radicalism through indoctrination process and also done with IT experts (Information Technology) (Denning, 2001), which

plays a role in cyberterrorism (Weimann, 2004), hacktivism, and propaganda to anticipate and counteract threats and information attacks. The propaganda carried out by terrorists through the mass media is fruitful, proving the rise of radicalism's sentiments towards the policies of the United States (US) and its allies around the world. Cyber-terrorism is one of the battle arenas that are also massive, the battle for information, media, values, ideas and beliefs. Through this media group of terror can impressively use the internet as a means of promotion, fundraising, socialization, recruitment, counter-opinion or framing issues. It is at this point that security analysts and researchers in the field of terrorism must be aware of this phenomenon that fundamentalist groups are no longer the same as the traditional terror groups that previously existed, they have all been transformed in the rapid progress in this information age. Terrorist followers continue to grow and flourish, that create resistance continuously followed after the WTC attack, therefore, the terrorist groups enable to represent a new trend in the privatization of terrorism in the presence of mass media (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

d) The Internet and Islamic Fundamentalism Agenda (a Case from al-Qaeda)

Al-Qaeda quickly adopted the use of the internet as the best means to deliver to the public. The al-Neda website, which al-Qaeda has started since 2002, published an analysis of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, with the comments given by al-Qaeda spokesmen about al-Qaeda's military operations, explaining how the al-Qaeda's struggle would later be beneficial for the *ummah* (global Muslim community) by fighting against the United States and Israel and secular governments. Regarding the symbolic messages contained in al-Qaeda sites, Michael Scheuer further explained, "reinforces Osama Bin Laden's message about Al Qaeda's aims and priorities: as much jihadist appeal to Muslim audiences worldwide" (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

According to a report in 2004 by the US Justice and Treasury Department (cited in, Samuel Jhon, 2015) al-Qaeda has been using "a dead drop" a typical espionage communication technique adapted to online media, especially through email. A selected number of al-Qaeda members are assigned a username and password to an email account e.g. yahoomail.com. Then a person will write a message, but he does not send the message to another email account but save it in draft and then logout from the email account. And then, other people from different places will access the email account, read it in draft, then shall give new message again in the draft or it can also be deleted. Messages that were never sent shall never have a record of ISP (Internet Servives Provider), which then cannot be tracked the presence in email histories (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

The Global Islamic Media Front, an al-Qaeda-affiliated media, focuses on recruitment targets and sympathizers living in European countries, being one of the providers of online video services featuring videos on firing strategies, launching grenade rockets, launching missiles, blasting cars, kidnapping hostages and other war tactics. In addition to videos about war tactics, al-Qaeda also reproduces jihadist appeals to its sympathizers. The online magazine *Sawt al-Jihad* (the Voice of Jihad) which appeared in 2004 was oriented to promote the mujahideens' activities (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote a message to al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawy and declared, "we are in the middle of a war, and most of this war is in a media battle. We are at a media battle of the hearts and minds of the *ummah*". Zawahiri's media battle was aimed at maintaining Al Qaeda's global presence amid public attention, both

when al Qaeda's activities are in improved condition and when conditions are declining. Osama bin Laden established the Al-Qaeda Media Department in 1988 as part of al-Qaeda's original organizational structure. The original purpose of this department was to encourage and support the struggle of the mujahideen in Afghanistan who fought against the invasion of the Soviet Union. After that al-Qaeda changed its message into a call for resistance against Israel, the United States and a number of government regimes in Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

Then al-Qaeda builds their media production house called as-Sahab (the Cloud), which is run through a complex mechanism and procedure. The videos of Osama bin Laden's attitudes, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other al-Qaeda spokesmen were recorded at an alien and remote location. It was then delivered by a courier who took it to a safe place to upload it on the internet and then sent the video to as-Sahab's production house, where the video was edited, granted language and added graphical features. As Sahab has used high quality electronic equipment (including Sony Vaio laptops) and also used high quality security software (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

The final product of the video is then stored on a flash which is then brought by courier to internet cafes and then uploaded on various sites affiliated to al-Qaeda. Then the links from the addresses of these sites will be disseminated through discussion forums and chat rooms, then the members of al-Qaeda will copy and distribute the video. This distribution system has been in use since 2005, used since al-Qaeda has stopped sending video to Al Jazeera media and other news media, which will be editing this video according to media needs, which al-Qaeda considers eliminating important messages that should display in the video (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

