

Portrait of Hate Speech Propagators' Behaviour in Indonesia Twittersphere: A Comparative Virtual Ethnography Study

SUWANDI SUMARTIAS
Padjadjaran University, Indonesia

DWIA ARIES TINA PULUBUHU
Hasanuddin University, Indonesia

ELFITRA
Andalas University, Indonesia

ENY RATNASARI
Tidar University, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Political life in Indonesia today cannot be separated from the social media platform Twitter (X) because it is often used to express opinions freely. Unfortunately, a handful of parties misused the freedom of communication and expression offered by Twitter (X) to spread hate speech. One of the biggest phenomena is "Cebong" and "Kadrun". This research examines the characteristics of hate speech spreaders in the political context of "Cebong" and "Kadrun". This study employed virtual ethnography to interpret the phenomenon of political hate speech on Twitter (X) in May 2022. The hate speech made by "Cebong" and "Kadrun" can be concluded as two hostile political camps. They argued with each other to show their identity as supporters of one of the camps and aimed to bring down the opposing political camp. The tweets made by "Cebong" were dominated by arguments classified as arguments by analogy; meanwhile, "Kadrun" was dominated by discovery arguments: arguments from cause to effect. The manipulation strategy carried out by "Cebong" is dominated by connotations, and "Kadrun" is dominated by specific warrants and connotations. The fallacy expressed by "Cebong" is dominated by persuasive definitions; meanwhile, "Kadrun" is dominated by hasty generalizations. These findings could be suggestions for creating a healthier ecosystem in the digital public sphere in Indonesia. Twitter (X) users should be more aware of reporting content that indicates hate speech. By knowing the characteristics of hate speech and the characteristics of hate speech spreaders, Twitter users can stop the spread of hate speech.

Keywords: *Cebong, Kadrun, hate speech, propagators, Twitter.*

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of hate speech is complex (Banks, 2010; Millar, 2019; Paz et al., 2020). The term hate speech in Indonesia was only heard in 2015 and became more widely heard in 2017. At that time, various cases of hate speech were related to the political context (Lim, 2017, 2023). In Indonesia, the phenomenon of hate speech is increasing along with the increasing use of social media (Newman et al., 2021).

By 2023, 167 million Indonesians will actively use social media (We are Social & Meltwater, 2023). According to the Digital News Report 2021, Indonesia is Southeast Asia's largest market, with a lively and diverse media sector (Newman et al., 2021). Social media

sites such as WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram are extremely popular among users in Indonesia. TikTok is gaining popularity with the younger generation elsewhere in the region (IDN Research Institute, 2023a, 2023b). Twitter became a medium for a primary political information source (Azwar & Nie, 2022).

Hate speech dominated the Indonesian political scene in early May 2015; specifically, it occurred on Twitter (X). Many politicians and parties used paid commenters, known as 'buzzers', and automated accounts to generate political propaganda ahead of the general elections in April 2019. Much attention has been directed at using social media to disseminate disinformation (locally known as hoaxes) and hate speech (Newman et al., 2021). At that time, an account called @Kage_yatsu tweeted to comment on a post related to a link discussing President Jokowi and his son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka. The account commented on the tweet by mentioning the term "Cebong" aimed at Jokowi supporters (Drone Emprit, 2022). The word "Cebong" itself is said to have come from the incident when President Jokowi released a frog in the Bogor Palace pool while activities were being carried out. It has become a symbol of Jokowi's support to this day. Then other calls that supported political provocation began to emerge, such as what was considered an opponent of "Cebong", namely the call for "Kadrun", which means the party opposing President Jokowi. The nickname "Kadrun" or desert lizard, was first coined by an influencer on Twitter named Denny Siregar (@Dennysiregar7) in August 2019 (Drone Emprit, 2022).

Hate speech is a difficult, broad concept, closely related to emotional elements, and does not have unique characteristics (Perera et al., 2023). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) defines hate speech in Article 20 as any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes an intention to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited by law (General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), 1976). Google defines hate speech as content that promotes or condones violence against or has the primary purpose of inciting hatred against an individual or group based on their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or any other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalization (Google, n.d.). Facebook defines hate speech as a direct attack against people — rather than concepts or institutions — based on what we call protected characteristics: race, ethnicity, national origin, disability, religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity, y and serious illness. We define attacks as violent or dehumanizing speech, harmful stereotypes, statements of inferiority, expressions of contempt, disgust, or dismissal, cursing, g and calls for exclusion or segregation (Meta Transparency Center, n.d.). Meanwhile, in Twitter (X) policy, hate speech is defined as not directly attacking other people based on race, ethnicity, national origin, caste, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease (X, 2023b, 2023a).

The rapid spread of hate speech is due to its ability to target the psychology of social media users directly (Bankov, 2020; Bilewicz & Soral, 2020; Burkitt, 2002; Edwards, 2023; Guillén-Nieto, 2023; Gurgun et al., 2022; Jin & Tay, 2023; Judge & Nel, 2018; Kiper, 2023; Marques, 2023; Petrescu et al., 2021; Rino, 2020; Sari et al., 2022). Social media users in Indonesia are quickly influenced by hate speech, closely related to hoaxes, due to low digital literacy (Burhani, 2021; Mazrieva, 2021; Pertiwi & Nistanto, 2021; Priancha, 2021). In Indonesia, hate speech occurs on Twitter (X) (Newman et al., 2021). Forms of hate speech are also spread in various tweets accompanied by images, videos, and even links.

The impact of hate speech in Indonesia does not only occur on social media but also in the real world. Hate speech in Indonesia can also lead to violations of the law because it is regulated in the Information and Electronic Transactions Law (ITE Law), which prohibits "any person from intentionally and without authorization from spreading information that is intended to cause individual feelings of hatred or enmity and certain community groups based on ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group (SARA)".

What needs to be paid attention to is that hate speech makes the social media communication climate unhealthy. There are violations of human rights in this case (SAFEnet, 2022), which can cause psychological impacts such as anxiety disorders, sleep disorders, decreased self-confidence, and even suicide attempts from victims of hate speech due to cancel culture (Bankov, 2020; Bilewicz & Soral, 2020; Edwards, 2023; Judge & Nel, 2018).

Social media platforms have realized the negative impact of hate speech. Twitter has created a policy to mitigate hate speech by updating its policy. In Indonesia, the Information and Electronic Transactions Law (ITE Law) also regulates freedom of opinion. Unfortunately, the many regulations do not necessarily have a deterrent effect on hate speech perpetrators in Indonesia. In prosecuting cases of hate speech in Indonesia, they must first wait for a report to process the perpetrators of hate speech. Likewise with Twitter, even though it has its own policy, the Twitter platform is waiting for a report if the tweet is indeed hate speech. Until now, there are still many anonymous accounts on Twitter that often spread hate speech and lead public opinion regarding SARA and government politics.

Today, problems related to hate speech in Indonesia are still being studied (Adiprasetyo et al., 2021; Anindyajati, 2021; Lim, 2017, 2023; Syahputra, 2021). Previous research states that the most challenging thing about the hate speech phenomenon is that people find it challenging to identify whether a post is hate speech or not. Therefore, to gain comprehensive knowledge regarding the phenomenon of hate speech in Indonesia, research is needed to help users identify hate speech, especially in the political context in Indonesia. Users need to understand how to identify the online characteristics and behavior of hate speech spreaders and the online culture that occurs. Thus, the research question guiding this study is as follows:

RQ1. How is the hate speech between "Cebong" and "Kadrun" on Twitter (X) social media?

This research explores the characteristics of hate speech spreaders in the political context of "Cebong" and "Kadrun" on Twitter by analyzing the content of tweets along with the arguments and manipulation strategies used. Researchers use the concepts of hate news (Banks, 2010), argument theory, manipulation strategy, and fallacies (Macagno, 2022). This research is expected to increase Twitter users' awareness of hate speech so that they can detect it more quickly and mitigate it.

LITERATURE REVIEW OR RESEARCH BACKGROUND

Political life in Indonesia today must be connected to the social media site Twitter (X). Twitter (X) is the social media most often used to express opinions freely (Best & Meng, 2015; Das Sahu & Kashyap, 2021; Nyoka & Tembo, 2022; Sumartias et al., 2023). By 2023, social media users in Indonesia will have reached 167 million users (We are Social & Meltwater, 2023).

As a microblogging site, Twitter (X) allows users to play hashtags that can become trending topics (Sumartias et al., 2023). Trending topics generated by Indonesians aim to

voice dissatisfaction with public services, criticize the government, and conduct digital activism (Sumartias et al., 2023). This is an implementation of supervision of the government (Kurniawan, 2023). Besides, trending topics eventually went viral and moved policymakers to listen to the people's aspirations on Twitter. This phenomenon then gave rise to the term viral-based policy in Indonesia (Kurniawan, 2023).

In the context of political issues, some researchers have found that there are agenda-setting functions in social media. Existing studies have found that during the pre and post 14th General Election in Malaysia, mainstream media and alternative media placed conflict as the main topic of the conversation. Meanwhile, state-owned media focuses more on attributes related to general elections. After the general election, only alternative media continued to discuss the conflict (Sanawi et al., 2022). Besides, Rumata and Nugraha (2020) found that fake narratives were more massively distributed on Twitter than on other social media like Instagram and Facebook (Rumata and Nugraha, 2020).

Unfortunately, the freedom of communication and expression offered by social media Twitter (X) is misused by a handful of parties to spread hate speech. Hate speech can be understood as any form of communication intended to belittle a person or group based on race, color, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or political affiliation (Banks, 2010; Guillén-Nieto, 2023; Marques, 2023; Millar, 2019; Paz et al., 2020).

Initially, hate speech in Indonesia was only considered an ordinary debate between netizens. However, users gradually consider this a problem because it makes social media uncomfortable. There has been an increase in the spread of false information, incitement to violence, and manipulative arguments (Macagno, 2022). In numbers, 27% of netizens have experienced hate speech online in Indonesia. Meanwhile, 43% had received hoaxes and experienced fraud. Then, 13% of netizens have been discriminated against (Microsoft, 2021).

The term hate speech in Indonesia became more familiar when the phenomenal case of the 2017 Regional Head Election "Pilkada DKI" occurred; candidates used social media to carry out political branding with several strategies, such as volunteer networks, buzzers, and micro-influencers. The distributed political messages are full of messages that touch users' emotions. In this case, freedom of expression is misused by individuals to hate each other (Lim, 2017). Individuals exercise their right to voice their opinions while actively silencing others. Even though social media belongs to the public sphere, social media algorithms still cause echo chambers (Takikawa & Nagayoshi, 2017), so individuals only believe what they want.

Hate speech is closely related to fake news, which includes misinformation, disinformation, and online propaganda. Hate speech and fake news are the two most significant causes of problems on social media (Quan-Haase & Sloan, 2022). Besides, social media has become a weapon of hate speech and lies that have dire consequences (Kyaw, 2019; Nyi Kyaw, 2021). Social media contributes to factors that worsen the humanitarian crisis and cause offline communal violence to continue (Sinpeng, 2021; Tapsell, 2020). In this article, we focus on analyzing the hate speech between "Cebong" and "Kadrun" on Twitter (X). We also explore the characteristics of hate speech spreaders in the political context of "Cebong" and "Kadrun" on Twitter by analyzing the content of tweets along with the arguments and manipulation strategies used.

Hate speech causes harm to the social media climate because it creates an unhealthy communication climate full of prejudice and intolerance, perpetuates discrimination and

hostility, and even facilitates acts of violence in the real world (Banks, 2010; Bilewicz & Soral, 2020; Castaño-Pulgarín et al., 2021; Perera et al., 2023). Besides that, online harassment also occurs, such as cyberbullying, doxing, and many more (SAFE-net, 2023).

One concept that can explain hate speech on social media is social deviance. This concept includes minor norm violations and unlawful acts against other people. Besides that, this concept considers hate speech to be an act that violates the law because it violates standards, rules, or culture along with norms of social interaction in the context of a social group (Henry, 2018). Several cases that have occurred in Indonesia related to hate speech include defamation, calls for violence, political and social provocations that are full of discriminatory views toward certain beliefs, rumors, and even conspiracies (Kyaw, 2019; Lim, 2017; Pate & Ibrahim, 2020; Paz et al., 2021; Syahputra, 2021).

These studies also analyze and identify the type of argument structure with argument theory, manipulation strategy, and fallacies. In argumentation theory, the types of arguments have been commonly analyzed through the concept of argumentation scheme, such as (1) Practical arguments: Argument from consequences; Argument from practical reasoning; Argument from commitment; (2) Evaluative arguments: Argument from values, Victimization; (3) Source-based (external arguments): Argument from expert opinion/ position to know; Argument from popular opinion, Ad hominem argument; (4) Discovery arguments: Argument from cause to effect; Argument from best explanation; Argument from sign; (5) Other: Argument from analogy/example; Argument from classification (Macagno, 2022). However, the manipulation strategy consists of (1) Topical irrelevance; and (2) Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Facts, Specific warrants; Word meaning or connotation (Macagno, 2022). Besides, types of fallacies consist of: (1) Straw man; (2) False dichotomy; (3) Ignoring qualifications; (4) Question begging epithets; (5) Post hoc ergo propter hoc; (6) Hasty generalization; (7) Slippery slope; (8) Persuasive definition; (9) Quasi-definition (Macagno, 2022).