The Internet has become a strategic means for al-Qaeda in spreading its political messages. By using online media, al-Qaeda can perform mass operations, disseminate its products and can massively spread ideas with less risk and cost. An al-Qaeda spokesman later described the internet as "al-Qaeda University of Jihad Studies". The "university" then offers a variety of educational tools that reflect the theory put forward by al-Qaeda thinkers Abu Mus'ab al-Sury, where al-Qaeda thought should be like a global company that can reach any corner of the world (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

Al-Sury in his book "The Global Islamic Resistance Call (2005)" issued a *fatwa* that instead of presenting recruiters coming to Afghanistan or elsewhere where al-Qaeda is based, "it becomes very important to transfer training to every home, in each group and at each area in the Muslim country bases". Al-Sury then emphasized, "the spread of culture and military readiness and training use all means, especially massive deployment over the internet" (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

In 2008, an al-Qaeda-affiliated online discussion forum launched an article on The Art of Recruitment, which provides recommendations on planned methods of planting radical religious values, which can then generate confidence in the aggressive jihad spirit. This recruitment process is designed to maintain quality and protect the security of the organization. This process is then repeated again through sites affiliated to al-Qaeda. It also provides guidance to protect members and cover the IP address of the computer or laptop used, how to use the proxy server, and various other ways to hide the identity online (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

Members of the radical forum are also aware that their online activities have been overseen by many intelligence agencies, security forces and organizations that oversee online terrorism networks. In 2008, via an al-Qaeda website published an article "Know Your Enemy from Monitoring and Analysis Websites", which specifically describes the site of translation, investigation sites, research projects, news coverage, and states that these sites are tools and media which the enemy has. Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni radical Imam from the United States, stated, "the only one who spends the money and time to translate the jihad literature is the intelligence agencies of the Western countries" (Seib & Janbek, 2001).

e) Towards the Roles of Media in the Islamic Radical Project Dissemination (Indonesian Context)

In July 2010, the President of Republic of Indonesia signed the Presidential Regulation no. 46/2010 and established the National Agency for Combating Terrorism '*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*' (BNPT). The agency's main function is to tackle terrorism that includes prevention, protection, deradicalisation, enforcement, and design of national preparedness. Associated with the function of deradicalisation, the agency engages in activities against radical propaganda ideology, the prevention of radical ideology, implementation of re-education and re-socialization programs (BNPT, 2018). Since the founding of BNPT a number of parties have asked the Ministry of Communications and Information (Kominfo) to close the websites spreading the teachings of radicalism. Director of Deradicalization of BNPT, Irfan Idris revealed efforts deradicalization through internet communication media has been implemented despite the facts the actions confront various difficulties (Republika, 2015). However, the extent to which Internet sites support and disseminate radical teachings there have been undertaken of some related researches.

Lim (2005), and Yang Hui (2010). Lim (2005) examines the role of the Internet in spreading radical Islam. The focus of his research is the use of the Internet by *Laskar Jihad* and radical groups in spreading radical Islamism and anti-American sentiment. Yang Hui examined 14 Indonesian websites including Arrahmah. Yang Hui (2010) saw the successful development of internet media, the influence and achievements on the radical websites spread in Indonesia and abroad. His research also highlighted the operations and narratives built by the 14 websites. What he highlighted was the narrative of *jihad* or the news about the Islamic struggle in both the international world and Indonesia.

As for the benefits gained by terrorists in using the media such as in operating the Internet the fundamentalists do not need expensive, low risk and facilitate the promotion in showing themselves and their movements, and their goals in terms of funding. The emphasis on terrorist funding has led to terrorist thinking about new sources of funding in an age of globalization that creates opportunities for their illicit activities. The UN says that terrorists have annual revenues of up to billions of dollars from various criminal activities, including through mass media.

In the context of Indonesia, the issue of financing certain terrorist groups for arms purchases, military training, and other needs of terrorist groups are also committed through single method which is electronic media, the internet of cyber *fa'i* (robbery through cyberspace) by hacking the investment site online speed line which managed to raise funds of 7 Billion Rupias (Mbai, 2014), by one member of a terrorist group named Rizki for the benefit of terrorist groups in Poso, despite being succeeded by the security forces. This proves that in terrorist financing, terrorist groups are also heavily dependent on the media.