METHODOLOGY

This research uses virtual ethnography to interpret the phenomenon of political hate speech on Twitter (X). Tweets with “Cebong” and “Kadrun” were gathered in May 2022. May 2022 was chosen because it reflects the peak period of the political narrative war in 2022. As pre-processing data, researchers concluded 30 tweets with the keyword "Cebong" and 30 tweets with the keyword "Kadrun". Then, researchers did a data cleaning process to remove irrelevant data to avoid inconsistency. Researchers got tweets from 10 accounts about "Cebong" and "Kadrun" from the data cleaning process. Researchers used the Atlas.ti version 9.1.7 tool as data analysis software.






Virtual ethnography is an ethnographic method that is carried out to see social phenomena and user culture in cyberspace. Virtual ethnography questions the generally accepted assumptions about the internet, interpreting and reinterpreting the internet as a way as well as a medium used to communicate, is "ethnography in, of and through the virtual" - face-to-face interaction is not needed (Hine, 2008, 2015). In virtual ethnography, interviews and surveys can be replaced by existing collections/archives derived from abundant information in online environments such as social networking sites and internet forums. Information can be found and archived online without being recorded and written like traditional ethnographers (Hine, 2008, 2015).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In analyzing hate speech and provocative uploads made by "Cebong" and "Kadrun" on Twitter (X), researchers used an application that is capable of recording the entire upload of each account that uploads sentences or words that contain elements of hatred from the "Cebong" and "Kadrun" accounts. To find out the motives and facts of hate speech raised by several parties on Twitter (X), researchers analyzed several tweets with several keywords through a tool called Atlas.ti.

The population studied were Twitter users who uploaded as many tweets with the keywords "Cebong" and "Kadrun" as possible—30 tweets each. The samples studied were 10 tweets with the keyword "Cebong" and 10 tweets with the keyword "Kadrun". It should also be noted that there are several color symbols in the analysis results via Atlas.ti, which can be interpreted as follows: (1) Green boxes and lines addressed to the person who created the tweet or the account owner in an existing tweet; (2) Blue boxes and lines, addressed to people who are tagged or people who are mentioned in tweets made by someone; (3) The orange box and line point to the location where the person who made the tweet is located; (4) White boxes and lines, shown to the content or writing of an existing tweet. As shown in Figure 1, the "Cebong" account made various tweets that spread hate on the "Kadrun" account. Therefore, in Figure 2, the "Kadrun" account makes various tweets to spread hate about "Cebong".

Table 1: Analysis of "Cebong" account

Account Name	Tweet	Analysis
Unknown account	 1:4 ¶ 11 – 14, Kadrun selalu bilang bahwa P. Jokowi Pembongh Krn tdk menepati Janji... in Twitter Import: cebong	The tweet shows that Jokowi's supporters (Cebong) cast hatred through their writing on Twitter which shows that the cadres always accuse Jokowi of being a liar and never keeping his promises.
@GunRomli	 1:3 ¶ 8, Golongan Kadrun ini emang bikin masalah di negeri ini. Sejak kapan per... in Twitter Import: kadrun	In the tweet, a cebong account named @GunRomli alleged that the parties against the Jokowi government were always looking for trouble by spreading lies and cother hatred.
@SaidahSafitri44	 1:12 ¶ 32, @KiBajolljo Biasanya Keluarga Kadrun berjualan Madu dan farfum murni d... in Twitter Import: kadrun	In the tweet, a cebong account named @SaidahSafitri44 commented on the @KiBajolljo account by scorning the kadrun that the kadrun who are spread across Indonesia usually have the identity of people who are in Middle Eastern style by selling honey and perfume.
@samaarchitect86	 1:15 ¶ 38, @SantorinisSun Kadrun kadrun memang cuma ngandalin foto... Otaknya pad... in Twitter Import: kadrun	In that tweet, a cebong account named @samaarchitect86 gave hate speech to the @SantorinisSun account by saying that the account was a stupid kadrun who only relied on photos and immediately commented even though he thought they should have researched more deeply before commenting.
@tengsfowocing	 2:11 ¶ 27, @ChusnulCh_ Syarat utama jadi kadrun = harus goblok in Twitter Import: kadrun	In the tweet, a cebong account named @tengsfowocing gave hate speech to the kadrun









@Fanan2021	 2:17 1 54, @Miduk17 Bang namanya kok bau ke kadrin sih, panembahan al saud 🤔 in Twitter Import: kadrin	<p>by saying that to become kadrin we only need to be stupid.</p>
@megatop99	 2:16 1 37 – 52, Sedang "perang" dengan Iblis (pembenci Jokowi). Dikeroyok kadrin gak... in Twitter Import: kadrin	<p>In the tweet, a cebong account named @megatop99 wrote on his Twitter account that Kadrin's name, who is a Jokowi hater, is Devils.</p>
@aniez479	 3:21 1 59, @Rizm85 @Dennysiregar7 Kadrin memang bego tanpa di gas pun sudah bego... in Twitter Import: kadrin	<p>In the tweet, a cebong account named @aniez479 wrote in the Tweet he made that Kadrin was fairly stupid and famous for his stupidity.</p>
@dez50162822	 3:24 1 69, @arifin34533 Kadrin Itu Otak Setengah Bacapun Setengah2 trus digoreng... in Twitter Import: kadrin	<p>In the tweet, a cebong account named @dez50162822 stated in his Tweet that Kadrin has a half (stupid) brain because according to him, the slightest news can turn big because of Kadrin's provocation.</p>
@jogman86	 3:18 1 47 – 51, @dwia6891_putra @ekowboy2 Kadrin klo gk HOAX gk makan ya druuunnn 🤔🤔... in Twitter Import: kadrin	<p>In the tweet, a cebong account named @jogman86 stated that Kadrin always spread hoax news, so if he didn't spread hoax news, Kadrin was considered to have no 'food' that could be consumed.</p>

Table 2: Analysis of “Kadrin” account keyword

Account Name	Tweet	Analysis
@el_f4hm1	 1:9 1 32, @cebongsejati1 @KusumaW57427580 Cebong ngelesnya pinter kayak bajai, in Twitter Import: cebong	<p>The tweet contains ridicule from the kadrin party who writes that every Jokowi supporter (cebong) always has a reason if his idol is cornered.</p>
@el_f4hm1	 1:5 1 16, @ApriliaLin Logika cebong pekok. in Twitter Import: cebong	<p>The tweet explained that the account @el_f4hm1 commented on the @ApriliaLin account that Aprilia had bad and incorrect logic. The @el_f4hm1 account also derided the @ApriliaLin account as a stupid tadpole.</p>
@syahi5758syari1	 1:3 1 9, @syahi5758syari1 Udh bisa di pasti kan para manusia2 KAFIR CEBONG BUZZ... in Twitter Import: cebong	<p>In the tweet, it was explained that the kadrin (party against Jokowi) threw hate speech at the account @syahi5758syari1 by writing that the account was just a buzzer supporting Jokowi which contained infidel humans.</p>

@Jaga_Indonesia1	 1:1 † 3, @ABDULRA89491208 @Mdy_Asmara1701 Bapak loe cebong y ?! in Twitter Import: cebong	In the tweet, it was explained that the @Jaga_Indonesia1 account gave hate speech to two accounts that gave Tweets containing good talks about Jokowi's government and the account @Jaga_Indonesia1 as kadrun mocked that they were Jokowi supporters.
@sardoko_tendo	 3:16 † 40, @bachrum_achmadi Itulah ulah cebong yg senang membohongi dan dibohongi in Twitter Import: cebong	The tweet contains a statement of hatred directed at Cebong who is accused of spreading hoaxes or lies and they are also easily deceived by other parties.
@dzulkarnainov	 4:16 † 59, @FerdinandHutah4 Ayo para cebong ponter dikit, tonton video yg asli ya... in Twitter Import: cebong	In a tweet originating from an account named @dzulkarnainov, it is written that he regrets the nature of the Cebongs who are considered very stupid because they are easily provoked even though they have not read the news and watched the videos that are distributed thoroughly but they have given reactions that offend other parties.
@dwia6891	 5:39 † 114, @aniezz479 @ekowboy2 Banjir jakarta era gubernur siapa nih Bong cebong... in Twitter Import: cebong	In a tweet originating from an account named @dwia6891, he expressed his hatred for Cebong by alluding to the Jakarta flood tragedy which according to Kadrun was the cause of negligence during Jokowi's tenure.
@apolah1234	 5:34 † 102, @TxdariHI Cebong dilawan.. hahaha in Twitter Import: cebong	In the tweet, it was explained that Kadrun, who has an account with the name @apolah1234, said that no one could fight Cebong because according to him Cebong had a large group and was difficult to beat even though Cebong was on the wrong side.
@fadlyhendra11	 5:4 † 9, @safrol @tvOneNews yg sinting ya kaum cebong dungu in Twitter Import: cebong	In the tweet, it was explained that the account @fadlyhendra11 as Kadrun said the Cebongs were stupid/crazy people because they were easily provoked and often spread hoaxes.
@vionnie_vionn	 5:52 † 146, @Jaya_Ind @M45Broo_ Jgn bawa nama gorong2 krn dr sana awal cebong munc... in Twitter Import: cebong	In the tweet, it was explained that the account @vionnie_vionn as Kadrun ridiculed the cebongs by saying that the culverts were the house or the starting place for the Cebongs to come from. This statement is supported by the fact that tadpoles do have homes in sewers.

Based on the analysis of data from the "Cebong" and "Kadrun" accounts (Table 1 and Table 2), it seems that social media has a very important function and role in communicating and building social relations among netizens. However, amid various conveniences, there are negative impacts from social media, especially Twitter, which is used to spread hate speech and lies among netizens, especially those related to practical political activities, candidate campaigns, and black propaganda.

The negative impact of freedom of access to social media can be seen in the presence of hate speech that someone utters freely on social media. The trigger for the phenomenon of hate speech comes from hoax news or hate speech, which makes one party feel cornered and creates a narrative war or narrative conflict on social media. Apart from hoax news and provocative narratives, other things can be included in the category of hate speech that are often found on social media, namely negative comments. Comments here mean that someone can easily write down everything that comes to mind by just typing, which can then be uploaded on social media as a commentary on one of the uploads. Others can later see, like, and comment on these comments. If the comments uploaded are included in hate speech sentences, then these comments may trigger divisions and cause crowds.

Apart from the various effects of social media that the public feels, it has an important role in the communication process carried out by high-ranking officials, who can be called political actors in their leadership period. Here, social media is used by political actors to communicate with potential voters and certainly their supporters. The form of communication carried out by political actors on social media can be developing public opinion or raising political support.

Any political actor who uses social media gets the same treatment and social network rules as other users. Therefore, high-ranking officials or similar political actors need to be aware of the ethics of the discussion they issue on social media because if they make a mistake, that leads to the emergence of various kinds of public opinion and becomes the beginning of intimidation and slander against politicians and the government in a country.

Figure 1: Social network of “Cebong” account




Figure 2: Social network of “Kadrun” account

The researcher analyzed the result (Tables 1 and 2) using argument theory, manipulation strategy, and fallacies (Macagno, 2022). The results of hate speech analysis can be seen in Table 3. The tweets of "Cebong" were dominated by analogy-based arguments. Meanwhile, the tweet made by "Kadrun" was dominated by arguments that were classified as discovery arguments: arguments from cause to effect. The manipulation strategy carried out by "Cebong" is dominated by Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Word meaning (connotation). Meanwhile, "Kadrun" is dominated by presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Specific warrants and word meaning (connotation). The fallacy expressed by "Cebong" is dominated by persuasive definition. "Cebong" makes an implicit modification of the meaning of a word to attack "Kadrun". Meanwhile, the fallacies "Kadrun" expresses are dominated by hasty generalizations. "Kadrun" looks for an example of an incident and generalizes the incident to attack "Cebong".

Table 3: Hate speech analysis of "Cebong" and "Kadrun" accounts with argument theory, manipulation strategies and fallacies

Example Tweet	Argument Category	Manipulation Strategy	Fallacies
A "Cebong" account gave hate speech to "Kadrun" account with saying that "Kadrun" account was stupid, who only relied on photos and immediately commented even though he thought they should have researched more deeply before commenting.	Source-based (external) arguments: Argument from popular opinion. "Cebong" account said, that "Kadrun" account should do research more deeply before commenting	Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Specific warrants	Post hoc ergo propter hoc (a temporal or spatial coincidence or succession presupposed as a cause-effect relation) "Cebong" account criticize online behavior of "Kadrun" account who really believe accounts without recheck the photos credibility
A "Cebong" account reply on the "Kadrun" account by scorning the "Kadrun" that "Kadrun" who are spread across Indonesia usually have the identity of people who are in Middle Eastern style by selling honey and perfume.	Other: Argument from analogy/example "Cebong" has labelled that "Kadrun" as Middle Eastern people who sell honey and perfume.	Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Word meaning or connotation	Persuasive definition (implicit modification of the meaning of words) "Cebong" perceives "Kadrun" like a Middle Eastern person
A "Cebong" account stated in his Tweet that "Kadrun" has a half brain (stupid) because according to him, the slightest news can turn big because of Kadrun's provocation.	Practical arguments: Argument from practical reasoning "Cebong" believes that "Kadrun" often provokes information.	Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Specific warrants	Hasty generalization (from specific events to a universal generalization) "Cebong" thinks that "Kadrun" often exaggerates information that was previously unimportant, but they consider it to be something big.