Commissariat General of Usman Nasution at a time when he was the head of the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) emphasized the increasing role of social media that serves as a means of ISIS dissemination. It was affirmed that there were more than 10 groups in Indonesia expressing support for ISIS. Through social media, ISIS groups, in the process of recruiting people to be sent to Syria, spreading propaganda, as well as raising financial aid. The potential use of cyberspace as a space of radicalist-terrorist ideology of propaganda is what the Government must quickly respond to by counterterrorism policy maneuvers.

The Head Chief of BNPT Suhardi Alius in his presentation at the International Exhibition Forum of 7th Edition Homeland Security in Singapore also acknowledged the phenomenon of the creation of radical ideological viruses on the internet, especially among the younger generation. Therefore, according to him needed special attention to the world may as a container of information and communication dissemination in the modern world. In addition, researchers from *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (LIPI) 'the Indonesian Institute of Sciences' holds an event "Discussing the Pattern of Radical Movement in Indonesia" even revealed findings among young Indonesians radicalized in an ideological and increasingly intolerant. In the discussion, it was conveyed that the spread of radicalism and the recruitment of terrorists also occurred through social media, where hard and radical ideas from terrorist network networks were spread massively via the internet.

f) The scheme of the developed factors of radicalization (Middle East to Indonesia)

ISIS radical propaganda is launched through various social media instruments. Through such propaganda, ISIS has been especially able to attract Muslim sympathizers from various countries to conduct jihad. Thus, ISIS is no longer just a local movement in Iraq and Syria, but has become a transnational movement. The development of the ISIS group in a transnational movement cannot be separated from its ability to effectively use information and communication technology via the internet (Berger, 2014). Nevertheless, despite the debate about ISIS's emergence in Indonesia, the fact is that ISIS networks and sympathizers have spread to various countries where virtual media has become a bridge of communication among their community members. Various understandings of groups seeking to implement Islamic law or establish Islamic State have been existing for a long period of time. Similarly, Liow (2004) in his article in 'Foreign Affairs' attempted to analyze some of the underlying factors of why the ISIS ideology gained a lot of sympathizers from Southeast Asian Muslim societies, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, one of which is because the Muslims in Indonesia suspect a parallel relationship between ISIS's missions with "the prophecy" in Islam that the world will ultimately stand in the *Khilafah ala Minhaj Nubuwwah* or Islamic Caliphate along with the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the Arabian Peninsula. This in turn triggered the rise of radicalism in Indonesia, along with changes in social and political order, in particular the existence of social media has played a significant role in advocating and supporting the state's enforcement groups, and even those committed in radical ways.

In line with the phenomenon of radical terrorist trips from the Middle East to Indonesia, it can be understood that the process of radicalization both in the Middle East and in Indonesia is not always linear, even tend to be complex. An expert on terror such as Professor Peter Neumann, renowned lecturer at King's College, London, believes that radical violence is actually shaped, not natural. That is, radicalism is influenced by many factors,

and not just by birth (Wahid Foundation, 2018, p. 5-6). Neumann further summed up his views after conducting research on the radicalism movement and its handling efforts in 15 countries. According to the following five stages can lead to someone affected by radicalism.

VIOLENCE
- Desire for revenge
- 'Brutalisation' and armed conflict

GRIEVANCES
- Cause 'crisis' or 'cognitive opening'
- Prompt questions and 'seeking'

IDEAS
- Identity 'scapegoat'
- Provide ideological 'project'

PEOPLE
- Love, Commitment, Trust
- Fear, Pressure, Social Obligation

NEEDS
- Power, Adventure, Belonging
- Psychological Vulnerability

Chart 1: The scheme of factors affecting people to act and think radically.
Adapted via information on Peter Neumann's Twitter account (Twitter, 7:25 AM - 30 Nov 2017).

Neumann (cited in Wahid Foundation-CSIS, 2018, p.19) exemplified the case of ISIS followers. Generally, they are from a 'mediocre' background in society. They are not identical with religious affairs, even from among themselves feel not yet successful, and socially less sociable. They have an emotional need to have a sense of belonging or engage in something bigger than themselves. It is at this stage that they arrive at the saturation point of a situation where one feels the need to meet the emotional needs of belonging even though they are not accepted by common society.