<p>A “Cebong” account stated that “Kadrun” always spread hoax news, so if he didn’t spread hoax news, “Kadrun” was considered to have no “food” that could be consumed.</p>	<p>Other: Argument from analogy/example</p> <p>“Cebong” has the perception that “Kadrun” often spreads hoaxes because hoaxes are their daily bread. “Cebong” chose to make an analogy of “Kadrun”’s habit of spreading hoaxes as food because food is a human need that must be met every day. In other words, according to “Cebong”, if “Kadrun” doesn’t spread hoaxes, something is missing in their day.</p>	<p>Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Word meaning or connotation</p>	<p>Persuasive definition (implicit modification of the meaning of words)</p> <p>“Cebong” likens hoaxes to the daily food of “Kadrun”. In other words, for “Cebong”, “Kadrun”’s daily life is filled with spreading hoaxes.</p>
<p>A “Cebong” account gave hate speech to “Kadrun” by saying that to become “Kadrun” we only need to be stupid.</p>	<p>Other: Argument from analogy/example</p> <p>“Cebong” thinks that to become a “Kadrun” you only need to be stupid. Stupid is what “Cebong” means in this case because “Kadrun” digital literacy is considered very lacking by “Cebong”.</p>	<p>Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Word meaning or connotation</p>	<p>Persuasive definition (implicit modification of the meaning of words)</p> <p>“Cebong” said that to be a “Kadrun” the qualification is to be stupid. The stupidity referred to by “Cebong” is caused by “Kadrun” who is often found spreading hoaxes.</p>
<p>A “Kadrun” account said that “Cebong” were stupid/crazy people because they were easily provoked and often spread hoaxes.</p>	<p>Discovery arguments: Argument from cause to effect</p> <p>“Kadrun” account labeled that “Cebong” were stupid and crazy because of their bad online behavior because “Cebong” were easily provoked and often spread hoaxes.</p>	<p>Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Specific warrants</p>	<p>Hasty generalization (from specific events to a universal generalization)</p> <p>“Kadrun” have perception that “Cebong” were easily provoked and often spread hoaxes. Therefore, “Kadrun” labeled them with stupid and crazy</p>
<p>A “Kadrun” account of hatred directed at “Cebong” who is accused of spreading hoaxes or lies and they are also easily deceived by other parties.</p>	<p>Discovery arguments: Argument from cause to effect</p> <p>“Kadrun” account criticize “Cebong”, who has bad online behavior spreading hoax, false information and also easily deceived by other parties.</p>	<p>Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Facts</p>	<p>Hasty generalization (from specific events to a universal generalization)</p> <p>“Kadrun” account criticize “Cebong”, who has bad online behavior spreading hoax, false information and also easily deceived by other parties.</p>

<p>A "Kadrun" account said that he regrets the nature of the "Cebong" who are considered very stupid because they are easily provoked even though they have not read the news and watched the videos that are distributed thoroughly but they have given reactions that offend other parties.</p>	<p>Practical arguments: Argument from consequences</p> <p>"Kadrun" account clearly stated that he regrets the nature of the "Cebong" who are considered very stupid. It is because "Cebong" easily provoked even though they have not read the news and watched the videos that are distributed thoroughly but they have given reactions that offend other parties.</p>	<p>Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Specific warrants</p>	<p>Hasty generalization (from specific events to a universal generalization)</p> <p>"Kadrun" found that "Cebong" easily provoked even though they have not read the news and watched the videos that are distributed thoroughly but they have given reactions that offend other parties. That's why "Kadrun" labeled "Cebong" very stupid.</p>
<p>A "Kadrun" account said that no one could fight "Cebong" because according to him "Cebong" had a large group and was difficult to beat even though "Cebong" was on the wrong side.</p>	<p>Discovery arguments: Argument from cause to effect</p> <p>"Kadrun" account identified that "Cebong" were a large group. So, it was difficult to have an argument with "Cebong" even though "Cebong" was wrong.</p>	<p>Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Facts</p>	<p>Ignoring qualifications (presupposing that the premise includes the qualifications necessary for drawing the conclusion)</p> <p>"Kadrun" clearly make conclusion that "Cebong" were a large group. It was difficult for them to have an argument with "Cebong" even though "Cebong" was wrong. Related to high context culture in Indonesia, this tweet could be satire.</p>

Social media is a jungle and it has practically no rules (Gasarah & Aye, 2015). If this challenge is not faced wisely, then the result is that these political actors become the subject of ridicule in cyberspace. In this case, the two camps still argue for and against the opposing camp, namely the Cebong and Kadrun cases. In this case, every "Cebong" will always defend the Indonesian president, Jokowi. The opposing party, namely the "Kadrun", will continue to sneer at the "Kadrun" with all its hate speech on social media.

Looking at the case above is enough to explain that social media has clouded people's understanding, whether what was said was an official stance or just an expression of his thoughts or feelings. This is due to the need for more knowledge of every social media user's certainty about the intent and purpose of each utterance issued through comments or statuses on social media. Today's politics is increasingly complex, and politicians turn to online activities using social media as a new platform to gain support for their political parties (Rodrigues, 2020; Farkas & Bene, 2021).

Until now, social media, especially Instagram and Twitter, have still been used by President Jokowi to communicate with Indonesian people (Afaf et al., 2019). Seeing from all the good sides, President Jokowi's use of social media continues to receive a negative response from his haters. It becomes evidenced by the existence of utterances of hatred

committed by two different camps who hate each other. The camps are "Cebong" and "Kadrun", whose names are still visible on Twitter, with the status of hate speech made through each status with the hashtags #cebong or #kadrun. As for the hate speech exchanged between the two parties, this always involved Jokowi's name and the opposition, like other political actors predicted to replace Jokowi's position when his term of office was over.

Social media should be a place for everyone to communicate with each other without any restrictions (Lipschultz, 2020). The absence of a person's restrictions on social media is sufficient to become a basis for hate speech uttered through writing, images, or sounds that can be uploaded to social media. This unrestricted freedom allows multiple people to express hate speech on social media, which can eventually affect the same social media users as a result of massive hate speech uttered by a person or institution.

The cause of how easy it is for social media users to be affected by hate speech that exists in every social media platform. Commotion. Second, the existence of a principle of belief, such as religion, which is based on a particular religion, means that there will always be conflicts in the name of religion when there is the utterance of hatred towards one or more parties. So, if there is chaos on social media, usually, the perpetrators of this hate speech will cast hatred against each other in terms of religion and beliefs that they each hold.

The things mentioned greatly affect the level of solidarity and respect for everyone on social media, both on behalf of official accounts and fake or bogus accounts, which are often found when there is chaos related to this phenomenon of hate speech. The influence of several factors causes division and eternal resentment among all supporters of the two opposing sides.

Hate speech about politics is one of the communication crimes that seeks to demean opponents to gain public sympathy. This undermines the character of the Indonesian people, who are known for their politeness when speaking Indonesian. However, the development of social media as a pervasive and rapid means of communication has caused some things to be complicated to achieve. Prevent, including hate speech about politics. As a country that upholds democratic principles, Indonesia has the Rights of all citizens, including freedom of expression in public. However, this freedom is restricted when rights are violated. Practice negatively impacts ourselves, others, and society in general. It is stipulated in the ITE Law (Anindyajati, 2021).

Hate speech uttered through social media can impact everyone who feels cornered due to conflicts that lead to him. The impact can be in the form of several effects, such as a person's lack of self-confidence when making choices in his life because he is afraid that his choices cannot be enjoyed by other people as well, then not a few also feel that when a lot of hate speech corners him in his name, someone can cause death to himself, by committing suicide due to major depression. In principle, freedom of speech, opinion, and association in the public sphere reflects democracy, but currently, online democracy in Indonesia is very free, and netizens have no awareness or responsibility.

This research strengthens previous studies (Barnes, 2022; Grossberg, 1997) that found political participation could be seen as fan studies. In this context, fan studies are based on audience research, specifically a reception approach. By applying a fan studies lens to participatory politics, researchers can begin to focus on what citizens do with political talk, what influence, effects, or meaning it takes on, and more specifically, how it is used to construct individual and collective identity or how it fits into what Grossberg calls "mattering

maps" (Barnes, 2022; Grossberg, 1997). In other words, the fan studies perspective can see public participation in a political context.

Previous research states that by looking from a fan studies perspective, researchers can understand online political discussions by answering the following questions: (1) The reasons they have access to these platforms; (2) What is their ability to participate in the chosen platform; (3) Why do they often behave this way?; (4) Why does their behavior often end in manifestations of polarization? (Barnes, 2022).

Like fans, whatever platform they use, what happens in the discussion is part of a show. More precisely, it is a show of oneself as a fan (Barnes, 2022). In the context of the discussion between "Cebong" and "Kadrun", each has a certain political perspective that encourages them to contribute as fans, such as refuting and opposing parties considered political opponents.

It should be understood that the terms "Kadrun" and "Cebong" represent different political camps. The online debate between "Kadrun" and "Cebong" falls under the category of emotional debate. Thus, assessments and contributions are not rational but a form of determining and defending a political camp (Barnes, 2022). This contradicts Habermas' opinion, which examines online political discussions that must be serious, rational, and aimed at determining policy positions (Habermas, 2006). It is not the case with the online debate in "Kadrun" and "Cebong". The accounts involved in this discussion deliberately involve themselves with people from different political camps to reaffirm their opinions and confirm which political camp they support. In democratic life in Indonesia, everyone has the right to voice their opinion. The freedom of opinion law protects this, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) Article 28. However, Indonesian people must comply with social media's Information and Electronic Transactions Law (ITE Law) .

This research also increasingly emphasizes that researchers need to eliminate the negative perception that fandom behavior is only related to meaningless activities. However, accepting that this behavior is appropriate fan behavior is deeply embedded in communication behavior in the digital world and contemporary sociality (Barnes, 2022). Like fans in the world of entertainment, fans in politics also have an element of entertainment and fun (Barnes, 2022). It is what must be realized in participatory politics. Entertainment in the context of this political discussion depends on culture. There is entertainment that is translated into banter and leads to hate speech, as found in this research. We must be careful with this translation because it can divide political discussions and lead to fandom wars. Likewise, regarding the debate between "Kadrun" and "Cebong," when viewed from the perspective of political fans, researchers conclude that this is a form of political fan behavior in Indonesia. By accepting this, researchers can identify the motives and factors that cause this debate. Ultimately, this polarization and division on social media can be overcome.

The condition of social media becomes increasingly dynamic when social media influencers are involved in political discussions. Social media influencers in Indonesia can create a new societal paradigm. There are various ways that social media influencers do this, such as creating and spreading hoaxes and hate speech for the opposition. Ultimately, they can influence public perceptions and views of political candidates (Fadillah & Wibowo, 2022). It has become a challenge for practitioners and political observers to this day.

This research has limitations in data, analysis period, and social media platforms. It is hoped that future research can examine more data by extending the data crawling period from Twitter with more keywords. Due to the digital public sphere dynamics, each supporter

has high creativity by creating different hashtags and keywords. It is not limited to just one keyword or hashtag. Apart from that, research on hate speech on other social media such as Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok must be conducted. Thus, hate speech research can not only be carried out using qualitative methods that examine the behavior and narratives of hate speech perpetrators but also further research can be carried out using quantitative methods based on the results of this research.

CONCLUSION

The hate speech made by "Cebong" and "Kadrun" can be concluded as two hostile political camps. They argued with each other to show their identity as supporters of one of the camps and aimed to bring down the opposing political camp. Cebong's tweets were dominated by analogy-based arguments. Meanwhile, the tweet made by "Kadrun" was dominated by arguments that were classified as discovery arguments: arguments from cause to effect. The manipulation strategy carried out by "Cebong" is dominated by Presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Word meaning (connotation). Meanwhile, "Kadrun" is dominated by presuppositions in conflict with the common ground: Specific warrants and word meaning (connotation). The fallacy expressed by "Cebong" is characterized by persuasive definitions. "Cebong" makes an implicit modification of the meaning of a word to attack "Kadrun". Meanwhile, the fallacies "Kadrun" expresses are dominated by hasty generalizations. "Kadrun" looks for an example of an incident and generalizes the incident to attack "Cebong". These findings can provide input for various parties, such as policymakers, social media platform developers, and law enforcers, to create a safer social media climate. One way is to create more specific policies to protect society from hate speech while upholding freedom of expression. In this way, all social media users avoid the negative impacts of hate speech. Creating a healthy ecosystem in social media is not only imposed on the government and platform creators; as users, we must be more aware of creating a healthy climate on social media platforms. Social media platforms have changed their policies in such a way as to create a better social media climate. Unfortunately, many social media users do not care about reporting content that disturbs them. To create a healthier social media climate, Twitter users must understand how to identify hate speech. Twitter users must also understand how to report tweets that indicate hate speech. By knowing the characteristics of hate speech and the characteristics of hate speech spreaders, Twitter users can stop the spread of hate speech.