However, saturation point can never always be synergized with direct indicators causing people to act radically. Injustice can be felt by anyone. The next decision process is other factors such as influential individuals to reinforce the narrative of certain ideological doctrines such as religious figures. Other influences may also come from people who are deemed to have the same fate, which can guide the actions and activities of violence seem ordinary -but just because it inspired the religious arguments to answer their needs. Radical ideologies are perceived to be capable of explaining their sense of injustice by making the 'wrong system' a scapegoat. Their violent actions are nothing but the outcome of indoctrination of "normalizing religion-based violence", a simple process of making violence a neglected issue.

Of course, the above scheme appears to be relevant with recent suicide bombing terrorist action committed at the three places at East Java of Surabaya, Indonesia, May 13, 2018 and a series of terror events the day after. This terror act was allegedly committed by

the *jihadist* fundamentalist network of *Jamaah Anshar Daulah* (JAD), the so called a new generation of radical extremist ISIS groups. This allegation was raised by police because the attack pattern is similar to that used by ISIS. In the attack, JAD brought not only new tactics but also messages to be conveyed on its network. These tactics and messages were conveyed in the involvement of wife and children by Dita Oeprianto and one other family while bombing three churches and Mapolrestabes Surabaya. According to Harits Abu Ulya, terrorism observers from The Community Ideological Islamic Analyst, the involvement of children and wife is committed because the police have started to detect the terrorists' movement of men and women. This pattern was also taken to blur the trail, "Indeed for blurring the action" (Nathaniel, 2018).

Based on the police statement, Dita Oeprianto (suicide bomber in Surabaya May 13, 2018) is an active leader of *Jama'ah Ansharut Daulah* (JAD) of Surabaya. Since November 2017, the police have dropped their claim to JAD as a terrorist group for being the main supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Indonesia. Researchers from the Center for Studies on Terrorism and Social Conflict, Faculty of Psychology, University of Indonesia, Solahudin, emphasized that the process of religious radicalization took place very quickly regardless of the educational status, social status and even one's economic status. In its process, terrorist groups often generate ambition through various narratives about the life enjoyment under the auspices of the *Khilafah* government and fully applying the Islamic Shari'a, in addition to positioning the Western countries as the real enemies who have led the Muslim community unable to carry out their divine duties in peace. In fact, Solahudin said, they also always assert about the end-time prophecy in which Syria has been claimed as the most blessed places in the world.

To cope with the global issues on both the radicalism and acts of Islamic fundamentalists as elaborated in the aforementioned discussions, the Indonesian government and civil society should create a conducive-environment and play an important role in interfering to mass media and societal transformations that are oriented to the public interest. In other words, the mass media must also be able to perform an objective and balanced information distribution function in the midst of accepted pressure. This is also done to anticipate the possibility of an asymmetric threat form which has an impact on the formation of public opinion that leads to negative sentiments, such as those committed by terrorist groups, so as to overthrow or destroy the legitimacy of government that can disrupt the national stability.

CONCLUSION

Media plays a significant role in supporting the Muslim fundamentalism activities in both the Middle East regional areas to the Asiatic, including Indonesia. The existence of media sets up a linking chain regarding the informational transmissions between members of the fundamentalist group, financing, politics, diplomacy, and legitimacy of such groups. In line with the phenomenon of radical terrorist trips from the Middle East to Indonesia, the occurring process of radicalization both in the Middle East and in Indonesia is not always linear, even tend to be complex. This process takes place very quickly regardless of the educational status, social status and even one's economic status. In its process, terrorist groups often generate ambition through various narratives about the life enjoyment under the auspices of the *Khilafah* government and fully applying the Islamic Shari'a, in addition to positioning the Western countries as the obviously real enemies who have led the Muslim

community unable to carry out their divine duties in peace. ISIS radical propaganda is launched through various social media instruments. Through such propaganda, ISIS has been especially able to attract Muslim sympathizers from various countries to conduct jihad. Thus, ISIS is no longer just an isolated local movement in Iraq and Syria, but has turned into a transnational movement.

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