BIODATA

Suwandi Sumartias is a professor of Political Communication at Faculty of Communication Science, Padjadjaran University, Indonesia. Email: suwandi.sumartias@unpad.ac.id

Dwia Aries Tina Pulubuhu is a professor of Sociology at Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia. Email: dwiatn@yahoo.com

Elfitra is a senior lecture at Sociology Department, Andalas University, Indonesia. Email: elbaiko69@gmail.com

Eny Ratnasari is a lecture at Tidar University, Indonesia. Email: enyratnasari@untidar.ac.id

REFERENCES

- Adiprasetio, J., Rahmawan, D., & Wibowo, K. A. (2021). A meta-analysis of hate speech in Indonesia: The yielding of an academic discourse to the discourse of authority. *Pacific Journalism Review: Te Koakoa*, 27(1and2), 251–267. <https://doi.org/mwbn>
- Afaf, N., Basit, A., Nurlukman, A., Wahyono, E., & Fadli, Y. (2019, November). *Social media in the public sphere, network society, and political branding*. Paper presented at the International Conference on Democratisation in Southeast Asia (ICDeSA 2019) (pp. 76-79). Atlantis Press.
- Anindyajati, T. (2021). Limitation of the right to freedom of speech on the Indonesian Constitutional Court consideration. *Indonesian Law Journal*, 14(1), 19–36. <https://doi.org/10.33331/ilj.v14i1.45>
- Azwar, A. I., & Nie, K. S. (2022). Factors influencing young Malaysians' political information seeking behaviour on Twitter. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 38(3), 87-105. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2022-3803-06>
- Bankov, K. (2020). Cyberbullying and hate speech in the debate around the ratification of the Istanbul convention in Bulgaria: A semiotic analysis of the communication dynamics. *Social Semiotics*, 30(3). <https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2020.1731175>
- Banks, J. (2010). Regulating hate speech online. *International Review of Law, Computers & Technology*, 24(3), 233–239. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2010.522323>
- Barnes, R. (2022). *Fandom and polarisation in online political discussion: From pop culture to politics*. Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/mwb2>
- Best, M. L., & Meng, A. (2015). Twitter democracy: Policy versus identity politics in three emerging African democracies. *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development*, 1–10.
- Bilewicz, M., & Soral, W. (2020). Hate speech epidemic. The dynamic effects of derogatory language on intergroup relations and political radicalization. *Political Psychology*, 41(S1), 3-33. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12670>
- Burhani, A. N. (2021, March 27). Digital civility of our society. *Kompas.Id*. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2021/03/27/digital-civility-of-our-society>
- Burkitt, I. (2002). Complex emotions: Relations, feelings and images in emotional experience. *Sociological Review*, 50(S2), 151-167. <https://doi.org/mwbp>
- Castaño-Pulgarín, S. A., Suárez-Betancur, N., Vega, L. M. T., & López, H. M. H. (2021). Internet, social media and online hate speech. Systematic review. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 58, 101608. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2021.101608>
- Das Sahu, S., & Kashyap, G. (2021). Digital activism and democracy: An analysis of select hashtags on Twitter (2016-2020). *Communicator*, 122–129.
- Drone Emprit*. (2022). Tren dan popularitas sebutan Cebong, Kampret, Buzerp, dan Kadrun. <https://pers.droneemprit.id/tren-dan-popularitas-sebutancebong-kampret-buzerp-dan-kadrun/>
- Edwards, A. (2023). On liberation psychology, hate, hope, and healing. *Journal of Hate Studies*, 18(1), 31-44. <https://doi.org/10.33972/jhs.229>
- Fadillah, D., & Wibowo, A. A. (2022). The fall of public relation officer and the rise of influencer in the Indonesian government. *Profetik: Jurnal Komunikasi*, 15(1), 19-33.
- Farkas, X., & Bene, M. (2021). Images, politicians, and social media: Patterns and effects of politicians' image-based political communication strategies on social media. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 26(1), 119-142.

- Gasarah, F., & Aye, G. (2015). Effect of household endowment on fertilizer use in rice production in Kwande, Benue State, Nigeria. *Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension, Economics & Sociology*, 4(1), 67-74. <https://doi.org/10.9734/ajaees/2015/12272>
- Google. (n.d.). Policies for content posted by users on search. Retrieved January 1, 2024, from <https://www.google.com/intl/en-US/search/policies/usercontent/>
- Grossberg, L. (1997). *Bringing it all back home: Essays on cultural studies*. Duke University Press.
- Guillén-Nieto, V. (2023). *Hate speech: Linguistic perspectives*. De Gruyter.
- Gurgun, S., Arden-Close, E., Phalp, K., & Ali, R. (2022). Online silence: Why do people not challenge others when posting misinformation? *Internet Research*, 33(5), 1928-1948. <https://doi.org/10.1108/INTR-06-2022-0407>
- Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research. *Communication Theory*, 16(4), 411-426.
- Henry, S. (2018). *Social deviance*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Hine, C. (2008). Virtual ethnography: Modes, varieties, affordances. In N. Fielding, R. M. Lee & G. Blank (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of online research methods* (pp. 257-270). SAGE.
- Hine, C. (2015). Ethnographies of online communities and social media: Virtual ethnography and netnography. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 41(1).
- IDN Research Institute. (2023a). Indonesia gen Z report 2024: Understanding and uncovering the behavior, challenges, and opportunities.
- IDN Research Institute. (2023b). Indonesia millennial report 2024: Understanding and Uncovering the behavior, challenges, and opportunities.
- Jin, Y., & Tay, D. (2023). Offensive, hateful comment: A networked discourse practice of blame and petition for justice during COVID-19 on Chinese Weibo. *Discourse Studies*, 25(1). <https://doi.org/10.1177/14614456221129485>
- Judge, M., & Nel, J. A. (2018). Psychology and hate speech: A critical and restorative encounter. *South African Journal of Psychology*, 48(1). <https://doi.org/mwbs>
- Kiper, J. (2023). Religious hate propaganda: Dangerous accusations and the meaning of religious persecution in light of the cognitive science of religion. *Religions*, 14(2). <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020185>
- Kurniawan, T. (2023). *Tantangan governansi publik di era disrupsi: Memperkuat peran etika dalam pembuatan kebijakan*. Universitas Indonesia.
- Kyaw, N. N. (2019). Facebooking in Myanmar: From hate speech to fake news to partisan political communication. *ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute*, 36, 1-10.
- Lim, M. (2017). Freedom to hate: Social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(3), 411-427. <https://doi.org/gh7f5s>
- Lim, M. (2023). From activist media to algorithmic politics: The Internet, social media, and civil society in Southeast Asia. In E. Hansson & M. L. Weiss (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of civil and uncivil society in Southeast Asia* (pp. 25-44). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367422080-3>
- Lipschultz, J. H. (2020). *Social media communication: Concepts, practices, data, law and ethics*. Routledge.
- Macagno, F. (2022). Argumentation profiles and the manipulation of common ground. The arguments of populist leaders on Twitter. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 191, 67-82. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2022.01.022>

- Marques, T. (2023). The expression of hate in hate speech. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 40(5), 769-787. <https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12608>
- Mazrieva, E. (2021, February 26). *Indeks keberadaban digital: Indonesia terburuk se-Asia Tenggara*. VOA Indonesia. <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/indeks-keberadaban-digital-indonesia-terburuk-se-asia-tenggara/5794123.html>
- Meta Transparency Center. (n.d.). Facebook community standards. Retrieved January 1, 2024, <https://transparency.fb.com/id-id/policies/community-standards/?source=https%3A%2F%2Fweb.facebook.com%2Fcommunitystandards%2Fobjectionable-content>
- Microsoft. (2021). Digital civility index.
- Millar, S. (2019). Hate speech: Conceptualisations, interpretations and reactions. In M. Evans, L. Jeffries, & J. O'Driscoll (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of language in conflict* (1st ed., Chap. 8). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429058011-9>
- Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Schulz, A., Andi, S., Robertson, C. T., & Nielsen, R. K. (2021). *Reuters Institute digital news report 2021*. <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021>
- Nyi Kyaw, N. (2021). Social media, hate speech and fake news during Myanmar's political transition. In A. Sinpeng & R. Tapsell (Eds.), *From grassroots activism to disinformation: Social media in Southeast Asia* (pp. 86-104). De Gruyter. <https://doi.org/mwb3>
- Nyoka, P., & Tembo, M. (2022). Dimensions of democracy and digital political activism on Hopewell Chin'ono and Jacob Ngarivhume Twitter accounts towards the July 31 demonstrations in Zimbabwe. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 8(1). <https://doi.org/mwbv>
- General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI). (1966, December 16). *International covenant on civil and political rights* (adopted). United Nations Human Rights. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>
- Pate, U. A., & Ibrahim, A. M. (2020). Fake news, hate speech and Nigeria's struggle for democratic consolidation: A conceptual review. In A. Solo (Ed.), *Handbook of research on politics in the computer age* (pp. 89-112). IGI Global. <https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-0377-5.ch006>
- Paz, M. A., Mayagoitia-Soria, A., & González-Aguilar, J. M. (2021). From polarization to hate: Portrait of the spanish political meme. *Social Media and Society*, 7(4). <https://doi.org/mwbw>
- Paz, M. A., Montero-Díaz, J., & Moreno-Delgado, A. (2020). Hate speech: A systematized review. *SAGE Open*, 10(4), 215824402097302. <https://doi.org/gmgbqw>
- Perera, S., Meedin, N., Caldera, M., Perera, I., & Ahangama, S. (2023). A comparative study of the characteristics of hate speech propagators and their behaviours over Twitter social media platform. *Heliyon*, 9(8), e19097. <https://doi.org/mwbx>
- Pertiwi, W. K., & Nistanto, R. K. (2021, February 25). Tingkat kesopanan orang Indonesia di internet paling buruk se-Asia Tenggara. *Kompas.com*. <https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2021/02/25/12022227/tingkat-kesopanan-orang-indonesia-di-internet-paling-buruk-se-asia-tenggara>
- Petrescu, A., Truica, C. O., Apostol, E. S., & Karras, P. (2021). Sparse shield: Social network immunization vs. harmful speech. *Proceedings of 30th ACM International Conference on Information & Knowledge (CIKM '21)*, 1426–1436. <https://doi.org/mwbz>

- Priancha, A. (2021, June 2). Why digital literacy matters for Indonesia: Making the Internet work for all. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Society*. <https://www.policyforum.net/why-digital-literacy-matters-for-indonesia/>
- Quan-Haase, A., & Sloan, L. (Eds.). (2022). *The SAGE handbook of social media research methods* (2nd ed). SAGE Publications.
- Rino, A. (2020). Dealing with negative social media comments: The giant bullhorn that punctures holes in organizations' walls, like an arrow to the chest. *The McMaster Journal of Communication*, 12(2), 56-77. <https://doi.org/10.15173/mjc.v12i2.2173>
- Rodrigues, U. (2020). Political communication on social media platforms and its implications for the public sphere in India. In Athique, A. and Parthasarathi, V. (Eds.), *Platform capitalism in India* (pp. 161-173). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rumata, V. M., & Nugraha, F. K. (2020). An analysis of fake narratives on social media during 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 36(4), 351-368. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2020-3604-22>
- SAFEnet. (2023). Laporan pemantauan hak-hak digital Triwulan III 2023. <https://safenet.or.id/id/2023/11/laporan-pemantauan-hak-hak-digital-triwulan-iii-2023/>
- SAFEnet. (2022). SAFEnet: Pemenuhan hak-hak digital di Indonesia kian memburuk. <https://safenet.or.id/id/2023/03/safenet-pemenuhan-hak-hak-digital-di-indonesia-kian-memburuk/>
- Sanawi, J. B., Mustaffa, N., & Sannusi, S. N. (2022). Perbincangan politik di laman Twitter: Atribut isu politik dalam ciapan media di Malaysia Semasa tempoh pra dan pasca Pilihan Raya Umum Ke 14. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 38(4), 231-249. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2022-3804-13>
- Sari, T. I., Ardilla, Z. N., Hayatin, N., & Maskat, R. (2022). Abusive comment identification on Indonesian social media data using hybrid deep learning. *IAES International Journal of Artificial Intelligence*, 11(3). <https://doi.org/10.11591/ijai.v11.i3.pp895-904>
- Sinpeng, A. (2021). Hashtag activism: Social media and the #FreeYouth protests in Thailand. *Critical Asian Studies*, 53(2), 192–205. <https://doi.org/gnn9pb>
- Statista. (2023, January). *Leading countries based on number of X (formerly Twitter) users as of January 2023*.
- Sumartias, S., Pulubuhu, D. A. T., Sudarmono, S., Noorlistyo Adi, A., & Ratnasari, E. (2023). Democracy in the Indonesian digital public sphere: Social network analysis of Twitter users' responses to the issue of nationalism knowledge test at the Corruption Eradication Commission (TWK-KPK). *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, 26(3), 240. <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.70896>
- Syahputra, I. (2021). The rise of political hatred in Twitter conversations of Indonesian netizens. *Jurnal Komunikasi Ikatan Sarjana Komunikasi Indonesia*, 6(1), 22–31. <https://doi.org/10.25008/jkiski.v6i1.518>
- Takikawa, H., & Nagayoshi, K. (2017). Political polarization in social media: Analysis of the "Twitter political field" in Japan. *2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data)*, 3143–3150. <https://doi.org/10.1109/BigData.2017.8258291>
- Tapsell, R. (2020). *Deepening the understanding of social media's impact in Southeast Asia*. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
- We are Social*. (2023). Digital 2023 Indonesia. <https://wearesocial.com/id/blog/2023/01/digital-2023/>

- X. (2023a, April). *Kebijakan entitas kekerasan dan kebencian*. <https://help.twitter.com/id/rules-and-policies/violent-entities>
- X. (2023b, April). *Kebijakan X tentang perilaku kebencian*. <https://help.twitter.com/id/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy>