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paper text:

THE IMPACT OF BROADCASTING LIBERALIZATION ON TELEVISION CONTENT IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN INDONESIA (1998 - 2014) MORISSAN P-KOD0030/11(R) Supervisors: Dr. Juliana binti Abdul Wahab

**Prof. Dr. Adnan bin Hussein SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION
UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA PENANG, MALAYSIA**

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2015 CHAPTER

I I N T R O D U C T I O N 1 . 1 Background The

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rise of freedom and the process of transition to democracy in Indonesian was marked by the collapse of Indonesian last authoritarian government led by President Suharto in May 1998. After the shift of political power, various

reforms in almost all aspects of life developed, particularly **the**

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media and press that relished the freedom the most. The euphoria is understandable because Indonesian media for decades it had lived under consistent pressure to go along to the ruler's political call. For decades, the autocratic government monitored firmly the media,

and the ruin of President Suharto allows the media to appreciate **the new** circumstance **of being free** from **the**

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government strict control. Currently, Indonesia, the world's fourth-largest population, becomes the new emerging democratic country.¹ At the time of authoritarian era, the media that dared to ignore or underestimate government controls, they would face fatal consequences. Media permits were frequently revoked, subject to bans, and even closed down without gaining access to open trial. The restriction imposed on media prevailed until Suharto came down from power. The downfall of the last authoritarian ruler grants Indonesian media to flourish aggressively. Under heavy pressures from the civil society and the market, a series of liberalization policies were taken by the post-Suharto governments. In the television business, five new private national channels entered the business sector. The entrance took place even prior to the House of Representatives enacted the new Broadcasting Bills in November 2002. The new stations should compete with another five stations established during the era of Suharto and

once controlled by Suharto's family and cronies.² After **the**

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downfall of Suharto in 1998, and since media permits are no longer required to establish new media outlets, the number of new media rose significantly.³ Notwithstanding the ten private television channel, every one 1 Important reforms that deserve note are the liquidation of the Information Ministry which was responsible for a long record of press ban in the country; the termination of the privilege of the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) as a single association of journalists; and

the birth of the Press Law

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and Broadcasting Law in 1999 and 2002 respectively.

2 The five new private television are: Lativi (now TVOne), **Metro TV**, Global **TV**, Trans **TV**, **TV 7 (now Trans 7)**

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³ There was official number but rough estimated indicated that the

number of radio stations rose to more than 1000 from 700, and

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newspapers rose drastically to

approximately 1.000 from around 300 during Suharto's era. The

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data obtained from various sources including Johannen, Uwe & Gomez, J.(2001); Johannen & Gomez (2001, p.125); Hidayat, Deddy N (2002) and; Gazali, E (2003); Hidayat (2002) in Gazali (2003, p.2); of them situated in the capital city, a large amount of regional stations have also entered the market.⁴ With the current liberalization, almost any kind of contents can be produced by Indonesian media, and such media freedom managed to increase people's consciousness about economic and political situation of the country. Nonetheless, a question stands out whether the current media liberalizations could produce responsible and good media. The media that have capability to add to the democracy quality. Freedom and independent of Media are great just in the event that

they support other objectives, including the cultural understanding, **democracy** advancement, **prosperity, human development, and so on** (Rozumilowicz, 2002, p.13). **In**

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a newly democratic country, like Indonesia, a question may arise, how media freedom could support the acceleration of democratic transition toward a consolidated democracy. According to Linz and Stepan (1996, p.3) a country might launch its democratization process, and begins the transitions toward democracy, but they might never be completed even though a new authoritarian regime no longer holds power. In the

development of rebuilding the media, the general assumption is that media should be away from dependency and control. Media reform should advance toward an ideal of independence and freedom. The structure of media that is autonomous without

interference from government, owner, business, or dominant social groups

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(Linz and Stepan, 1996). When democratization removes state censorship, and the media enjoy freedom of expression, we have to deal with the following questions: Who ultimately controls the content in the media? Who actually shapes the news and entertainment content that we see or hear? For some, these are moot questions in media and communication studies. In the media literature, issues on factors affecting media content are actually a part

of the political economy of media. Political economy as a study started in the

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eighteenth century, somewhat to clarify, legitimize, and bolster the speeding up of capitalism (Mosco, 1996, p.11). According to Mosco (1996, p. 25), one likewise can consider

political economy as the study of the social relations, especially the relations of power that commonly constitute the generation, circulation, and utilization of assets or resources. From this vantage point, the result of communication, such as

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media content and audiences, are the primary resources. Mosco (1996, p.138) develops a substantive

map of political economy with three entry processes: commodification, spatialization, and structuration.

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Commodification is the 4

Unofficial data indicated that in 2010 there are at least 150 local commercial television stations throughout the country

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(Digibox Broadcast Solution, 2011). procedure of changing use value to trade or exchange value; Spatialization is the change of space with time, or the procedure of institutional expansion; while structuration portrays the procedure whereby structures are commonly established with human agency. According to Mosco, several issues consisting of gender, race, social class, hegemony and social movements accompany the process of structuration. Social class issues explore the significance of class power followed by gender discrimination; hegemony is the process of constituting the common sense, while race issues discuss the differential access to communication that racial division brings about; and social movements bring together people from a range of social identities. A specific interest power relation, more or less, united the people. Some media theorists, including Golding and Murdock (2000), McQuail (2000), Shoemaker and Reese (1991) and Gerbner (1969) depicted communicators in mass media as working under pressure from internal and external variables such as: proprietors, customers or clients (for example, sponsors), other media (competitors), regulators, viewers, legislators, and other institutions This research will look at how television contents were influenced by political reform followed broadcasting liberalization in post-authoritarian era. In other word, the research will investigate how the political economy of media in the era of democracy may affect media content. The research topic on political economy was chosen because of major changes in the structure of television industry recently, especially by the process of democratization. The following parts of this chapter explain in brief the theoretical concept about the

media's role in democratic society proceeded with the discussions about the

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history, structure, organizations, individuals, government regulations and practices, which dominate the media industry in Indonesia before and after the political reform in 1998. The discussions concentrate primarily on the rapid changes during the past decade, locating these developments within the context of reform after the descent of former president Suharto and his self-proclaimed New Order Government.

1.2 Media and Democracy

In the course of the last two decades, numerous nations experienced

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a transition to democracy. They moved from despotic government with low public participation in making

political decision, and weak restraint on executive power implementation, to more democratic governments with the more extensive political participation, and looser confinement on the activity of political power (Murtin & Wacziarg, 2011, p.2). It is important to note that 4 liberalization and reform in many sectors, including mass media, usually emerge going with the democratic transition process. According to Rozumilowicz (2002), during the time spent to reform the media, the general presumption is that media should be away from dependency and control. Media should progress toward ideal media that is free and independent. The structure of media

that is free of interference from proprietors, government, legislators, or predominant social masses are more ready to hold and bolster democracy and the related democratization procedure (Rozumilowicz, 2002).

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However, media which are liberal and independent are not good in them, but only in such a way that the media support other goals, including democracy, human development, prosperity, understanding of culture, and so on. Free and independent media some times, in a certain sense, buttress these greater social aims and are, therefore, rank them as less important (Rozumilowicz, 2002, p.13). Indonesia, as a newly democratic country, has to deal with the issue of whether or not the current media roles support the acceleration of democratic transition toward a consolidated democracy. According to Guo (n.d), democratic transition is the movement of political process aimed at establishing a democratic political structure, initiated either from above or below or a combination of both. The political process allows compromise and bargaining among various political powers for the resolution of social conflicts, controlling procedures and pluralist structures by which different political powers are permitted to compete over the force, adjusting power transfer, and taking part in the fundamental transformation of political structure. Linz and Stepan (1996:3) recommend a clear-cut procedure serving as an established or accepted measurement needed to set a parameter about how far any given nation has gone toward finishing its democratic transition. According to them a transition process to democracy is finished

when a government comes to power that is the immediate outcome of free and popular vote, when

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adequate accord

has been reached about political mechanism to create and chose government, when government has the ability to

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deliver new laws and regulations,

and when the executive, legislative and legal force created by the new democracy rules system does not need to share power to other bodies de jure. Linz and Stepan

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indicate, with this working definition, that transitions may begin but they might never be completed even though a new authoritarian regime no longer holds power. Such a standard is also extremely useful in circumstances where the old non-democratic regime has collapsed or been overthrown and an interim government is in power. 5 Such moments are normally replete with elation, sweeping reforms, and decrees. However, unless there is a quick engagement to finishing every procedures required for a post-authoritarian transformation into democracy, the "temporary" interim government may get to be everlasting. Linz and Stepan differentiate between democratization and liberalization. According to them liberalization may exist even in authoritarian states. They said, in a non democratic setting, liberalization may involve a blend of social changes and policy, for example, relaxing censorship, the discharging of most political detainees, opening up a few issues for public discussion, less restriction of the media, the introduction of some legal safeguards for individuals such as habeas corpus, or a lawful action by method for which prisoners can look for alleviation from unlawful detainment. According to Linz and Stepan liberalization in a non democratic setting may also involves moderately

greater space for the organization of self-governing working class activities,

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the arrival of outcasts, measures for enhancing the dissemination and distribution of income and the like, and most important, the toleration of opposition, but short of choosing a government through freely competitive elections. In other word, according to Linz and Stepan, liberalization is a controlled partial opening of the political space, or only a limited and controlled concession of social and political rights from above. Strictly speaking, liberalization is not the same as democratization, but liberalization is vital for democracy. The concept of liberalization must be wider and more specific politically. Democratization needs open competition over the privilege to gain control of the government. Open competition thus requires free election races, the outcomes of which determines who rules. Utilizing this idea, it is clear that there can be liberalization without democratization. Consolidated Democracy. In order to achieve a level of consolidated

democracy many efforts should be made, conditions that must be established, propensities and states of mind that must be developed. All these works must be conducted during the period of transition to real democracy. With consolidation, democracy can be developed into a regular procedure, and profoundly internalized in social, institutional and even mental existence of a general public, and additionally in computations for making progress. According to Linz and Stepan (1996), civil society alludes to the arena of polity (political community) where people, movement and self-organizing groups, generally self-governing from the state, endeavors to advance their interests, make affiliations and solidarities, articulate values, and advance their interests. Political society is the arena in which an organized community particularly orchestrates

itself to challenge the real right to practice control over public power and state apparatus. 182

In modern democratic theory, especially for questions about how to consolidate democracy, it is imperative to stress not only the uniqueness of civil society and political society, but also their complementarities. They said political society should by one means or another accomplish a workable concession in which democratic power will be worked out and crafted. In this regard, civil society puts pressure, inform and periodically renew political society in order it can attain that agreement. The important level of autonomy, self-sufficiency and independence of civil and political society must further be implanted in to achieve a consolidated democracy supported by the rule of law. Every single stakeholder must regard and comply the rule of law. These conditions explained above are virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. In any case, they are considerably more possible to be contented if a bureaucracy useably by institutionalized economic societies and democratic leaders exist. A democratic government needs the compelling ability to order and manage in order to protect citizen's rights and to convey the other fundamental services that citizens request. This incorporates the capacity to practice successfully its demand to the monopoly of lawful utilization of power in the region. For this it requires a working

state and a state bureaucracy considered applicable by the 393

new democratic bureaucracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). The final supportive condition concerns the economic society, which consists of a set of social-political accepted and socio-politically crafted regulations, norms and institutions that intercedes in the middle of state and market. Linz and Stepan assume that no less than a market autonomy and ownership diversity in the economy is important to deliver the autonomy and energy of civil society with the goal that it can make its contribution to a democracy. However completely free markets do not co-exist with modern, consolidate democracies because the state is necessary to perform certain functions. Linz and Stepan give three reasons for that (pp.12-13) and conclude, that consolidation of democracy requires the institutionalization of a politically and socially directed market. This requires an economic society, which thus requires an effective state, for example to carry out privatization (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p.12-13) The Role of Media.

Within the setting of backing democratic transitions, the goal of media development in general should be to move 47

to one that is more transparent, open as well as has a degree of editorial independence that serves the people and public interest from one that is 47

controlled or even obviously directed by private or government interests. So as to set up the media that

have any significant role in a democracy so the utmost objective of media 47

support ought to

be to develop a range of diversified mediums and voices that are tenable, and 7

the credible media can be established by establishing and reinforcing a sector that advocates such objective (U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], 1999). Media sector that support democracy enables people to access to information they need to engage in society and to make informed decisions. The credible media outlet would be one that has the freedom in their editorial decisions, has different and plural voices, financially feasible, and serves people interest. The media that advocate people interest ought to be representing a variety of voices both

through the differences of perspectives and voices reflected within one outlet 231

and

a greater number of outlets (USAID, 1999). The development of autonomous and

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free media has customarily been connected to freedom of expression, viewed in theory of democracy as inherent and all inclusive human rights. However, it is not enough to state freedom of expression just as a doctrine without further examining its function in human life. In the first place, expression and communication are aspects of "humanness" that require actualization and, in certain ways, a human life is not fully realized unless it can express and communicate its state, concerns, and interest. According to Rozumilowicz (2002, p.13), in media development, this concern has given rise to a dual and dialectic process. On the one hand, the freedom and autonomy of media are vital so people can express belief, opinions and perspectives to other human beings, in a public forum. On the other hand, the freedom and independence of media are needed to educate, inform, entertain, and thereby enhance human life through the outpouring of others' opinion, idea and visions. Rozumilowicz said both aspects are seen as vitally important to the functioning of democratic government and democratic institutions. Without abundant expression of alternatives, choices get to be constrained or hindered, and without sufficient info, significant decisions can't be taken. A subsidiary issue, however, which arises with the delineation of "free and independent media," is the question of free and independent from whom or what. Independence and freedom were connected to bureaucracy directly and in the classic concept of media they functioned as the guard dog of democracy. State monopoly of media sources must be limited for the sake of giving the public with sufficient information to make 8 decisions and to guarantee a discussion forum for the development of thoughts and alternatives. Therefore, the media have been relegated to the competitive market with the understanding that economic criteria of access should prevent tyranny of opinion. Modern technologies have led to the circumstances in which media are central to an ever-greater degree, and media monopoly is an increasingly significant threat. Some may question whether media dominated by the market offer the depth of information and the plurality of options necessary for democratic government to thrive. Transitional societies may further experience control of their national media by certain social or cultural elites. This can limit the access to these sources for minority

social and cultural groups. In this case, to ensure democracy, it is

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important to ensure access to those less privileged. It seems that the substance of media freedom and independence lies in its non-monopolization, whether by the market, government, or by predominant social forces (Rozumilowicz, 2002). 1.3 Indonesian Media in Authoritarian Era For decades, Indonesian media were closely monitored and lived under consistent pressure to comply to the ruler's political demand, and by an interventionist government. The media must confront deadly results in the event that they set out to belittle or disregard controls from government. Without any recourse to open trial, Indonesian media are frequently subject to bans. The restriction on media prevailed until the last authoritarian leader stepped down from power in 1998. This part introduces the Indonesian liberal mass media today by firstly explaining what had happened to the media during the authoritarian era, before the liberalization took place in 1998. It seeks to explain key incidents, which illustrate the government's firm hand in controlling and penalizing the press during the authoritarian era.

It is important to comprehend the development of the media during this period, in order to

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understand fully Indonesian liberal media currently. This part also illustrates a brief development of the press since the independence of Indonesia, and during the period of authoritarian government under the leadership of the first president Sukarno (called Old Order era), and the second president Suharto (New Order Era). The following discussion notes, particularly the periods of government's anti-press actions, and more recent economic liberalization and expansion during the current period of democratization. This chapter will especially focus on the recent expansion in circulations and markets, together with changing

patterns of ownership and financial control, particularly the emergence of media

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empires. 9 1.3.1 Media in Old Order Era The foundation of the Republic of Indonesia after the Proclamation of Independence by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta on 17 August 1945 was enthusiastically supported and disseminated by a 'nationalist' mass media. The news agency Antara, originally founded in 1937 and absorbed by the Japanese Domei agency during the Occupation, re-emerged in September 1945.

A growing clutch of nationalist papers appeared following the independence,

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primary amongst them the Jakarta-based Merdeka (Independence).

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Merdeka proved to be an enormously important training ground for an early generation of renowned journalist/editors after the independence of Indonesia.⁵ During the initial decade of independence in 1945, Indonesian media

was dubbed by founding president Sukarno a 'toll of the Revolution', responsible for energizing and mobilizing public opinion

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(Hill 2007, p.14). In the early years of Independence throughout the 1950s the number of newspapers sprung up 'like mushrooms in the rainy season', as political parties sought media promotion for their views. In 1949, the year the Dutch recognized the country's

independence, there were 75 press issuances, with an aggregate circulation of 413,000 for every issue. By 1955, the time of Indonesia's first General Election, the quantity of publications had expanded sixfold to 457, with an eight-fold increment altogether circulation to 3.46 million. The Indonesian population was by then around 85.5 million

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(Dhakidae 1991, p.551). According to Hill (2007), the 1950s and early sixties were characterized by a vibrant, often caustically partisan press, organized along party lines, technologically and financially impoverished but richly committed to stimulating public debate and mobilizing public opinion. In 1957, throughout the period of martial law, Sukarno was determined to rein in renegade media for a range of 'political' reasons such as considered lending editorial support for regional movements against the central government, or offending the president or senior political or military figures. Sukarno closed down newspapers, and he was adamant that, whatever the international odium associated with the press suppression, he would 'not allow destructive criticism of my leadership' (Hill 2007, p.30). As part of an effort by government to mobilize the mass media in forging a strong and unified nation, a presidential decree in 1962 brought the news organization Antara 5 Merdeka is today Indonesia's oldest-running, most irrepensible national daily. The young activist-journalists who established the paper was B.M Diah (76) who acted as editor-in-chief. He passed away in 1996. Diah was only in his mid-20s when he took over the Japanese sponsored Indonesian-language daily Asia Raya. See Chaniago, J.R. et.al (1987) in Hill, T. D (2007, p.27). straightforwardly

under the power of the President, as the 'semi-governmental' National News Agency (LKBN Antara). While keeping up an operational self-sufficiency, in practice, government control expanded.⁶ In

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February and March 1965, some 29 papers were closed for their support of an anti-Communist or anti-Sukarno bloc. In the repercussion that followed the political chaos of 1 October 1965, some 46 of Indonesia's 163 remaining newspapers were banned indefinitely because of their presumed association with, or sympathy for, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its allies (Atmakusumah, 1980). Many hundreds of staff were arrested. Leftists were expelled from the

Indonesian Journalist Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, PWI) and the

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national Antara news agency. It was the worst suppression toward media

in the history of the press in independent Indonesia.

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Antara, for example, was decimated after the events of 1 October 1965, when it was placed under the Jakarta regional military command and 30% of its editorial staff were sacked. The arrests and killing of Communist and sympathizing journalists in 1965-66, carried out against a background of large-scale massacres in the countryside, cast a very long shadow over the press for subsequent decades (Hill 2007, p.35). 1.3.2 Media in New Order Era With the transition of government after the putsch of 1 October 1965 and the transfer of power to Major-General Suharto on 11 March 1966, the

New Order Government dropped the 'revolutionary' rhetoric in

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favor of a more moderate call to the industry. The new government called the press to safeguard

national security against internal and external threats, and to

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act with a conscience

as the 'guardian of the Pancasila', the five ideological principles of the

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nation (Hill, 2007). The Pancasila, initially coined by Sukarno in an extempore speech on 1 June 1945, was substantially re-interpreted by the New Order government. 7 Indonesian constitution basically requires freedom of expression to be provided for by law (Article 28) however after 1945 the government has implemented other laws that significantly have restricted

the freedom of the press. The Indonesia Act

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No 11, 1966 (it was modified in act No 1 of 1967 and amended with act No 21 of 1982) on the Basic Principles 6 See Atmakusumah's entry on 'Antara' in Ensiklopedia Nasional Indonesia (1988), Vol 2, PT Cipta Adi Pustaka, Jakarta, pp.132-137. 7 The new interpretation of Pancasila principles to become:

belief in the one and only God; a just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations representatives; and social justice for all the Indonesian

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people (Morfit, 1981). of the Press declares

that 'No censorship or bridling shall be applied to the National Press

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that

freedom of the press is guaranteed in accordance with the fundamental rights of citizens and

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that no publication permit is needed⁸. Nevertheless, the fact made a ridicule of these principles for during an unspecified 'transitional period' two related permits had to be obtained by newspaper publishers: the

Permit-to-Publish (SIT) from the ostensibly civilian Department of Information, and the Permit-to-Print (SIC) from

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the military security authority body, or Kopkamtib. It was not possible to produce a regular publication legally without both of these permits and the withdrawal of either one by their issuing authority effectively banned the periodical (Hill, 2007). The Press Law stipulated that for a transitional period, publishers required a publication permit, SIT, obtainable from the Department of Information. However, the "transitional period" lasted until 1982 when a new demand for license, replaced the old one. (Sen & Hill, 2000). In promoting this adherence to a common Pancasila ideology, the Suharto Government sought to eliminate party organs or critical papers, domesticate the vociferous press, and ensure that press workers and management were ultimately to the government. By 1969, savage bans, by the incoming regime cut the number of newspapers and magazines, and their total circulation, to less than half the 1964 level (Dhakidae 1991, p. 551). In July 1971 two newspapers *Harian Kami* and *Duta Masyarakat* were banned briefly for contravening a government prohibition against election coverage or comment during the 'Week of Calm' (Minggu Tenang) preceding the general elections. In January 1973 a newspaper *Sinar Harapan* had its Printing Permit (SIC) withdrawn by security apparatus for eight days for leaking details of the 1973-74 National Budget Proposal (RAPBN) prior to its formal release in a Presidential address to the Legislative Assembly (DPR). But such incidents were minor in contrast to the 'slash and burn' style of press control during martial law in the late 1950s and the New Order crackdowns of 1974 and 1978. In 1974, twelve publications have their printing and publishing permits withdrawn.⁹ Only two publications were permitted to reappear, albeit with altered names and pruned of certain staff.¹⁰ The multiple bans were induced by widespread public demonstrations erupted in January over several days in Jakarta, triggered off by the visit of Japanese Prime Minister 8 See Chapter 2 Article 4, Article 5.1., Chapter 4 Article 8.2 Act No 11, 1966. 9 Those publications are: *Mingguan Wenang*, *Pemuda Indonesia*, *Ekspress* weekly newsmagazine, *Nusantara*,

Harian KAMI, *Indonesia Raya*, *Abadi*, *The Jakarta Times*, *Pedomam* (all Jakarta), *Suluh Berita (Surabaya)*, *Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Bandung), and *Indonesia Pos*

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(Ujungpandang) ¹⁰ The two publications were *Pelita* (replacing the *Islamic Abadi*) and *The Indonesian Times* (replacing the English-Language *The Jakarta Times*) Tanaka, but rooted in growing hostility towards government social and economic policy and festering distrust for leading presidential confidantes and associates. The government ultimately responded with an iron fist against the demonstrators and the media, which had given them sympathetic coverage, and supported public criticism of government policies. In January 1978, seven Jakarta dailies were banned after their assertive reports on

anti-government student protests, which were sweeping through the main campuses

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(Hill, 2007).¹¹ Government development policies, specifically the questionable involvement of foreign investors, Chinese financiers and government officials, were targets of student censure. The President's family was specifically criticized and there were calls for him to stand down. Security authorities responded the protests by banning the newspapers including a further seven student newspapers, disbanding all university student councils. The move was made prior to the military occupation of several key campuses and the arrest of some 223 students. Unlike 1974 when several of the papers were killed off, in 1978 the banned papers were back on the streets within weeks, and although there have been many subsequent bans, never again has the broad press community challenged the government in such a concerted frontal manner and been suppressed in such numbers. From this low point in the early 1970s, over the next two decades the media industry in Indonesia had been transformed dramatically. Publications look smarter and more attractive, as full advantage has been taken of improving technologies. The entry of heavyweight investors into the industry during the late 1980s changed the patterns of press ownership and broadened the range of publication produced. The Indonesian press industry was riding the crest of a wave of media expansion. In the electronic media, in 1988 the first private-owned

television station, RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia) began test broadcasting in

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Jakarta. Two years later SCTV (Surya Citra Televisi) followed suit in Surabaya. In 1991 the nominally 'educational' television channel TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia) commenced broadcasting nation-wide, eight hours daily. In both the print and electronic media the new decade promised a continued growth, flux and change. This new investments improved significantly the salaries and general working conditions of journalists as 'headhunting' entered the industry, perceptibly altering the ethos of the profession, and the stakes required to play in the industry's big league. Both sales and newspaper coverage, see Dhakidae 1991: 301-323 figures and the capital required to establish and run a sustainable publication rose rapidly. For the first time in Indonesia history, media companies graduated from cottage industry to the ranks of big business (Hill 2007, p.15). However, the burgeoning trend of the media companies in the 1980s did not loosen government's grip on the industry. In 1980s, numerous individual publications have also been killed, including a business magazine *Jurnal Akin* in 1983, *Fokus* magazine (1984), *Sinar Harapan* (1986), *Prioritas* (1987), and *Monitor* (1990). The Publication Permit of *Jurnal Ekuin* and *Fokus* were withdrawn over articles on 'Indonesia's 100 Millionaires', and '200 Wealthy Indonesians' the lists which included an embarrassing number of New Order confederates (Sadono, 1993). Newspaper *Sinar Harapan* was shot down over commentaries on economic policies, and after considerable negotiating and editorial restructuring the prime movers behind *Sinar Harapan* were permitted to bring out a new paper, *Suara Pembaruan*, on 3 February 1987. A burgeoning new economic daily *Prioritas* was shut down because of various reasons. According to the Ministerial Decision withdrawing the newspaper licence, despite prior warnings 'Prioritas daily newspaper still continued as a general and political paper, contravening the conditions of its permits as a daily [which specified that it would] allocate 75% of its space to economic news/reports and 25% to general news/reports'. Its reporting was 'in conflict with the values of the Pancasila Press System' and various press laws and regulation. Furthermore, it 'often contained news which was incorrect, not based on facts, and which was cynical, insinuating, tendentious and clearly violating the essence of responsible press freedom'.¹² Many observers regarded these as spurious justification, suggesting that the ban was due rather to the accuracy of *Prioritas*' predictions of government economic policy. Despite numerous subsequent protests by owner Surya Paloh at this arbitrary exercise of ministerial power, the once flamboyant *Prioritas* remains a memory. Tabloid *Monitor* was the most successful publication in the country's largest publishing empire, Kompas-Gramedia, until its publishing permit was curtailed in 1990. *Monitor*'s high-flying editor Arswendo Atmowiloto offended official vocal Muslim groups with what he thought was an innocuous readers' 'popularity poll' in the 15 October edition. In what was interpreted by some Muslims as an unforgivable sleight against the Prophet and the Faith, the poll listed the Prophet Muhammad at 11th place (somewhat under President Suharto in the first place and Arswendo himself in tenth). A flurry of militant Islamic groups demanded the closure of the magazine and the arrest of the editor in one of the most controversial religious imbroglios in the New Order. Faced with the threat of a widespread Islamic backlash against all its publications, the nominally Catholic publisher Kompas-Gramedia willingly surrenders *Monitor*'s publication permit. Arswendo was charged with offending religious sentiments and was sentenced to five years' jail (Hill, 2007, p. 41). In the early 1990s, there was a general sense of increasing political latitude and liberalism as previously taboo topics began to be broached with greater boldness. Some believed that the very magnitude of the publishing industry and the growing diffuseness and fragmentation of power in the New Order State would no longer enable the government to undertake the kind of mass bans that typified the 1970s. At the very least, such bans could not be imposed with impunity. But beyond many predictions, the government has done the most dramatic crackdown on the press since 1978 by withdrawing the publication permits of the country's three major news weekly publications: the longest-running and highly prestigious *Tempo* magazine; the most critical, fastest selling political tabloid of the 1990s, *DeTIK*; and the weekly magazine *Editor*, modeled on *Tempo*. Taking full advantage of a period of increasingly open political and press coverage since 1991, these publications together with most others had published detailed (often critical) analyses of presidential family business, human rights abuses, misuse of authority, maladministration of government funds, and factional splits within the government and the military. While the issue was cumulative, in the preceding months these three

publications had tested fate with several on-going reports. Among other stories, tempo had detailed conflicts within the Cabinet between Finance

Minister Mar'ie Muhammad, and Suharto protégé **Minister for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie,** over **the** purchase and refurbishment of

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39 ships

from the mothballed **navy of the former East Germany.**

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Detik had highlighted military criticism of key civilians within the government in startlingly forthright interviews with disgruntled senior officers, and has speculated openly about who would succeed Suharto. In April 1994 Editor ran a cover story questioning when the President's son, Hutomo Mandala Putra (known as Tomy), would be called to account in the trial of office-bearers of the collapsed government development bank, Bapindo. The probing proved too much for the president, who in an extempore public speech railed publicly against the media's license, asserting that some publication were jeopardizing national stability by provoking political controversy over issues like the purchase of the German warships. Despite this forewarning, the triple ban caught most observers by surprise and was widely regarded as a politically counterproductive over-reactions. According to Ariel Heryanto (1990),

the mass media, including the press and particularly the **electronic media,**

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have

been the most important area of maintenance and reproduction of the New Order's legitimation.

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Understandably, the Indonesian press has been an institution of cultural practice that went through the most severe and most frequently blows of the [New Order] State. During the authoritarian era, the government had created political barriers to entry in the media industry. The policy was aimed at producing domination by the government with the power to grant and to revoke media licenses. The government-controlled television station TVRI, set up in 1962, was the first and the only television in Indonesia for 26 years since its inception. Through its power, the regime was able to limit market players to politically favorable parties. This was especially visible in the television industry, when the government for the first time in 1988 granted licenses to the private commercial television RCTI controlled by Bimantara Group, a predominantly general product holding

company, owned by Suharto's son.

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Another four private commercial televisions, which follow suit in the nineties: Indosiar, SCTV, and TPI (now MNC)

had been under the control of giant enterprises owned by Suharto's

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circle. David T. Hill (2007) wrote something about this: While several such entrepreneurs had invested heavily in the press during the boom years of the 1980s, on the surface the industry did not then seem to have attracted interest from members of the Suharto family. This contrasted starkly with the television industry in which the three pioneering private channels, initially in Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya (but now carried nationally on Palapa satellite) were effectively monopolized by companies associated with President Suharto's family (p. 99). Suharto's son Bambang Trihatmojo owned RCTI, issued with the first commercial television license in 1987. Foster brother Sudwikatmono gained the second commercial license in 1990, heading Surya Citra Televisi, SCTV. In August 1990, TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia, or Indonesia Educational Television), controlled by President

Suharto's daughter H. Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana (known affectionately as'mbak Tutut)

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through her holding company Cipta Lamtoro Gung Persada, gained the third licence. The entry of new stations represents both horizontal (or cross-media) and vertical integrations.

Vertical integration alludes **to the pattern of business ownership in which**

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an organization sets up or purchases different business company,

which relate to the core business – say, publishing. Specifically, extensive **media organizations tend to attempt to oversee production, distribution and retailing**

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(Golding & Murdock, 2000). This is similar to a 16 pattern by which business conglomerations, from other spheres of operations penetrated broadcasting sector as part of their business expansion (Golding & Murdock, 2000, p.10). 1.4 Political Changes and Press Liberalization The 21 of May 1998 was a day of great importance in the Indonesian history. The day when President Suharto was forced to surrender his power after more than 30 years in power. From that day, the country started its path to democracy, which also paves the way for freedom of the press, and one-step in this process was the development of a new press law. Observers perceived

that the media actually played an important role in the process of

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Suharto's forced resignation. It started with

the ban of three publications: Tempo, DeTik and Editor

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in 1994. The ban triggered dissatisfaction among many journalists who then took to the street to stage protests. Another significant protest took place in 1996 when an opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesian first president Sukarno, was forced to leave her political party Indonesia Democratic Party (PDI). The move was mentioned to be masterminded by the authority. Public discontent toward government reached its culmination in 1998 when newspapers reported about the riots breaking out all over the country. President Suharto himself announced his resignation at the presidential palace broadcast live across the country by some private television stations erected by his own children. It was a very dramatic moment especially when Suharto said "I declared my resignation as President", responded by cheerfulness and ecstatic joy by tens of millions television audience, especially the gathering demonstrating students who had waged protests for days just to wait that very precious moment. Suharto was then superseded by his protégé, Vice-president, B.J Habibie. He was the one who lead the country until an election could take place the following year. Immediately Habibie started to decide about new political reforms. One of the most important reforms were the new electoral law which made Indonesia, for the first time since 1955, go to a fair and democratic election in June 1999. He announced that Indonesian citizens were free to form new political parties and opened up for a press freedom that was not possible before. (Johannesson, 1999; Liddle, 1999). Habibie appointed General Muhammad Yosfiah as Minister of Information, and one of Yosfiah's first moves was to abolish the right for the Department of Information to revoke press permits. He also

allowed the establishment of other journalists' associations than the state sanctioned PWI

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and he

streamlined the process of granting government approval to new media organizations

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(Tesero, 2000). 17 Yosfiah and a lot of media people also recognized that the press law needed to be changed to reflect the new reality in Indonesia. The ministry therefore began to draft a new press law. He also invites people from the media community to help him draft a new press act. And finally on September 22 1999, Indonesia's new Press Law number 40 was signed by president B.J Habibie replacing Soeharto's repressive 1982 Press Law. The move, maybe one of the last reasonable acts in Habibie's brief 17-month administration. Its motivation was to give a lawful system to a free press after so many years under autocratic rule when the country's press was definitely not free. The 1999 Press Law compellingly uprooted the instrument of government control. The 21-article law rejects the power of government to issue permit, censor, regulate, or ban the press. Further, the law commanded the foundation of a totally new, autonomous Press Council to maintain

freedom of the press and improve the national press.

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13 With the Press Law,

for the first time in the history of the Indonesian press, the

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regulation of the press transfers from the government to the media industry itself. Article 15 stipulates that a

Press Council is established to develop the freedom of the press. The Press

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Council will have a lot of functions, such as to

protect the freedom of the press

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from any intervention; conduct studies to develop the existence of the press and decide and control the compliance of the Code of Ethics for Journalists. It is also said that members of the Press Council are journalists, people from press companies and representatives from the society who are experts in the field of the press and/or communication. The government's decisions to abandon the system of licenses made it possible for the print media to grow in a matter of a few months from 289 to more than 1000. (Heryanto & Adi, 2001). Soon it was inflation of both journalist organizations and publications. In early 2000, there were about 40 press organizations (Leijel, 2002). It was like the euphoria of freedom celebrated by the society. Not only in the press industry, but also among the political parties, there was an "explosion" with the formation of 108 new parties, compared to three during Suharto's era (Batubara, 2001). Two obstacles are particularly serious about the development of a free and democratic press in Indonesia. They are the problems with the increased violence against journalists and the absence of institutions working in the society, such as the police and the judiciary. The media have progressed speedier than other democratic institutions, for example, the legal 13 The Jakarta Post daily. Indonesia Press Acts: Mend or Amend, 23 September 2011 bodies, and are currently forcing these bodies and society as a whole, to keep stride (Leijel, 2002). The defamation and the legal environment are one of the main negative components for the nation's press.

Cases brought against the media that charge untruthful or unfair reporting keep on being filed and indicted in numerous courts as criminal offenses. A portion of the

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criticism cases are politically inspired filed by political or business leaders, and with more

politicians and businesses owning their own private media, the connection between media outlets and political

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force in some cases produce an extremely bias content (Kaufman, 2010). 1.5 Broadcast Liberalization So far, the discussion about press development in Indonesian is dominated by the print media (newspapers, magazines) and rarely describes the electronic media (radio, television). It has been recognized that the media closure cases, mostly befall upon the non- electronic media. The reason for this is because print media, especially newspapers, had always been freer than the TV and the radio, and under the Suharto era, the TV and the radio were more or less state owned or owned by Suharto's relatives. (Sen & Hill, 2000). According to a London-based human rights and media freedom watch organization called itself 'Article 19', Indonesian Broadcasting Law, together with 1999 Press Law, is a symbol of civil society's triumph in advancing free, autonomous and independent media and propelling the public interest. The draft Bill supplanted the 1997 Broadcasting Act, which formally became effective on

September 1999 but it never been implemented in practice

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(Article 19, 2002). President Abdurrahman Wahid, who replaced Habibie tried to draft the new Press Law and Broadcast Law. After being drafted during President Wahid, the new broadcast law was signed by President Megawati, Wahid's predecessor, in 2002. One year later, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), an independent state regulatory body, was established. The draft was initially rejected and protested by The Private TV Association (ATVSI) immediately. The law intends to cut the long-held privilege of the Jakarta-based national television companies to broadcast directly across the country, undermining the right of local people to establish their own private television stations. Under the new Law, the national television companies can reach their audience in the regions only by affiliating with local stations. It is obviously disadvantaging them. Before the existence of the new Broadcast Law, 19 national TV stations pocket all the advertiser money. Now, they have to negotiate and cooperate with local TVs about the share of the advertisement revenues. The TV companies even mobilized their workers, talents and artists to demonstrate to the parliament building when the bill was deliberated. The stations also campaigned through their TV screens telling people that "the freedom of the press is dead" because the new law may kill the public freedom to get information and entertainment. In fact, the new law gives opportunities to every region (town and regency) to have their local private television stations. Currently, almost every town and regency in Indonesia has their own local private television stations. However, the domination of private national television stations still continues. Until 2012, ten years after the enactment of broadcast law, the national television companies still can reach their audience in the regions without necessarily affiliating with local stations, undermining the right of local TV stations toward their own broadcast zone. According to human rights organization Article 19, the law

represents a very significant improvement over the 1997 Broadcasting Act, and it

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contains a number of positive features. It recognizes the

important role of the three categories of broadcast station – public, commercial, community, and

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subscription broadcasting services. In general, the law tries to ensure the free stream of information and thoughts to the public in Indonesia. The organization stated that the law also commands the establishment of independent broadcast regulator, the

KPI, with responsibility for regulating and providing recommendations in the area of broadcasting.

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KPI consists of national (KPI)

and regional bodies (KPID), with important authority over broadcasting (Articles 6 and 7).

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Members of KPI and KPID were nominated

by the People's Representative Council (DPR) and the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) after public input and based on a fit and proper test

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(Pursuant to Article 10) KPI's

members are formally appointed by the President and KPID's members

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are appointed by the Provincial Governors. A number of formal conditions must be met by the member candidates, including not being linked to any political parties and not having interests in any mass media. Upon the suggestion of the DPR, members may be replaced by a Presidential Decree (with a comparable process for regional members). Considerable

protection against political or business impedance in the work of the

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KPI was granted through these provisions, Article 19 said. In the meantime, the law has various concerns. Regardless of the way that it builds up

the KPI as an autonomous body, the law also grants important powers to the government with 20 regard to

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broadcasting permit (contrary to clear international standards).¹⁴ The arrangement in the law for huge government controls over television, frequently mutually with the KPI, pose a far more serious problem. Pursuant to Article 33, even though upon proposal and after concurrence with the KPI, albeit upon endorsement and after approval with the KPI, it is the government ministry, not the KPI that allocate licenses to broadcasting media. Consistent with international law in this area,

a ministry frequently under the control of a senior politician, ought to have no role at all in issuing

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broadcast permits. Although attempts have been made to restrict the role of the government on issuing licenses but the provision still persist (Article 19). A number of articles in the broadcast law stipulate many other

regulatory matters to be created together by the KPI and the legislature. Examples include the

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procedure for obtaining a broadcasting permit; provisions concerning the networking of broadcast stations

and the activities of foreign broadcasters as well as

regulations on the procedures for imposing administrative sanctions, Article

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19 said. Not all the regulatory power

noted above are necessarily prone to this type of abuse of power. For instance, **it is** commonplace for governments to set guidelines on media

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proprietorship. The problem with allocating powers to governments

is that it may misuse these powers to cutoff critical or independent media

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in spreading stories about government's works.

Many of these powers, especially the ones relating to permitting procedures and sanctions, may be manhandled for political reasons and

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ought to, thus, be allotted just to a free body, for example, the

KPI, and not to government. In fact, to some degree these powers undermine the endeavors made in Article 32 to confine the role of the State in issuing

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television and radio licenses (Article 19). 1.6 Problem Statement This research departs from the above-described circumstances Indonesian broadcasting media are facing at the present time. The research topic on political economy chosen because new life has been given to media, organizational research by major

changes in the structure of the television industry, especially by the

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process of democratization, globalization, ownership conglomeration, and organizational fragmentation. This research is conducted nearly 16 years after the collapse of President Suharto's 32-year authoritarian rule in 1998, ending the era of government-controlled media. The 14 Alliance of Independent Journalist (AJI) and

Article 19 (2005), Freedom of Expression and the Media in Indonesia.

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p48 research grapples with a persistent question, which become a problem statement of this research: although broadcast regulator, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), plays a role in the era of liberalization but when state censorship is removed, who ultimately controls media content?; Does the KPI function well? How political economic factors influence television workers in shaping content?; Which political economic factors that influence television workers and their content the most? All these issues have been problematic because nobody knows exactly the answers of these questions in the context of post-authoritarian Indonesia. No comprehensive study has been made about this particular topic so far. Some subsequent problematic statements may also worth to ponder. For example, how will Indonesian broadcast media, especially television, operate in a post-authoritarian context while the rules and practices of democracy are being constructed? Since one group's majority rule may well imply the silencing of another, so it is important to ask: how will journalists and other media practitioners relate to popular but not necessarily unified aspirations for democracy? In addition, what in the end is the value of an open media to the establishment of democratic governance in Indonesia? Pertaining to a question, who actually shapes media content in Indonesia today? In the final analysis, without day-to-day state control over what appears in the media, media workers literally 'make' the content and interpret them for the audience. However, the practice of producing media content is itself always determined by a number of influential factors that surround the media. This research focuses on investigating the influential political economic factors that affect television content, and how these factors affect the content. The political economy factors will include media owners, advertisers, regulators, audience or politicians. This research will focus on measuring the influence of these political economy factors over television content by means of surveys on television workers, and by means of in-depth interviews, observation, and document study we will know how these influential factors affect content during the democratic era in Indonesia.¹⁵ The central question in the

study of political economy of communication is how the

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public sphere be restrained or liberated by the

changes in the array of forces that exercise control over cultural production and distribution.

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This directs attention to two key issues. The first is the ownership pattern of such institutions and the consequences of this pattern

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toward 15 See Chapter 3 for details of research methods used in this research project.

control over their media content. The second is the nature of the relationship between communications institutions and state regulation (Golding & Murdock,

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2000). This study is important to identify general patterns and/or relationships of political economy factors being studied and to make predictions about the influence of those factors on media content particularly in the Indonesian context. Last but not least,

this research is expected to contribute to the development of political economy media

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studies.

This research is about the political economy of media,

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with a focus on television, based on theoretical frameworks of political economy of communication suggested by several communication theorists, especially those propounded by

Peter Golding and Graham Murdock (2000), Denis McQuail (2000), and Pamela J. Shoemaker and

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Stephen D. Reese (1991) and others. 1.7 Research Objectives This research will look at how political economy factors in the liberalization era in Indonesia may affect the relationship between television stations with their stakeholders, which in turn affect media organizational activity and the mass communicator role, and finally these all things affect media content. Since television content among stations vary in term of genre, so it is unlikely to focus on specific programs. This research focus on ten Jakarta-based free-to-air national television stations whose content compositions are not exactly similar. A survey is carried out toward television workers (media centric) combined with interview with various sources, including professionals from internal and external television organization and other parties representing the industry stakeholders. Both survey and interview are conducted in order to get comparative findings for the sake of research triangulation, more than one research method is used in this study in order to confirm the results.

Based on the above illustration, some formulation with regard to the objectives of this research can be drawn as the following: 1) To

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describe how political economy factors influence television workers in shaping the content. 2) To determine which political economy factors that influence television workers and their content the most. 3) To identify general patterns and/or relationships in the political, economic factors being studied particularly in Indonesia context. 4) To make an estimate about the influence of political economy variables being studied on media content particularly in Indonesia context. 5) To contribute to the development of media political economy studies. 1.8 Key Research Questions 1) How do political economy factors influence television workers in shaping content? 2) What is the most influential political, economic factor that affects television workers in shaping content? 1.9 Research Significance Fundamental changes have affected a very large part of the world media system during the last two decades, not only in the countries within the old communist bloc in Eastern Europe, but also in developing countries, which have been liberated from an authoritarian regime like Indonesia. As McQuail (2000) stated that, it is impossible to leave this extensive change unrewarded in a chapter of media structure in a book of media theory. The diversity of circumstances among those countries makes broad generalization impossible. This applies especially in the early stages of the process, and to the various ideological components, which included nationalism, religion and liberty of expression and of economic enterprises. This research is expected to gain important findings in understanding mass media, especially television. This research is especially studying factors affecting the content which may produce very significant and valuable data in the

study of the political and economy of mass media. As Golding and

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Murdock (2000:6) said that access to audience and texts are relatively easy, but businesses of media

are not. Information about their financial affairs **and** policies **is hard to** be obtained **for reasons of confidentiality.** They said **access to the production needs of their businesses may be denied for the same reason.** Media **organizations are** frequently **suspicious of what academic researchers are going to do and say**

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(p.6). As mentioned earlier, this research would provide insight on various factors affecting television contents. The findings of this research would be

a contribution to the knowledge **of political economy of** media. In addition, **the** context of

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this research is more specifically 24 focused on Indonesia due to the lack of research concerning the actual situation of the television industry after the collapse of the last authoritarian ruler of the country. According to McQuail (2000), while there are enduring differences between media systems, which have their origin in the facts of history, geography, culture and politics, nevertheless there are also many similarities between countries. He said, media particular character and mode of integration depend on factors that lie outside media systems while they are still very much the institutions of particular nation states. It is important not to assume that we can properly understand the media of a particular society, nor to underestimate this continued diversity in terms of a few universal features of structure and dynamics. In addition to the difference of media systems, patterns of cultural preference and actual media use behavior also differ markedly from country to country. The differences originated not only in politics, culture and history but also in varying market circumstances (reflecting the great complexity of the media business). Media markets are still very culturally specific. Commonly experienced trends, such as that of media globalization, do not logically have to lead to the same outcomes in certain countries, including in Indonesia.

New means of distribution (such as cable, satellite and telecommunication networks) **have also given rise to new kinds of media**

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organization (McQuail, 2000). _____ CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 The Fall of Suharto and

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Political Transition For more than 50 years, two leaders, Sukarno and Suharto, who run their governments in an authoritarian manner, ruled Indonesia. Sukarno, who led the struggle for independence of Indonesia from the Netherlands, was the country's first President from 1945 to 1967. During his rule, and with the backing of the military, Sukarno disbanded political parties, arrested and imprisoned political opponents, used martial law to closed-down mass media criticism of the government's policies, and other repressive actions. Suharto rose to power after the assassination of six senior generals in October 1965 in a coup attempt launched by the supporters of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) supported by a group in Indonesian military forces. The assassination angered many people who retaliated by involving in a massacre that killed as many as half a million PKI's supporters. Soeharto, at that time one of the most senior generals, assumed control of the army. He then managed to reestablish order, stability and security. The turmoils led to the collapse of president Sukarno, and Suharto was appointed for the first of his five-year terms as President. He ruled Indonesia for more than three decades. Suharto maintained his authoritarian regimes with the backup of military. Suharto managed his New Order government by combining suppression with co-optation to curb the rise of organized political opposition. For example, by the early 1970s, the ten legal parties permitted by the previous government of President Sukarno had been cut to three in the era of Suharto. The three political parties are: the government's electoral vehicle and the military- created, Golongan Karya (Golkar), the Indonesian Democracy

Party (PDI), and the Muslim- based United Development Party (PPP). Unless for Golkar, **the**

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chance for the two political parties to assemble popular support was severely limited. They were fully controlled by the operations of military intelligence, while the government's support of their leaderships depended on their incorporation into Suharto's nepotism. The government maintained its outright repression policy. Opponents of all types were imprisoned, or faced intimidation, and other restrictions. According to Indonesian constitution,

People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) elects separately **president and vice president**

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for five-year terms. MPR consists of the members 26 from the House of Representative (DPR) and representatives of the regions and social groups appointed by Suharto. In other words, Indonesia's president was elected by and responsible to the MPR. Despite electing presidents, MPR also had authority to alter the constitution, decide the State Policy Broad Outline and issue quasi constitutional of MPR decrees. Under Suharto's regime, military officers dominated both the central and regional administration. Legislative elections were held at five-yearly intervals. Golkar managed to gain constant victories throughout the New Order period. It always won, on average, more than 60 per cent of the votes. Following the election, the MPR convened and regularly reelected Suharto as president by common consent. In mid-1997, backed by the booming in the economy, Suharto's political power seemed imperturbable. According to Crouch (2010, p.18), Suharto was in full control and appeared destined eventually to die in office. In July 1997, the Financial Crisis in several Asian countries, sparked by the Thai Baht crash, devastated Indonesian economy and other Asian countries. MPR members met in March 1998 and despite the economic catastrophe, unanimously re-chose Suharto for his seventh presidential

term, and endorsed his chosen one for the vice president, **B.J. Habibie**

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(Crouch, 2010). The inability of the government to halt the economic plunge sparked popular resentment especially toward Chinese community. Many Indonesians saw a Chinese businessman grew bigger, and some of them became conglomerates, because their businesses were supported by Suharto. The anti-Chinese food riots broke in many towns while students staged protests across the country called on the president to resign. The waves of demonstration, and the inability of government and security forces to cope with them, forced President Soeharto reluctantly agreed to resign and, according to the constitution,

was replaced by his vice president, **B.J. Habibie**

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(Crouch, 2010). 2.2 The Democratic Governments Era 2.2.1 President B.J. Habibie Within days of succeeding to the presidency, Habibie was proposing the release of political detainees, anti-subversion law reform, the removing of restrictions on the press, the formation of new political parties and the holding of a new general election. Habibie decided to hold an early general election based on new electoral legislation and lifted existing restrictions on the formation of new political parties. MPR that convened at a Special Session on November 1998 brought forward the next general election from 2002 to June 1999 under a new electoral law. The holding of an election was crucial to Habibie's attempts to win legitimacy and curb opposition in the parliament. The new electoral laws were formulated in crisis-ridden circumstances amid huge demonstrations that occurred regularly in Jakarta throughout the year demanding the implementation of a quick political reform agenda. On the last day of November 1998, the MPR's special session was held in order to allow the June 1999 election. Outside the MPR building, security forces had fired on demonstrators, killing seven students and wounding many more. The outcome of the session was a set of new electoral laws that permitted an election far more democratic than the New Order Era. The new laws allowed any party that could meet criteria to compete in the upcoming election, in stark contrast to the New Order laws, which permitted only three parties to contest elections. No less important was the free environment in which the election was held. The Habibie government had lifted the tight New Order restrictions on the press and other media while the military had severed its formal link with Golkar and refrained from openly backing any party. Despite widespread fears, the first genuinely free election since 1955 was held on 7 June 1999. Many Indonesians felt elated at the election and freedom they are having after decades living under authoritarian rule. Some 48 political parties, including three parties established in the New Order era contested the largely violence-free election. The results showed that no single party achieved an absolute majority (Crouch, 2010). The leading party was the

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri,

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with one third of the votes (33.8 per cent). Golkar suffered huge losses, and ran second with 22.5 per cent (74.5 per cent in 1997). Three other parties –all Muslim-based – gained significant votes: the United Development Party (PPP) with 10.7

per cent, the National Awakening Party (PKB) with 12.6 per cent and;

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National Mandate Party (PAN) with 7.1 per cent,

while another 16 small parties also won representation. PDI-P and Golkar obtained respectively 153, and 120 seats in the DPR and; 185 and 182 seats in the MPR (Crouch, 2010). The new MPR convened four months after the election in October 1999 to elect the president. The presidential election conducted indirectly in the MPR put Megawati in a strong position. Megawati's PDI-P held the largest of 27 per cent of the MPR seats, slightly more than Golkar, which obtained 26 per cent of the seats. However, the political maneuver in the MPR brought Abdurrahman Wahid, head of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's biggest Islamic organization. Wahid was almost blind, had suffered strokes twice, could not walk without assistance, and whose party grabbed only eight per cent of the seats in the MPR. The 28 ailing Wahid came out as Indonesia's first democratically elected president (Crouch, 2010). Following her lost in the presidential election, the disappointed Megawati was persuaded and finally was elected as a vice president. 2.2.2 President Abdurrahman Wahid The rise of Abdurrahman Wahid, (popularly called Gus Dur), to the

presidency was widely welcomed by those who had been protesting against authoritarianism due to his reputation as an advocate of democracy. He established the cabinet with positions was distributed among the political parties roughly according to their contribution to the president's election. The result was a disparate 35-member cabinet representing major and small parties, as well as the military. However, Gus Dur had no modern administrative skills in running the government. His erratic behavior resulted in a cabinet that lacked political coherence. He used to make controversial policy statements without consulting his cabinet colleagues. He carried out a major cabinet reshuffle that excluded senior leaders from the PDI-P and Golkar. He deprived himself unnecessarily of the support of the two biggest parties that together held a majority of seats in parliament. The revelations of misuse of government funds gave the president's opponents in the parliament to launch an impeachment process against him. In July 2001, the parliament eventually dismissed Gus Dur and his replacement, in accordance with the constitution, by the vice president, Megawati (Crouch, 2010). The MPR later elected Hamzah Haz as a Vice President. 2.2.3 President Megawati Megawati tied all major political groups into her government. The diversified cabinet members served its goal in securing the stability of the government for the remaining three years of Megawati's presidential term. However, the leader showed no clear vision or policy framework and provided little guidance to her ministers. The situation sparked rivalries within the cabinet members. The rival parties in the cabinet seemed more focused on preparing their electoral campaigns as the 2004 general election approached. Although Megawati was able to preside over a period of political stability, economic growth was not high enough to give a major boost to her re-election chances. However, the stability of Megawati's government provided space for legislative bodies to adopt important legislation (Crouch, 2010). Meanwhile, the MPR adopted fundamental reforms, which transformed the 1945 Constitution, which had been used by two authoritarian regimes, Sukarno and Suharto, in 29 ruling Indonesia. Progress in lawmaking including the adoption of new electoral laws, the police and military laws, the passage of national defense, and the revision of regional autonomy laws, while a new anti-corruption commission and court were established. The new 2004 Laws following the constitutional change provided for a direct presidential election, members of DPR (parliament) and DPD, a newly created regional representative's body, replaced the 1999 Electoral Laws. 16 General election for the DPR, 32 provincial DPRDs and 416 district DPRDs were conducted on 5 April 2004 contested by 24 parties that met the eligibility criteria (Half of the number contesting in 1999). According to the Indonesian Election Commission (KPU), two parties made significant advances, the Democrat Party and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which respectively won 7.5 per cent, and 7.2 per cent of the votes. Retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (often called SBY) established the new Democrat Party party in 2001. He was a former senior minister in Megawati's cabinet. Meanwhile, two major parties suffered declines in national votes. PDI-P fell from 33.8 per cent in 1999 to 18.3 percent, while Golkar declined to 21.6 percent from previous 22.5 per cent. The three middle-level parties in 1999 also declined, with PKB wins 10.6 percent, PPP (8.2 per cent), and PAN (6.4 per cent). 17 In the presidential race, five candidates contested the first direct election. In the first round of the election on 5 July 2004, SBY who ran together with Jusuf Kalla, and the incumbent President Megawati, who teamed up with Hasyim Muzadie emerged as the top vote-winners with respectively 33.6 per cent and 26.3 per cent of the votes and were thus qualified to enter the second round (KPU, n.d). Jusuf Kalla was a businessperson and a senior member of the Golkar party, while Hasyim Muzadie was the leader of a Java-based Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Yudhoyono, who had served in both Abdurrahman and Megawati cabinets, although both dismissed him, eventually won the second round with 60.6 per cent compared to Megawati's 39.4 per cent of the votes. 18 The first direct presidential election in 2004 was a landmark

in the reform of the country's political life. The

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election brought to an end the transitional period in Indonesia's politics that began in 1998. The election passed peacefully despite dire predictions of communal and political conflicts, and the ballot produced a result that was widely 16 According to the amended constitution, a joint session of DPR and DPD forms the MPR. 17 Indonesia Election Commission (KPU), Reports of Election Results, retrieved from <http://www>

.kpu. go.id/dmdocuments/modul_1d.pdf 18 Indonesia Election Commission

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(KPU), Reports of Election Results, retrieved from <http://www>

.kpu. go.id/ dmdocuments/modul_1d.pdf

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acknowledged as legitimate (Crouch, 2010). After Megawati ended her term, Indonesians saw three post-Suharto presidents be replaced in a short period of six years. None of whom served the normal five-year term defined by the constitution. The decade after the collapse of the New Order began with reforms by President Habibie but quickly lost their momentum under Gus Dur and proceeded very slowly under Megawati. The country was eager to see a stable, authoritative and commanding government, and Yudhoyono's convincing victory seemed to assure him of a full term. 2.2.4 President Yudhoyono President Yudhoyono's cabinet was not different very much from his predecessors of "rainbow" cabinet since he didn't produce a presidential cabinet composed solely of members of the ruling party. He formed coalitions between political parties in forming the cabinet, especially after Golkar joined in following the election of Vice President Jusuf Kalla as Golkar's general chairperson (Crouch, 2010; Sukma, 2010) The Yudhoyono presidency was marked by the further democratization of regional government. Under the

new law, provincial governors and district heads were elected

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through a direct election. There was much public speculation in the beginning about the likelihood of communal and political violence when local leaders were elected in 33 provinces and over 400 districts, but conflicts seemed minimal in practice, and there was widespread acceptance of the election results (Sukma, 2010). In 2009, other post-Suharto elections were held in Indonesia, the third democratic elections since the downfall of Suharto regime in 1998. Despite the facts that the elections were marred by administrative and technical flaws, but the ballots were largely acknowledged to be free and fair. The legislative elections were held on 9 April 2009 to determine the membership of national and regional parliaments. The parliamentary elections passed without major violence, indicating Indonesia's good record in maintaining security and political stability (Sukma, 2010). The results showed some parties gained significantly in support and others declining, but the overall pattern of a fragmented multi-party system remaining intact. The election outcomes indicated critical

changes in the distribution of votes among political parties. The

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newly established Democratic Party (PD) emerged as a champion, obtaining the biggest votes of 20.8 per cent, an almost threefold increase over its 2004 result of 7.5 per cent. The triumph of the Democratic Party in the elections came as a surprise to many people. For a party built up just eight years before the election by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono this was a remarkable 31 achievement. The more established major parties like Golkar

led by Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) led by Megawati

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Sukarnoputri suffered a significant decline. Golkar obtained 14.5 per cent of votes (or down 7.1 percentage points compared to 2004 elections) while PDIP obtained 14.0 per cent (down 4.5 percentage points compared to 2004).¹⁹ The

first round of direct presidential elections was held on 8 July 2009, the

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second such election since the descent of Suharto in 1998. Three pairs of candidates emerged: Yudhoyono-Boediono, Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto, and Megawati-Prabowo. The stunning performance of the Democratic Party in the earlier parliamentary election inspired its founder, President Yudhoyono, to consider changing his running mate. The partnership between Yudhoyono and Kalla was not renewed in 2009. Yudhoyono picked Boediono, the governor of the central bank, as his running mate. Kalla decided to challenge Yudhoyono for the presidency by picking up retired general Wiranto, former military chief during the New Order era, as his running mate (Sukma, 2010). The incumbent President Yudhoyono enjoyed

a landslide victory with 60.8 per cent of the vote,

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making a second-round presidential race, scheduled in September, demonstrated pointless. The victory proved the general most satisfactory with the democratically elected Yudhoyono's presidency (Sukma, 2010). Many Indonesians liked Yudhoyono for certain characters he had, calm,

polite, wise, fatherly and well mannered. His popularity was heightened by the view of his accomplishments, including

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political stability, and improved economic performance, especially when his government distributed money directly to the poor in a cash handout program as a part of social welfare initiatives (Sukma, 2010). Many believed that the success of the Democratic Party in the earlier parliamentary election was also attributed to the popularity of Yudhoyono, not the result of organizational success (Sukma, 2010).^{2.3} Political and Constitutional Amendment The new

People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, or MPR), as a result of the

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1999 election, had a key task of amending the 1945 Constitution that resulted in the change of Indonesia's political landscape significantly.¹⁹ The Indonesian Election Commission (KPU). Reports of 1999 Legislative Election Results. Also see Rizal Sukma (2010), "Indonesia's 2009 Elections". toward democratization.²⁰ As stated earlier, despite amending the constitution, MPR also had authority

to elect a president and a vice president, determine the

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Broad Outline of State Policy, and issue quasi constitutional of MPR decrees. Nevertheless, in spite of strong insistence from reformist groups to amend the constitution, many members of MPR are not fully committed to the thorough democratic overhaul of the constitution. Elevated as part of the national ideology, the 1945 Constitution was treated as sacred by both Sukarno and Suharto. The historic document continued to be revered by nationalist politicians even after the fall of Suharto. Before being amended for the first time since its birth in 1945, Indonesia's original Constitution was not explicitly authoritarian. The constitution had been drafted in a rush because nationalist leaders prepared to launch the Indonesian revolution against Dutch colonial rule in 1945 (Crouch, 2000). That is why, without a significant change to the incomplete and short constitution, it may entice any leaders to abuse power. The constitutional amendments proceeded in stages during four MPR sessions between 1999 and 2002. In the absence of a party that dominates the MPR, or a coalition able to impose its will, the only way forward was through compromise. The long-established practice of taking decisions by consensus rather than voting was continued. The most significant initial amendment by MPR was limiting the president and vice president to two five-year terms while other amendments stressed the authority of the DPR. The most fundamental and controversial amendments of the constitution were adopted in the third and fourth rounds in 2001 and 2002. The constitution was reformed to allow people to elect direct

president and vice president as a

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pair of leaders, or team, rather than individually as in the past. These teams were

nominated by political parties or coalitions of political parties. The amendment required that

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the winning pair would need to win not only more than half of the national votes, but also 20 per cent minimum in more than half the provinces, and if no pair of candidates could win the election in the first round, so the second-round direct vote must be held (Crouch, 2000). With this amendment, the president would receive a mandate directly from the people, stressing the presidential nature of the constitution. After the final round of amendments, the MPR lost its supreme status as the source of sovereignty and no longer elect the president, or issue the state policy. Its role is reduced to three: amending the constitution, formally installing the

president and vice president, and removing the president and/or vice president

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if they acted against the constitution. Its 20 MPR is composed of the members of the

Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) and the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat,

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or DPR) members, as amended in 2002, would

consist of members of the House of Representatives

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(DPR) and Regional Representative Assembly (DPD), both of which would be fully elected in general elections. The members of the DPD thus replaced the old regional representatives in the MPR while special group representatives were no longer appointed (Crouch, 2000). One consequence of this was that the military would be excluded after the 2004 election. Two key institutions were erected in the 2001 round of constitutional amendments: the DPD and the Constitutional Court. Although resembling a senate in a federal system, the DPD was not part of a truly bicameral system in which both houses exercise equivalent powers. Politicians in MPR imposed severe power limitation on DPD; the role was limited to monitoring and considering regional matters. DPD also had no power to veto legislation adopted by the DPR. Each province had an equal number of representatives in the DPD elected at the same time as the DPR. Political parties would only contest the candidates for DPR members while non-Party individuals could only contest the candidates for DPD (Crouch, 2010, p.18). The main function of the new Constitutional Court was to assess whether laws, made by DPR together with the government, were not in disaccord with the constitution. The court also had several other functions involving disputes between state institutions, disputes or conflicts over the outcomes of general elections and the dissolution of political parties. It is also mandatory for the court to respond to request from the DPR to determine whether the behavior of the president or the vice president merited dismissal. The court consists of nine judges, and each three judges nominated respectively by the Supreme Court, DPR and the president (Crouch, 2000). Another new institution established because of an amendment is Judicial Commission, whose tasks are to nominate Supreme Court judges and to investigate abuses allegedly committed by judges. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution was not limited to the institutional, electoral and judicial reforms, but included important change concerning human rights, regional autonomy, defense and security as well as the economy. The four assemblies of the MPR between 1999 and 2002 had indeed reformed the 1945 Constitution that was broadly accepted by all significant political forces. The amendments changed the country to become

a state with constitutional checks and balances

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from a state with a single all-powerful highest institution

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(Crouch, 2000). 2.4 Indonesian Broadcast Industry This part discusses the development, especially reform of Indonesian broadcast industry, with a focus on television. The broadcasting industry has been developing over a period from the establishment of the government-controlled television and radio stations, the

Radio of Republic of Indonesia (RRI) in 1945 and the Television of Republic of Indonesia (TVRI)

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in 1962. RRI and TVRI were perceived as instruments of nation building, education, culture as well as government propaganda (Sen & Hill, 2000, p.81). This perception lasted from the birth of TVRI and RRI until the last authoritarian regime ended in 1998.²¹ The two state broadcasting media served the public in monopolistic ways until the emergence of the first national private televisions in late 1980s, and broadcasting liberalization in 2002. The first radio broadcast facility in Indonesia was recorded during the colonial era when in 1911 a broadcast of maritime communication radio started on Sabang, off the northern tip of Sumatra, the gateway to the Straits of Malacca, one of the busiest sea-lane of that period. It was still illicit for people to listen to radio signs because they were used mainly for military purposes. After the

end of the First World War, and with the loosening of wartime controls, the

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Batavia Radio Society was built up by amateur broadcasters, which began broadcast regularly in 1925 (Sen & Hill, 2000). Throughout the following couple of years, under the Dutch administration, radio broadcast had been in private hands, mainly Dutch, but also Chinese and indigenous. In 1934, a Dutch community radio society, the Nederlandsche-Indische Radio Omroep Maatschappij (NIROM) obtained government permission to fund operations throughout Java by operating five stations. It was not a monopoly practice since there were about another thirty stations operating independently. The first network of native radio, Perikatan Perkumpulan Radio Ketimuran (PPRK) obtained a license to broadcast cultural or social matters in 1937. This official Dutch

tolerance of heterogeneity ended in 1942, at the point when the Japanese military forces set every single radio

13

station in Indonesia under the control of Sendenbum, the Japanese Information and Propaganda Department. Sendenbum then established the Java Broadcasting Superintendent Bureau to control radio (Sen & Hill, 2007). The Japanese prohibited the relay and reception of all transmissions from abroad, and staffs

from the government- controlled Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) were sent to control and manage the Bureau's eight local stations (Kurasawa, 1987). **The**

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Indonesian Republicans succeeded to flee Japanese control of the Jakarta Hoso Kyoku radio station on the evening of 17 August 1945, and aired the Declaration of Independence read by Sukarno earlier that morning.²² ²¹ The

role of state television was expressed **as having "a capacity as a mass communications instrument to do physical, mental, and spiritual improvement as a major aspect of Indonesian country building, particularly in the advancement of Indonesian socialist humanity.**

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See

paragraph 1 of the Presidential decree of February 1963 which concerns TVRI (**KEPPRES/27/1963**).

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²² PRSSNI, Petunjuk Radio, pp 19-21. See also Anderson

(1972). Java in the Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944- 46, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

58

p84. Another version said that The next day a crackling telecast was transmitted around the nation and the globe from Bandung where youthful Republicans had hooked the neighborhood radio into shortwave transmitter belonged to the Central Telegraph Office, telling the world in Indonesian, with an English translation, that a new independent country was born (Sen & Hill, 2000). 2.4.1 State Monopoly Era 2.4.1.1 Radio On 11 September

1945, the state radio chain, Radio Republik Indonesia

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(RRI) was set up

as a syndicate of eight local radio channels previously in the Japanese-controlled network.

13

Their activities and operation were set

under the Department of Information in April 1946.

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In the beginning of its development, RRI managed to play an important part in keeping the country and the global society informed about the Indonesian battle for freedom. It set up a global

division, the Voice of Indonesia, to transmit shortwave bulletins

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targeted to abroad group of listeners. The young republic's use of radio for propaganda purposes during the next four years earned it the disparaging epithet of the 'microphone republic' from the Dutch UN representative. (McDaniel, 1994). Domestically, radio persisted to remain a fundamental communication tool for the young country. Record of figures for licensed radio set ownership in mid-1950s was about half a million. Radio was utilized broadly as a part of education, particularly political education, for example, setting up the

electorate for the nation's first general elections in 1955.

13

After independence, Indonesia took after the Japanese strategy of government monopoly over broadcast. By the time of the establishment of a New Order, there were thirty-nine stations of RRI all over the country, transmitting to licensed radios amounted to more than a million (McDaniel, 1994, p.218). It is mandatory for all RRI stations across the country to relay news and other designated special broadcast from Jakarta. However, beyond this, local programming was still accommodated and broadcast by regional stations. The RRI was the most centralized and

the state's primary medium for creating public opinions in

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early 1960s, especially because there was still no television in that era (until 1962), and also because of

low literacy level and a relatively diverse and free press. (Sen & Hill, 2007). RRI remained the

13

only broadcaster until the mid-1960s. However, political instability in 1965 and dissatisfaction with government radio had

fostered the growth of hobby radio stations

13

in the early 1960s. Somewhat more than a modest bunch of people broadcast their telecast from their private home. Some of these stations turned out to be all the more the Declaration of Independence went to air when announced at 10 a.m on 17 August (See Astrid Susanto

(1978). The Mass Communication System in Indonesia

15

(pp.229-58, p.233)

in Karl D Jackson & Lucian W. Pye (eds), Political Power and Communication in Indonesia, University of California Press,

71

Berkeley. straightforwardly

politicized after the incidents of 1 October

15

1965 when members of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) supported by pro-Sukarno military factions assassinated a number of military generals (Sen & Hill, 2007). Groups of student activists who defied President Sukarno manned the stations day and night. One of well-known,

Radio Ampera, built -up by activists including Arief Budiman and **Soe Hok Gie.**

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While illicit technically, such anti-Sukarno and anti-communist broadcasts were not only excused, but also protected by troops that supported Suharto (Sen & Hill, 2000) According to Sen and Hill (2000), even though very limited audience reach due to low transmission power, the presence of

unofficial stations on the air amounted to hundreds **in the capital alone**

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and its surroundings

broke RRI's monopoly control effectively **over** interpretation of political **information of the**

13

time and other broadcasted information. Radio Ampera, for example, forced listeners to choose between Ampera and RRI. Radio Ampera determined to transmit its popular news commentaries at 7 p.m, exactly at the time of the RRI evening news. As the state's primary and the most centralized medium during the era, RRI had the power to ban certain sorts of Western popular music considered improper for Indonesian cultural values. However, stations run by students mocked the ban by transmitting well known tunes from disallowed bands like the Rolling Stones and Beatles. RRI never recovered its airwaves monopoly since the strategy attracted more youthful audience members to the young and inexperienced non-government radio.

2.4.1.2 Television TVRI was first established as part of the Asian Games preparations and was coordinated by the newly created Bureau of Radio and Television under the direction of the Fourth Asian Games Organizing Committee. Indonesia's first trial television broadcast was made on 17 August 1962 when public for the first time saw on television the seventeenth commemoration of the Declaration of Independence from the Istana Merdeka (Freedom of Palace) in Jakarta. A week later, 24 August 1962, the newly established service broadcast the twelve-day coverage of the fourth Asian Games lives from Senayan Stadium, Jakarta. The broadcast of the Asian Games provided Indonesia with an international stage on which it could present to its regional neighbors as a modern, rapidly developing, technologically sophisticated nation. At that times, of the countries participating in the games, only Japan (in 1953), the Philippines (in 1953), and Thailand (in 1954) has established television broadcasting services. For a first broadcast made in the early 1960s, it was a remarkably modern television event (Kitley, 2000, p.31). The Asian Games broadcast 37 began on 24 August and continuing until 12 September, when broadcasting stopped because no thought had been given to programming for after the games (Kitley, 2000, p.22). After the Asian Games ended in early September, TVRI was placed under the immediate supervision of the president. The income source available to the developing service were a subvention from the national budget, monthly fees paid by owners of television sets, and other income-generating activities such as sponsorships, and earnings from sales of advertising time. The complexity of managing and allocating these sources of funds led TVRI to establish itself as a foundation (Yayasan) in its own right on 20 October 1963. In later development, the government granted the foundation with responsibility for the licensing of private television services in Indonesia. In the 1960s, there had been no consideration given to developing private television in Indonesia since the government considered private television was too open for manipulation by antigovernment and disruptive forces. The former Information Minister said about this: "We thought we would wait until the intellectual awareness of the public was sufficiently high – about ten years"

(Kitley, 2000, p. 41). Under the New Order,

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established following the coup attempt in 1965, television has three

goals: (1) the advancement of national integration and unity; (2) the advancement of national stability and

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solidness and; (3) the advancement of political stability (Alfian et.al, 1981, p.23). The government's perception that television was part of the national development apparatus led to strict policy guidelines that governed the selection of suitable programs for TVRI. Although TVRI was in effect a government television service, its institutional affiliation puts the use of TVRI's budget beyond the reach of government departments and gave it considerable day-to-day operational and creative autonomy. As a foundation, TVRI has a curious status, sharing something with non-government, non-profit organization, and as government

agency, having a lot in common with other sections of the state bureaucracy. In 1966, the foundation was brought within the environment of the Directorate General of Radio, Television and Film (RTF) in the Department of Information. The number of television audience was certainly still limited in the early 1960s. Television sets were still expensive, being twenty times the monthly salary of senior public servants. During the broadcast of the Asian Games in 1962 there were approximately 15,000 television sets in use. The figure included some 10,000 sets purchased by government departments for free distribution to public servants to take home as a way of fostering interest and demand. Many of these public servants let their home doors widely opened welcoming 38 neighbors who came in to watch television. In its initial development in the 1960s, television broadcast reached no more than 80,000 viewers, or about two percent of Jakarta's total population, or 0.09 percent of the Indonesian population. In the mid 1970s, TVRI broadcasts were largely restricted to Java Island, where about 62 percent of Indonesian lived. Some 91 percent of all television sets were registered on Java, and about half of these were registered in Jakarta. The

launch of the Palapa satellite in 1976 brought the

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outer islands, home to about 38 percent of Indonesia's population, within TVRI's reach. In the space of just a few years, television took on a truly national scope. Sales on television sets rose dramatically as the total number of receivers registered almost tripled or 269 percent from 1975 to 1978 (Alfian & Chu, 1981, p. 25). In 1972, TVRI was incorporated as a public corporation in a bid to draw it under the government's auspice. In 1980, the director of TVRI lost control over general staff when the government changed the status of TVRI's employees as public servants on the payroll of the Department of Information. The final blow to TVRI's financial and operational autonomy was effected just a few months later when television advertising was banned starting 1 April 1981. President Suharto explained his purpose of banning television advertising was

to focus TVRI more towards the assistance of programs development, and to avoid negative effects, which don't add to the soul of development.

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The move considered by some as an effort to impose a much higher degree of state influence and control over TVRI's operation. For just about

30 years, the single, state-owned television station TVRI relished a market monopoly as a national chain. Nonetheless, the

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rising demand for foreign

programming, over which the Indonesian government has no control

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over the content, challenged the government's opinion that television ought to be utilized to advance the idea of building Indonesia.

Overly formal, ceremonial, frequently bombastic, turgid and dull programming offered by TVRI

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bored many wealthy and educated Indonesians. This audience segment found new media innovation, for example, foreign satellite television –accessed via parabola antennae- and video was appealing, open, and highly popular (Sen, 2002). The parabola antennae arrived in Indonesia in the early 1980s. At that time, the still expensive antennae put them past the range of everything except the richest segment of society. From around 1983, parabola antennae started to mushroom across the skyline of Jakarta's wealthy suburbs and began spreading to other metropolitan cities. Within a few years, parabolic antennae can be found easily across the country, including in rural areas (Sen, 2002). At the time parabola antennae began widely used by Indonesian audience, TVRI broadcast covered only 35 per cent of the nation's land mass and some 65 per cent of the population. Even on the small, densely populated island of Java, there were "blind-spots" where TVRI signals could not reach. The parabolic antenna, which threatened to allow foreign broadcasts to permeate national boundaries²³, also held the promise of extending Indonesian national television broadcast to the corner of the archipelago, beyond TVRI's terrestrial signal range. In 1986, the government officially declared an 'open sky' policy, permitting private and residential use of parabolic antennae, which were already in use in many cities. The government also provided some transponders on the Palapa satellite to be used for foreign broadcast companies. By the late 1980s, fifteen transponders were used for non-Indonesian channels like NBC, STAR and CNN broadcasting to South-East Asia, earning the government substantial revenues (Atkins, 1995:25). 2.4.2 The Rise of Private Stations 2.4.2.1 Radio As Indonesian politics was transformed during the late 1960s, so was ready. In 1967, the New Order government tried to regulate the non-government radio stations by separating small hobby stations from the more formally established broadcasters. In 1968, Suharto ordered a crackdown to limit a campus-based and other student stations. In 1970, private radio stations were legalized. The following year, the government obliged the newly legalized private stations to relay RRI newscast in an attempt to curb their political role.

Also from 1970, district governments began establishing their own station (Radio Khusus Pemerintah daerah) independent of local RRI. In 1970, Government

Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No 55 on Non-Government Radio Broadcasting set out the criteria for

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establishing a non-government radio broadcasting enterprise. The regulation stipulated that station owners were not office-bearers in any political party or mass organization, and they had to be Indonesian citizens who had not been implicated in the PKI or the Thirtieth of September Movement. Foreign investment (or donation) was prohibited. The social function of radio was described as 'education, information and entertainment' and programs were 'not to be used for political activities'. Broadcasts had to be based on writing scripts, held as documentation and noted in a daily log. Licenses were issued for one year and were renewable. Department of Communication was responsible for the technical aspects of broadcasting, particularly the allocation of frequencies before being shifted to the Department of Tourism, Post and Telecommunication. The monitoring of content to ensure 'security and public order' (pengamanan, keamanan dan ketertiban umum) was the responsibility of the military's

Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) and the

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Department of Information. 23 In many Asian countries including the neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore, the coming of satellite-transmitted television programs had generated a new bout of anxiety about Western cultural imperialism. The local mooring of radio was emphasized in 1971 after the government issued a Minister Information Directive

stating that a radio broadcast is not national but local **in character.**

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After 1982, shortwave transmission by private radio was terminated. Stations opted increasingly for AM and, from 1987, FM

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band, which provided much clearer signal over shorter distances. The authority likewise regulated most extreme

transmitter power, which restricted the broadcast area to about 300-400 km for AM station and

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100 km for FM. The employment of government regulation

was the obligation of the Regional Authority for the Development of Non-Government Radio (Badan Pembina Radio Siaran Non Pemerintah di Daerah, BPRSNDP) henceforth Regional Radio Authority, appointed by the governor and

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consisting of provincial bureaucrats. All stations had to present a monthly report to it (Sen & Hill, 2007). The Indonesian Private, Commercial Radio Broadcasters Association (PRSSNI) was set up in December 1974 by some 173 non-government radio stations from thirty-four cities. The association formation was intended to advance private radio broadcasting in Indonesia and to assist the government in making development a success in the fields of information, education and social-cultural affairs.²⁴ The government formally declared PRSSNI the sole recognized association for private radio stations in 1977, and all private stations were obliged to join. The move was the common government practice with industry body.²⁵ PRSSNI's influence over private radio stations was important since, among the bulk of letters and documents needed before a station could be issued with its annual license, were letters from both the regional and national levels of PRSSNI.²⁶ From the state's point of view, PRSSNI's most significant role was in ensuring industry self-censorship. With little capacity to monitor directly the highly diverse broadcasting of a regionally and financially dispersed industry, the government depended on the industry's self-restraint. In 1978, central government in Jakarta gave more power to local authorities to take both 'preventive' and 'repressive' actions, including withdrawing permission for, and closing, non-government stations, which broke the law. The Regional Radio Authority also had the right to inspect any transmission devices which imported from abroad'. The local body held power to determine which contents were 'wajib relay' or mandatory relay from RRI in agreement with the interests of the region concerned. Private stations also instructed to broadcast news and other undefined contents from RRI Jakarta.²⁷ In addition, private stations ought to give precedence to contents whose materials come from local and are ²⁴ The association

had a membership of 449 AM and 241 FM

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nationally in 1996. 25 Riwayat Ringkas

Persatuan Radio Siaran Swasta Nasional Indonesia

318

(PRSSNI) (pp.19-21) in PRSSNI,

Petunjuk Radio Siaran Swasta nasional '95

318

in Krishna Sen (2007) 26 Some local branches have been prepared to flex their muscle even against the Minister of Information, when the latter has issued permits for radio stations not approved by local PRSSNI. 27

Ministerial Directive SK No 24/KEP/MENPEN/1978 and Appendix

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in Sen & Hill (2007: 86) suitable to local society and whose contents are taken from local regional cultures.²⁸ The effect of such regulation was to emphasize that private radio was a local medium, over which provincial authorities held considerable sway, armed with the capacity to terminate licenses. (Sen & Hill, 2007, p.86). After 1987, annual license renewals for private stations also had to be approved centrally by the

Directorate-General of radio, Television and Film of

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the Department of Information. The annual renewal of broadcast licenses was an insecure process. A license took months to obtain from Jakarta and cost Rp. 10 million (including 'unofficial' charges) in the mid-1990s, an average month's profit for small provincial stations (Lindsay, 1997). Many small stations attempted to circumvent the regulations by going on air with only the approval of the provincial governor, or broadcasting illegally without any permits. The illegal stations risked closure in annual surveillance, referred to as 'sweeping', carried out by the Department of Telecommunications.²⁹ 2.4.2.2 Television Companies associated with the President Suharto's family initially did not seem to have attracted in the press industry, even during the industrial boom year of the 1980s. This contrasted starkly with the television industry in which the three pioneering private channels, initially in Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya (but now carried nationally on Palapa Satellite) were effectively monopolized by companies associated with Suharto's family. The TVRI Foundation's licensing power gained considerable significance in the late 1980s, when commercial providers approached TVRI about establishing commercial television services. It was the TVRI Foundation that licensed the first commercial providers RCTI (in 1987) and SCTV (in 1990) to establish commercial television services in Jakarta and Surabaya respectively. TVRI also has the right to negotiate with each commercial provider for a share of gross advertising revenue. The first private station, RCTI, belonged to Bambang Trihatmojo, President Suharto's third child, at the helm of the powerful Bimantara business group, which held extensive interests in primary and manufacturing industries. RCTI started in 1987 as pay television, but in August 1990 it was permitted to broadcast free to air for the Jakarta broadcast region. 30 28Instruction of the Directorate

General of Radio, Television, and films No 09/INSTRK/DIRJEN/RTF/78

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in Sen & Hill (2007: 86) 29 For instance, in Aceh province,

thirty-six of the seventy private stations

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closed in 1996 (Kompas, 12 November 1996). 30 Economic magazine Warta Ekonomi reported that Bambang's Bimantara Group invested US\$ 80 million in developing RCTI, the nation's first private television network (Warta Ekonomi, Makin Dewasa di Usia Sebelas, No 4, IV, 22 June 1992, pp.147) RCTI was not only the oldest, but also the most successful of

the commercial television stations during the era. In

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1989, the second private channel, Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV),

went to air from the capital of East Java, Surabaya, Indonesia's second largest city.

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A consortium led by President Suharto's cousin Sudwikatmono owned 20 per cent of shares, while the bulk of 80 per cent was reportedly controlled by Henri Pribadi, an ethnic Chinese businessman with a long association with Sudwikatmono. In December 1990, TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia, Indonesian Educational Television) controlled by President Suharto's second child Siti Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana

(known affectionately as 'Tutut') through her holding company Cipta Lamtoro Gung Persada, gained the third license. TPI leased transmission facilities belonged to TVRI, the new station at first confined to a four-and-a-half hour instructive and educational programs in the morning, to supplement school and school educational module, yet immediately extended to eight hours, with just 38 per cent educational content left.³¹ TPI's declared profile as an educational channel, run by a purportedly non-profit organization, which allowed it to use TVRI facilities, also implied that it could telecast nationally, whereas TPI's competitors, RCTI and SCTV, were restricted to Jakarta and Surabaya. Within a year of going to air, TPI's advertising revenue had overtaken RCTI's. TPI's national access and consequent advertising advantage quickly became another element in the public family business rivalry (Sen & Hill, 2007, p.112). Apparently, RCTI and other newly established commercial televisions were closely linked to the ruling Golkar party. For example, Bambang was a treasurer of the ruling Golkar party while Tutut was once deputy chairperson of Golkar. Their political position and connections with government high-rank officials allowed them to gain advantage in running their television business. For example, a deregulation in 1993 permitted private stations to telecast all over Indonesia by means of the Palapa satellite, with the goal that they could hereafter be received all through the nation and beyond by parabolic antennae (Sen & Hill, 2007). The last two private stations, Cakrawala Andalas Televisi or ANTV (which started broadcast in 1993) and Indosiar (in 1995), were national networks when they were launched. ANTV was owned in part by the Bakrie Group (whose business fortunes pre-date the New Order) and partly by Agung Laksono, closely associated with the Golkar party. Aburizal Bakrie, a senior member of the Golkar party, controls Bakrie Brothers. Finally, President 31 PT Cipta Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia, Company Profile of Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia in Sen- Krishna, 2007:112) Suharto's longest standing Chinese

partner, Liem Sioe Liong, who controlled the Salim Group,

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one of the biggest ethnic Chinese business conglomerates, owned the

youngest of the five commercial channels, Indosiar Visual Mandiri (Indosiar). At the

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time commercial television was introduced in Indonesia, the television industry was controlled by a confounded and befuddling series of regulations. The regulation tended to support the interests of the new private licensees. Permits were issued with no procedure of open tendering, and there was no autonomous power that had the obligation of observing and monitoring television (Kitley, 1994). A reason illustrating the regime's option to permit private televisions apparently has nothing to do with promoting genuine pluralism of media. The policy has been to guarantee that private station is put under the immediate control and influence of Suharto's family and friends, so keeping on guaranteeing a consistent compliant television industry (Sen & Hill, 2007). This powerful group of Suharto's family business resisted all attempts by the Department of Information to limit their broadcast coverage in any way. The tension was clear in 1996-97 as the parliament completed Indonesia's first Broadcast Bill, which the President refused to sign. This was the first time that President Suharto returned a Bill for reconsideration. It was widely reported that the Bill's requirement that no station transmit to more than 50 per cent of the national population was unacceptable to the industry. Some months later, Harmoko, the long-serving Minister of Information (1983-97) was replaced. The new minister, Hartono, a close political associate of Tutut, criticized the contentious provision of the Bill. Parliament obliged by removing the offending clause. Suharto finally signed the Bill on October 1997, his last important intervention in the formation of media institutions in Indonesia 2.4.2.3 Media Oligopoly

Success in the television business prompted Suharto's family companies to also venture into print media. In 1991, Sudwikatmono began publishing a 24-page weekly tabloid, Bintang Indonesia (Indonesian Star) devoted to television, video, radio and film news, and purporting to 'meet society's need for light reading.'³² He also launched a Newsweekly called Sinar in 1993 to evoke memories of the banned and defunct Sinar Harapan daily, which he had attempted to obtain in 1986. In 1989, Hardiyanti Rukmana established a 32-page weekly tabloid for women, Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Woman), which devoted eight pages to TPI programs. In 1992, Bambang Trihatmojo's holding company Bimantara Citra involved in a 32 Kompas, 2 March 1991, p.12. The foundation was called Yayasan Tujuh Dua. media company Surya Persindo Group controlled by a media tycoon Surya Paloh. Bimantara placed two of its executives in the operational business of Surya Persindo although it was still not very clear the motive behind the cooperation between the two companies. Nonetheless, some industry figures view with concern the involvement of Bimantara in Surya Persindo, which together with Sudwikatmono's Bintang Indonesia and Sinar and Hardiyanti's Rukmana's Wanita Indonesia, may represent a calculated move by members of the presidential family to establish a foothold in the print, after their success in the electronic media (Hill, 2007, p.103). By having individuals from his own particular family become tied up with the media by early 1990, Suharto attempted to check the press. The strategy was likewise considered by some as an attempt by Suharto to control the media. Family members managed to control all three of the commercial television stations and publishing companies (Vatikiotis, 1993, p.108). In the 1990s, Tutut and Bambang, the biggest media owners among the Suharto's Children, started to expand business by acquiring shares in radio stations. The interest of the members of the president's family in the media expanded with an attempt to establish radio networks and forging conglomerate cross-media ownerships. However, their holdings (about six between them) remained insignificant in the highly diverse radio industry. The first family's hold over the radio was also extended through manipulation of PRSSNI, the radio industry organization, which was established in 1974. In 1989, in a further step to ensure the organization's responsiveness to the regime, President Suharto's daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, an office-bearer of the government's election machine Golkar party, was elected Chairperson of the PRSSNI despite the fact that her position on the association contravened regulations prohibiting political party functionaries from holding radio broadcast permits. Tutut remained re-elected in

1992 and 1995. Her position was legalized in 1997 with passage of the Broadcast Bill that superseded previous legislative restriction in this matter. The bill removed this restriction on ownership, stating expressly that 'Every Indonesian citizen has equal right and the broadest possible opportunity to play a role in the creative, work and business aspects in the broadcast sector.³³ Tutut relinquished her control of the PRSSNI only in October 1998 after her father's fall from power. 33 Ch. VII, Clause 59 in Krishna Sen & David T Hill (2007, p. 87) Observers mulled the driving intention of companies associated with President Suharto's family must logically be to strengthen their political position. These conglomerates were entering the industry, both for financial and political advantage.³⁴ The growing control of the presidential family into the media industry sparked concern among journalists since the increasing concentration of press ownership in a few hands would give rise to a monopoly over public opinion. Nevertheless, the new development in the media industry, especially broadcast, highlights the deepening disagreement between the interest of Suharto's family business in amplifying the income-generating-capacity of the media business and the regime's desire to control the streams of information keeping in mind the end goal to keep up the "security" of the State. For example, the transmission of CNN's (uncensored) international news broadcasts via Indonesia's Palapa satellite may irritate the Indonesian Government from time to time, but it benefits Bambang Trihatmojo, one of the President's sons, whose company is engaged in the CNN-Palapa deal. While the Minister for Information may be adamant about excluding foreign investment in the media lest the State's control over information flows be diminished, Bambang Trihatmojo's RCTI television company, reportedly keen for permission to accept overseas partners (Hill, 2007, p.21). 2.4.2.4 Content Surveillance Dozens of publications were banned since the New Order government held power, and throughout a period of more than 30 years, many others had gotten warning notices, which mean they would be prohibited too if they kept on transgressing into government's sensitive zones. According to a London-based human rights organization Article 19, there had been much and obvious proof of press restriction and censorship following the New Order government had been in force. In contrary, no private broadcast media, television or radio channels, had been warned and banned. The government exercised tight supervision over the diffusion of information made by the private commercial broadcast stations. A legitimate restriction was forced

on the production and telecasting of news by the private radio and

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television chains with an end goal to keep the broadcast media in check. No-one was permitted to generate their own news programs. State controlled broadcasters supplied private stations with government news programming. Private stations were required to broadcast the kind of red tape news provided 34 Tempo magazine, 'Pasar Besar, Oplah Turun, 15/2/92, p33. to them by the related state controlled electronic media, by RRI for private radio broadcasters and TVRI in the case of television.³⁵ Such news programs constantly give only one interpretation of

events, which owes more to the regime's specific perspective on events than to more appropriate journalistic thinking, for example, newsworthiness, accuracy, cover both sides, and completeness. News bulletins barely contains any reference to the perspectives of the government's political opponents

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and faultfinders. Furthermore, information that are regarded particularly

sensitive politically or which reflect poorly on the government very frequently are not transmitted at all

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(Article 19). In broadcast media, self-censorship was exercised by editors and journalists on a daily basis, as in the print media, and they know that certain issues are taboo. Article 19 stated that

self-censorship is widely acknowledged as being pervasive throughout the Indonesian media.

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The media were banned from airing news that the authority deems provocative, intriguing, speculative and sensational. The media were also banned from antagonizing ethnic, religious, racial or group feelings, topics which were regulated by the regime's security rules, frequently known by their Indonesian abbreviation SARA. Blatant

criticism of the President and his family is likewise banned and taboo. Beyond these subjects, the circumstance is a great deal less clear for journalists and editors with respect to

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news, which may or may not be reported. This situation provoked a climate of self-censorship as reporters and editors embrace a "security first" state of mind that ends up certain news not being broadcast even when it is not at all obvious that the regime would reject them. Like the print, the broadcast media, were also targeted at the government's media control system

called **'budaya telepon', or telephone culture**. It is a control framework, **which involves** authorities occasionally **telephoning** editorial staffs **or**

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even owners, to speak to them to stay away from a certain point or to obey their lines on a specific issue. The control system was conducted by officials of Information Ministry and, once in a while, by other government authorities and even military, to remind the media workers that they are under consistent examination. Owners then are required to convey the same message to their reporters, editors and producers, to guarantee that they tone down their reports, stay away from reference to particular people

or do whatever is important to fulfill the official's appeal

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(Article 19, 1996). In 31 July 1996, PRSSNI's central office-bearers called on all radio stations to be vigilant against fermenting public unrest in the aftermath of riots in Jakarta four days earlier 35 According to Article 19, it is mandatory for private television stations to relay

TVRI news programs **three times a day, while** private **radio has to**

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telecast 13 news bulletins daily from RRI. In addition, it is mandatory for private radio and television stations to broadcast other programs considered national importance by the government (27 July 1996). The riots were triggered by a military-backed takeover of the opposition political party PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) headquarters in Jakarta from the supporters of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the legitimate leader who had been unseated by government manipulation. PRSSNI instructed radio stations to record and archive all discussions, analyses and interview broadcast, and effectively barred stations from broadcasting anything other than the government's interpretation of the incidents (Sen & Hill, 2007, p.88). Such calls, which cannot be backed up with surveillance, were never fully heeded by every station. Many stations, while eschewing overt political analyses, continued to broadcast stories of local student demonstrations in support of PDI activists, sometimes under the guise of local traffic reports, such as information on roads blocked off by demonstrators. The issue of keeping records of programs has always been resisted by radio stations, largely because it absorbs money and space which most do not have, but also because recording is a serious restraint on the station's ability to broadcast politically sensitive material without leaving material evidence of dissidence. Since the only legal source of news was initially still held by TVRI, the government station played a major role, especially in the news, despite the growing importance of commercial television. With a specific end goal to get around the confinements on news programs, or attempt to camouflage such programs under different names. Private stations used magazine program formats and news feature or human-interest programs. They created what they called "information programs". The initiative was mainly driven by growing competition among the private stations, and in order to be able to broadcast news programs similar to TVRI (Article 19, 1996). According to Article 19 (1996), this type of information programs offers a more in- depth news stories and, once in a while, more systematic and analytical approach to news. There was a growing trend at that time among some broadcast stations to try and discover methods to content viewers appetite

for more real **information as reflected by the relatively high audience figures** watching news from **foreign satellite broadcasts**.

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SCTV's talk show program Perspektif and

RCTI's regular news feature program, **Seputar Indonesia (Around Indonesia), for example,** have **proven highly popular with the public**.

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One of the most popular **examples of this** happened **in the case of Perspektif, a weekly talk show** program **produced by an independent production house** for SCTV. **The** program's format **was**

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one of interviews between the host, Wimar Witoelar,

with individuals from many different walks of life including

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critics of the government. Among Perspektif programs,

in particular, that **got the** program **into** turmoil, **before it was finally** dropped, **was an interview with Abdurrahman Wahid,**

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head of Indonesia's biggest Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama, before he was elected as Indonesia's

third president; Mochtar Lubis, author and journalist, who is popular as an outspoken critic of the government and;

a judge Benjamin Mangkoedilaga, who was also head of the Jakarta Administrative Court

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(Article 19, 1996).

In a case brought by a former editor of Tempo magazine, Goenawan Mohamad, the judge

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Mangkoedilaga ruled against the government. The authority closed down Tempo in 1994. He was then interviewed only a few weeks after his unexpected and controversial rule. Mangkoedilaga had decided that the Information Minister led by Harmoko, one of powerful figure in New Order era, had acted wrongly in June 1994 when he pulled back the publishing permits and closed down Tempo and two other weeklies. Indonesian court judgment seldom goes against the government, so prior to Judge Mangkoedilaga's ruling,

few had daydreamed that he would rule in Tempo's favor — so when the judge did so, he was praised vociferously by many as having taken a

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daring stance (Article 19, 1996). In September 1995, the talk show was abruptly aborted without warning. Sources within the television station indicated that the program closure

was the result of political pressure from the government

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although SCTV executives denied the speculations. Officials at the station who declined to be named

reported that a high positioning Ministry of Information authority had telephoned one of SCTV's proprietors to whine about the

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program, and

called for it to be dropped. The proprietor is then said to have talked with the station's management, who eventually consented to hack out the program and let the production company knew their decision

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(Article 19, 1996). News reports from both private and state-run radio and television were generally dominated by the activities of the government,

and the activities of the government-backed political party, Golkar. Very limited airtime is devoted to broadcast news from the main opposition parties, even on important political issues.

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One television executive quoted by Article 19, a London-based human rights and freedom organization in its report as saying:

"Although not formally, they (Golkar) will be asking us, in some cases demanding of us, certain facilities, certain exposures, certain slots".
Some **senior** officials **in the** television business **are**

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in many cases also Golkar senior members

and, in the case of no less than three of the commercial television stations— TPI, RCTI and ANTV — those

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who hold senior positions with controlling stakes in the television companies also snatched senior positions in Golkar. This was a reason why television workers felt they had little choice yet to consent to "demands" from government or Golkar authorities for coverage on certain events. For example, when Information Minister Harmoko closed down three popular magazines Tempo, Editor and DeTik in June 1994, RCTI and ANTV simply broadcast video of the Minister's announcement. Neither of the two stations broadcast any in-depth stories or any reactions, or discussion, to the bans. Certainly, the victims of the bans, such as

journalists, editors, or ordinary readers were not interviewed or discussed in any programs of the three television channels (Article 19, 1996). The presence of the powerful international television networks beamed in via uncensored satellite prompted the burgeoning middle-class to demand greater access to information and plurality of voices in the press. This constituency is demanding greater coverage and probing analysis from their own domestic television stations. Competition for audience markets is increasing among the stations to capture a public demanding more substantial, interesting and entertaining television services. Such pressure pushed the government to permit private television companies to broadcast their own news programs from August 1993, ending the news monopoly of the State-run television's TVRI. TV stations began developing their own news, and programs genre like current affairs and talk shows were liked since they were much more liberated than any time in recent memory. These sorts of programs were well known with viewers and supported interest groups contending for changes, as they demanded greater freedom and democracy. Despite the family ties, and even before Suharto stepped down, the new openness created bolder television programs. The new television stations dared to offer investigative reporting and political talk shows that never been watched before. The private TV stations beamed several daily news programs, which brought better entertainment values than TVRI. Audience who switched channel to other private TV stations, which offered bigger appeal, then abandoned the government television gradually. For some, the presence of the private stations seemed eventually helped speeding up the political reform movement that brought down the former president Suharto from his power. 2.4.3 Television in Liberal Market

After the downfall of Suharto regime in 1998, the

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political and media atmosphere in the country changed altogether from tyrant and tight state control to the circumstance characterized by freedom and liberalization, a highly aggressive business sector, and essentially less intervention from state (Heryanto and Adi, 2001). The Renaissance of Indonesian media was at first stamped by the abolishment of the press permitting procedure (SIUPP) during the presidency of B.J. Habibie in 1999, followed by the destruction of the information ministry blamed for its tough measures in closing down some

media during the New Order era, and the passing of Press Law No 40/1999 and Broadcast Law No

81

32/2002 by former president Abdurrahman Wahid. The later advised that

an independent body, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI),

59

be established. The KPI will function as a partner to the government for managing broadcast media. There was a dramatic increment in the quantity of media, not long after the nullification of the press permitting framework.³⁶ After 1998, when the authoritarian government disappeared and control over media, press permit and content checks were abolished, the media industry grew exponentially. Advertising holds as the very backbone of the private TV station's existence. The country's liberalization and democratization process combined with a huge consumer market with increasing amounts of money to spend inspired large companies to increase their investments and promotions as they put the greater part of corporate advertising budget into television.³⁷ A year after Suharto withdrew the number of print media soared six folds to 1687 (although half of these numbers disappeared later due to lack of business viability)³⁸. In early 2000s, five large new television channels were opened: Global TV, TV 7, Metro TV, Trans TV, and Lativi competing on a national basis with five stations set up earlier during Suharto's era. Some of these stations changed names later due to ownership changes. Currently at least there are five key players in the Indonesian media industry consisting of five large diversified business groups. All 10 national television stations are currently controlled by the five business group which also control

other types of media. They are: Media Group, Para Group, MNC Group, Bakrie Group, and Emtel Group.

7

Media Group. The group controls an all-news TV channel, Metro TV, which has over 53 transmission sites all over the country. Based in West Jakarta, Metro TV is the country's first 24-hour news channel. The television channel began to broadcast in the capital in November, 2000. Besides its predominant programming in Indonesian, it is the only TV station to offer Mandarin news. It carried programs in Mandarin to cater Chinese audience reflecting the easing of restrictions on Chinese language and cultural media imposed during the authoritarian era. Metro broadcast no sinetron (soap opera) programs, but the station airs entertainment talk show programs. Media group and its television station belong to the businessperson, Surya Paloh, who also owns a national newspaper Media Indonesia daily. Media Group also controls other local newspapers distributed in different parts of Indonesia.³⁹ 36 873 radio stations in 2002, 11 television stations, 279 tabloids, 242 magazines, 186 daily newspapers, 245 weekly newspapers, and 5 bulletins in 2003. Gobel, R & Escborn, N 2005, Indonesia: KAF democracy report 2005 dalam Lukman Hakim, Media Democratization in Indonesia Post-New Order Regime, 2008 ³⁷ Indonesian Press Reference. Look at

<http://www.pressreference.com/Gu-Ku/Indonesia.html>

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38 Wikrama Iryans Abidin, member of Indonesian Press Council as quoted by media, February 14, 2008. 39 Indonesian Press Reference. Look at

<http://www.pressreference.com/Gu-Ku/Indonesia.html>

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Para Group. The group controls Trans Media Corporation, which manages Trans TV, one of the quickest developing TV stations in Indonesia. The station began broadcasting on 15 December 2001, and it has been successful with its entertaining programs in capturing audience interest. Para Group originally focused on three business sectors — finance, property and multimedia. Para Group, controlled by businessman Chairul Tanjung, acquired Bank Mega in 1996. Tanjung started his business in 1987 when he and his three companions built up PT Pariarti Shindutama, which manufactured kids' footwear. Tanjung pulled back not long after from the company and built up Para Group, which developed into one of the fastest-growing business conglomerates, and Tanjung became one of Indonesia's wealthiest men in the country. On December 2011, Tanjung changed the name of his business group to CT Corporation or CT Corp., (initial of his name). The initial success prompted Trans Media to acquire the controlling stake of languishing TV 7 owned by an Indonesian giant publisher Kompas Gramedia Group in 2006. The latter is controlled by Jakob Oetama whose reputable daily paper Kompas has been the market leader in Indonesia for decades. However, Kompas Gramedia failed to manage TV 7 successfully prompting the company to sell TV 7 to Trans Media which then changed the station's name to Trans7. Chairul Tanjung is close to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In 2007, he coordinated several well-known entrepreneurs, and senior government official to launch the 'Visi Indonesia 2030' (Indonesian Vision 2030) project which mapped out how Indonesia could achieve 'developed status' by the year 2030. Tanjung chaired the project and since then he and his team have become unofficial Presidential advisors. Bakrie Group. Based in East Jakarta, TVOne is an Indonesian privately owned national television station. Aburizal Bakrie, who controlled private nationwide television station ANTV, expanded his venture in the television industry by buying shares in Latvia, another nationwide TV station grappled with financial difficulties. Latvia was established amid booming on national TV in early 2000's. Lativi was initially owned by Abdul Latief, a famous businessman and former minister under Suharto. Latief established the station in 1999, and it commenced broadcasting in 2002. The ownership of the network was changed to Aburizal Bakrie and Erick Tohir by the year 2007 due to debt and poor network management. The station is currently owned by PT Visi Media Asia, Tbk controlled by Bakrie Group. The launching of TV One was made on 14th February 2008. Aburizal Bakrie and his son Anindya Bakrie continue to dominate shares in Latvia (now TVOne) and ANTV. 52 Anindya, and Tohir were appointed as Chief Commissioner and President Director respectively. Aburizal was once a senior minister in President Yudhoyono's cabinet for the period of 2004-2009. In October 2009, Bakrie was elected chairperson of Golkar, the political party which held power throughout the New Order and which has survived as a key player in the post-Suharto political landscape. Meanwhile, there has been significant change among the owners of television stations associated with

Suharto's family and cronies. The fall of

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the president Suharto in 1998 pulled down the business empires of his sons and daughters. People like Suharto's second son, Bambang Trihatmojo, and Sudono Salim (also known Liem Sioe Liong, a close Suharto crony) are no longer major owners at their respective televisions. MNC Group. The group manages media subsidiaries under Bhakti Investama Group, another holding company, which have widely varied business units mainly in the financial service sector. This company group was established by Bambang Hary Tanoesoedibjo, better known as Hary Tanoe, who began gaining popularity in 2002 after he purchased 24.5% shares in PT. Bimantara Citra Tbk from Bambang Trihatmojo, Suharto's third child. In the same year, Bimantara Citra also took over a US\$ 15 million debt of a television

station, TPI, controlled by Suharto's second child, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana or Tutut. The

263

debt takeover allowed Bimantara to control 75% of TPI through a subsidiary PT Berkas Karya Bersama.40 Since 2002, Hary Tanoe has held a major share of Bimantara Citra and been its CEO. Bimantara Citra holds 100 per cent of PT Media Nusantara Citra (MNC), a holding company which manages media subsidiaries, including nationwide private television channels TPI, RCTI and Global TV, and the principal permits of three national cable television networks41 MNC also controls major print media and radio stations. In May 2007, Bhakti Investama increased its stake in Bimantara to 52.85%, and at the same time the name of the company was changed to PT. Global Mediacom Tbk, and become a sub holding of Bhakti Investama in the mass media including broadcasting sector. Emtek Group. Since 2004, the two brothers, Fofu and Eddy Sariaatmadja, through their own holding company PT Elang Mahkota Teknologi (Emtek Group), purchased shares of PT Surya Citra Media (SCM), which controlled the nationwide private television station SCTV, from Henry Pribadi and Sudwikatmono (Suharto's cousin). However, Suharto's second daughter, Titik Suharto (through her joint share with Sariaatmadja's brothers) and Suharto's grandson, Dandy Rukmana, remain members of the SCTV shareholder board (Ida, 40 Industry report by

Goliath: Business Knowledge on Demand. [http:// goliath.ecnext.com/](http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/page_)

334

about 41 The three networks are Indovision, Oke TV and Top TV. 2011, p.14). In 2001, Emtel Group also acquired 85% shares at PT Indosiar Karya Media Tbk, which controls a television station Indosiar, one of major national television channels in Indonesia. Apart from the ten private television stations, which are

based in the capital city, a number of

7

private local TV stations have entered the market. Available data indicate that in 2008 there were 60 commercial television stations on local and national basis throughout the country. Currently, there are more than

1,000 print media (magazines, tabloids and newspapers), 2,000 radio stations, 115 television stations and a growing number of online news portals,

244

most of them operating in the local level (Lutfia, 2010). 3.4.4 Local Media A process of decentralization and the strengthening regional autonomy have accompanied the transition from authoritarian rule towards a new democratic system in Indonesia. The expansion of regional autonomy has opened up the possibility for development of more local commercial media. Local and community newspapers, radio stations and television channels competing for local audiences with their local content. The initiative to establish local television stations is supported by major local private companies. Local entrepreneurs started expanding their business power by building local television stations with broadcast coverage of a city, or regency. Successful media companies then expanded by establishing more station in other regions. Among the most important players in the broadcasting industry at local and regional level in Indonesia are Jawa Pos and Bali Post. Jawa Pos Group. One of the most successful local media companies is Jawa Pos Group controlled by Dahlan Iskan. The group started its business with a Jawa Pos daily paper established as a family concern in 1949. The daily was about to collapse in the early 1980s. Dahlan Iskan, then a journalist with the leading news magazine Tempo (banned by Suharto's government in 1994), was called in to manage it. Within a decade, Iskan had changed the company into one of the country's top twenty enterprises. Iskan now controls more than 140 companies spreading over the archipelago under his

Jawa Pos News Network (JPNN). JPNN is Indonesia's largest newspaper network

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with more than 80 regional dailies in major towns and sub-districts across the country from Aceh to Papua (Ida, 2011, p.18). Since 2002, the Jawa Pos Group has also established local private televisions in several provinces. Jawa Pos TV (JTV) in Surabaya, East Java province, was the group's initial entry into local television. JTV's reception area includes greater Surabaya and almost all of East Java, but it can also be accessed in other parts of Indonesia using a parabolic dish 54 and via the cable television. By 2009, there were 15 local private TV stations in Jawa Pos Group, spanning the country. Bali Post. Bali Post is the largest and most successful daily in regional Bali and Lombok and was set up by Naradha family. The family also controls Bali TV, a successful private local TV station. The success of Bali TV inspired Satria Naradha to expand and invest in other regional private television stations in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sumatra under his holding company Media Bali Post Group. Naradha has collaborated with local media entrepreneurs in these provinces to establish his own media network, while always placing his representatives (Balinese male) alongside the local TV executives. These station include Yogya TV and Cakra TV in the city of Yogyakarta and Semarang respectively, in central Java. Cakra TV was established in collaboration with MNC Group. The Bali Post Group also established Bandung TV in West Java, Balikpapan TV in east Kalimantan, Makassar TV in South Sulawesi, Sriwijaya TV in Palembang (South Sumatra), Surabaya TV in east Java, and Aceh TV in Aceh. In addition to the TV station, the Bali Post Group also controls several other media businesses, including commercial radio and print. In Bali, the group controls three newspapers, and manages the two commercial radio stations. Meanwhile, some national level media players began their business expansion into local level. For example, PT Kalimahakam Media TV is being positioned by MNC to be a local Surabaya of RCTI. MNC Group also bought shares in several local stations in Malang, East Java province. MNC Group also collaborated with Jawa Pos Group in establishing SBO TV in Surabaya. These tangled webs of media ownership, which began to emerge in the last few years have come to dominate and shape the entertainment industry in the post-Suharto era.

CHAPTER III THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 3.1 Media and Society Theories This chapter discusses theories of media, which have a strong relationship with society and culture. Since society, culture and media are inseparable, it is understandable that

most media theory relates to both society and culture together and has to be explained in relation to both.

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McQuail (2000, p.68) proposed three main varieties of theory about media and society. First, there are media theories about the relations between media and other social institutions (macro-theories), which bear on the extent to which the media are autonomous. Do media offer alternative visions of or simply reinforce otherwise dominant lines of power and influence? Secondly, there are theories that focus on how media interpret and carry out their chosen or given tasks. These theories pay attention more directly on media

institutions and organizations, especially under conditions of changing technology and competition for resources and support. Thirdly, there are theories that focus on the consequences of using the media to gain social experience. These theories discuss the perspective and needs of the audience. This also covers the question of the everyday-life experience of audience members and the social context of media reception. According to McQuil (2000), there is no neat system for categorizing the available theories since most of them

are fragmentary and selective, sometimes overlapping or inconsistent, often guided by conflicting ideologies and assumptions about society. 12
He said **theory-formation**

responds to real-life problems and historical circumstances; it

does not follow a systematic and logical pattern. 12

Media-society theories can be classified into seven groups (McQuail, 2000, pp.74-87): 1) The mass society. The theories emphasize the interdependence of media with other institutions that exercise power. The media

cannot be expected to offer a critical or alternative definition of the world. 12

Media is used as an effective tool to organize people in masses, so it's important to control or run the media in a monopolistic way. The media content is aimed at serving the interests of political and economic power-holders. 2) The Marxist perspectives. The theories regard

mass media as instruments of control for a ruling class, 370

assuming

a direct link between economic ownership and the dissemination of messages that affirm the legitimacy and the value of a class society. 168

The Marxist theory of media was built on the premises that mass media are owned by bourgeois class and operated in their class interest. Media promotes working-class false consciousness, and access to media is denied to political opposition. 3) Functionalism. The theories explain

social practices and institutions in terms of the need of the society and of the individual. The media are depicted as essentially self-directing and self-correcting. Media are 155

not seen as a source of major change, but more as a means of maintaining society. The theory posits that the mass media will gain more power if audiences become more

reliant on the media for information and the more society is in a state of crisis or instability. 189 4) The critical political-economy. The

theories

focus primarily on the relation between the economic structure and dynamics of media industries and the ideological content of media. This 83

socially critical approach directs its

research attention to the empirical analysis of the structure of ownership and control of media and to how media market forces operate. From this perspective, the mass media have to be considered as part of the economic system, with close relation to the political system. 17 5) The modernization and

development. This approach base its idea in the belief that the media could be a powerful instrument in economic and social developments. According to this idea,

mass media serve as agents of development by spreading technical expertise, encouraging individual change and mobility, campaign of democracy, promoting consumer demand, aiding literacy, education, health, population control etc. 6) Communication 159

technological determinism. The theories believe that social changes were created by the sequences of the

invention and application of communication technology, while communication revolutions lead to social revolutions. 326

Technology determinism approach perceives

communication technology as fundamental to society, and each technology has a bias to particular communication forms, content and uses. 7) Information society. The 221

theories focus on new media technology that leads people to an information

society characterized by predominance of information work, and great volume of information flow. 316

According to this theory, growth and interconnection of networks allow globalization, while technology of new media enables interactivity relations, integration and convergence of activities amid a postmodern culture. 3.2 The Political Economic Perspective As mentioned earlier, media and society theories comprise of seven groups including theories of the critical political economy. This study uses the political economic perspective as the basis of its framework. The theories, as said earlier, pay attention mainly

on the relation between the dynamics of media industries, economic structure and the ideological content of media. This study uses a socially critical approach, 83

which directs its research focus on empirical analysis of media control and the

structure of ownership and to how media market forces operate. From this perspective, the mass media have to be considered as inseparable from the economic system, with close relation to the political system. The 130

political-economic theories stem from the rise of media industry that

led business to take a close look at the economics of communication. The result was research on everything from how to produce and market radio and television receivers to how to sell products to mass audiences. 92

Research on factors affecting media content in a democratic society is also part of the study of political economy of media. The

growth of a critical political economy was built in part on an effort to understand this process critically, for example, to connect mass marketing to wider economic and social processes and to criticize them from a range of humanistic values. 67

Much of this work was built on a Marxian framework, which served as the intellectual wellspring for most communist and socialist movements (Mosco, 1996). Political-economy theory emphasizes the interplay between the

dynamics of media industries, economic structure, and the ideological 253

content of media (McQuail 2000, p.82). Political economy

as a study originated

in the eighteenth century, partly to explain, justify, and support the acceleration of capitalism

111

(Mosco, 1996, p.11). It rejected as inefficient and unproductive mercantilist policies that required strong state support.⁴² According to Eatwell et.al (1987, p.907)

in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, political economy can be defined as the science of wealth and deals with efforts made by man to supply wants and satisfy desires'

123

(as cited in Mosco, 1996, p.24). Most research in this field paid attention to the empirical analysis with topics ranging from

the structure of media ownership, control of media, to how media market forces operate. From this perspective, the media institution has to be considered like a part of the economic system, with close links to the political system

102

(McQuail 2000, p.82). ⁴² Mercantilism is set of state policies and economic philosophy that spurred government action to build the country's treasure by raising its resources of precious metals. State intervention is used to limit imports and boost exports in order to pile up surpluses of gold. European states in the early modern era up to the early nineteenth century were guided by this idea before it was replaced by liberal ideology of free trade and limited government interference in commerce (Source: World History Glossary, onlocationeducation.net/world-history-glossary-m-r) However, the further

development of economics narrowed what was originally a broadly

23

based discipline. As early as 1913, the original Palgrave noted that 'although the name political economy is still preserved, the science, as now understood, is not strictly political.

145

Political economy

deals primarily with the industrial activities of individual men

23

so

it is not confined to relations only between the government and the governed,

23

(Palgrave, 1913, p.741 as cited in Mosco, 1996, p.24). The term political economy

applied to broader problems of real cost, surplus, and distribution

23

as the

Dictionary of Modern Economics defined political economy as 'the theory and practice of economic affairs' in 1948.

230

This definition was

viewed as matters of social as well as individual concerns.

23

However,

the emphasis shifted to changes in market values and questions of equilibrium of the individual firm

249

when the

utility concepts was introduced in the late nineteenth century.

407

Such problems no longer required an expansive social viewpoint and there was no need to stress the political (Horton, 1948,

23

p.110). Mosco (1996, p.25) thinks about political

economy as the study of “the social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources.” From this standpoint, the product of communication, such as films, books, newspapers, videos, and audiences, are the dominant resources. This definition has a certain heuristic value

23

because it

calls attention to fundamental forces and processes at work in the marketplace. It emphasizes the institutional circuit of communication products that links, for example, a chain of primary producers to wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, whose purchases, rentals, and attention are fed back into new processes of production.

73

Moreover, political economy tends to concentrate on a specific set of social relations organized around power or the ability to control other people, processes, and things, even in the face of resistance (Mosco, 1996, p.25).

56

According to Murdock and Golding (1977), the effect economic forces in mass media are not random, but

work consistently to exclude those voices lacking economic power or resources.... the underlying logic of cost operates systematically, consolidating the position of groups already established in the main mass-media markets and excluding those groups who lack the capital base required for successful entry. Thus the voices which survive will largely belong to those least likely to criticize the prevailing distribution of wealth and power. Conversely, those most likely to challenge these arrangements are unable to publicize their dissent or opposition because they cannot command resources needed for effective communication to a broad audience

28

(p.37). McQuail (2000, p. 83) said that the core idea

of political, economic theory has not changed since earlier times, but the scope of application is much wider.

251

He characterized the

critical political-economic theory in the following propositions: 1) Economic control and logic is determinant. 2) Media structure tends towards concentration. 3) Global integration of media development. 4) Contents and audiences are commodified. 5) Diversity decreases. 6) Opposition and alternative voices are marginalized. 7) Public interest in communication is

12

subordinated to private interests. According to

Burton (2005, p.6), political economic

approach would be interested in four issues: 1) **The production of cultural goods by institutions;** 2) **Regulation of those institutions and by government;** 3) **Media text with reference to the relationship between representation and the conditions of production and consumption;** 4) **Cultural consumption in relation to cultural and social inequalities. In this**

1

regard,

media institutions exist within a context of other powerful organizations

1

(Burton, 2005, p.16).

Garnham (2000) makes a criticism of at least certain kinds of approach to media. He says that media studies tend to

1

ignore

social process, which lies behind the media.

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The studies focus too much on things beyond social process.

Media institutions may have particular position and a particular qualities within society, commerce and culture. However, media institutions **are not**

1

superior. Groups and individuals resorted to the law for the purpose of containing or even redefining what it was acceptable for the media to do. The government utilizes legal and political power to adjust their level of operation. Schools and universities

makes the media an object of research and may question its role.

1

Security apparatus

may act for the state in the same process of containment. In short, the media

1

interact with many institutions in society. However, the position of the media

neither dominant nor submissive in this interaction,

35

and

whatever influence media may have, this influenced is qualified and modified

1

(Burton, 2005). Several trends in the media business and technology recently have increased the relevance of political-economic theory and research (McQuail, 2000, p.83): 1)

There has been growth in media concentration worldwide, with more and more power of ownership being concentrated in fewer hands and with tendencies for mergers

17

(Murdock, 1990). 2)

There has been a growing global 'information economy' involving an

17

increasing convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting

(Melody, 1990; Sussman, 1997). 3)

There has been a decline in the public sector of mass media and in direct public control of telecommunication under the banner of 'deregulation', 'privatization', or 'liberalization'

17

(Siune & Truetzschler, 1992; McQuail & Siune, 1998) Media need profit from their operations, and the profit motive prompts the media to expand their scope of business to the level of monopolistic tendencies by implementing the corporate business practices, which have been a characteristic of many major media institutions in the world recently. The media business practices to include: vertical integration,

multi-nationalism, conglomeration, lateral integration, and diversification (Burton, 2005, pp .10-

351

11). 1)

Vertical integration refers to the pattern of business ownership in which a company purchases or sets up other companies that relate to the core business. In particular, big media companies tend to try to control

1

the process starting from production, distribution, retailing, to the exhibition. This

integrated power also gives such a media institution the power to cut one-sided deals with apparently independent makers of film and TV (Burton, 2005, p.10).

147

2)

Multi-nationalism relates to globalization and refers to the fact that the largest media companies distribute product across different countries, have

1

manufacturing bases in different countries,

do business in different countries, and have links across national boundaries (co-productions).

321

This can make them more difficult to 'challenge' in national and cultural interests,

305

more difficult to regulate, and less easy to tax

1

(Burton, 2005). 3)

Conglomeration refers to a tendency to

35

purchase shares in other companies with

similar businesses in order to meet competition and to dominate the media sector, which a given company is in.

1

4)

Lateral integration refers to a company move sideways, buying the controlling shares across different media.

1

5) Diversification refers to

another version of the lateral process in which a media company buys a business, which has no relation to the media 250

industry. These features explained above can be argued as

linked to economic drivers which in turn may be encapsulated as seeking profit capacity, control of the market, economies of scale, and suppression of competition. All these business and commercial practices contribute to the excellent market position and power of certain media organizations. Nicholas Garnham (2000) produces the following three models of media organizations in relation to their economic activity: 1) Flow model – in which 1

a continual supply of goods is produced (as in broadcasting). 1

2) Press model – in which goods are produced collectively, but are also guaranteed repeat sales (such as newspapers) 3) Editorial model – in which 1

individual goods are produced directly for the consumer (such as CDs) 1

Such models reinforce the idea that organization of media are institutions of commerce, as much as creative sources, cultural enablers or part of a social 1

(Garnham, 2000) 3.3 Processes of Political Economy Vincent Mosco (1996) develops

a substantive map of political economy with three entry processes: 53

commodification, spatialization, and structuration. Commodification is the process of transforming use value to exchange value, and the manifold ways this process extends into the social field of communication products, audiences, and labor, 26

which has been given less attention than one would expect from a political economic analysis. Spatialization is the

transformation of space with time, or the process of institutional extension, 53

while

structuration describes the process whereby structures are mutually constituted with human agency, or, to put it more specifically, structures are constituted out of agency even as they serve as the very medium for that constitution. The outcome of structuration is a set of social relational and power processes organized around class, gender, race, and social movements that both correspond to and oppose one another (Mosco, 1996, p. 138). 3.3 .1 Commodification The process of commodification describes the 26

capitalism carries out its objectives of accumulating capital, or realizing value through the transformation of use values into exchange values. 199

43

Political economy has tended to give considerably greater weight **to** those **383**
business institutions **and**

structures that produce and distribute commodities and to government bodies that regulate the process.

The political economy of communication has been prominent **for its** **82**
emphasis on explaining **and examining the significance of those**
structural forms responsible for the production, distribution, and exchange
of communication commodities and for the regulation of these structures,
principally by the state. Political economy **has**

tended to foreground corporate and state structures and institution in its analysis without neglecting the

commodity itself and the process of commodification **107**

(Mosco, 1996). According to Mosco (1996, p.145), when political economy

has treated the commodity, it has tended to concentrate on its **117**
embodiment in **media content,**

to a lesser extent on media audiences, and paid surprisingly little attention to the labor process in the communication industries. However, emphasis on the first two

is understandable, in light of the importance of global media **53**
companies and growth in the value of media content.

The Commodification of Content. Political economists have tended to start with media content when they think about the commodity form of communication. From this regard, the

process of commodification in communication involves transforming **188**
messages, ranging from bits of data to system **of meaningful thought,**
into marketable products.

The history of mass media

production in capitalist society has involved numerous processes, **64**
including commodification, which makes the storyteller **a wage laborer**
who sells her labor power, the ability to write stories for a wage. Capital
turns that labor power into a newspaper article or column which, along with
other stories and advertising, forms a packaged product,

and then sold in the marketplace. If the sales were successful, earn surplus value, a profit, the media can invest in expanding its business or in any other venture that promises additions to capital.

Marxian political economy views this as the realization of surplus **93**
value because the control that capital wields over the

43 Following Marx who began capital with a discussion of the commodity form,

it is largely through 'the immense collection of commodities' that **111**
capitalism present **itself, its most common embodiment (Mosco, 1996:**

140)

means of production (ownership of the press, offices, **etc) enables it to** **93**
receive **in labor more than it pays out in wages.**

The Audience Commodity. According to Smythe (1977), the

audience is the primary commodity of the mass media. The mass media are constituted out a process in which media companies produce audiences and deliver them to advertisers. 126

Media programming is used to attract audiences. From this vantage point,

audience labor or its labor power is the chief product of the mass media. 61

For Smythe,

a triad that linked media, audiences, and advertisers are brought together **in a** process that **set** a **binding reciprocal**

relationship.

Mass media programming is used to construct audiences; advertisers pay media companies for access to these audiences; audiences are thereby delivered to advertisers. 112

The argument emphasizes that media commodification takes place beyond the immediate process of media companies producing a newspaper, radio broadcast, television programs, and films to include advertisers or capital in general. 3.3.2 S p

a t i a l i z a t i o n The 135

term 'spatialization' was introduced

by the social theorist Henri Lefebvre to denote the process of overcoming the constraints **of space and time in social life** 80

(Lefebvre, 1979). There are two reasons why spatialization holds special significance

for the political economist **of communication**. First, **the** communication **process** 107

and technology are central to the spatialization process throughout the wider political economy. Second and partly because of this, spatialization is particularly significant in the communication industries. The

political economy of communication specifically discusses **spatialization chiefly in terms of the institutional extension of corporate power in the communication industry. This is manifested in the sheer growth in the size of media firms, measured by assets, revenues, profit, employees, and share value. Political economy has specifically examined growth by taking up different forms of corporate concentration.** 27

The

simplest form of concentration takes place when a media firm buys a controlling interest in a company cooperating **principally in the same business (Mosco 1996,** 157

p.175). Some of the major ways people have thought about media concentrations are horizontal and vertical concentration. According to Golding and Murdock (2000),

horizontal concentration takes place when a firm in one line of media purchases a controlling stake in another media operation, not directly related to the original business, or when it takes a major stake in a company entirely. The typical example of the first or cross -media concentration

61

is the purchase by a firm in an old media line;

107

say a newspaper, of a firm in a newer line, such as a radio or television station.

53

This is one way an industry as newspaper publishing is able to remain profitable in the face of newer media forms. Vertical concentration

describes the concentration of firms within a line of business that extends a company's control over the process of production.

177

Vertical concentration consists of forward and backward integration. Forward integration takes place when

a firm expands further along the circuit required for the realization of value. For example,

304

a film producer purchases a film distribution company. Backward vertical integration takes place when a newspaper company purchases paper mills,

thereby expanding the company down the production process.

117

(Golding & Murdock, 2000, p.11). 3.3.3 S

structuration

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According to Mosco (1996, pp.213-245), structuration

describes a process by which structures are constituted out of human agency, even as they provide the very 'medium' of that constitution. The theory of

80

structuration was presented initially by Anthony Giddens (1984) to bridge what he perceived to be a chasm

between theoretical perspective that foreground structure and those that emphasize action and agency.

44

Giddens suggests that we consider the structure as a duality, including constraining rules and enabling resources. No longer the rigid scaffolding that controls and gives form to social life, structure both constitutes action and is reproduced with it. In this respect, structure and action are interconnected in the ongoing patterning of social life. Mosco suggests that structuration theory along with the process of commodification and spatialization advance a political economy of communication.

Social life is comprised of the mutual constitution of structure and agency. The structuration theory

273

is characterized by the prominence it gives to social change, seen here as a ubiquitous process that describes

how structures are produced and reproduced by human agents who act through the medium of these structures.

227

The conception of structuration responds to criticism directed at functionalist, institutional, and structuralist thought arising out of their tendency to present structures as fully formed, determining entities (Mosco 1996,

p.213). These approaches have made an important contribution to understanding the operations of structures, but they have given an inadequate accounting of the process of structural formation, as well as social action and human agency. 3.4 The Propaganda Model Another scholars well-known for their thoughts in the political economy of media are

Edward S. Herman's and Noam Chomsky (1988) who introduced "propaganda model" in their book Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media.

31

The book focuses on inequalities of power and wealth

as its multilevel influences on mass-media choices and interests. Their idea traces the routes by which power and money are capable to filter out the news fit to broadcast or print, marginalize dissent, and allow dominant private interests and the government to get their messages across to the people. Herman and Chomsky claim that the mainstream American mass media work ideologically to prevent dissent, for economical and political power elite.

31

Mass media support the societal power blocks (government, business and experts) through five news filters as the followings: 1) Profit orientation and concentrated ownership of the dominant mass media firms. Large firms control the dominant mass-media outlets operated for profit. Therefore,

the financial interest of media owners -often corporations or particular controlling investors-

57

must be served first. Media need capital-intensive technology to reach a mass audience, so

the size of the companies is a necessary consequence of the capital requirements. 2) Advertising as **the**

57

primary income source of the mass media.

Media outlets are not commercially viable without the support of sponsors and advertisers.

29

It is because most

of the revenue of major media outlets derives from advertising, not from sales or subscriptions. Advertisers have acquired a "de facto licensing authority" (Curran & Seaton, 1981). Mass media

138

must therefore cater to the economic desires and political prejudices of their sponsors and

29

advertisers This has weakened, for example, the working class media, and also helps explain the gradual reduction in the number of media

216

companies.

3) The reliance of the media on information provided by societal power block of government, business and experts.

31

According to

Herman and Chomsky, the large bureaucracies of power blocks subsidize the

29

mass media by

reducing the media's costs of acquiring and producing news. The
power blocks contribute **to the**

303

thrive of media outlets by giving special access to their reporters to get information. The large entities that provide this subsidy have privileged access to the media and become 'routine' news sources. On the other hand,

non-routine sources must strive **for access** to the media, **and may be**
neglected **by the arbitrary decision of the gatekeepers.** 66 4) Disciplining
the media by "flak"

190

"Flak" means strong criticism or

negative responses to a media statement or program (e.g. Complaints,
letters, lawsuits, or legislative actions). Flak can be expensive to the
media

29

since it can cause the media to loss potential advertising revenue. Media also spend money for the

defense of the media outlet's public image

29

and the costs of legal defense. Flak can be organized by powerful, mass organizations, NGO, or

private influence groups (e.g. think tanks). The prospect of bringing out
flak can be a hindrance to the reporting of certain kinds of facts or
opinions. 5) **Anti-communism as a**

57

national religion and control mechanism.

Anti-communism was included as a filter for **the** interest **of** power blocks
during **the**

29

era of cold-war,

but Chomsky argues that since the end of the Cold War (1945–91),'war
on terror' **replaced**

29

anti-communism propaganda as the major social control mechanism 3.5 Media Institutions and Finance A useful general description was proposed by Grossberg et al. (1998) about

how media make sales and derive income

35

as the following: 1) Consumers purchase directly the

commodity – e.g. the cost of the magazine

1

2)

Indirect financial support, though the commodity is free at the point of
sale – e.g. commercial television 3) **Indirect financial support, plus a**
cover cost – e.g. advertising in newspapers.

1

4)

A charge for access to the point of distribution or display – e.g. box
office charge at the movie theatre, or the Internet provider charge.

1

Commercial mass media depend a great deal on advertising, and this dependence on advertising is backed

up by a strong orientation toward market, which dominates media institutional values.

It means that the interests of the media

1

companies are similar to the

interests of other kinds of business.

35

Media institutions treat their product like any other commodities underpinning the idea

that media commodity **come to be treated like any other** industrial products, and **if media** commodity **are** expressions **of culture, then that culture becomes a** pile **of commodities, where the media are concerned**

1

(Burton, 2005). This research will use frameworks and perspectives taken from several communication theorists with regard to two important topics, namely: 1) political economic factors of communication affecting media contents and 2) the performance of media. 3.6 Media Content The discussion about media content begins with the definition of content. Pemela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese (1991, p.2) define

content as “the complete quantitative and qualitative range of verbal and visual information distributed by the media”. In other words, just about anything that appears in the

75

media. Content researches have been organized by scholars

around a variety of theoretical perspectives, and they group these approaches into a handful of categories

6

(McQuail, 2000, p.246): 1) Content is

influenced by media workers’ socialization and attitudes. 2) Content is **influenced by media routines.**

338

3)

Content reflects social reality with little or no distortion

6

4)

Content is a function of ideological positions and maintains the status quo. 5) Content is

6

influenced by other social institutions and forces.

409

Communication content is of interest not only in its own rights, but also as a signal of many other underlying forces. The study

75

is significant since the interaction between media and society can be understood only by knowing how the media themselves operate. Studying content help us explain

phenomena that are less open and visible as well as **the people and media organizations that produce the content.**

6

The impact of content on audience can also be predicted by a study of media content. According to Garnham (1979), the

underlying economic interest of media owners and decision-makers

382

to expand market become the predominant character of what the media produces. In addition,

the exchange value of different kinds of content, under conditions of economic pressure 327

becomes the character of media content. The economic interests provoke consequences in the

reduction of independent media sources, concentration of the largest markets, avoidance of risks, and reduced investment in less profitable media tasks such as investigative reporting and documentary film making 12

(Garnham,1979). Media content can be categorized in many ways. Content might be labeled based on the medium used (television, radio, print), particular effects (prosocial/antisocial), audience appeal (highbrow/lowbrow),

sexual content (pornographic/nonpornographic), or any of a dozen other ways 6

(Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, p.24). One common approach is based on genre, while another

approach is based on the use, or function, that content is designed to serve. 6

3.6.1 Content Social Function It has been stated previously that

one common approach toward content is based on the use, or function, that content is designed to serve. Harold Lasswell (1948, as cited in 6

Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, p.25)

identifies three important functions that communication serves in society –surveillance, 6

correlation, and transmission- while Wright (1986) adds one more entertainment. 1) The surveillance. News provides information about the occurrences and

warnings about imminent threats and dangers in the world. 6

In other words,

news content most closely fits the surveillance function 6

of the environment. The underlying events become the basis for the production of news, and

traditionally there is a clear separation between the subject of the news and its producers. Unlike the producers of 6

entertainment who can control even manipulate the event; the

producers of news do not have full control over the event on which their product is based. 6

2) The correlation. Correlative content

is most often considered to comprise purposive communication that attempts to persuade. 6

In other words,

correlative content might actually include any content that interprets the news.

6

The function of the media is to correlate

parts of society in responding to the environment.

6

Wright (1986) associates correlation with an editorial and propaganda activity by producing

appropriate responses to the problem identified through surveillance content (as cited in

6

Shoemaker and Reese, 1991, p.25). 3) The transmission. Mass media helps people in transmitting values, and the perceived norms of society were transmitted in virtually all forms of content in some way. This function was performed by all mass media at some time in some way. Entertainment, surveillance, and correlative

content all help disseminate lessons to new members of society.

6

Mass media transmit social heritage from one generation to another. 4) Entertainment. The fourth function of the media is to entertain,

but entertainment content is usually not designed to convey actual events

6

although it

may shed light on reality, represent the human experience.

6

Entertainment content usually provides immediate gratification, relaxation, and relief for the audience. However, the content

is under the complete control of its producer.

6

Shoemaker and Reese (1991) identify patterns of media content that have been among the most widely examined by communication scholars, including news sources, deviance, political bias, and behaviors depicted by the media including aggression, violence and sex. The way media tell

us what is normal is by showing us what is deviant.

341

The media marginalize some people

by ignoring them or presenting them less advantageously and outside the mainstream,

124

and

give importance to some people and groups by portraying them frequently and in powerful positions. Media report frequently by

124

magnifying the damage caused, the seriousness of events, and the violence that occurred. The treatment of deviance is therefore an important feature of media content. With regard to news sources, Herbert Gans (1979) found that news of CBS, NBC, Newsweek, and Time is dominated by the 'knowns', or people already prominent consisting of

incumbent presidents, presidential candidates, cabinet members, state and local officials, and alleged and actual violators of the laws

77

(well-known people who get in trouble with the law, or become enmeshed in political scandal). The

unknowns consisted of five types:

(1) protesters, rioters, strikers; (2) victims; (3) alleged and actual violators of the laws and mores; (4) voters, survey respondents, and other aggregates; and (5) participants in unusual activities

77

(Gans, 1979). 3.6.2 Genres of Television Content

Many different kinds of television programs, each of which can be classified as belong to a genre or, in some cases, mixed genres. The

3

various program genres were broadcast by television as an electronic medium across various audiences.⁴⁴

A genre refers to as coded set of formulas and conventions, which indicate a culturally accepted way or organizing material into distinct patterns

3

(Kellner, 1980, pp.2-19).

Once established, genres dictate the basic conditions of a cultural production and reception. For example, crime dramas invariable have a violent crime, a search for its perpetrators, and often a chase, fight, or bloody elimination of the criminal, communicating the message “crime does not pay.”

3

(Kellner, 1980). People

do not actually watch the medium of television, per se, when they watch television, but specific television programs—or, to use the popular term in academic circles, texts. All media are based on texts, which all fall into various categories or genres. The growing interest in genres

3

is because of their effect on the

creation of television programs, what the social, cultural and political implications of different genres may be, how genres

3

44

The term “genre” comes from the French language and means “type” or “kind.”

291

See Berger (1992).

begin and evolve and why some genres, such as the western, died out after years of great popularity

3

(Berger, 2007, p.2).

We identify genres by looking for similarities in texts relating to common themes, subject matter, settings, characters, conventions, plots, and important material objects (such as the white cowboy hat in westerns for good cowboys). Television genres refer to a class of television programs and a given program is an example of that genre. ⁴⁵ The

3

creators of television shows generally focus on a particular audience and adapt the conventions of a genre to their purposes. When a

3

particular television show becomes popular, other television production companies start imitating it, hoping to cash in on the popularity of the genre.

There are large numbers

of mixed genre television shows that have been developed,

3

and sometimes,

it is difficult, in many cases, to place a particular show in a category,

3

since some of them could fit in several genres. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assign many shows to a particular television genre. Some of the more important formulaic broadcast television genres and programs that can be placed in each genre are the

following (Berger, 2007, p.5-9): Commercials. The

system of paying for television is based on money made by stations broadcasting commercials.

3

For this reason the

television commercial is the most important genre found on television.

3

Commercials are type of content through which broadcast stations sell their audiences to advertisers.

News shows. Television broadcasts many hours of daily news and

3

plus weekly news programs. Originally seen as a public service, this type of content turn to

become an important source of revenue for television stations.

3

Documentary is one

category of news programs and deal with social, cultural, political and economic and other topics of interest. However, the number of documentaries on commercial television stations has dropped considerably over the years.

3

Situation Comedies. Popular situation comedies are able to make big amounts of money for television station. However it is not easy

to create a good situation comedy, but television have kept producing new ones every year since the return from a good situation comedy, in audience size and profit, is considerable. The most popular situation comedies are

3

able to generate big money for the creators and producers. 45 Although

in philosophical parlance, some deny the reality of classes of things while other (the realists) accept their reality, but for our purposes, since we are dealing with a class of television programs called genres, we must accept the realist perspective. With few exceptions, the material found in literature and the popular arts is an example of some genre or mixed genre. We

3

deal with genre just for the sake of popular arts found in the media. Sports Broadcasts. Television stations broadcast sport contests such as tennis, baseball, golf, basketball, football, and car racing. This program

genre

have a dramatic quality because in many cases audience cannot know what the result of the game will be until the game is over. 3

Advertisers can reach male viewers, aged 18 to 45, through sport programs, who are important target audiences for products like automobile, beer, and sports equipment. Crime Shows. These shows involve the fighting between the police and criminals of one kind or another and are frequently showing violent. One of crime 3

show category

called the classical detective show, which involves crime, but generally is not violent. The classical type uses a detective who solves the mystery by exhibiting superior powers of analysis, observation and intellect. Soap Operas. In Indonesia, this type of television genre 3

is called sinetron which can last for hundreds of episodes.

It is characterized by never-ending and incredibly complicated love relationships and family problems. Soap opera feature generally physically attractive romantic leads. Television broadcast soaps 3

to reach female adolescents as their target audience, while others focus on older or younger audiences. Talk Shows. There are many television shows

that involve an expert in some area, which are basically full of talk. 3

For example, a medical expert give advice to troubled individuals and families how to solve their problems. The late-night comedy talk shows is

an important subcategory of these shows. This late-night show is usually hosted by comedians 3

who interview humorously show business celebrities. Reality Shows. Many viewers think that these shows are reality but the program actually

are highly edited and so aren't as "real" as many viewers think. 3

These shows, which are very popular in recent years, represent a new genre in television programs. Since they are not scripted, these shows are relatively inexpensive to produce.

A number of different other genres were sometimes mixed in these shows 3

and have elements in them of contest shows, action-adventure shows, 3

and travel

shows. Science and Education show. These shows have an educational elements in them and find ways of educating audience and entertaining them at the same time. 3

Cooking Shows. In these programs, chefs teach audience

how to cook various dishes from a number of different cuisines. 3

Many chefs who host the show become celebrities especially after the programs get more attention from the audience.

Action-Adventure Shows. This category covers a wide range of dramas, some of which have supernatural elements in them, others have elements of horror in them, and others have stories about people who face problems and find ways of troubleshooting them. 3

72 Game Shows. These shows involve having participants answer questions on any subject and guess the price of some object,

with those who are successful, having the chance to win prizes and sometimes-large sums of money. These programs 3

attract good size audiences and, in some cases, huge audiences 3

while it is cheap to produce.

Children's Programs. These programs are produced specifically to entertain young children and often contain material that amuses and educates them. 3

Nevertheless,

many psychologists urge parents to curtail viewing of this material 3

since

some children's programs feature cartoons that are humorous but full of violence. 3

Religious Programs. These programs involve religious themes featuring various television evangelists and other religious figures. They talk about 3

various topics relating to religion including the Holy book and other religious texts. For those who study television content,

to deal with all the different genres and subgenres shown on television 3

is not an easy task.

Many movies—representing different genres—are shown on television every day, at any given moment. 3

To further complicate matters,

there are a number of different genres of television programs competing with one another for viewers. When 3

television personnel produce

television programs, they always have some genre, or combination of genres, in mind, which has certain conventions they will follow. These formulas make it easier for them to create new texts, since there are patterns they can follow, and for viewers to comprehend what is going on in the texts they create (Berger, 3

2007, p.9). 3.6.3 Shaping Media Content Some media theories have tried to answer questions about who decides what is in the media content, what is in news, drama, music program or any genre of television programs. What is important enough for an actor or actress used in drama, a headline in a news bulletin, a host for an entertainment program, what criteria do media use. In Fact, there are many different answers to these questions. The answers reflect a wide range of

assumptions about how society functions and the role of the media.

63

This section and the following one will discuss some theories with regard to a question about who shapes media content. The Gatekeeping Theory. The

theory emphasizes the crucial role of the gatekeepers, the media executives who can either open or close "the gate" on a story.

63

Gatekeepers

can squelch new ideas and suppress the news of events that others might find important.

116

73 However, gatekeeping actions by media executives must be taken very selective, unless they are willing to see, their audience leaves for other media with more complete pictures of the world. A related theory examines how reporters

frame a story. Reporters decide what to include within the view, or frame, of a story and what to leave

181

out. They must decide not only what events or facts to include, but also the conceptual framework, context, and interpretation of the facts. All these decisions bias the story (Straubhaar, 2000). According to Bourdieu (1998), the invisible self-censorship working even in countries where there is supposedly freedom of expression. In these countries, journalists realize what is permissible, and what is not permissible, pushing them to pre-edit their own work to be consistent with those perceived norms.

The Agenda Setting Theory. Donald **Shaw** and Maxwell **McCombs (1977,** p.5) described **the**

371

power of media in structuring issues for the public.

The media set an agenda by establishing the salient issues or images in the minds of

78

people. Agenda setting theory examines the

relationship between the events of the day, the decisions of media professionals, and media content, with a special emphasis on the content of the news.

63

Since media coverage affects public opinion, agenda setting bestows political power of the media (Straubhaar et.al, 2000, p. 47). According to Shaw and McCombs (1977)

editors and broadcaster play an important part in shaping social reality as they conduct their day-to-day task of choosing and spreading news.

16

They said the **impact of the mass media** that include **the ability to effect cognitive change among individuals and to structure individuals' thinking has been** labeled **the agenda-setting function of mass communication. Here may lie the most important effect of mass communication: the ability to mentally order and organize the world for**

their audience. They said:

"In short, the mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they stunningly successful in telling us what to think about"

48

(Shaw and McCombs, 1977: 5). **The reason why agenda setting occurs is that the**

press must be selective in reporting the news.

136

Media professionals must decide about what to report, and

how to report it. What people know about the state of affairs at any given time is largely an outcome of media gatekeeping

185

(Shoemaker, 1996). According to

Rogers and Dearing (1988), the agenda-setting function is a

172

three-part linear process. First, reporters in the media discuss the priority of issues, resulting in the 74

media agenda. Second, the media agenda in some way affects or interacts with what the public thinks. If the people consider the media agenda

11

is important then

public agenda established. Finally, the public agenda affects or interacts in some way with what policymakers consider important, called the policy agenda.

11

In short, the

media agenda affects the public agenda, and the public agenda affects the policy agenda. Who affects the

48

media agenda in the first place? It is a complex and difficult question to answer. According to Reese (1991), it appears

that media agendas result from pressures both within media internal organizations and from outside sources.

166

In other words, he said, the

media agenda is devised by some combination of internal programming, editorial and managerial decisions, and external influences from non-media sources such as socially influential individuals, government officials, commercial sponsors,

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including program rating reports, and the like. The

power of media in establishing a public agenda depends in part on their relations with power centers. The

96

elite class in society will probably affect the media agenda and the public agenda in turn if the media

11

have a close relationship with them (Littlejohn and Foss, 2005). Many critical theorists believe that the dominant ideology in society

has the potential to influence the public agenda, and

381

media can be and usually are a tool of the dominant ideology. News Definers. In the study of the production

or media content, especially news, Herbert Gans (2004, p.116) asserts that news content is very much affected by the relationship between reporters and their news sources that may be able to dominate the supply of news, and sources can ensure their perspectives in framing the reports of events. For him, the relationship is mutual benefit, for journalists seek access to sources for news, and sources seek access to journalists for promoting their interests.

Either sources or journalist can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading.

269

Recent research has suggested, however, that the source-reporter relationship is much more complex than at first appears and that the nature of that interaction needs study that is more careful (Negrine: 1996). Stuart Hall et.al (1978) claimed that media texts are not neutral; they are shaped by the belief system and worldviews of media-makers and journalists. Hall conducted studies of the moral panics that arose around the media reporting of mugging in Britain. The news media over-reacted to the alleged threat of violence by black youth and other 'deviants' who seemed to be threatening the social order. A spiraling of press report about mugging was encouraged by more black offenders being sent to court, caused by 75 increased police organization against deviant members of the black community (Burgh, 2000). In this case, journalists tend to approach the police as sources of information because black suspects were not considered appropriate definers of reality on the ground of being seen as criminals. The above situation resulted in media as secondary definers to consistently reported one viewpoint.

Primary definers of events were seen to be structurally dominant groups in society.

306

Primary definers are those people in society who have the power to 'set the agenda' and 'define the terms' of what is discussed and how.

141

Primary definers are structurally dominant groups who are able to cue in the media to a particular event

223

(Stevenson, 2002). Primary definers could be the Government, the police, the courts, business leaders, scientists or influential pressure groups (Burgh, 2000). According to Hall et al (1978), the media are secondary definers of events because they journalistically select and interpret information received from primary definers. The news media, as the secondary definers, translate the statements and viewpoints of the primary definers into words or idioms understood by the public. The media elaborated on the comments of the primary definers (Hall et al: 1978). The study was significant because it showed the impact that 'primary' and 'secondary' definers of events have on news reporting. 3.7 The Political, Economic Factors that Shape Contents According to McQuail (2000), the

media organization, where media content is made, is an essential link in the process of mediation by which society addresses itself.

171

In this regard, structural features of media organization such as

size, forms of ownership and media, industrial function can be seen as having direct consequences for the conduct of the particular media

91

organization. McQuail refers conduct to all the system activities that in turn affect

performance, in the sense of the type and relative amount of media content produced and offered to audiences.

91

According to this model, we need to look not only at internal features of media organizations, but also in their relations with other organizations and with the wider society. This research will look at the forces at work within television organizations, the external influences upon their

activity and the influence of particular organization features on what they produce and

166

disseminate. McQuail said, the theories, which have been formulated based on research into media organizations, have been consistent. They support the view that organizational routines, practices and goals systematically and distinctively influence content. 76 The questions about the degree of freedom

media organization poses **in relation to the wider society, and how much freedom is possible within the organization**

131

and

media- organizational routines and procedures for selecting and processing content

131

lead to consideration of the tension. The following oppositions reflect the tension at the heart of media-making: 1) constraint versus autonomy; 2) routine production versus creativity; 3) commerce versus art and ; 4) profit versus social purpose (McQuail, 2000) The broad range of issues, which arise, can be appreciated when one takes an overview of theoretical perspectives organized around the question of influence on media content, as posed by Shoemaker and Reese (1991) who suggest five main hypotheses: 1)

Content reflects social reality (mass media as mirror of society); 2) Content is influenced by media workers' socialization and attitudes (a communicator- centered approach). 3) Content is influenced by media-organizational routines; 4) Content is influenced by social institution and forces;

65

5)

Content is a function of ideological positions and maintains the status quo (the hegemonic approach) McQuail

65

identify five main kinds of relationship, which

need to be examined in order to gain some understanding of

361

the conditions affecting media

organizational activity and the mass communicator role: 1) Relationship with society 2) Relationship with

89

owners, clients and suppliers 3) Relationship with pressure groups 4) Relationship with internal organization 5) Relationship with audience

A number of different relationships within and across the boundaries of media organization must be taken into account

89

in any theoretical account of media organizations and occupations. These relationships

are often active negotiations and exchanges and sometimes conflicts, latent or actual.

89

Gerbner (1969) depicted communicators in mass media as working

under pressure from different external 'power roles', including

175

audience,

competitors (other media in the main),

175

clients (such as sponsors and advertisers),

authorities (especially legal and political), experts, and other institutions.

175

// According to Pringle and Starr (2005, p.102), all broadcast station content (programs) is determined by four influences: audience, broadcaster, advertiser and regulator. The audience, which seeks out a station for its programs. Listeners or viewers may be exposed to other content, such as commercials and public service and promotional announcements, but their principal goals to hear or view program content that satisfies their need at a particular time. Programs that fail to attract listeners or viewers, or fail to satisfy their needs, are imperiled. So are the financial fortunes of the station. The broadcaster, who is responsible for operating the station profitably for its owners. The greater the audience, the greater the likelihood that a profit can be realized. Accordingly, the broadcaster selects and schedules programs to attract as many people as possible among the targeted audience. The advertiser, whose principal interest in using a radio or television is to bring

a product or service to the attention of

375

those most likely to use it. Programs that attract potential customers stand the best chance of attracting advertising revenues, especially if the number of people is large and the cost of delivering the commercial to them is competitive. The regulator, or government and its agencies, whose goal is to ensure that the station is operated in a way that serves the public interest. The regulator take actions aimed at compelling or encouraging broadcasters to engage in certain programming practices to satisfy that goal. J. David Lewis (1969) used responses from 301 stations in the United States to determine influences in television station programming. He developed eight categories, in no particular order of priority. 1) Direct feedback from the audience, including letters, telephone calls, and conversations. 2) Regulations, or rules and standards of practice, such as commitments to the FCC, its rules and regulations, and the station's own policy statement 3) Inferential feedback, or ratings 4) Conditional, a mix of factors, including comments about critics and

opinions of friends outside the station 5) Production staff, **the**

114

opinions of station personnel with production responsibilities 6) Personal or subjective judgment, including instinct,

common sense, and knowledge of the community

114

7) Financial, or factors related

to the station's income and expenditures,

114

such as sales potential, sales manager's opinion, and cost 7 8) Tactical, that is,

methods of program planning, the arrangement of the schedule, and

114

viewing trends. Commercial radio and television stations air thousands of hours of programs each year. Individual programs may be produced by the stations itself or obtained from another source. They may be designed chiefly to entertain, inform, or educate. Pringle and Starr (2005:102) write about these influences: "Much is said and written about broadcast programming. However, it would be unwise to identify any one influence for praise or condemnation. The programming we hear and see results from the interaction of all four forces." (Pringle & Starr, 2005:102) This research will examine the political economy factors that affect content as mentioned earlier by the communication theorists. However, this research will focus on five factors considered the most influential in shaping the television content: media owners, advertisers, audience, government and politics. The five factors are widely discussed in the various media, literature, and the following are reviews with regard to the five variables. 3.7.1 O w n e r s

It is difficult not to conclude that most media companies work in the
interests **of owners – as opposed to the** interests **of audiences or the**
community

156

at large. Owners occupy the top command posts of media organizations, and they

or their appointed top executives eventually **have the final say in what**
the organization does.

287

If the employees don't like it they can quit.

369

Others will be found to take their place, and routines can always be changed. Questions remain about how media owners have lived up to this responsibility. In many developed countries, this responsibility has become greatly diffused. However, in Indonesia many independent owners run their own media

organizations, some of them have become part of the larger corporate fabric. The key issue with regard to the relation between media workers and owners

is the extent to which the workers can claim to exercise autonomy in relation to

32

their owners. According to Altschull (1984), the

interests of those who finance the press were always reflected in

376

the content of news media. The notion is fairly clear and also consistent with the principles of free 'market' press theory. However, there is usually some degree of autonomy on the part of media workers employed by media owners, especially freedom based on professionalism or the requirements for creating.

Owners in market-based media have ultimate power over content, and

340

there is no doubt that they

can ask for what they want to be included or left out in the production of

103

content. Even so,

there are quite strong conventions relating to journalism, which protect the decision-making autonomy of editors on particular news stories.

103

It is not too surprising that journalists should claim more autonomy even though

they are reluctant to admit being told what to do by the proprietors.

324

Nevertheless,

there is an unavoidable tendency for those who own news media to set broad lines of policy, which are likely to be followed by the editorial staff they employ. There may also be informal and indirect pressure on particular issues that matter to owners. For instance, relating to their other business interest

19

(Turow, 1994). Change in ownership shows its influence most clearly. According to Shoemaker & Reese (1991), this may come in the form of a corporate takeover, which often brings different values, objectives, culture, and ultimately content. Indeed, in recent years the buying and selling of large newspaper and broadcasting companies have become a big story in its own right. Ownership changes in big media were used to be covered by other media. The new media owners clearly imposed a new policy with far-reaching effects. The news was to be treated like their other business, expected to support itself, a departure from the traditional view that network news is a loss-leader public service supported by the entertainment side of the enterprise. These changes have direct implications for content. Another important feature of ownership patterns today is the sheer size of a media conglomerate. The

number of publications on newsstands and radio and television stations, as well as new communication channels, makes it appear that ownership is widely distributed. In truth, though, most media are owned by a handful of corporate media giants.

95

Tracing the organizational connections among media reveals greater reasons for concern over the homogenization of media content and ownership.

208

The strongest effect of ownership usually comes up when owners try to impose their views on

media content. This is of particular concern in the news media

366

that occasionally endorse certain political candidates. One may assume that these endorsements provide a direct measure of the owner's or publisher's political attitude or that of the editorial board. To what extent do these attitudes find their way into the more objective news report? Several studies have examined the extent to which a medium slants its news reporting to conform to its editorial voice. Doing so would indicate that decisions at the top levels of the organization has superseded the content dictated by the routines of objective news gathering (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991).

3.7.2 Advertise

332

r s The

relationship between media and advertisers is best described as a symbiotic one. The central issue raised is about how far the

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media count

on advertising revenue. This in turn leads to a question about

1

the degree to which media content serves market ideology and advertisers' interests (Burton, 2005, p.18). According to Garnham (2000),

we need to understand the nature of the advertising market

1

in order to

understand the media economy and what is and is not sustainable within it.

1

A media organization can

be defined as the social, formal, usually economic entity that employs the media workers in order to produce media content (Shoemaker & Reese,

178

1991) Generating income is the primary goal of most media organizations. Other goals such as to produce a quality product, serve the public, and achieve professional recognition, are built into this overarching objective. The organization obviously can not afford to ignore the economic goal indefinitely despite success in achieving professional objectives. For example, many television companies in Indonesia are

privately owned, the owners can operate the business as they see fit.

49

Although only few television media in Indonesia

are owned by public stockholders. However, this form of public ownership intensifies the purely economic objectives of the company. Managers of publicly traded companies can be replaced if they fail their responsibility to the stockholders to maximize profit. The stock market cares little for public service if it means sacrificing profitability

49

(Burton, 2005) Most media institutions depend very much on the work of, or on revenues from, advertisers to finance their operation and reap profit. Television stations count on advertising entirely;

Quality newspapers rely on advertising for about two-thirds of their revenue;

1

magazine producers rely on advertising for 50 per cent and more of their income

1

and the

tabloid press for about one third.

35

In

turn, advertisers depend on the media for a vital means of communication with customers (Burton, 2005).

268

In this regard, advertisers are stakeholders behind the advertising text, from

media brokers doing deals over the cost,

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consultancies to video outfits shooting commercials, to brokers

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who place the commercials in certain media, to

any business or organization that contracts with the

35

advertisements. Those who work in newsrooms frequently see economic considerations as indirect influences on editorial decisions and as constraints to their work. News workers find it hard to relate the quality and nature of their news coverage to audience demand and advertising revenue (Sigal, 1973). Would one story, for example, raise newspaper circulation or television ratings more than another does (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). The mass media do not rely on the audience to get revenues but to advertisers. Audiences who tune to a station to hear or view its programs do not make direct payment for the programs they receive. Advertisers, who gain access to those audiences with information on their products and services, purchase advertising time sold to them by the media. The sales department is the principal generator of revenues for the media. However, its ability to sell time is determined to a large degree by the media creative workers' in drawing audiences, especially those that advertisers want to reach. Good programming attracts audiences, which in turn attract advertisers and revenues. It is not surprising that advertisers' interest influence greatly the

structure of much of the mass media industry in most capitalist countries.

19

According to Shoemaker and Reese (1991), most media in

free-market countries are finely tuned to jointly optimizing the needs of advertisers and sponsors as

122

well as

their own interests as a normal condition of operation. The 'normal' influence involves the matching of consumption patterns

122

of targeted audience with media content to be produced. Media design, scheduling, planning, layout, often reflect advertiser interests. According to Altschull (1984, p.254), the interests of those who finance the press have strong correlation with the content of the press. He said, "The

press is the piper, and the tune the piper plays is composed by those who pay the piper."

215

There is substantial evidence that both advertisers and audiences affect media content, both directly and indirectly. According to Burton (2005, p.19),

advertising as an activity supports the ideology of the marketplace

1

at any price. The marketplace ideology includes promotion of product, pleasing consumers, commercial competition, company expansion, and maximizing profits. The

tendency of media owners to support the dominant ideology, the security of the status quo and conservative values,

1

is effectively guaranteed by advertising. In this market economy model, reducing

production costs and increasing audience consumption control any genuine pluralism of material or of ideas.

1

The

consequence of the patterns of ownership and of the production practices of media owners, combined with **the collusive**

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relationships between media and advertising, result in the

meanings of media text, the dominant discourses that produce certain kinds of meaning about how the world should be

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(Burton 2005, p.19).

This interest in the work of institutions in manufacturing discourses within a text is part of a political economy critique of the media.

161

82 McQuail (2000) who quoted Baker (1994) said that

'advertisers, not government are the primary censors of media content in the United States today'. He cites evidence of advertisers using their market power to attempt to block particular communications that damage their interests and of advertiser pressure, which influences personnel as well as editorial decisions in the media. However, influence comes in diverse forms that are often hard to detect and not necessarily illegitimate (for instance providing information that has a promotional value, product placement, sponsoring, etc).

19

Jamieson and Campbell (1983, p.97) said advertisers some times

are not afraid to "use their financial muscle to protest what they perceive as unfair treatment by the news segment of the mass media".
Because the survival of

99

commercial mass media depend very much on their advertising income, the bigger the advertiser, the more income it has. Large multinational advertisers and their advertising companies therefore have huge power to contain public messages they do not like. According to Kessler (1989), one kind of advertisers who made the most attempts to control mass media content were tobacco companies although some of the controls may be self-imposed by the media themselves in an attempt to deter censure by cigarette producers. For example, Kessler (1989) reported that there was almost no editorial content about any health hazards of smoking –“the number one cancer killer of women”– in six major women's magazines published in U.S although women's health was a major topic in the magazine. Weis and Burke (1986) said editors of U.S women's magazines frequently told the writers or contributors who wrote about health topics for the magazine to

stay away from the subject of tobacco.

85

They also said that the film industry was also affected by the power of tobacco advertisers. Advertisers often paid film producers to

display smoking as an appropriate, desirable behavior among socially active adults. Tobacco companies offer to help underwrite film making costs; in return, the filmmaker agrees to portray the key characters in the film as smokers.

85

Although tobacco commercials in some countries are no longer permitted on television, the tobacco companies spend million of dollars advertising non-tobacco products on television. Advertisers or sponsors who bought whole shows, or major portion of a show, regularly read a script a day or two in advance of shooting. Gitlin (1985) said at the behest of an ad agency for a gas company sponsor, CBS took out half a dozen instances of the word 'gas' referring to gas chambers in a 'Playhouse 90' drama of the Nuremberg trials. After the quiz show scandals of 1958, CBS president Frank Stanton set down an explicit rule that advertisers would no longer be permitted to read scripts in advance and intervene if they thought their corporate image at risk. Stanton said advertisers would be permitted to screen the filmed episodes, and if they wanted to beg off a particular one, the network would excuse them. The 1980s saw an important change in television programming, the advent of advertiser-created shows. This type of program represents a new stage in the long relationship between advertising and the mass media. Janus (1984) said that advertisers develop programs so skillfully intertwined with other information that the viewers cannot be removed or avoided in order to prevent viewers from erasing or skipping over advertising messages. 3.7

.3 Audience

363

Conceptualizing 'audience' must come in the first place before the

discussion of a relationship between media and audiences. The audience

1

can be understood based on the following conceptions: (1)

a disparate collection of individuals who happen to be consuming one text at one time; (2) a coherent social group who have in common characteristics outside their consumption; (3) a mass group whose identity comes from the very fact of their consumption (Burton, 2005, p.16). Although the

76

political-economy

approach centers on media activity as an economic process resulting in the commodity (the media product or content), there is a variant

17

in this approach that suggests that audience as the real and the

primary product of the media. This refers to the fact that the media

350

give public

attention to advertisers and shape the behavior of media publics in certain distinctive way (Smythe, 1977). What commercial media sells to their clients is a certain more or less, guaranteed amount of potential consumers, according to a market-relevant profile

12

(McQuail, 2000, p.82). According to Burton (2005), in order to satisfy their advertisers

media institutions need to objectify their audiences. Advertisers

1

must be satisfied because in

most cases, media depend on their commercial payments for survival and profit. In this case, advertisers are looking at quantitative research and at ways of measuring what the audiences do with the products.

1

More specific descriptions of audiences emphasize this view.

1

So although given media organizations may talk in general about their

1

readers, **listeners or** viewers, **in fact they are thinking about consumers. The**

most important reason for audience's existence

is to provide cash for the media institutions **to continue to operate.** The number **of**

1

audience is crucial for media. Broadcasters refer to ratings. Newspapers refer to circulation figures and readership. These descriptions translate into numbers. The bottom line of every audience research, even the qualitative ones, is to obtain data about

who are prepared to spend, given amounts of cash on the given media service, and

1

how far do these translate into certain numbers of certain kinds of people who are spending, or

1

the

goods and services that it may be promoting? ⁴⁶ **So the relationship at the level of** the executive, **of** policy, **of** shareholders, **is a material one**

1

(Burton, 2005, p.16). The mass media audience is divided into various segments, and not all audience members are equally important. Segment of mass audience most likely to buy an advertiser's product is called

the target audience or market. **Target audiences are** grouped **in terms of**

99

demographic (such as income, gender, age, and education), geographic, or psychographics (attitudes and life-styles). The media, which could provide the best target audience for advertisers' products, are the most sought-after. The relationship between media and audience is actually dissimilar, even when audiences are part of television program production,

as in the case of reality TV

35

or other programs that invite people to the studio. Television workers

define the terms on which audiences may participate. A strict control **is**

1

imposed for those who want to appear on the media.

It is obvious in the case of television **shows**

1

with the audiences in the studio (for example quiz, or music show), once they are on the show they are no longer the audiences. They are not onlookers; they are talents, part of the production team. Audiences in studio

stand in a rather different relationship, with regard **to textual material,** **than do the audiences at home. What doesn't change is that** media **institution still controls the players** including **studio audiences who are also players of a kind.**

1

Media have the dominant and **controlling role in the** audience-media **relationship**

1

with

audiences largely lack access to the **media.**

35

His dominant role still persists for examples of media

where audiences appear to participate through email, letters, phone-ins and other communication devices

1

(Burton 2005, p.17) When commercials began airing on radio stations, advertisers naturally wondered

how many listeners were exposed to their messages and how effective the messages were.

36

That's why traditional advertisers, not broadcasters, were the initiators of broadcast research (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). However, it became the responsibility of broadcasters to

provide empirical evidence of the size and characteristics of their audience.

36

Electronic media research studies today fall into two main categories: ratings and non-ratings research.

36

Program rating is the average numbers of audiences during a television program expressed as a percentage of the total group sampled or potential. Program Rating points can be based on the smallest time unit of 1 minute.⁴⁶ For television personnel, the rating results from research companies on television programs quite often bothered some broadcasters. Creative television workers including performers, writers, directors, producers and others in programming became particularly sensitive to the rating reports. Often their careers, and sometimes their incomes, were dependent upon where they stood in program rankings. Nevertheless, the slavery to the decimal point decided the fate of many programs and it caused the renewal or termination of the advertising contracts of many sponsors. Casualties were common every season in the television schedules (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). Broadcasting rating creates controversy in many areas. TV viewers complain that "good" shows are cancelled: radio listeners complain that their favorite station's format is changed. Producers, actors, and other artists complain that numbers are no judge of artistic quality. Radio and television station owners and operators complain that the results are not reliable; and advertisers balk at the lack of reliable information. Although there may be merit to these complaints, one basic fact remains until further refinements are made, rating as they currently exist will remain the primary decision-making tool in programming and advertising (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003) Rating reports made based on audience research survey are the most common institutional device for making contact with the audience. Market and audience measurement research are important tools of the media sales department. Radio and television audiences are measured by diary, telephone, and personal interview. Television audiences are also measured by meter. The research reports in estimates of the size and composition of the audience, and enables the station to advise advertisers of the number and kinds of people who hear or see its programs, and the costs of reaching particular demographic categories. The research report serves an essential management function especially in determining programming strategy. The report also relates media to the surrounding political and financial system but convey a little that is meaningful to the individual media worker (McQuail, 2000). The

pursuit of large audiences by the television stations led media workers to eventually have a cynical view toward the audience as stupid, incompetent and unappreciative

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(McQuail, 2000). The negative view result in a tension between the Nielsen Audience Measurement. See http://www.agb.com/whereweare/dynPage.asp?r=98.6977823182094&svr=4&lang=en_us&lang=english&id=484&country=Indonesia#8

professionalism of the communicator, with its implied autonomy, and the meeting of apparent audience demands and desires, with their implication of limiting autonomy.

32

The situation may also stem from the fact that the mass communicator is offering a professional service and a product, while the dominant criterion applied by the media organization is nearly always the ratings (McQuail, 2000). Most media workers agreed that professional success has to be demonstrated in terms of rising circulation and advertising revenues. However, most people in the media, with some justification, will not recognize rating as a very reliable measure of intrinsic quality. However, the resistance to ratings and other audience statistic should not necessarily be equated with negative views of the audience. Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) found that the

single most important factor contributing to work satisfaction of journalists **was the possibility of helping people.** 32

They also

found that the single most frequent source of feedback to journalists is **from individual members of the audience.** 32

Today large commercial television stations can obtain rating reports almost on day-to-day basis and use them to improve television programs. Media organizations are, for the most part, in the venture of producing content as a way of inviting audiences to come and generating profit and employment.

They need some firm basis on which to predict the interests and likely degree of attention of audience 222

by utilizing rating reports as their parameter. Audiences are attracted in large numbers to many entertainment programs. If audience interest in other kind of content is high in a particular market, or if the station believes that interest can be stimulated, it may wish to produce or buy programs that respond to such interest. Although the audience is considered the

most important of the clients and influences in the environment of any media organization, research tend to show that **audience as having a low salience for many mass** media creative workers, **however** management follows **closely ratings and sales figures.** 110

3.7.4

Regulators Regulators in 313

many countries exert controls over the mass media. In democratic societies, the media are free to operate within the limits of laws and regulations. However, conflicts still occur in relations with regulators. In countries where the media are largely privately owned, regulators exert controls on mass media through laws, regulations, licenses, and taxes, whereas in countries where the media are primarily government owned, control is exerted through media financing (Janus, 1984). A media regulator is an independent body or a

government agency responsible for exercising autonomous authority over 84

media activities

in a regulatory or supervisory capacity. An independent media regulator **is a regulatory agency that is independent from other branches or arms of the government. The** 84

relationship between media and regulators, though not entirely one of equals,

is similarly one of mutual self-interest. 35

When things really get difficult, regulators

makes law and controls the flow of information. 1

Regulators controls mechanism of regulation directly or indirectly. Given

the access of media to the audience, regulators **often** 408

use media to disseminate policy, to promote initiatives, and to release information into the public domain. 1

Media are also used

to test reactions to possible new law, and most of all to present in a public sphere a favorable view of

200

regulators' works. Regulators

are very conscious of the value of media coverage, of what they assume to be the power of the media to sway public opinion. The media are also conscious of

1

their alleged

influence, but are informed too of the power of regulators as an information prime source. Broadcast media personnels are especially aware of the financial consequences of regulators' power to allow or to stop things from happening

1

(Burton, 2005, p. 20). In its review of 178 governments' or regulators' relationship with their mass media in 2010, Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom found that Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, and Switzerland as the model countries that have

set an example in the way they honor reporters and news media and protect them from judicial abuse.

248

48 In recent years, Reporters Without Borders (2010) drew particular attention of countries where it is not good to be a journalist or media worker. Marked by a complete lack of news and information and persecution of the media, some 10 countries including China, North Korea, Burma, and Syria are clustered together at the bottom press freedom world index. The situation of press freedom keeps on worsening in these authoritarian countries and it is getting more difficult to say which is worse than the other is. Although Indonesia is ranked 117 in the index, press freedom in Indonesia has improved since the end of Suharto's authoritarian government.

Indonesia has built and maintained a media environment that allows greater freedom and diversity, and with the decline of press freedom among some of its neighbors in East Asia, the country has emerged as one of the better performers in the region.

33

However, continuing problems, especially in 48

Reporters Without Border, Press Freedom Index, 2010.
<http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html>

237

Indonesia's legal system, is preventing the Indonesia's press from being classified as fully "free." (Kaufman, 2010) The government influence on the

mass media content can be seen in the battle of determining public

81

agenda. Scholars

have long known that the media have the potential for creating issues for the public. According to

172

Walter Lippmann (1921), the

public responds not to actual events in the environment, but to the picture in our heads.

16

Lippmann wrote:

“real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutation and combinations. And altogether, we have to act in that environment; we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it.”

16

(as cited in Littlejohn & Foss, 2005, p.279). The

power of media in establishing a public agenda depends in part on their relations with power centers (government). The

96

authorities

will probably affect the media agenda, and the public agenda in turn,

48

if the media have close relationships with them. There are four types of power

relations between the media and the government as the

106

outside source vis-a- vis the media (Littlejohn & Foss, 2005): (1)

High-power source, low-power media.

11

In this kind of arrangement,

if the two see eye to eye, a positive symbiotic relationship will exert great power over the public agenda.

11

This would be the case, for example, with

a powerful public official who has especially good relations with the media. On the other hand, if the powerful

11

source doesn

't agree, a struggle may take place between them. (2) High-power source and low-power media. Here, the authorities will probably co-opt the media and use them to accomplish its own ends.

11

This is what happens, for example, when politicians buy airtimes or when

a popular President gives the press the “privilege” of interviewing him. (3) Low-power source and high-power media. The media organizations themselves will be largely responsible for their own agenda. This happens when the media marginalize certain news sources such as the student radicals in

11

U.S in the 1960s. (4)

Low-power source and low -power media.

11

Public agenda will probably be established by the

11

events themselves rather than the media or the leaders.

Gerbner (1969) portrayed media workers as operating under pressure from various external ‘power roles’,

325

obviously neither power roles nor types of leverage are in reality separate or isolated. On the contrary, they often combine and overlap. The accumulation of 89 power roles and possibilities of advantage gives certain institutions dominant position in mass communication of their societies. In

87

the case of agents of government or business, these can represent powerful advantage and at the same important sources for the media themselves. 3.7.5

Politicians The

330

emergence of mass media technologies is able to simultaneously communicate with millions of people creating the

288

possibilities for politicians to communicate with the masses.

2

Not surprisingly, politics became enmeshed with the

mass media, which became key players in producing and circulating political symbolism.

2

The

relationship between media and politicians is based on a

372

mutual need. The media need

politicians to appear in the media

35

so that they may attract an audience by having access to authority figures. Politicians need to appear in the media to

186

have a platform for their positions.

Unpacking the media's role in the political process is facilitated by examining four themes – the nature of the relationship (institutionalized and informal) between journalists and politicians; how commercial pressures set parameters for journalists; the practices of political journalists; and journalistic belief about their role in the political process. The belief component of liberal journalism can best be understood by examining the notions of the Fourth Estate and watchdog journalism

2

(Louw, 2005, p. 62) The Fourth Estate and watchdog journalism are two interrelated notions

central to the way in which the media/politics relationship has been conceptualized within liberal democracies.

2

From this

notion grew the idea that liberal journalists should be adversarial (towards politicians) to be effective watchdogs.

2

Schultz (1998, p.29) notes that

liberal journalists now adhere to the following self-definition of their

2

role: 1) To be necessarily critical of politicians (adversarial); 2) To champion citizen rights against the abuse of state power; 3) To provide a platform for debate.

Sabato (1991) examined the

full range of relationships that can develop between journalists and politicians. In this regard,

2

he identifies five type of journalism. Although his notion referred to

US journalism, nevertheless these are useful, not just for understanding American journalism, but also for understanding, in general, the sorts of relationships that can emerge between journalists and politicians

2

anywhere. Partisan Journalist. The first type of journalist-politician relationship is partisan

journalism wherein the media support a particular political party, or ideology. This form of media characterized the early liberal oligarchies of Britain and America when middle- class/burgher journalists actively worked to challenge monarchies. Partisan journalists worked collaboratively with those politicians they supported to help to promote their causes.

2

This type of journalist

flaunt with pride their partisanship and propagandistic role.

2

Nonpartisan Journalists. Nonpartisan

journalists can adopt one of three insider relationships to the liberal political system

2

(Louw, 2005, p.62) : 1) The

journalist-as-loyal-opposition, or watchdog. This role can take two forms. Firstly, the provider of 'intelligence' (for policy makers). Secondly, the watchdog adversary. 2) The lapdog, where journalists cooperate with politicians making the political system work. It is easy for partisan journalists to slide into becoming lapdog journalist when (successful) revolutionary movements they support become governments;

2

3) The journalist-as-emotional-provoker. Journalists seek

out those aspects of political behavior that provoke emotional responses (e.g. anger, shock or outrage) in audiences because these can be sensationalized and hyped up

2

geared toward

attracting mass audiences, rather than an actual concern with politics-as-policy. This type lends itself to politicians working with (or leaking stories to) journalists, in order to undermine their opponents.

2

The

second type of the journalist-politician relationship is Fourth Estate Journalism.

2

in

this model, journalists are insiders within the liberal political process. 2
 This is **a part of the policy-formulation process as far as they service the policy-making elites with information, 'intelligence' opinion and a platform for debate. This journalistic genre eschews sensation and titillation, and it can lead to conflict between** journalists and politicians

since this type of journalists will also publish stories politicians dislike. However, the journalists do not cultivate a necessarily adversarial position. They are also not interested in pursuing political news in the form of political bickering as a means to attract audiences. This genre is

associated with 'quality journalism' aimed at elite audiences interested in policy issues 2

(Louv, 2005) Third, there is muckraking (or 'yellow') journalism,

which is commercially driven, strives to build mass audiences through sensationalism. 2

The media attract mass audiences by presenting spectacular, titillating or lurid

stories about the rich and famous, including politicians. 2

Stories of conflict, sex and pain are also rampant. **Journalists justify such stories** ⁹¹ **by deploying the Fourth Estate principle, which gives them the right to publish whatever they want.** This journalistic genre **is driven not by political or a concern with policy issues, but by a search for** sensational and personal **stories. Conflict between journalists and politicians occurs when 'yellow' stories impact on political players.** 2

This journalistic genre also became associated with corrupt journalistic practices in which politicians paid the media to not publish negative stories. 2

A fourth type is lapdog journalism. In this category, **journalists** collaborate with politicians **and put aside the watchdog approach.** In short, **they** avoid adversarialism. **This collaboration is not necessarily motivated by political partisanship, but is more often driven by a belief that one's society faces 'challenges' serious enough to make adversarial watchdog journalism unhelpful while trying to solve the problems.** 2

A sub-variety of lapdog journalism is sunshine journalism, a Third World genre emerging from the New World Information Order/NWIO (Masmoudi, 1979). During the 1970s and 1980s NWIO theorists argued that the problem facing the Third World Government was so serious that journalists needed to avoid 'negative' stories which might destabilize them, and instead actively collaborate with their 2

government in producing

'development journalism'. Development journalism deliberately focused on positive news, and stories that promoted modernist development. Much development journalism mutated into propaganda, while sunshine journalism allowed corruption and maladministration to flourish 2

(Masmoudi, 1979). The

fifth, is a variety of watchdog journalism characterized by adversarial watchdogs. This is the belief that journalists,

2

in order to function as effective watchdogs, must be deliberately adversarial towards politicians.

Although related to the Fourth Estate approach, adversarial watchdog journalism has less of a policy focus,

2

but personality. Since

personality and character, are easier to sell to mass audiences,

2

adversarial watchdog journalists tend to focus more on political personalities. The

quality of socio-political debate or policy making

2

is not necessarily improving with this watchdogism. Unfortunately, the outcome of this journalist category is mainly controversy and conflict. The

sixth type, junkyard journalism, marries aspects of muckraking to adversarial watchdogism. This genre of attack journalism

2

produced political reporting that is often harsh, aggressive, and intrusive, where feeding frenzies flourish, and gossip reaches print. Every aspect of private life potentially becomes fair game for scrutiny as a new; almost "anything goes" philosophy takes hold

2

(Sabato,

1991: 26). Junkyard journalism is even less helpful than adversarial watchdogism for promoting the exploration, discussion and debate of policy issues. This form of journalism is especially well suited to the needs of commercial media⁹² chasing mass audiences because it is a highly sensationalist genre lending itself to voyeuristic stories about conflict, pain and sex associated with the lurid and titillating events in the lives of the rich and famous. Junkyard journalism

2

is inherently unconcerned with politics as policy making. Because this journalistic genre is concerned with 'storytelling'

2

rather than information and intelligence,

it can become a highly de-politicizing force in society. It focuses on entertainment and sports celebrities, and (non-political) human-interest stories geared toward sensation, titillation, voyeurism and human emotions.

2

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH METHODS 4.1

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Research Focus Based on research questions mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, it is necessary for this chapter to indicate its focus in conducting the research. The research focus is established based on the research questions, especially the first one. "How do political economy factors influence television workers in shaping their content?" Specifically, this research will focus on five political economy variables: media owners, advertisers, audience, government, and politician. As the consequence, this exploration endeavors to answer and portray the following five questions: 1) How do media owners influence television workers in

snapping content? 2) How do advertisers influence television workers in snapping content? 3) How do audiences influence television workers in shaping content? 4) How do government influence television workers in shaping content? 5) How do politicians influence television workers in shaping content? Television workers would be the center of attention of this research (subject of study), and answers to the above five political economy questions would depend on their opinions, comments, and responses which will be collected through in-depth interview. Most of research methods used to examine various factors affecting television contents is 'media-centric', which means taking, or recording the view from within the media. The reason for this is because only by knowing how the media operate and assess themselves can we understand how society influences the media and vice versa (McQuail, 2000). The other reason is that data about media strategies and their money related undertakings is rare for reasons of classification

information about media policies and their financial affairs is hard to come by for reasons of confidentiality

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(Golding & Murdock, 2000).

It is important to note in this study that it is

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unlikely to focus on the certain program genre since Indonesian television channels have a different focus in their program content. There are broadcast stations that focus on drama, news, film, etc. Television stations in Indonesia broadcast various program genres, so it is unlikely in this research to focus on specific programs. This research focus on ten Jakarta-based free-to-air national television stations whose content compositions are not exactly similar. The ten stations are: Indosiar, SCTV, RCTI, MNCV TV, Global TV, Metro TV, ANTV, TVOne, Trans TV and Trans 7. 4.2 Research Methods Used The method used in this research is

a case study, which utilizes as many data sources as possible to investigate individuals, groups, organizations, or events

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systematically. According to Wimmer and Dominick (2003, p.131),

at least four sources of data can be used in case studies: 1) Documents, which

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include

letters, memos, minutes, agendas, historical records, brochures, pamphlets, posters, and so on.

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2) Intensive interviewing, or conducting survey research method as respondents asked to fill out questionnaires to gain their comments and opinions. 3) Observation/participation, which investigates phenomena in a natural setting. 4)

Physical artifact: a tool, a piece of furniture, or even a computer printout.

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This research tends to call for a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Surveys, field observation and participant observation of media people at work accompanied with in-depth interviewing of involved informant would be predominant methods in this research.

Field observation is useful for collecting data, and

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like all qualitative techniques, it is concerned more with description and explanation than with measurement and quantification.

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4.2.1 Survey

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s On some points, quantitative methods like survey, either primary or secondary sources, would provide essential information especially with regard to the research question "which political economy factors that influence television workers and content the most?". In other word, surveys are used to measure the most influential political economic factors that shape content. This research will utilize methods of survey by

distributing questionnaires to television workers who were, or are employed, in producing or, managing content at some of the largest television stations in Indonesia. The measurement technique used in the questionnaires is Likert rating scale. Respondents are asked to rate on a number of statements in the questionnaires with the five-level of scale to reflect their level of attitude toward certain issues, or frequency of 95 occurrences of certain events. The benefit of the Likert Scale is that it is

easily understood. The responses are easily quantifiable and the responses presented accommodate neutral or undecided feelings of participants

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(LaMarca, 2011). There are two noteworthy sorts of surveys:

descriptive and analytical. A Descriptive survey endeavors to depict or archive current condition or

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states of mind. Analytical survey endeavors to depict and clarify why circumstance exist by examining two or more variables to

investigate research questions or test research hypotheses (Wimmer & Dominick 2011, p.185). This research

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employs descriptive survey since the objective is just to describe and explain a situation of political and economic pressures that befall television workers. Jakarta is chosen as the location of research because most major television stations, especially those broadcasts nationally, are based in the capital of Indonesia. This research is expected to survey and interview media workers selected purposively from top level to lower level employees who have been working, or who had worked, at some key television stations in Indonesia including Metro TV, TV One, Indosiar, RCTI, SCTV, ANTV, MNC TV, TVRI, Global TV, Trans TV, and TV7. In order to capture a wider political economy perspective of Indonesian television industry, additional surveys and interviews with employees of local television companies are also carried out. 4.2.2 In-depth Interviews As explained earlier, the survey will be followed with in-depth interviews in an effort to answer the research question "How do political economy factors influence television workers in shaping content?". The informants to be selected purposefully based on some criteria. They must become a member of the group who can talk directly about the group per se. In other word, the informants to be selected for interview are those who are well versed in the issues that researcher wish to study and who is willing to tell what he or she knows about. As outlined by Babbie (2008), this research uses the following criteria to evaluate potential informants. 1) Did the informants' positions permit them to interface consistently with numerous different individuals inside and outside of their areas of expertise, or were they isolated or marginal members of the stations' community? Informants with a wider range of interactions are preferred in this research than those with fewer interactions. 2) Was their information about the department or working unit limited to their specific job, or did it cover many aspects of the operation? In this regard, the informant whose job covers many aspects of television station operation is preferred. 96 The general objective of this in-depth interview is to gather the wealthiest conceivable information, which mean a wide and various scope of data gathered over a moderately drawn out period in a constant and orderly way. The information are expected to give the meanings connected with the activities of those this examination is considering and to comprehend the setting in which those activities are inserted (Lofland et al, 2006, p.15). 4.2.3 Collecting Qualitative Data The research question, "How do political economy factors influence television workers in shaping content?" This question needs a qualitative descriptive answer from various sources, including interview transcripts, notes made while observing in the field, diaries, journal, documents, media and television reports. In-depth interviews with television workers and other data sources are expected to reveal a number of cases, which illustrate how the political economy factors influence television content directly or indirectly. The key question that needs to be raised during an interview with selected television workers is, more or less, the following line: "Can you give some cases based on your experience which illustrate how owners, advertisers, government, audience, politicians or others may influence your work that eventually affect your television program content?" In this study, subjective information are gathered applicable to some topics and are assembled into proper and important classes based on cases that involve owners, government, audience, advertisers and politicians, as suggested by prior theory, and explanation emerges from the data. In this process, the data are arranged in chronological order according to the sequence of events that occurred during the investigation. Each piece of information should be coded to identify the source. Interviews conducted with key informants are transcribed. The researcher defines each individual assertion into the existing categories. Though a few information don't fit the preexisting category, new classification might be made. Information that fit under more than one category ought to be duplicated and incorporated where relevant. For those process, the stress will be looking into thinking about information and discovering similarities around those information that fit under certain classifications. In addition to the above methods, there is also scope for applying structural, behavioral and cultural analysis, since all three are relevant and in accordance with the political, economic theories, especially the processes of political economy, suggested by Mosco (1996), which have a strong emphasis on critical perspective, as explained in Chapter 3. 4.2.4 Population and Sample With regard to sample size for this survey research, Wimmer-Dominick (2011, p.102) contend that the

size of the sample required for a study depends on at least one or more of the following seven factors: (1) project complexity, (2) project type, (3) project purpose, (4) amount of error tolerated, (5) financial constraints, (6) time constraints, (7) financial constraints, and (8) previous research in the area.

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Certain sample sizes are suggested

for various statistical function , but no single sample-size recipe or method a is available for every enquiry method or statistical procedure.

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Cost and time considerations always control sample size, and

most research is conducted using a sample size that conforms to the project's budget.

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However, considering that reducing a sample size from, for example, 1,000 to 400, reduces the sampling error by only a small percentage, researchers may be wise to consider using smaller samples for most projects. Regarding the sample selection, this research will use non-probability sample instead of probability sample. As we may recognize, there are

two broad categories of sampling: probability and non-probability.

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Probability sampling uses mathematical rule of thumb

whereby each unit's chance for selection is known. Non-probability sampling does not follow the rule for mathematical probability. The most significant characteristic distinguishing the two types of sampling is that probability sampling allows inquiryers to calculate the amount of sampling error present in a research study; non-probability sampling does not (Wimmer and Dominick, 2011, p.

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90). Non-probability sampling technique is used in this research because there is no list of all television workers in Jakarta -moreover, in Indonesia- nor is it likely to create such a list. For this reason, probability sampling would not be appropriate even if it were possible. According to Babbie (2008, p.203), there are four types of non-probability sampling: purposive or judgmental sampling, reliance on available subjects, snowball sampling, and quota sampling. This exploration on elements influencing content utilizes the purposive or judgmental testing, which means selecting a sample in light of information of a population, its components, and the motivation behind the study. In other word, purposive testing is a kind of non-probability examining in which the units to be watched are chosen on the premise of the researcher's judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative. The non-probability purposive sample is used because there are no reliable data available currently concerning the exact number of Indonesian television workers especially those in charge of content. Purposive sample is utilized because this study wish to examine a little subset of a bigger populace (Indonesian TV laborers) in which numerous individuals from the subset are effectively recognized, however the count of every one of them would be about unthinkable (Babbie, 2008, p.204). The sample to be taken in this research includes subjects selected for specific characteristics or qualities based on knowledge of a population, its elements, and the purpose of the study (Wimmer-Dominick, 2011).⁴⁹ In other words, the sample is deliberately selected no randomly. The respondent to be taken as sample members are especially those who have knowledge about the process of television content production, and other personnel at television station related to content (see list of interim key informants). Given to the time constraint and research cost, it is expected that this study will produce some 50 to 100 respondents to be selected purposively with a criteria that they must be in charge of television content production, either in pre-production, production, and post- production of television programs, or any other positions in television stations related to content. After the survey completed a portion of the respondents to be interviewed deeply. The interviewees are also selected purposively with criteria or preference given to respondents or informants who have a wider range of interactions, and the informant whose job covers many aspects of television station operation. 4.2.5 Operational Definitions and Measurements This research needs to specify the procedures to be followed to experience or measure a concept. Operational definitions are needed because observations

cannot be made without a clear statement of what is to be observed.

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In this research, it is necessary to provide operational definitions

because they enable investigators to measure relevant variables.

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An operational definition should specify how a variable or concept will be measured. The following operational definitions are envisaged based on research questions in Chapter 1. 49

Roger D Wimmer dan Joseph R Dominick, Mass Media research: An Introduction, Ninth Edition, Wadsworth,

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2011, p94. Research question: What is the most influential political economic factors that affect television workers in shaping content? Variable Indicator Operational Definition Measurement Owner Influence 1. Media owners contribute their ideas with regard to programming content. 2. In election coverage, the owners mentioned their support toward certain candidates or political parties. 3. The owners rejected programming content considered incompatible to media internal policy 4. Television workers were told not to broadcast content since it may harm owners' interests. Summated scores on a five-point Likert Scale to four statements of owners' influence Frequency of occurrence of very frequent (score 5) to very rare (score 1) Advertisers Influence 1. Advertisers/sponsors contribute their ideas on programming content. 2. Programming content policy accommodates advertisers' or sponsors' needs 3. Media program planning and scheduling accommodates advertisers' or sponsors' needs 4. Advertisers or sponsors asked your media to cover their events 5. The media did coverage advertisers' events if they asked for it 6. Commercial or promotional messages were inserted into programming content Summated scores on a five-point Likert Scale to six statements of advertisers' influence Frequency of occurrence of very frequent (score 5) to very rare (score 1) Audience Influence 1. Television owners asked for rating rise of programmings. 2. Television owners said that news program rating is important. 3. Decision on programs depends on its rating performance. 4. Careers, and sometimes incomes of media workers depend on where they stood in program rankings. 5. Program improvements were made based on the up-and-down of rating reports. Summated scores on a five-point Likert Scale to five statements of audience's influence Frequency of occurrence of very frequent (score 5) to very rare (score 1) Government 1. The authority reprimanded media with Summated scores on a Frequency of Influence regard to its content five-point Likert Scale occurrence of 2. The program content frequently be changed due to reprimand from the authority to four statements of government's influence very frequent (score 5) to very rare (score 1) Politicians Influence 1. The

media support a particular political party, or ideology

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2. Politicians conflict with media on reports Summated scores on a five-point Likert Scale to two statements of politicians' influence Frequency of occurrence of very frequent (score 5) to very rare (score 1) 4.3 Contribution and Practical Implications of Results During the last two decades, fundamental changes have affected a very large part of the world media system not only in the countries within the old communist bloc in Eastern Europe, but also in developing countries, which have been liberated from an authoritarian regime like Indonesia. The diversity of circumstances among those countries makes broad generalization impossible. This applies especially in the early stages of the process, and to the various ideological components, which included nationalism, religion and liberty of expression and of economic enterprises (McQuail, 2000) As mentioned earlier, this research would provide insight on various factors affecting television contents. The results would be a contribution to the knowledge and theory of media structure. While there are, many similarities between countries, but there are also enduring differences between media systems, which have their origin in the facts of history, geography, culture and politics. The media are still very much the institutions of particular nation states, and their particular character and mode of integration depend on factors that lie outside media systems. It is important not to underestimate this continued diversity, nor to assume that we can properly understand the media of a particular society in terms of a few universal features of structure and dynamics. 4.4 LIST OF RESPONDENTS, INTERVIEWEES & SECONDARY SOURCES No. Name 1. Achmad Paji P. 2. Ade Irawan 3. Adi Nugroho L 4. Adjat Wiratama 5. Adji Purnomo 6. Afrizal 7. Agus Ivan 8. Agust Nindyatomo 9. Agustinus S 10. Ahmad Anggi 11. Aleksius Jemadu 12. Anirudya Mitra 13. Anastasia Kristi D 14. Andy Mirza 15. Angga J Utomo 16. Ardiansyah 17. Arie Bachdar 18. Aris Puji Haryatno 19. Artha Tiar Asih 20. Asep Sopian 21. Atm Sumarkidjo 22. Azelia T 23. Azelia Trifiana 24. Budi Darmawan 25. Budi Setiawan 26. Cor Pangaribuan 27. Dandhy D Laksono 28. Deddy Corbuzier 29. Deny Nugroho 30. Dian Komalasari 31. Dian Purba 32. Dino Ridha 33. Diyan Srikandini 34. Dwi Arini 35. Edit Anugrah 36. Eko Agus Miyadi 37. Eri Sumaryadi 38. Eri Sumaryadi 39. Erlangga Yan 40. Erry Farid 41. Erwin Susanto N 42. Eugene Daniel 43. Fasmi Berry 44. Febriyana 45. Frisca Artinus 46. Groza Subakti 47. Hadi Natha Negara 48. Handi Amo 49. Hartawan Hari P 50. Haryo Wicaksono 51. Ignatius Haryanto Institutions Metro TV Metro TV ANTV Global TV TVOne SCTV TVOne SCTV Trans TV Metro TV -- MD Entertainment Metro TV Global TV Trans TV TVOne Metro TV RCTI Metro TV Trans TV RCTI Metro TV Metro TV SCTV SCTV SCTV RCTI Trans 7 TVOne TVOne SCTV TVOne Metro TV Indosiar ANTV MNC TV RCTI RCTI Global TV RCTI Global TV TVOne Indosiar MNC Indosiar Multivision Plus TVOne Global TV RCTI Trans TV IPSD Position ADM Production Staff Videoman News Producer Cameraman Master Control Producer News Editor Logistic supervisor Reporter media analyst co-producer Producer Producer Staff Ass. Producer Production Staff Set Designer News Producer Ass. Producer Dep. News Director Reporter Reporter Spokesperson Producer Producer Senior Producer host Cameraman Producer Executive Producer Floor Director Producer Production Ass Production Ass. Video Editor Producer Producer Producer Senior Producer Production Ass. Floor Director News Producer Reporter Producer senior executive video engineer Unit Production Corp. Affair Producer media analyst Length of Work 3 years -- 1.5 years 3 years 7

years 1 year 8 years 2 years 14 years -- 3 years 10 years 5 years 3 years **30**
 7 years 2 years 11 years 5 years. 10 years 1 year 1 year 5 yaers 10 years
 10 years 10 years 5 years 5 years 7 years -- 8 years 13 years

2 years 3 years 8 months 12 tahun. 12

years 9 years 21 years 2 years 3 years 5 years 5 years 16 years 10 years **30**
 3 years 1 year 8 years 9 years 5 years

52. Ikram S Metro TV 53. Indiarto TVOne 54. Jahja Immanuel RCTI 55. Jiwa Nugraha RCTI 56. Joni Arman ANTV 57. Jovita Lupi S Trans 7 58. Junaedi Setiawan SCTV 59. Krisna Koswara Indosiar 60. Lurinjani TVOne 61. M Fasmii Berry Indosiar 62. M. Adijohar TVOne 63. M. Akbar Tri Indosiar 64. M. Iqbal Indosiar 65. Manoj Punjabi MD Entertainment 66. Mardatillah Trans 7 67. Maulana Indosiar 68. Meyta Fitrianingrum Indosiar 69. Moh. Hafizni Metro TV 70. Natia Adly RCTI 71. Neil R. Tobing Viva Group 72. Oktavdian TVOne 73. Pernanda Cakra Metro TV 74. Putu Wijaya production house 75. Rachmah Ida Unair 76. Raden Rachmadi TVOne 77. Radit Pratama TVOne 78. Rafid Helmy TVOne 79. Rahmat Yuniarto Metro TV 80. Raymond Kaya SCTV 81. Retno Pinasti SCTV 82. Riskomar Dilianto Metro TV 83. Romel TVOne 84. Rommy Budiman RCTI 85. Septiadi Pradana Indosiar 86. Siti Nur Aisyah PH 87. Sri Wahyuni TVOne 88. Syaifudin Metro TV 89. Tesa Stephanie Kreatif 90. Tubagus Baron H Trans TV 91. Tulus Hendra W Global TV 92. Uni Lubis ANTV 93. Vians Horisson MNC TV 94. Vicky Esa SCTV 95. Victor Savoy TVOne 96. Wachyu Eka Metro TV 97. Winarso TVOne 98. Wishnutama Trans TV 99. Yanuar Nugroho CIPG 100. Yul Andryono RCTI 101. Yulia Santi N Indosiar 102. Yunita Putri Indosiar 103. Yunita R Daulay RCTI 104. Zudarlis Elfira Trans TV 105. Zulham TVOne Production Staff Programming Executive Producer Set Designer News Producer Assc. Producer Cemeraman Prog. Dir. Ass Supporting Producer Logistic staff crew studio Studio Cameraman senior executive Executive Producer Production staff Floor Mananger Senior Producer Production Ass senior executive Reporter Production Staff script writer media analyst Producer Cameraman Reporter Executive Producer Senior Producer News Anchor Video Editor Floor Director Set & Property Studio Cameraman Director Ass. Producer Junior Producer ANTV Marketing PR Video Editor senior executive Audio man Creative Production Ass. Talent Coordinator Senior producer senior executive media analyst Executive Producer Production Ass Creative Producer Executive Producer Floor Director

1 year 30 years 14 years 3 years 16 years 5 years 17 years 1 year 4 **290**
 years 18 years

1.5

years 1 year 1 year 10 years 8 years 16 years 2 years 23 years 1 year 5 **30**
 years 1 year 2 years 5 years 10 years

5 years 4 years 5 years 12 years 10 years 4 years 3 years 8 years 1 year **30**
 1 year 15 years 2 years 10 year 2 years 1 year 11 years 10 years 3 years 1
 year 4 years 6 years 9 years 10 years 10 years 15 tahun 2 years 2 years 20 years
 11 years 6 years

4.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE THE IMPACT OF BROADCASTING LIBERALIZATION ON TELEVISION CONTENT IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN INDONESIA Nama responden/respondent name :

..... Jabatan terakhir di TV/ last position in TV :

..... Nama stasiun televisi:

..... Pengalaman kerja di TV/ TV working

experience :tahun/years Nomer HP/ HP number :

..... Email/email

..... Seberapa sering anda mengalami pernyataan berikut. Berilah tanda 'u?' pada kotak yang paling mewakili pengalaman/pendapat anda (How often you experience the following statements. Please put N o 'u?'" at the box the most suitable to your experience)

Pernyataa **373**

n (statements) Sangat jarang (very rare) Jarang (rare) Tidak tahu/ragu (Neutral) Sering (frequent) Sangat sering (very frequent) 1 Owner influence Pemilik media ikut memberikan pandangan dalam penentuan isi program TV yang harus disiarkan? (Media owners contribute their idea to programming content) 2 Pemilik media atau pimpinan anda pernah menolak isi program yang dinilai tidak sesuai atau bertentangan dengan kebijakan media (The media owners or your boss ever rejected content considered incompatible to your media policy) 3 Anda atau rekan anda pernah diberitahu untuk tidak menyiarkan sesuatu terkait dengan

kepentingan pemilik media anda (You or your colleagues were told not to broadcast content since it may harm the owners' interests) 4 Advertisers influence Pemasang iklan/sponsor ikut memberikan saran atau pandangan terhadap isi program anda (Advertisers/sponsors contribute their idea to content). 5 Kebijakan programming di media anda mempertimbangkan keinginan pemasang iklan atau sponsor (Your media content policy accommodates advertisers' or sponsors' needs) 6 Perencanaan dan penjadwalan program siaran mempertimbangkan kepentingan pihak pemasang iklan atau sponsor (Your station's programming planning and scheduling accommodate advertisers' or sponsors' interests). 7 Pemasang iklan/sponsor sering meminta media anda untuk memberitakan kegiatan mereka (Advertisers or sponsors asked your media to report their activities) 8 Media anda memberitakan kegiatan pemasang iklan/sponsor jika mereka meminta (Your media did report advertisers' activities if they asked) 9 Isi program siaran anda memasukkan pesan dari sponsor atau promosi produk (Commercial or promotional messages were inserted you're your program content) 10 Audience (rating) influence Pemilik media atau pimpinan meminta peningkatan rating program (Media owner asked for a rating rise). 11 Pemilik media atau pimpinan anda pernah mengatakan bahwa rating program merupakan hal yang penting (Media owners once said that program rating is important) 12 Keputusan terhadap program ditentukan oleh rating program bersangkutan (Decision on program continuity depends on its rating performance) 13 Laporan rating program mempengaruhi karir dan pendapatan pengelola program (Program rating influenced your careers and incomes) 14 Perbaikan isi program siaran dilakukan berdasarkan naik-turunnya laporan rating (Program improvements were made based on the up-and-down of rating reports) 15 Regulator (government) influence Pihak berwenang (KPI) sering kali menegur isi program siaran anda (The regulator [KPI] frequently reprimanded your program with regard to its content) 16 Isi program siaran sering kali harus diubah karena teguran dari pihak berwenang (Your program content were frequently being changed because of reprimand from the regulator) Politician influence 17 Pemilik media atau pimpinan anda pernah menyatakan dukungannya terhadap salah seorang politisi atau partai politik tertentu (Your media owners or boss ever mentioned his/her support toward certain politicians or political parties) 18 Media saya pernah mendukung partai politik tertentu (My media once supported certain political parties) 19 Media saya pernah berkonflik dengan politisi atau partai politik tertentu (My media once conflicted with politicians or political parties) TERIMA KASIH ATAS PARTISIPASI ANDA PADA PENELITIAN INI 4.6 INTERVIEW QUESTION LIST Owners Influence 1. Pernahkah pemilik media anda ikut serta memberikan pandangan dalam penentuan isi program anda? Jika pernah berikan contohnya! (Have your media owners contributed their ideas to programming content? If they have, give examples!) 2. Apakah pemilik media atau pimpinan anda pernah menolak atau memberi peringatan karena isi program anda yang dinilai tidak sesuai atau bertentangan dengan kebijakan di media anda? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Have your media owners rejected content considered incompatible to media internal policy? If they have, in what case? Give examples!) 3. Pernahkah anda atau rekan anda diberitahu untuk tidak menyiarkan sesuatu terkait dengan kepentingan pemilik media anda? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Have you or your colleagues told not to broadcast content since it may harm owners' interests) Advertisers Influence 4. Apakah kebijakan programming di media anda mempertimbangkan keinginan pemasang iklan atau sponsor? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya? (Does your media programming policy accommodate advertisers' or sponsors' needs? If yes, in what case? Give examples!) 5. Pernahkah pemasang iklan/sponsor ikut memberikan pandangan dalam penentuan isi program anda? Jika pernah, iklan jenis apa? Seperti apa pandangan yang disampaikan? (Have advertisers/sponsors contributed their ideas into programming content? If they have, what kind of advertisements? What idea they contributed?). 6. Apakah perencanaan dan penjadwalan program anda mempertimbangkan kepentingan pihak pemasang iklan atau sponsor? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Did your program planning and scheduling accommodate advertisers' or sponsors' interests? If they did, in what case? Give examples). 7. Pernahkah pemasang iklan atau sponsor meminta program atau media anda untuk menyiarkan kegiatan mereka? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya (Have advertisers or sponsors asked your media to report their activities? If they have, in what case? Give examples). 8. Apakah media anda menyiarkan kegiatan pemasang iklan/sponsor jika mereka meminta? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Did your media report advertisers' activities if they asked. If they did, in what case? Give examples) 9. Pernahkah anda memasukkan pesan dari sponsor atau promosi produk ke dalam program siaran anda? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Have you placed commercial or promotional messages into programming content? If you have, in what case? Give examples) Audience (rating) influence 10. Pernahkah pemilik media atau pimpinan anda meminta peningkatan rating program (Have your media owners or your boss asked for rating rise? 11. Apakah pemilik media atau pimpinan anda pernah mengatakan bahwa rating program merupakan hal yang penting (Have your media owners or your boss once said that program rating is important?) 12. Apakah kelanjutan keberadaan program anda ditentukan oleh rating yang diperoleh? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya. (Does decision on programming continuity depend on its rating performance? If yes, in what case? Give examples) 13. Apakah laporan rating program anda dapat mempengaruhi karir dan pendapatan anda? Jika ya, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Did your program rating influenced your careers, and sometimes incomes? If yes, in what case? Give examples!) 14. Apakah perbaikan isi program siaran anda dilakukan berdasarkan naik-turunnya laporan rating? Jika ya, berikan contohnya? (Program improvements were made based on the up-and- down of rating reports? If yes, in what case? Give examples!) Regulator influence 15. Pernahkah pihak berwenang (KPI) menegur isi program siaran anda? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Did the regulator [KPI] reprimand your programming with regard to its content? If it did, in what case? Give examples!) 16. Pernahkah isi program siaran anda harus diubah karena adanya teguran dari pihak KPI? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Have you changed your program content because of reprimand from the regulator? If you have, in what case? Give examples!) Politicians influence 17. Apakah pemilik media atau pimpinan anda pernah menyatakan dukungannya pada politisi atau partai politik tertentu? Jika pernah, partai politik apa? Bagaimana pimpinan/pemilik menyatakan dukungannya? (Have your media owners mentioned their support toward certain candidates or political parties? If they have, what political parties!). 18. Apakah media anda pernah mendukung partai politik tertentu? Jika pernah, berikan contohnya! (Did your media support certain

political parties? If yes, in what case? Give examples!) 19. Apakah media anda pernah berkomunikasi dengan politisi atau partai politik tertentu? Jika pernah, dalam hal apa dan berikan contohnya! (Did your media involve in conflict with politicians or political parties. If yes, in what case? Give examples!)

CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH FINDINGS 5.1 The Political, Economic Factors

Television stations in Indonesia differ in term of organization structure, adhering to no standardized table of organization. Indonesian television stations vary in the number of people and the type of organizational structures they use. Based on observations and interviews made during this research, each national free-to-air television stations, which become objects of this research, has between 1000-1500 employees splitting into those who work in administrative or managerial units and those who occupy positions related to content productions. The latter including news personnel, production, promotion, sales, business, and technical as well as on-air talents familiar to the viewing public. To manage the employees, television stations in Indonesia perform some basic functions reflecting on the way they organize works. Since this research is media-centric, which means taking or recording the view from within the media, so it is important to, first of all, understand the general pattern of television organization in Indonesia? Organizing is the process of arranging human and physical resources in a formal structure and responsibilities is assigned to specific units, positions, and personnel (Pringle & Starr, 2005). In television station organizing involves the division of work into specialties and the grouping of employees with specialized responsibilities into departments. Generally, there are five areas of operations common to most commercial television stations in Indonesia, namely, techniques, programming, production, news and administration. President! Director! Techniques! Programming! Production! News! Sales! Administration! Figure 5.1: Departments found most frequently in Indonesian commercial television stations.

The technical or engineering department is responsible to select, operate, and maintains transmitting equipment, studio, and control room. The department employs engineering staffs. The programming department plans, selects, schedules, and monitor program. The department consist of staff and researcher. The production department is charged with writing and producing television programs. The department hires creative 108 people including script writers, art director, director of photography etc. The news department consists of reporters and is responsible for putting newscast on air regularly, while the sales department is in charge of selling time to advertisers. The department consists of salesperson, or typically called account executives. The administration department conducts a variety of works needed to the functioning of the station as a business. The following parts reveal research findings, which explore in detail the five most influential political economy forces that shape television content: owners, advertisers, audience, regulator and politicians. However, based on interview, observation and other data obtained throughout this research, other factors also contribute to shaping television content, although the influences were less significant compared to the five political economic factors to be explored later in this chapter. Indonesian television workers said they weigh many factors before shaping program content. One significant effect on television content is competition. Indonesian stations compete against each other and against other media in the market for advertising revenues. That translates into competition for audiences. A television channel obtains an audience from other competing channels, or loses viewers to other competing stations. A successful television program will normally produce reactions from its competitors, usually in the form of producing similar programs. In the same way, television managers' conducts will be influenced by content of other competing stations. Another significant impact on television content is the workers themselves. The numbers of people available for work, and their skills, have a direct influence on the content. The station's ability to hire and retain qualified and productive employees is a major determinant of the content's performance. Most television workers in Indonesia do not establish unions since they work for private television stations whose managements do not allow unions. In the non-unionized television firms, the management tends to be less attentive to the treatment of employees, and even guards against the threat of unionization. Business activities also play a role on television content. The economic situation determines the amount of money people have to expend on advertising products and their spending priorities. Businesses may be tempted to reduce their advertising expenditures when the economy is sluggish, posing a challenge for broadcast stations. However, in 2012 television still dominated advertising expenditure in Indonesia. The media took in 64 percent of the spending while daily papers assimilated 33 percent; magazines and tabloids made up the remaining sum. The figures are like 2010's business sector piece ("Telecom companies", 2012). Television generates most of the country's advertisement spending. 109 Demographic factors also contribute to program content decisions since television stations must be responsive to the interests of their audience. The programmer must respond, analyze, and interpret trends with regard to the size and composition of the population, spending habits and income as well as employment practices. Advances in technology continue to play a major part in station practices. Television stations must respond to the influence of new broadcast technologies. The biggest challenge for television stations currently is to move from analogues to the digital broadcast system. The Indonesian government plans to replace the existing analogue system with a full implementation of digital TV broadcast by 2018 for a far better quality of picture and sound ("Digital TV", 2010). The government was currently preparing regulations and infrastructure for the new era of TV broadcast. Lastly, the skill and experience of television managers in implementing good programming strategy also play role in content. Managers' skill and experience assumes an essential part in deciding content and even the achievement of a business station. Apart from several programming factors which have been described briefly earlier, there are several other factors considered very crucial for television workers in shaping their program content. The followings are research findings with regard to the most significant political economy influence of television content which become the focus of this research.

5.1.1 The Influence of Owners Those who own or control a media outlet or corporation is frequently considered to hold a very powerful position, since their positions may enable them to control information and shape content. Media owners are often seen an intriguing factor in understanding the programming content, either entertainment or information. Studies showed that ownership, to a certain degree, has influence on how media workers produce content. As described earlier, this research will attempt to answer and describe the question: How do Indonesian media owners influence television workers in shaping content? The key question which have been raised during interview with selected television workers: "Can you give some cases based on your experience which illustrate how owners influence your work that eventually affect your

television content? This section will reveal the roles of television owners in Indonesia, and examine their influence on workers and their content. As explained earlier, Indonesia right now has 10 private free-to-air TVs with across the nation scope controlled by the following five individuals: 1) Hary Tanoesoedibjo, through his holding company PT

Media Nusantara Citra (MNC), owns and controls three private national TV stations RCTI, Global TV and MNC TV 2) The 25

Bakrie family has interests in the Viva Group, which operates two televisions: TV One and ANTV. 3) Surya Paloh, through Media Group, controls MetroTV. 4) Chairul Tanjung, through his holding company CT Corp, owns two televisions: Trans TV and Trans7. 5) Fofa and Eddy Sariaatmadja, through his company PT Elang Mahkota Teknologi (Emtek), has two televisions: SCTV and Indosiar. This part will cite, based on research findings, several examples of how Indonesian television owners influence television workers in shaping the content. Television workers interviewed during this study explained that the influence of media owners may take various forms, and one of them is in the form of negotiation or compromise made between owners and television workers. According to Dandhy Dwi Laksono, a senior producer at RCTI, the owner of his television station, Hary Tanoesoedibjo, once invited the station's editorial staffs to his office to discuss the news coverage of an aircraft accident of a privately-owned carrier, Adam Air (Laksono, 2012).

Hary Tanoesoedibjo is the president director of PT Media Nusantara Citra (MNC) which owns and controls three private national TV stations RCTI, Global TV and MNC TV. 214

An aircraft of Boeing 737, operated by Adam Air, crashed into the sea of South Sulawesi on January 1, 2007 after departing from a Djuanda airport in Surabaya for Manado in North Sulawesi killing all 102 people on board. Along with the accident, Hary Tanoesoedibjo was considering to venture into the airline industry, and his another holding company PT Bhakti Investama was in talks to buy a stake in PT Adam Sky Connection Airlines which owns Adam Air. In March 2007, Hary Tanoesoedibjo purchased 50% shares of Adam Sky Connection through Bhakti Investama. Hary said he was planning to improve Adam Air which has been plagued by several accidents. According to Dandhy Dwi Laksono, during the meeting between MNC management and RCTI's editorial board, Hary Tanoesoedibjo said that the news programming of the station "must give an opportunity to the new management of Adam Air to make 111 improvements with regard to its flight safety, and services to the passengers." (Laksono, 2012). Hary stressed it was not every day he used RCTI's screen for the sake of his business interests. Laksono said, a negotiation took place between Hary and RCTI's news team about how the television should report the crash. Finally, the agreement reached, RCTI will report just the latest and official news about the crash, and only from the ministry of transportations, or The National Commission on Transportation Safety (KNKT) in the station's news programmings. In other words, in the case of Adam Air, RCTI was not allowed to develop stories taken from the non-governmental sources. The news content must be official driven stories, not customer or public driven news. However, this type of owner-worker negotiation on news content didn't last long when

Hary Tanoesoedibjo and his brother Hartono Tanoesoedibjo 229

in 2008 were implicated in

a graft scandal at the Justice and Human Rights Ministry, 229

popularly called Sisminbakum case. "The prior precedent of form of compromise (in Adam Air case) was proposed again in the Sisminbakum case, a year later, but it was rejected," Dandhy Dwi Laksono said (Laksono, 2012). In another case involving former President Suharto and his family, Hary Tanoesoedibjo briefed RCTI's executive editors to delay a report about the legal case implicating the former authoritarian ruler. Dandhy Dwi Laksono gave other accounts of how the airing of his investigative reports on RCTI which had been prepared for two months should be adjourned for one year waiting for Hary Tanoesoedibjo to complete his business deal with Soeharto's family. Hary intended to purchase shares of Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI) from Siti Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana (known as Mbak Tutut), Soeharto's oldest daughter. Soeharto and his family (popularly known as a Cendana family because Soeharto lived on Cendana street in central Jakarta) aggregated colossal measures of riches amid his influence and constructed an incomprehensible rent-seeking network in the form of extensive number of philanthropic magnanimous establishments. There were no less than 40 establishments connected to Soeharto and his gang, with the largest three being the Dharmais, Dakab and Supersemar foundations. Jakarta's local court's rejected the administration's corruption argument against Soeharto in late September, 2000, announcing him therapeutically unfit to stand trial. However, after being suspended for several years, the public prosecutor demanded the continuation of legitimate procedures against the former leader after the doctors reporting Soeharto's health was improving. 112 Amid media rising attention about Soeharto's legal case, Dandhy Dwi Laksono was preparing to produce a six-episode television report with a comprehensive perspective about how Soeharto's family accumulated wealth through his various foundations.

In order to get a complete picture about the issue, Dwi Laksono and 352

his news team visited Soeharto's foundations one by one, verifying documents, delineating fund transfers and cash flow, meeting with those who received financial aids including interview with scholarship recipients from the foundations. Unfortunately, when the report was completed, Dwi Laksono was told that the report can not be aired immediately, and Dwi Laksono (2012) said: Ketika program telah siap ditayangkan, jajaran pimpinan di redaksi meminta agar program tersebut ditunda dengan alasan pemilik MNC/RCTI sedang melakukan negosiasi bisnis akuisisi sisa saham TPI dengan keluarga Cendana. Tayangan berseri yang saksi siapkan sedikitnya enam episode tersebut dikhawatirkan dapat mengganggu hubungan dan merusak suasana negosiasi bisnis dengan keluarga Cendana (Laksono, 2012) (When the report was ready to go on air, the executives of the editorial board requested that the airing of the program be delayed for a reason that the owner of MNC/RCTI was negotiating an acquisition deal of TPI's remaining shares with Cendana family. The airing of a serial report consisting of at least six episodes was worried to disturb the relationship and spoil the atmosphere of negotiation with Cendana family). Dwi Laksono also gave another account which implicated Hary Tanoesoedibjo who was reported involved in the issuance of Negotiable-Certificate-of-Deposit (NCD) worth over US\$28 million published by Unibank. The holder of the certificate, PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP), could not exchange the NCD for the amount of money it was worth. It turned out later that the certificates were faked. CMNP had bought the problematic certificate-of-deposit from Drosophila Enterprise through a brokerage service Bhakti Investama owned by Hary Tanoesoedibjo. CMNP said if it turned out the certificates were fake, then the broker should have also played some bogus role. According to DWI Laksono, the national media were paying attention to the issue since it implicated a businessman and a media mogul Hary Tanoesoedibjo, and it was the reason why he and other members of RCTI's editorial board were instructed to produce a special programming in the format of talk shows in a bid to clarify the issue. Hary Tanoesoedibjo himself showed up and spoke on the talk show along with other four invited speakers who mostly supported his stance on the issue. Dwi Laksono said, as a senior producer, he tried to suggest that RCTI used external host, a host from outside the station, in an attempt to keep the neutrality of its programming content, but his idea was rejected, and 113 RCTI remained using its internal host. Dwi Laksono added that the imbalances and one-sided information presented in the talk show have pushed the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) to release a letter of reprimand to RCTI. Adjat Wiratama, a News Producer at Global TV -another television station, which also owned by Hary Tanoesoedibjo- said that the television owner through his executives warned him with regard to news implicated Hary Tanoesoedibjo or his family. Adjat Wiratama said he was warned against not being careful in running a story about Rudijanto Tanoesoedibjo who were involved in a corruption case. Rudijanto Tanoesoedibjo is an older brother of Hary Tanoesoedibjo (Adjat Wiratama, personal communication, Juli 21, 2013). In March 2011, Media reported Rudijanto Tanoesoedibjo who was questioned by the anti-graft body Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as part of its examination concerning a corruption case focusing on asserted markups of a 2006 acquirement of health instrument for bird-flu patients. Rudijanto is the executive of PT Prasasti Mitra which collaborated with state-possessed PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia in securing the health equipment for relieving bird-flu flare-ups, which happened in Indonesia from 2005 to 2006 Owners influence also persisted in other television stations owned by Bakrie family. The family controls diversified business companies including two national television stations, TV One and ANTV, and other media. The family was mentioned to have influenced their media content. In October 2009, the family's patron Aburizal Bakrie was elected the new

chairman of the Golkar Party --currently the country's second largest political party--

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replacing Jusuf Kalla after defeating his main rival Surya Paloh. On June 2012, the party's declared Aburizal Bakrie the single presidential hopeful from the party. However, his presidential candidate was marred by an accident made by one of the Bakrie's companies six years ago.

Bakrie is affiliated with oil and gas company PT Lapindo Brantas, a company accused of being responsible for the

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worst mud flow disaster in Indonesia. In 2006, an eruption of mud took place in Sidoarjo regency, East Java, in the area where a mining company owned by Bakrie family PT Lapindo Brantas was drilling a well for natural gas. The company contends that the gush of mud from the well was triggered by a distant earthquake in Central Java three days before although many geologists dismissed the explanation. The mud flow was unstoppable, and it has since flooded and swamped many villages, factories and surrounding areas, displacing thousands of people. Bakrie family, and their company PT Lapindo Brantas, were seen as having been responsible for the disaster. Reporters who work at both stations admitted that they were given special instructions with regard to the reports of mud flow. For instance, they must quote just authority Lapindo sources at each opportunity when reporting the mud stream, and had started to self-edit. They were told about how stories ought to be worded. Editors were to allude to the mud stream as the 'Sidoarjo mudflow', instead of the 'Lapindo mud spring of gushing lava', the term most normally utilized in other media. As indicated by sources who worked at both stations, journalists were agonized over their future livelihood in the event that they composed stories about the mud stream case in a negative tone as the same number of other media by and large did. A police investigation on whether or not Lapindo Brantas should be responsible for the mud flow limped along for more than three years. The case was dropped not long after a government examination in August 2008 proclaimed that the mud stream was a natural catastrophe and Lapindo Brantas can not be reprimanded for such mishap. In another case, television workers at Metro TV said they were instructed to broadcast any events that involved their station owner, Surya Paloh, especially

whenever the boss was giving a speech. Surya Paloh seemed to always enjoy the advantage of full coverage from his television. The news programming on Metro TV broadcasts any ceremonies in which Surya Paloh delivered a speech, much like a head of state. The lengthy coverage of his speech continued despite mounting criticism about the way he used his television for his personal interest. Surya Paloh has been active in politics since the New Order era. He was head of the Advisory Council of the Golkar Party, one of the greatest political party in the country. Paloh

left the Golkar Party not long after he was crushed by Aburizal Bakrie in the race for the party's leader in 2009.

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A political scientist, Aleksius Jemadu, commented: "He wanted so much to become the party's chairman, but was defeated by Aburizal Bakrie, who commanded far bigger financial resources," (Jemadu, 2013). In 2010, shortly after he lost his bid for Golkar Party chairman, Paloh called a national movement by establishing a mass organization Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem) in order to answer the call to adjust the country's condition, and to answer the demand of the country's rebuilding. Paloh claimed that Nasdem was a civil association and it would not change into a political party. The development has quickly drawn positive reactions from the country's important figures. Nasdem's establishment on February 1 was advertised in several national newspapers and on Paloh's MetroTV station. Pioneered by several Nasdem's members, the civil organization, then gave birth to a new political party, Nasdem Party, in 2011. "When Surya Paloh came up with an idea that Indonesia needed a new political party to bring restoration in Indonesian politics, he was smart enough to create a public impression that he had no personal ambition behind the establishment of the National Democratic Party, or NasDem. Thus, he was satisfied enough to become the chief patron of the party. Instead of right away becoming the party chairman, Surya focused more on leading the expansion of Nasdem as a mass organization" Jemadu (2013) said. Surya Paloh's move in Nasdem apparently attracted another media mogul Hary Tanoesoedibjo to the political party which invited the latter to become a member, and after a lengthy talks, Hary joined the newly established Nasdem Party with a position

as chairman of the party's council of experts.

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Hary controls Media Nusantara Citra (MNC) Group whose business incorporate an assortment of media outlets, from daily papers, radio, TV, , magazines, tabloids, the Internet. The vicinity of Hary Tanoesoedibjo in Nasdem alongside media big shot

Surya Paloh, the proprietor of Media Group, which runs Metro TV and Media Indonesia daily,

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enhances Nasdem's political influence. Just in a couple of months after its introduction to the world and still in the enlistment process, Nasdem turned into the main political gathering in Indonesia with the most grounded connections to media. Those figures who are interested to became member including, to name a few, Governor and King of Yogyakarta Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, Golkar senior politician Siswono Yudohusodo,

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) politician Budiman Sujatmiko, former Muhammadiyah chairman Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif,

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politician Khofifah Indar Parawansa,

and Paramadina University rector Anies Baswedan.

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The move was protested by Nasdem's renowned members including Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, who pioneered other members to renounce their membership in the organization. Sultan said that he exited the association on the grounds that he felt baffled when Paloh and other Nasional Demokrat individuals set up Nasdem party, which used to be a shortened form for the mass association. Those who disappointed saw the civil organization Nasdem, whose objectives were noble, had been used as an instrument to give birth to a new political party controlled by those who have a strong political ambitions. With his media power, much larger than Paloh's, Hary played a very significant role in helping Nasdem became the only new political party declared by the General Election Commission (KPU) eligible for the 2014 election. According to Aleksius Jemadu (2013), it was quite clear from the very beginning that building up a civil organization was not Surya Paloh's ultimate goal. It was just a political strategy to justify the real motive behind the whole construction of his political ambitions. Now that the Nasdem Party has been declared eligible to participate in the 2014 polls, Paloh has to recalculate his position in order to pave the way for the next episode of his struggle for power. Paloh also feared that the newcomer Hary Tanoesoedibjo, whose financial resources were larger than him, would use his wealth to buy influence within the party. The first step he has to do is to make sure that he has a complete control over the party. The only way to make this happen is by replacing the party chairman, Patrice Rio Capella, with himself.

Surya Paloh's move to seize control of the party

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was rejected by some other members, including Hary Tanoesoedibjo who said that the majority of the party's members were young people, and he wanted young cadres to keep handling the party's management, not Paloh. Talks between the two media mogul ended fruitlessly prompting Hary to resign from the party in protest over Paloh's intention to take over the party's leadership. Following the power struggle in the party which led to the exit of its most valuable member, the party held a national congress in January 2013 which unanimously elected Paloh as the party's new chairman. Television workers at Metro TV said Surya Paloh controlled program content, especially news, through his trusted men who held strategic positions at Metro's editorial board. After being briefed by Surya Paloh, Chief Editor or other senior members of the editorial board were used to rebrief news producers and their assistants with regard to the latest editorial policy which must be obeyed by all television workers involved in news production. The news producers were briefed during the daily meeting of news evaluation and planning. Senior members of editorial board delivered the instructions they got from Surya Paloh about his up-to-date instructions, about who or which issues should be developed, strengthened, or abandoned. Mohammad Hafizni, a senior news producer at Metro TV, said Surya Paloh never spoke directly to television workers in giving his instructions with regard to news content. "Not directly" Hafizni said when he was asked whether or not media owners gave their opinions in determining news content. He further said (M. Hafizni, personal communication, July 20, 2013): 117 "Tidak pernah Surya Paloh turun langsung ke tingkat produser untuk menyadarkan (kita) mengenai berita yang (harus) kita turunkan atau naikkan, tetapi pimpinan redaksi itu sering kali memberitahukan inilah kebijakan kita, (mereka) memberikan pandangan tentang penentuan berita. Dalam rapat kita mendiskusikan itu semua" (Surya Paloh never got down directly to the level of producers in order to make us realized about which news items must be broadcast or left out, but those leaders at the editorial board frequently briefed us about our policy, they gave us opinions about news selection. We discussed all those things during the meeting). Meanwhile, after leaving the Nasdem Party following his internal rift with the party's patron Surya Paloh, Hary Tanoesoedibjo joined the People's Conscience Party (Hanura), a middle-scale party led by Wiranto, a retired Indonesian army General. Wiranto was the military commander when Soeharto decided to step down from power. He ran unsuccessfully for president and vice-presidency in the previous elections. In July 2013, Hanura surprised people in general when the political party declared its official assignment of its chairman

Wiranto and media big shot Hary Tanoesoedibjo as president and

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VP applicants for the up and coming 2014 presidential race. Wiranto said his bid with Hary is the representation to

pluralism, since he was a Muslim and Javanese while Hary was ethnic Chinese and Christian. Hanura is the first political gathering to unhesitatingly pronounce its ticket for the 2014 elections

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("Hanura declares", 2013).⁵² The announcement of their candidacies in Jakarta on July 2 was broadcast live across the country in breaking news on

three national terrestrial televisions –RCTI, Global TV, and MNC TV-

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owned by Hary Tanoesoedibjo. Television workers at Global TV responded calmly to the political maneuver by Hary Tanoesoedibjo. The workers were aware the consequence of Harry's political move that they have to shift their support to another political party, Hanura Party, from the previously Nasdem Party. They also understood completely that the owner will certainly use the media to meet his political goals, especially after the declaration. A producer of news and talk show on Global TV, Adjat Wiratama, said he was aware the consequence of working in a medium whose owner showed blatantly his or her political ambitions (A. Wiratama, personal communication, July 20, 2013). Wiratama said the television's leadership may turn down a report if it was against the television's policy ⁵² In the 2009 general election, Hanura just got

3.8 percent of the vote, getting just 18 seats at the House of Representatives, while in the meantime race regulation obliged 20 percent of the vote in favor of a political party to have the capacity to name its own presidential

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hopeful, especially if it involved Hary Tanoesoedibjo. Adjat Wiratama said he could not choose any topics nor the sources for his talk show program based on his free will since they must be verified to make sure that the program content wouldn't go against Hary Tanoesoedibjo's political goal. Wiratama said sources for talk show must be approved by the management. He was once reprimanded by the television executives when a source of his talk show program, spoke something which attacked the station's business group and the media owner. He further said (A. Wiratama, personal communication, July 20, 2013): "Saat saya memegang program dialog, tema-tema yang diangkat harus disesuaikan dengan kepentingan group atau setidaknya tidak menyerang pemilik media. Beberapa narasumber harus mendapat persetujuan pimpinan (siapa) boleh diundang atau tidak. Pernah diperingati, saat beberapa narasumber yang diundang ternyata punya pandangan berbeda dengan kepentingan atau kebijakan media" (When I was holding a talk show

program, the topics of dialogue must be adjusted with the groups' interest, or at least, the topics must attract the media owner. Some sources must be approved whether they can be invited or not to the show. I was once warned when the invited sources showed a different view with the media policy) Agate also said he was also obliged to pay attention to news that may offend top executives at other companies but still under the same holding company. Adjust cited an example, when Global TV was banned from broadcasting news about Panda Nababan, a senior politician and member of parliament, who was inflicted in a corruption case. The news was banned because Panda Nababan was a father of RCTI's chief editor, Putra Nababan. RCTI was a sister company of Global TV. The corruption case drew media attention in mid 2012 since it involved many politicians from several political parties. Meanwhile, television workers at two private stations,

Trans TV and Trans 7, owned by business tycoon Chairul

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Tandjung, said that the owner involved directly in the programming content, either entertainment or news. They said Chairul Tandjung used to come to programming, planning and evaluation meeting at the television stations attended by television workers such as: producers, executive producers, managers, and other staffs involved. In the meeting, Chairul Tandjung himself led the discussing sessions with his television workers. He evaluated the performance of the ongoing program and giving suggestions about what should be done to improve the content, especially if a program in the downturn in term of rating vis-à-vis competitors of similar program. Compared to other television owners, Chairul Tandjung was the most involved in the day-to-day works in preparing programming content. 119 Mardatillah, an executive producer at Trans 7, reported that Chairul Tandjung was a real television businessman whose mission was to take commercial advantages from every programming his television stations broadcast (Mardatillah, personal communication, July 21, 2013). In an effort to accomplish this commercial goal, Tandjung was building up an intensive communication with his television workers, from his top executives all the way down to producer's level. They were invited to a weekly meeting with him to talk about how to improve programming content. Unlike other large television owners who tend to be reluctant to talk with their lower rank staffs, Chairul Tandjung would rather discuss television content directly with program producers than other staffs who are more senior or close to him in term of job hierarchy. Mardatillah said in an interview (Mardatillah, personal communication, July 21, 2013) : Sebagai pemilik media atau pimpinan dia selalu memberikan pandangan lewat meeting mingguan setiap satu minggu sekali atau bahkan arahan yang lebih bersifat mandat atau order bahwa arah program atau konsep acaranya lari kemana (As a media owner or a leader, he always gave his insight [into programming] through the weekly meeting, he even gave instructions which are mandatory, or an order about the direction of a programming, or where does the programming concept should go). Zudaris Elfira, an Executive Producer at Trans TV, who supervised celebrity news programs (infotainment show) used to report the latest celebrity gossips in the entertainment industry said that Chairul Tandjung were concerned about infotainment programs on televisions which tended to sensationalize celebrities' personal life. Tandjung advised Elfira against sensationalizing and started to instill educational values instead into the infotainment programs. Elfira said (Z. Elfira, personal communication, July 23, 2013): Dia memberikan pandangan atau arahan untuk program (infotainment) yang saya bawahi, bahwa sebuah program harus memberikan pendidikan dan hiburan untuk penonton (He gave his opinions and directions for the program [infotainment] under my supervision, [he said] a television program must educate and entertain their viewers). Mardatillah gave an example, it is Chairul Tandjung who suggested that Trans 7 should maintain its popular talk show Hitam Putih (Black and White) in prime time when most viewers flocked in front of their television set. Tandjung said the programming was unique and it was not necessary for Trans TV and Trans 7 to broadcast Sinetron -an Indonesian popular term for television drama- during prime time just to emulate its key competitors. Hitam Putih featured a host Deddy Corbuzier, a master illusionist, who

played up the mysterious and somewhat arrogant side of his stage persona

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with his distinctive bald head, arched eyebrows, and all-black clothing. Deddy has always played up the mysterious and somewhat arrogant side of his stage persona.

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As it turns out, he has proven a smart

and intelligent interviewer on an interesting talk show

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(Emond, 2013). Haryo Wicaksono, a producer of a talk show program at Trans TV, said Chairul Tandjung involved in the birth of Dokter Oz, a program that he produced. The program discussed about the health imitating similar program in America (H. Wicaksono, personal communication, July 19, 2013). He said Tandjung contributed his idea into the program content, especially in the process of preparing a new program. For example, in selecting a host for the program, Tandjung suggested some names he considered appropriate to guide the show. Wicaksono said when a program had been produced and went on air, Chairul Tandjung used to follow its performance development in term of ratings or shares, and he used to advise the producer about how to improve the program performance in an effort to boost its ratings. He said (H. Wicaksono, personal communication, July 19, 2013): Iya, biasanya kita ada meeting per minggu atau per bulan, nanti kalau sharenya turun, dikasih tahu supaya dinaikkan lagi sharenya. Pemilik media memberikan

aranaan bagaimana suatu konten. misalnya, pada pemilihan host, dan pada awal-awal pemertemuan program (Yes, we used to have a weekly or monthly meeting, when a program share declined we were told to lift up the share. The media owner gave us instructions about how content should be. For example, in selecting a host program, and at the beginning of preparing a program). Mardatillah said Chairul Tanjung sometimes reprimanded his television workers to maintain decency in their program content, especially those which received many criticisms from the public. The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) frequently reprimanded Tanjung's television stations, especially Trans TV, for airing indecent programs which included intruding into people's privacy, promoting excessive sexuality, giving details on how to mix illegal drugs, and other improper content. KPI revealed that Trans TV in 2012

topped the list of television stations breaching broadcasting norms and regulations

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("Commission reprimands", 2012). However, despite mounting criticism from the public, Chairul Tanjung were rarely scrapped a program from the list just because of its indecent 121 content. The program would still be maintained with some corrections as long as it was still commercially viable. Mardatillah added that Chairul Tanjung once instructed his television workers not to use a rock star and popular musician, Ahmad Dhani, in every program on Trans TV or Trans 7 after the musician seemed to have accused him of having an affair with his wife. "There was a celebrity who was rumored that she had an affair with him, and then the celebrity and her family were banned from Trans Corp," Mardatillah said. Ahamd Dhani and his wife, a singer-song writer, Maia Estianty divorced in 2008. They have three children who became members of a children band. Rumor has it that Maia had an affair with Chairul Tanjung following a statement made by the outspoken Ahamd Dhani, who said that one of high rank officials at Trans TV had an intimate communication through short message service with his wife. Television workers at SCTV and Indosiar owned by Fofo and Eddy Sariaatmadja said during interview that the media owner through his management staffs sometimes stepped into the program content by suggesting news people about events that need to be covered but very rarely with regard to political occurrence. They said owners occasionally demanded news team to cover activities pertaining to their business just for the sake of publicity. Fasmi Berry, a News Producer at Indosiar, said the station's owners placed their personnel in the television company's board of directors, and they also even placed personnel in the television news department (F. Berry, personal communication, July 23, 2013). However, the involvement of owners in the program content was still minimal since they only asked to cover something considered trivial. Fasmi Berry said he was once asked to make coverage about Indosiar's public and community development services of relocating street vendors who sold mainly nourishment in their food stalls along the street which became the entrance to the television station. Indosiar management felt the growing number of food stalls along the street sidelines had disturbed the traffic into the television station, especially when materials for production must be carried into the station compound. However, the management needed the street vendors since most their employees were their consumers. Fasmi Berry said (F. Berry, personal communication, July 23, 2013): Beliau memasukan ide (ke dalam program), salah satunya Pembangunan Pengembangan pedagang kaki lima di Indosiar. (Mereka biasanya memasukannya sebagai salah satu content di program Fokus yaitu liputan mengenai relokasi para Pedagang Kaki Lima di Jalan Damai, Daan Mogot, Jakarta Barat ke lokasi yang lebih nyaman dan lebih higienis, kegiatan ini juga diharapkan mampu berkesinambungan sehingga bisa menciptakan tata kota yang indah sekaligus membangun citra positif media di mata masyarakat (They [the management] contributed ideas [into the program], and one of them is street vendors development in Indosiar. They used to insert [the story] as one of program content in Fokus, [the story] is about relocating street vendors at Damai Street, Daan Mogot, West Jakarta to another location which was more comfortable and hygienic, the event was expected to become sustainable in order to create a nice urban development as well as establishing the media's positive image in the public eye) The Sariaatmadja family through their company Elang Mahkota is not the only conglomerate in the country that manages more than one television station. By 2013 the majority of television owners discussed earlier controlled at least two private stations with nationwide coverage. Except for Surya Paloh who had only one television, Hary Tanoesoedibjo owned the most with three televisions while Chairul Tanjung, Bakrie, and Sariaatmadja families have respectively two televisions. There are about 300 private local stations spreading across Indonesia by 2013. Around 200 of them are managed by Jakarta- based television stations, which are controlled by these five conglomerates (Sipahutar, 2013). A media analyst who was former Deputy Chief Editor at RCTI, Atmadji Sumarkidjo, said in an interview that businessmen who owned television could be classified into three categories based on their business background. The background of the owner, in a certain degree, might play a role in influencing how television workers shaped their program content. The first category is a businessman who came into television with a previous background in the media industry. This type of businessmen put media service as their main focus and they have companies involved in various media businesses. Hary Tanoesoedibjo was one good example of this category with his business included newspaper, radio, Internet provider, cable TV, and network TV. The second category is television owners whose background in various industries but not media. Chairul Tanjung could be placed into this category. Before coming into the television business and became a conglomerate, Chairul Tanjung was a moderate businessman who had business in various fields including banking, retailer and food industry. Sariaatmadja family had experience in the plantation business for quite a long time, while they also had a computer-related-company, before they made stock purchase which allowed them to jump into the television industry by owning SCTV and Indosiar. The business shift was made possible after they sold their ownership in the plantation company. The third category is television owners who jumped into the television business driven mainly by political motives. According to Atmadji Sumarkidjo, this type of businessmen intentionally placed themselves in the television industry by owning television stations since they could use them as an instrument to achieve their political goal and aspirations. Surya Paloh was the best example for this category as he used his media, newspaper and television, to funnel his political idea, and later to promote his new political party. Bakrie family was another good example

in this category as they used their two televisions to consistently support their patron, Aburizal Bakrie, in every political maneuver he made as a

chairman of Golkar Party -the country's second largest political party- and the party' 142

s candidate in the presidential election in 2014. Atmadji Sumarkidjo added that owners usually also acted as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who involved in day-to-day television operations. The reason for this high involvement was because television industry was a high-cost business and the owner would do everything to reduce costs and shorten turnaround times. An owner-cum-CEO was certainly granted a full access to control program content as he or she could intervene easily into programming. Atmadji Sumarkidjo said his observations indicated that owner intervention in program content was varied from one television to another. However, he concluded that the intervention was very dominant at televisions whose owners were also politicians like Metro TV and TV One. He said the intervention was obvious, especially because the televisions were a 24-hour news televisions. 5.1.2 The Influence of Advertisers As explained earlier in chapter 2, the relationship between media and advertisers is symbiotic. However, the

central issue in the relationship rest on the degree to which the media 387

depend on advertisers. Attracting audiences sought by advertisers and enabling advertisers to reach their target audience are major factors in program decision. This study tries to figure out how far TV program speaks to the advertisers' interest and the philosophy of the market keeping in mind the end goal to comprehend the characteristic of the advertising business sector and the media economy and what is and is not maintainable inside of it. For television, program content plays an important role in attracting advertisers to spend their promotion budget as much as possible in the form of television commercials. Advertising expenditure in Indonesia was dominated by televisions. This type of media absorbed most of the country's advertisement spending. According to Nielsen, a media 124 research firm, advertising expenditure in Indonesia has been in a rising trend over the last few years triggered partly by audience interest in television content. For example, in 2010, advertising expenditure posted strong growth,

rising 23% to a total of Rp 60 trillion. 52

Nielsen said the advertising expenditure denoted the most elevated increment

since 2006 and was expected in huge part to the quantity of special sports events happening amid the year, especially the World Cup and the AFF Suzuki Cup. Telecasts of soccer matches 52

topped every one of the

ten spots of the most watched television programs, with the AFF beating up the World Cup as Indonesia's national group advanced to the finals. For sponsors, TV kept on being the media of choice, 52

representing more than 60% of promotion spending (Nielsen, 2011). However, competition is fierce between Indonesian commercial televisions in pursuing advertising revenues. Television workers interviewed during this research said advertiser played significant role in determining program content. They said, apart from regular commercial breaks, televisions in Indonesia offered various methods to advertisers to broadcast their promotional messages. Many stations exchange air time for merchandise or services in a transaction known variously as a trade, trade out, or barter. For example, advertisers may provide the station with travel, food, or furniture for its own use or as contest prizes, in return for advertising time with an equivalent cost. Merchandise or services instead of cash are accepted by many stations to settle delinquent account. It is also common for television stations to get advertisers to help produce programs. Stations may design sponsorship programs and directly solicit businesses to provide funding for the program's production. Increasingly, advertisers are engaging consumers by providing programming that is branded with the sponsor's name. Stations may also provide time slots for advertisers to promote their cause on existing programs. Another common practice is product placement. The engagement involves using products or services as part of editorial or entertainment content in return for advertisers financial contribution. According to Mardatillah, an executive producer at a television station Trans 7, advertisers may contribute ideas and advice to the station's production team with regard to 125 program content they financed especially if the advertising contract was for full sponsorship. She said advertisers were allowed to determine story or topic of a program content including the performers. She said one advertiser on the station's most popular entertainment talk-show 'Empat Mata' (Four Eyes) determined a topic that need to be discussed during the show including who became the celebrity guests. "On Empat Mata program, he (advertiser) gave his view with regard to the topic of discussion, for example, the topic of family, and they select the guests," Mardatillah said. However, she explained, the station didn't allow advertisers to fully control program content, adding that advertisers who held full sponsorship had a chance to determine up to 80% of program

content while the rest was still controlled by the station's production team. A news producer at Global TV, Adjat Wiratama, said that his news program sometimes broadcast a news story from advertisers as a result of engagement between advertisers and his television marketing department (A. Wiratama, personal communication, July 8, 2013). He said advertisers contribute their idea to the text that must be written or the video that must be displayed. Wiratama said it was mandatory for him to run the sponsored stories in his news program since the sponsor paid off some amount of money on a contractual basis. Wiratama said (A. Wiratama, personal communication, July 8, 2013): Jadi, liputan kerjasama dengan tim marketing itu biasanya liputan komersil yang ada sistem barter di dalamnya. Sistem barter disini berupa tayangan yang wajib tayang dan kemudian dibayarkan sejumlah uang oleh klien yang bersangkutan. Kami meliput kegiatan tersebut untuk kemudian ditayangkan pada program acara kami. (So, the collaborative coverage [among advertiser] and the marketing team constitutes a commercial reportage which involves a barter system. The barter of a news story for the payment of any amount of money from the client concerned. We made coverage of [clients'] activities and then we televise [the story] on our program) Wiratama gave an example, when his news bulletin runs two paid news stories. The first story concerns government's serious battle through its tax collection institution to urge all Indonesian nationals to have code numbers of taxpayer (NPWP) and present their yearly tax return forms (SPT), while the second story was about the launch of the Proton Suprima car in Jakarta in June 2013 that marks the hatchback's first entry in an export market since it was first introduced in August. Wiratama said, in this type of news story, advertisers supervise the news text and video before being televised through his news program. "Proton conducted quality control on the script and video before being broadcast. They checked the news content to make sure that the story has been already in line with their demand" Wiratama said. Adjat Wiratama said politicians also designed their news story in collaboration with television stations, especially in the period before and during the election. Wiratama said he ran the politician sponsored stories in his news bulletin after the marketing team briefed him to do so. He added the politicians usually invited television reporters to cover their political campaign and they asked televisions to broadcast those campaigns as news stories. Wiratama said the political advertisers sometimes set the time when the stories must go on air. He added (A. Wiratama, personal communication, July 8, 2013): Contohnya pada saat Ratu Atut menjalani proses pemilihan Gubernur Banten dan bersaing dengan Marissa Haque, pihak Ratu Atut meminta seluruh kegiatan kampanyenya diliput dan ditayangkan. Tentunya hal ini tidak gratis, pasti ada uang masuk. Yang jelas liputan tersebut menggunakan tanggal penayangan ditentukan dari pihak sponsor atau klien, melalui tim marketing yang nantinya di beritahukan ke programming dan tim produksi. (For example, when a politician Ratu Atut run campaigns for the gubernatorial election in Banten province where he competed with another candidate Marissa Haque. Ratu Atut demanded all her campaigns be covered and televised. Of course, it was not free of charge, there were certainly some amount of money came in. The coverage was televised on determining dates as demanded by the politicians or clients. The marketing team then told the programming and production team (about the deal)" Neil R. Tobing, an executive with PT Visi Media Asia (VIVA), a holding company owned by the Bakrie family that controls two television stations -TV One and ANTV- said advertisers played an important role in determining whether or not a free-to-air television station should run popular and important events (Grazella, 2013). Television stations had to expend a large amount of money to purchase broadcasting rights for important events, for example the World Cup and British Premier League, which usually garnered high ratings. Tobing said Viva paid US\$61.5 million to get selective television rights for the 2014 World Cup. The telecaster secured a \$10.8 million bank assurance to be the official supporter for the occasion. Tobing clarified that sponsors helped the station to recoup the costs with respect to the buy of the television rights. Advertisers played a key role in the free-to-air television when it broadcasts major sporting events. Advertisers helped television stations to book profit margins that enabled the stations to air such programs for free. "This is why we need sponsorships." Tobing said. He 127 added such occasions in different nations are not free-to-air and are broadcast through pay TV rather, considering the high expenses of gaining the rights (Grazella, 2013). Although advertisers

play a key role in shaping the content

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and contributing incomes for television station's fortunes, however, their influence are not unlimited especially when advertisers' missions go against television owners'. A television station was once reported had declined the political advertisements of a presidential candidate

Megawati Sukarnoputri and her running mate, Prabowo Subianto,
during the

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2009 presidential election. Sources from the campaign team of Megawati-Prabowo said a few national TV channels had declined to air some of their campaign ads, saying the advertisements were brimming with criticism against the administration. They said there was a station official who conceded that the station got telephone calls to dismiss the campaign commercials, in spite of the fact that they have been set in the business plan. The campaign team suspected there had been a conceivable way to deal with the management of TV station by delegates of a certain presidential hopeful. Budi Darmawan, a representative of SCTV, recognized that his office had declined one of the Megawati-Prabowo campaign commercials. The station considered the potential for an infringement of the Presidential Election Law as the advertisement depicted the officeholder (Yudhoyono) saying "bankrupt" while his full declaration was cut (Pasandaran, et al., 2009). He said the advertisements can possibly incite and make superfluous feedback toward government. Since the Presidential Elections Law required all TV media to treat every single presidential competitor reasonably and that TV stations had no power to judge the substance of advertisements, Darmawan's remarks clearly indicated that SCTV was pro the incumbent president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and went against Megawati-Prabowo. Mohammad Hafizni, a senior news producer at Metro TV,

said his television station sometimes took orders from politicians who demanded the station to make reports on events held by their political parties (M. Hafizni, personal communication, July 21, 2013). Hafizni said the order was treated as advertisements, and the politicians were considered as advertisers. He said politicians sometimes reserved air time, and the station broadcast their political events, like a meeting or congress of certain political parties, for some financial compensation in return. The air time blocking by the politicians sometime should replace the television's regular programs. Hafizni said regular advertisers sometimes asked the station to make news coverage on their commercial activities in order to promote their business. He said staff from marketing department sometimes approached him to convey requests from the television's 128 loyal advertising clients who solicited news coverage from the station on their commercial events. Hafizni said (M. Hafizni, personal communication, July 21, 2013): Dia meminta melalui sales dan sales menyampaikan ke orang gathering, gathering menyampaikan kepada kita. 'Tolong dong ini wajib, karena dari pengiklan'. Nah, kita saling bantu lah. Artinya kita memberikan dia media pemberitaan lain, semacam bonus lah. Jadi ada simbiosis mutualisme sama- sama berkepentingan, supaya dia senang jadi tetap pasang iklan di kita. (He [advertiser] requested via sales and the sales delivered the message to staff of news gathering, and the gathering people delivered the messages to us. 'Please help, it is mandatory, because [the request] from advertisers'. So we help each other. It means we gave them news coverage, a kind of bonus. So there was a symbiosis mutualism, there was a common interest, so he [advertiser] was happy and remained loyal in putting their commercials on our television). Zudarlis Elfira, an executive producer at Trans TV, said her television station was sometimes considered the number of advertisements in which an artistes performed before hiring them to play with her television programs (Z. Elfira, personal communication, July 13, 2013). She said the reason was the artistes had potential to attract advertisers to put their commercials in a program in which the artistes performed. Elfira said advertisers tend to put their advertisements in the television programs in which their commercial stars played. Responding to a question whether her station's programming policy considering advertisers' will toward television programs, Elfira said in an interview that advertisers' will is an important thing to consider in order to gain advertisements in the program. She said (Z. Elfira, personal communication, July 13, 2013): Iya. Misalnya, kami membuat program, lalu programming dan bagian marketing mengusulkan untuk menggunakan artis-artis yang iklannya banyak. Sehingga artis tersebut menarik banyak iklan atau sponsor secara otomatis (Yes. For example, we make a program, then programming and marketing departments recommended to hire artists who have played in many advertisements. So, the artistes might automatically attract many advertisers or sponsors) Elfira said advertisers sometimes asked her for making news reports on their commercial or social activities. "An advertiser once asked me to cover his program of corporate social responsibility" she said. Elfira said her television would cover the advertisers' events as long as they paid some amount of money to the marketing department, adding that her station never broadcast promotional news for free. She explained every program in her station is also open for built-in advertisements or product placement, an 129 advertising technique used by advertisers to subtly promote their products through appearances in television program. She said, this advertising method is often initiated through an agreement between advertisers and the television's marketing department. Of course, advertisers must pay to have their product featured in television programs. Asked whether the continuity of a program is determined by rating or advertisers, Elfira said her station considers advertisers as more important than program rating. The influence of rating on program's fate is not dominant, she said. The station usually maintains a program despite its low rating as long as the program's advertisers still produce profits for the station. She explained in the followings (Z. Elfira, personal communication, July 13, 2013) that a high rating program was not necessarily producing a large income for the station. Karena selain nilai rating dan share yang dilihat, ada sisi lain yang dipegang oleh sebuah iklan atau sponsor yaitu "Trust". Program yang memiliki trust yang kuat terhadap client nya, maka keberadaan acara tersebut akan tetap diposisi yang kuat pula karena dukungan sponsor yang besar, walaupun rating dan share yang dihasilkan tidaklah seberapa. (Apart from seeing rating and share, there was another aspect that needs to be grasped by a commercial or sponsor namely "Trust". A program with a high trust toward its client, so the program's existence will remain strong because of large support from the sponsor, although the program produces a low rating). Television workers at Metro TV, which specializes in producing news and informative programs, said advertisers play important role in giving influence to their mostly factual program content, although the advertisers' strong will to intervene directly into content is still controllable. According to Anastasia Kristi, a producer of a talk-show program Kick Andy, advertisers used to propose that the program bears certain promotional messages designed by the advertisers (A. Kristi, personal communication, December 21, 2013). She said that her production team was very scrupulous in considering advertisers' suggestion in putting certain promotional messages into the program content given the program's good image. Kick Andy was selected in 2008 as the highest-quality TV talk show based on a survey conducted by several non-governmental organizations led by

Science, Aesthetics and Technology (SET) Foundation. Unlike the

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Nielsen's surveys which took respondents from various segments of the audience, SET's survey only took educated television viewers. Some

191 educated television-lovers in major cities across the country involved in the

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survey to judge television shows based on

their informative content, social empathy, factuality, critical views, balance, objectivity and public interest.

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Kristi said some episodes of Kick Andy's content were initiated and devised by her and other members of her production team, while some others were based on advertiser's initiatives proposed to the station's sales department. She said her program would accommodate sponsors initiatives in putting promotional messages into the program as long as the messages were not in contrary to the program's missions and images. Kristi said (A. Kristi, personal communication, December 21, 2013) as the followings: Jadi ada program yang memang sifatnya idealis atau orisinal berangkat dari ide maupun usulan dari tim maupun dari producer tetapi juga ada ide program yang dimunculkan atau diusulkan oleh tim sales. Artinya kalau ide tersebut dimunculkan oleh tim sales biasanya berkaitan dengan memasang iklan atau sponsor yang berkeinginan untuk membuat istilahnya "built in content" di dalam program tersebut (There were episodes of the program which were idealistic or original derived from production team's ideas or from producer, but there were episodes which were suggested by team of sales. It means, since the idea came from the sales team so it has something to do with advertisers or sponsors who committed to make a built-in content into the program). Kristi cited an example, when Nestle, a Swiss multinational food and beverage company, once proposed a built-in promotional message (product placement), a type of television commercials in which the brand of a product or service are observable during television program. She said advertiser wanted the talk-show program to discuss the company's mission to promote 'sporting and hard work values' in an attempt to boost the sale of the company's sport nutrition products in Indonesia market. Kristi said the company's messages were not opposite to the program's missions and images, and she found no difficulties to put the messages into the program content. Product placement was presented in way that create positive sentiment towards the advertised brand. Kristi said the advertiser's message was mentioned and discussed through the program. However, she added that Kick Andy didn't display a blatant product placement. The program showed the promotional message and product brand in a subtle manner.

5.1.3 The Influence of Audiences

Every broadcaster naturally wondered how many audiences were exposed to their programs and how effective the program was. As discussed in chapter two, the number of 131 audience is crucial for televisions. In order to know their audience number, broadcasters rely on reports of program rating based on audience survey. The bottom line of every audience research is to obtain data about audience number of certain television programs. In order to serve the clients, television stations give research-based confirmation of their group of viewers size and qualities. Market and audience measurement research are important tools for the media sales department. The reports indicate a level on a scale that shows how good, important, or popular a television program is. The media with the best target audience for advertisers' products are the most sought-after. Currently, rating reports become the most common institutional device for making contact with the audience, and the most influential instrument in shaping the program content. In other word, the influence of audience on television content is best presented on the use of rating reports by broadcasters in developing their program content. In Indonesia, competition among commercial television stations has never been fiercer recently in this rating-obsessed industry. It was RCTI, the first Indonesian private television that enjoyed all audience attention in terms of ratings and popularity. Since its establishment in 1989 when competition was still less intense, RCTI has always been number one. However, ten years after its birth, RCTI had to make room for other competitors - especially SCTV, Indosiar, and now Trans 7- which also staked their claim on territory where RCTI took for granted for so long. Indonesians viewers of all socioeconomic classes enjoy watching television, and nearly all (95%) the country's middle class homes own a television, with 96 percent watching television programs almost every day. For this reason audience measurement is important for television broadcasters and advertisers. Television ratings in Indonesia are supplied by Nielsen Audience Measurement.⁵³ Most advertisers and Indonesian national television stations depend on the rating reports issued by the research agency. If a program happened to gain a low rating, the program would be repaired: broadcasters change the program's storyline and characters for improvements; and if the rating is still low, the program would be scrapped as the possibilities of getting ads for the show would be thin. ⁵³ Nielsen Audience Measurement's ratings data can be obtained by a subscription. The information can be analysed through any of the perceived programming bundles accessible to the business sector. Arianna is Nielsen Audience Measurement's exclusive TV programming examination apparatus. In addition, a range of topline reports of Television Audience Measurement (TAM) are provided to subscribers via website. In order to fulfill individual client needs customised reports also can be developed. See ww.agbnielsen.co.id With regard to information program, television workers interviewed throughout this research said they used to prioritize and broadcast more stories about popular figures that could boost ratings in their news programs. For example, television workers have been abuzz with news of Joko Widodo who was chosen governor of Jakarta capital in September 2012 because of overpowering backing from the city's urban poor and white collar classes. Already the major of Solo, a far littler city than Jakarta, Jokowi campaigned on a supporting common people, promising Jakarta inhabitants that he could bring real change to their ambushed city. Joko Widodo, or popularly called Jokowi, along with his Chinese deputy Basuki Tjahja Purnama, or Ahok become the media darling ever since, especially for television channels. Jokowi was popular because of his humble and clean reputation. He was seen as a man who listens to the people. Jokowi and Ahok were hugely popular with young people and they were indeed Newsmakers who attracted many audiences and high ratings on television. In covering their stories, each television outlet deployed one team consisting of at least two reporters and two camera persons to trail both Jokowi and Ahok to cover their activities and reactions for news. One reporter was assigned to follow Jokowi as he liked to wander around the city and made an impromptu visit to unexpected places, such as slums, river banks, traditional markets, and local public office. His management style was adored by many Indonesians since it was in contrast to many leaders who prefer to work behind a desk. Another reporter was assigned to follow Ahok, because of his daring attitude while he often made cool comments. It is now common place to see reporters from televisions and other media stand guard in the City Hall main lobby -an area previously restricted to the media- to prepare themselves to cover the two leaders. Retno Pinasti, a senior news anchor with SCTV, said audiences liked Jokowi's laid-back and informal character, so the station also covered seemingly trivial things about him to cater to people's curiosity (Setiawati, 2013). "Jokowi's attraction lies in his sincerity. He gives short answers and he is not

arrangements to admit he doesn't know all the details about certain budget allocations. Meanwhile, Anok Bener delivers bold statements and makes interesting breakthroughs," Pinasti said (Setiawati, 2013) Apart from information program, certain entertainment program genres continue to attract many television viewers as well as ratings. Some of those programs were

broadcast during the prime time that span **from 7** to **10 p.m.**

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and become the most critical part of the day for most channels. This period offers the biggest potential for viewership and the best chance to rival different channels for the supremacy of national viewership (Blum & Lindheim, 1987). Shows on soap operas, slapstick comedy, reality shows and supernatural shows were 133 broadcast throughout prime time and continue to draw a large number of viewers since many local audiences have always been interested in these types of programs. Among entertainment programs, television soap operas, known locally as sinetrons - the

term 'sinetron' comes from the words sinema (cinema) and elektronik (electronic)

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- are always a favorite for most Indonesian audiences. However, due to its expensive production cost, only several large television stations that have the capability to consistently produce sinetrons and broadcast them during prime time.⁵⁴ Sinetron is the most durable program in Indonesian television channels, and lengthy air time is usually a benchmark of a successful program in the local free-to-air television stations. On the condition that Nielsen's reports indicate good ratings, stations usually tend to extend its sinetron's running time to provide more space for commercial breaks. Nielsen Audience Measurement

which tracks programs on Indonesia's 11 national stations as well as 10 local ones

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supplies reports on television ratings. The

content of television does have a big impact on society allowing television **as the most**

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influential media sector. For example, RCTI broadcasts a sinetron that holds the supremacy of Indonesia's longest running TV series Cinta Fitri (Fitri's Love) with an astounding 1,003 episodes.

However, as the ratings show, the most viewed types of content are

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sensational news and moreover television

drama (soap opera or sinetron). Most TV stations sell drama as their main content, and the audience share for news television is diminutive **compared to the others (See Table 5).**

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RCTI leads the audience share by having sinetron as their main reliable program, **followed by SCTV and Trans TV which predominantly broadcast** sinetron and **variety shows.**

5

Sitting at the bottom with the most diminutive audience shares are

TV One and Metro TV, which fixate on news broadcasting. Unless **the**

5

news is sensational, ostensibly the audience prefers drama to news.

Other TV stations additionally broadcast news and infrequent **investigative reports and documentaries that address** gregarious **-political issues, but these magnetize a more diminutive audience than sinetron or** regalement **- talkshows such as Bukan Empat Mata in Trans 7, as the ratings of the latter boost.**

5

Television stations used to extend its contract with production houses if the program ratings were satisfactory. The production of sinetrons and other television programs continue if Nielsen reports indicate

the ratings are high, and television stations terminate production if a television stations normally paid between Rp250 – Rp350 million (or around US\$25.000 – US\$35.000) to Local production houses for an episode of a sinetron series. A production house usually sign a contract to produce a standard 13 episodes. A popular sinetron player can get up to Rp 50 million (US\$4166)

for one episode of a sinetron series, while a

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newcomer may feel content with

only a ""transportation fee"" for a few minutes appearance on the

38

television screen. the rating agency says the sinetron is 'bad'. Nielsen Media Research offered rating reports to television stations and advertisers on the basis of weekly, daily and even

a minute-by-minute audience measurement, gauging how many viewers stay tuned not only during

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the program but also during commercial breaks. Currently, most producers of television programs utilize minute by minute (MBM) rating reports to design their program content.

Table 5. 1 : Audience share in free-to-air television in Indonesia, 2011
Source: Media Partner Asia (MPA) Analysis, 2011

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According to Yul Andryono, RCTI's Executive Producer for Drama, the MBM rating reports determine sinetrons' storyline, including actors that must be maintained or dropped for the next episode (Y. Andryono, personal communication, February 10 2014). He explained if the Nielsen reports indicated higher rating in a certain scene, meaning audience like the scene. Maybe they like that type of scene, or the actors who appeared during the scene. So, in the next episode, production house must give more time to develop that type of scene and give an opportunity for the actor to appear longer in the sinetron. On the contrary, if television noticed the rating dropped during a certain scene so the story have to be changed, or the actor be dropped. He said (Y. Andryono, personal communication, February 10 2014): Bagian programming kita, dibantu oleh data dari Nielsen, selalu melihat setiap hari dan setiap minggu, perkembangan rating, minute by minute, dari sinetron tersebut. Misal, jika artis A muncul dan kemudian rating tinggi, sedangkan artis B yang muncul tapi rating menurun, maka artis A terus yang diminta untuk muncul. Misalnya, si A, aktor utamanya mati karena tabrakan, jika ternyata besok penonton menurun, maka (si A) akan dihidupkan lagi. Jadi ceritanya dibuat on the spot, berdasarkan perkembangan (Our programming department, assisted by data from Nielsen, checked the daily and weekly rating progress, minute by minute sinetron progress. For example, if actor A showed up and the rating was high, while actor B showed up and the rating was down, so actor A must be played more. For instance, if actor A was killed in a traffic accident, and later the audience number declined, so actor A must be resurrected) Since many television stations are still unable to produce sinetron, commercial televisions depend on production houses. Most successful sinetrons in Indonesia were made by local production houses. However, the success was not one-sided since television stations also played significant role in sinetron content. Yul Andryono said the production house used to follow what television wanted with regard to the storyline and braced for an impromptu change, although the production house's scriptwriter has prepared the scenario from the beginning. He said production house could not turn down television's request for a story change since the station kept monitoring sinetron performance through day-to-day rating reports. "We pay production house around 300 million rupiah (US\$30.000) for one episode, that's a lot of money, how can they say no to us," said Yul Andryono. The stations' daily feedback on the rating performance allowed the stations to review and adjust the story. Production houses were obligated to complete the 60-minute sinetron production process in less than one day. It is a common practice among Indonesian production houses to produce hurriedly a very brief one-day sinetron production to meet a deadline in order to satisfy audience demand, and this process called locally kejar tayang. In order to wrap up one episode in one day, the production has to therefore continually keep ahead of the screening deadline. "Shooting of Sinetron was made in the morning for broadcast in the evening still in the same day" Yul Andryono said. One of the country's famous production houses is Multivision Plus owned by Surabaya-born Indian-Indonesian Raam Punjabi. He pioneered Indonesian sinetron that became the country's most popular television program and was dubbed 'the king of sinetron'. The Punjabi family is Sindhi who came from the province of Sind in Pakistan, an adjacent parts of Rajasthan and Gujarat in west India. The family was part of the over 100,000 Indian diaspora in Indonesia following the social disorder caused by India's partition in 1947. Along 136 with thousands of other Sindhis who moved to the South East Asian archipelago, Raam and Dhamoo's parents moved to Indonesia (Aiyar, 2013). Multivision's former senior official and Raam Punjabi's important aide, Groza Subakti, said "Textile was the main business of the Sindhi community in Indonesia. The Punjabis run a textile business in the East Java city of Surabaya. The family moved to the capital, Jakarta when Raam, Dhamoo and another brother began a business importing and producing movies in 1972." (G. Subakti, personal communication, February 12, 2014) In replication

to the elevate of private television stations and the demise of the film

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industry

in early 1990s, the Indonesian television drama industry commenced to develop well and be prosperous. In order to accommodate the

high demand for local content to fill broadcast hours, many film companies

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shifted their busines to production houses (Widodo, 2002).

Following the establishment of RCTI, the country's first television station in the 1990s,

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Punjabi's Multivision commenced to get many orders to produce television programs. He was successful producing some of the most popular sinetron. Since then, for almost 15 years, his sinetrons could be seen on almost all TV channels. Multivision dominated Indonesian sinetron market,

which reportedly once controls 80 percent of the industry.

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Multivision's first big competitor came in 2003 when Dhamoo Punjabi and his son Manoj Punjabi who parted ways with Raam set up another production house MD Entertainment which quickly became a key player in the film industry. A MD production, Cinta Fitri (Fitri's love), is Indonesia's longest running soap opera. The company has seven hours of soap operas running on different channels every day. In the period of 10 years after its birth, around a third of the market for popular sinetrons was produced by MD Entertainment; and that's not including some of the country's most successful movies. MD Entertainment in 2008 produced Ayat Ayat Cinta (The Verses of Love), the first movie in Indonesia that broke the box office record held for 10 years by Titanic, a Hollywood blockbuster movie. Four years later, in 2012, with an estimated 4.6 million viewers, Habibie and Ainun, another MD production, became the highest grossing movie in Indonesia of all time. Manoj is today the king of Indonesian entertainment, replacing Raam Punjabi (Aiyar, 2013). According to a former journalist Anirudya Mitra who moved to MD Entertainment as a co-producer and scriptwriter, Manoj and his production house managed to help several television stations expanding their market share (Aiyar, 2013). He gives an example of how Indonesia's SCTV channel shot up to the number one position from fourth place in terms of 137 market share when it began airing MD sinetrons in 2007. Similarly, MNC TV's (another channel) fortunes transformed to the top from the number seven position, when MD teamed up with the station in 2011. "Whatever Manoj touches kind of turns to gold," enthuses Anirudya Mitra (Aiyar, 2013). Most Punjabi's sinetrons had a story line around love and tragedy played by attractive actors surrounded by luxurious houses and fancy cars. Beauty and luxury became common features in sinetrons during the era. According to Groza, the Punjabi family imitated Indian cinemas for their sinetron. Many Punjabi's sinetron were produced exactly like imported television soap operas from India and Latin America. Raam Punjabi even hired the Indian television drama director in order

to make sure that the appeal of Indian television drama was transferred to Indonesian sinetron.

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He said many plots in the Indian drama film was also found in Punjabi's sinetrons with the story mainly centered around family matters imbued with dramatic reversals of fortune, and convenient coincidences. The story revolves around long-lost relatives and siblings separated by fate, or boy met girl...girl's parents declined...they parted away, and eventually after lots of tears and drama, they saw their love again. For some people, the luxury shown in Punjabi's sinetrons was in stark contrast with many Indonesians who still lived under the poverty line (Endah, 2004). He was accused of producing decadent soap operas. Punjabi's sinetrons were then often receiving harsh criticism from media observers for only selling daydreams, for not reflecting the real Indonesian life. But Punjabi seemed to know well his Indonesian television audiences. Indonesian society was like a pyramid in term of social economic status, with poorly educated, low-income people making up the majority of the lower structure. They are usually not critical and enjoy watching the dream lives of wealth and ease shown in the sinetron series. The television industry is capitalizing on the situation by producing more lightweight shows.

"I know that my viewers are middle- to lower-class people. But I can't use their problems as story ideas. It would only depress them."

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Punjabi said (Junaidi, 2005). Sinetron producer, Manoj Punjabi, said that the storyline in sinetron was the

result of both audience or rating demand and industry direction. "If we make something that audience can't relate to, they won't watch it. We adapt to the people," said Manoj, whose production house MD Entertainment

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was responsible for the

success of Indonesia's longest running sinetron series. According to Wishnutama, former CEO of Trans TV, some 98 percent of Indonesian audiences prefer local to international content, so high-quality programming doesn't work for 138 them. "We once ran this sitcom called Kejar Tayang inspired by my favorite show Friends which eventually went to the dustbin after years of sinking ratings. Our focus group discussion found that the content was too witty for our audience." (Paramita, 2011). He said the audience still wants the overly dramatic sinetron with all its nonsense. "I've tried hard not to have sinetrons in our programs, which has positioned us in the upper and upper-middle class of viewers. But neglecting the demands of the lower and lower-middle classes would push us to the bottom of the ratings. Understanding intelligent content requires time and higher education. Meanwhile, there are not that many university graduates yet in Indonesia." Wishnutama said (Paramita, 2011).

Putu Wijaya, one of the most prolific drama writers, who has

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indited more than 50 sinetron designations, expounded how people in production house think about television viewers. He verbalized

television channels and production houses relegated television audience into two categories, class A and class B

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(Widodo, 2002). Putu Wijaya explained that the audience classification

has been a useful tool for television and sinetron workers to imagine their target audience

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although he sometimes observed these classifications as being arbitrary and inconsistent. Class B viewers comprise middle and lower-class families. This type of viewers is considered not interested and quickly get bored with

long dialogues or discussions of difficult concepts when they

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watch television programs including sinetron.

Instead, they are stimulated by action, more susceptible to manipulation of emotions and keen for ebony -and- white morality. Putu Wijaya

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verbally expressed

when an order for a production of sinetron series designates that it is for Class B, he will automatically have in mind an audience of housewives

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and blue-collar workers such as maids, drivers, food vendors or low-level civil auxiliaries.

According to Putu Wijaya, sinetron for Class B audience often relies on simplicity at the expense of thinking and narrative aspects. In practice, this indicated linear plotting:

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less description of events in a story, very few flashbacks, and no multiple framing (Widodo, 2002). Stereotypical character of a person demonstrated visually through outfits, mimics, body parts, and gestures; events or characters were exaggerated to display conflicts and amazing enthusiastic expressions on exceptionally solid domestic issues. Clashes occurred between relatives or among people inside of a given social setting.

Class A consists of middle and upper-class families.

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This group of viewers classification would incorporate experts, high positioning civil servants, journalists and upper-scaled business people. The crowd is envisioned as more responsive to long talks on more complicated

matters, more disparaging of consistent **representation of reality**, ready to
139 comprehend **complex plotting, tolerant of less** obvious issue **solutions**,
keen to **artistic**

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manifestations and more educated. Putu Wijaya said when he gets a request for a Class A, he feels more liberated to express his tasteful innovativeness (Widodo, 2002). Sinetron makers frequently believe that Class B viewers won't be critical in looking at the rationale of sinetron's storyline. Viewers consider sinetron generally as exhibitions for excitement, which require not inexorably speak to reality. With regards to his "unreasonable" sinetron, Punjabi claims that he was not a merchandise of dreams, rather, of wishes. He said everybody yearns for an agreeable life. Believed that poor people must be sick of destitution; Punjabi decides to show extravagant autos, charming ways of life, delightful stars and pleasant houses. He asserts that his sinetron is well-known on the grounds that viewers have the capacity to recognize

themselves with characters and circumstances **in the sinetron. Viewers**
distinguish reality in **sinetron**

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as not quite the same as the

social reality in which they live. Sinetrons **are** seen **as a medium to** show
modernity and for viewers to connect with **themselves in** virtual reality to
feel **a high -class touch**

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(Widodo, 2002). However, Punjabi's notion of giving luxury and dreams to audience of middle-to- lower-class might be rejected by those who have different views about the taste of Indonesian audience, especially viewers of sinetron. According to Rachmah Ida, a media researcher at Airlangga University in Surabaya who has invested years examining and analyzing television viewers' responses to sinetron. She discovered the audience is entirely not the same as the one envisioned by the sinetron makers. She burned through

four months in a Surabaya Kampong **watching** ladies **watch sinetrons.**
She observed **viewers to be** profoundly reproachful **of the program and the**
characters. Their education had ceased **after** middle **school**, yet **their tastes**
were very refined. **They** regularly mocked **the** charm **and settings; for them the**
storyline was most critical, especially **if it related to their**

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reality (Graham, 2007) She added that middle-to-lower-class viewers are contemptuous of many stock characters in sinetron like the femme fatale, and the scheming mother-in-law. These type of viewers can't be fooled because such figures don't include in their day by day life. They giggled and sneered at a few circumstances that don't bode well, or out senseless. "The

audience isn't passive. It's critical of much of the fare. The women I
encountered saw most sinetrons as Jakarta-centric and unreal,"

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Rachmah Ida said, adding that television is important for many middle-to-lower Indonesians. Audience want television drama with stories that identify with the lives they lead. She found that most women in Kampong don't want the imaginary world constructed by men in the metropolis (Graham, 2007). 140 After persisting on television screens for 15 years, and along with the emergence of new themes, many Indonesian viewers fed up with stories about beautiful and rich people they watched every day. They found a liking in a new type of sinetrons which gave Islamic background in its storyline. A new trend, then emerged, Indonesian television drama evolved from rich and beautiful people in an urban depiction to representation

of daily lives full of humorous **moments and actors**

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whose appearance similar to ordinary people; Indonesian sinetron transformed from something that only offered dreams to something else that's more down-to-earth. According to Rachmah Ida, Indonesian sinetrons currently

tend to fall into four main categories. First, moral Muslims:

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this type of sinetron revolves around an easily angered individual goes astray to evil ways, however is safeguarded by relatives and considerate companions wearing all around squeezed hijab and

sarong who lead the crook **back to the mosque. Second, morbid**

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mysteries: superstition, black magic and

frightening, but imagined supernatural events; deceitful folk in serious discussion with the evil one; the resurrection of the dead; people transforming into animals. Third, broken families: insidious relatives and conspiring maids mix toxins and devise the destruction of the individual they abhor the most. Fourth, student crises: kid (with enormous car) meets attractive girl (with huge ambitions); kid loses the girl to spoiled opponent, girl apologizes as she understands the error (Graham, 2007). Manoj Punjabi

said that the most critical component in a religious sinetron was the script.

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He anticipated that religious sinetron would continue going solid over the next five years (Arditya, 2013). He said stories are not difficult to make, however the script and the dialog are hard since it sets the feeling of the sinetron. Punjabi said he hired scriptwriters who truly comprehend about Islam and television viewers, and those are elusive.

"We make the trends. It's not easy; we have to be consistent and persistent. We could make 10, 20 shows before being able to put on one successful show. Once we succeed, others will follow and the trend will roll" Manoj said

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(Arditya, 2013). Islamic sinetron is a phenomenon that has been around for almost 15 years. However, according to a program creator and media expert Maman Suherman, production houses utilize religion just as packaging so really there is nothing religious about the Islamic sinetron since the substance is practically not different to other mainstream sinetrons. He said sinetron frequently showed performing artists playing clerics or those who lived in pesantren (Islamic boarding school) yet the story still centered around: love, conflicts in family or the ludicrous portrayal of black-vs-white characters (Arditya, 2013). 141 Most television stations refer to rating reports in planning their new program or improving the running programs. Rating report, which represents the audience demand sometimes override the owner's influence in determining television content. For example, owner of Trans 7, Chairul Tanjung, once suggested that the station should maintain its popular talk show Hitam Putih (Black and White) in prime time. An account of the station's executive producer Mardatillah said it was Tanjung who requested that the show should be maintained since it was a unique and inspirational show (Mardatillah, personal communication, July 21, 2013). Hitam Putih featured a host Deddy Corbuzier who played up the puzzling and to some degree haughty

side of his stage persona with his

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unmistakable bare head, curved eyebrows, and all-dark garments (Emond, 2013).

Master illusionist Deddy Corbuzier managed to put his guests in the hot seat

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answering his questions that elicit frank and honest responses. The guests run the gamut from celebrities to common people who managed to resolve their past troubled life which brought a positive response from viewers who considered the show as inspirational. However, on January 16, 2014 - after three years on a television screen- the program should stop since it was unable to defy the declining rating and share. Responding to queries from his loyal viewers about the program terminates, Deddy Corbuzier wrote on his Facebook the following lines (D. Corbuzier, 2014):

"Namun kita semua tahu bahwa di saat ini yang dinikmati masyarakat jauh dari hal-hal inspiratif.. Sehingga pasti acara seperti ini akan kehilangan share dan rating, karena share berada di tangan masyarakat majemuk..Kami tidak menyalahkan siapapun.. Inilah dunia TV dan Masyarakat. Dan kami pun saat ini menyerah.... Bukan untuk binasa namun utk berpikir dan berkarya lagi..Kami tidak bisa mengikuti arus dan kami berpegang pada hati... Maaf bila saya mengejutkan jutaan pemirsa dengan mengkahiri acara Hitam Putih,"

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(As we may know at the present time what people enjoy is far from inspiring things. So program like this would lose its share and ratings, because share is in the hand of diversified people. We don't blame anyone. It is the television world and society. And we give in now... Not to die, but to think and to create again. We can't go against the flow and we stick to the heart... Sorry if I have to surprise million of viewers by terminating Hitam Putih show). Deddy said the station management of Trans 7 actually still gave him the opportunity to continue running the show, but only on weekends (Saturday and Sunday) from previously daily. However, he opted not to continue the program despite mounting requests from loyal viewers who

pread for the community of the talk-show. Deby said he was unable to go against Indonesian television program mainstream or duplicating other popular program at the expense of the program's educational and inspirational values. According to Yanuar Nugroho --a media expert from University of Manchester, who conducted research on Indonesian media recently (et al., 2012)--, there is a tendency television station to emulate the highest-rated programs, resulting in duplication of television programs. He said the media clearly have a tendency to work

on the desire of manufacturing people and after that claiming that the

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desire represent general population's need. That is the manner by which the media shape people's taste and enthusiasm in many issues. To put it plainly, the media business has turned out to be

more a profit-oriented industry than a public medium

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(Nugroho, et al., 2012). As indicated by Rachmah Ida, sinetron – in every its form – had gotten to be trapped into seeking profit motivation. She discovered the reiteration of similar, tiresome template in sinetron stories. She said

private TV stations tend to play safe by

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remaking previous popular program or duplicating other successful program from other stations with a specific end goal to minimize their risks and uncertainties as opposed to having the strength to present option or new programming (Graham, 2007). Uni Lubis, the chief editor of ANTV, said the trend of copying other successful television programs was motivated by commercial concerns. The television business relies on upon advertisers and advertisers rely on the rating of a program ("Warnings over," 2013). She said stations depend on the Nielsen research agency to find out the ratings of their shows. She recalled that her television management policy of audience segment-based selection had very nearly disposed of her news program. She said the management of ANTV once proposed that the station's news program went off the air, in light of the fact that in view of a survey, the lion's share of the station's audience were female, and they expected that women didn't have to watch news programs on the grounds that they weren't sufficiently intelligent ("Warnings over," 2013). A media expert Ignatius Haryanto from Institute on Press Studies and Development said television programming just designate a little parcel of time for news, with the exception of in a news station. Yet, aside from that,

media content, including news, is moving towards commercialization, and sensation. Numerous essential public issues are being disregarded since they are less fascinating and less

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profitable. At last

it is about ratings; and ratings have debased public agenda and taste

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(Nugroho, 2012). Recent

research into the nation's television viewing habits has revealed most

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Indonesians like

to watch soap operas and reality shows

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more than any other programs. 143 However, the very same people consider

news and talk show programs to be the best in terms of education. In other word, the majority of Indonesian viewers still prefer to watch soap operas and reality shows,

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although they realize the two programs, lack of educational values ("The best programs on TV", 2009). Agus Sudibyo from the

Science, Aesthetics and Technology (SET) Foundation that involved in the

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research said that some audience consider news and talk shows as the most valuable program to watch, but the same audience still want to watch sinetron

and reality shows, which they themselves consider are low quality ("The 45

best programs", 2009) 55 Indonesian television viewing habit changes drastically during the month of Ramadan since more than 90 percent of Indonesia's 240 million people embrace Islam as their religion (Nielsen, 2010). Ramadan is the ninth month of the Muslim year, during which Muslims do not eat, drink or have sex during the day while it is light. Ramadan provides a hefty market for television stations to exploit. Television stations saw a significant increase in term of audience number

during the fasting month of Ramadan. A number of 397

television viewers were up by 21% compared to regular days, especially in the first half of fasting month. The biggest increase of 32% was seen among children (5-14 years). School holiday in the early fasting month seems to contribute to the additional child viewers. Meanwhile,

there was an increase of 18% in the number of female 356

15+ (above 15 years old) and male 15+ viewers (Nielsen, 2010). Television gained more audience in the period between 2 to 5 a.m in the morning -an estimated 8 times bigger than regular days- when Indonesian Muslims ate their meals in a late supper time before they fast during the day in the month of Ramadan (Nielsen, 2010). Islamic teachings recommended Muslims consumed their meals very early in the morning before fasting. This tradition is locally known as Sahur, regarded as a benefit that allows Muslims avoiding weakness caused by the fast. Children shown the most fantastic 17 times increase. TV also drew female 15+ viewers (above 15 years old) eleven-fold that of regular days and male 15+ viewers, which was six times bigger than regular days (Nielsen, 2010). The largest audience number ever existed was at the time right before and during fasting breaks (4 to 7 pm) since there was an extra 28% viewer watched television. The biggest contribution still came from children that increased 35%. On the contrary, during 55 The research findings were drawn from a survey conducted by SET Foundation. Some

220 respondents from across 11 major cities in Indonesia including 45
Jakarta, Bandung, Medan, Palembang

involved in this survey. The survey was

conducted between April 7 and April 13 45

2009. Majority of respondents (90%) who participated in the research were university graduates. See The Jakarta Post. tarawih –an extra prayer performed by Muslims, mostly at mosques, at between 7 to 9 p.m. during Ramadan– number of TV viewers was 5% lower than regular days. During the fasting month, a large number of Ramadan programs compete with each other to draw attention from the audience in a once-a-year program battles. National TV stations raised broadcast hour of their religious program to 115%, especially during the first half month of Ramadan, resulting in a total of almost 190 broadcast hours. At fasting break times, the additional broadcast hour was obviously seen, from nothing in regular days to 42 hours. Broadcasters offer more entertaining programs at sahur time. The broadcast hour at Sahur increased 16 hours to 79 hours. Pushing entertainment broadcast hour jumped 221% to 158 hours.56 Audience's time spent watching on national TV was also growing 3 hours on average during Ramadan. At sahur time, audience watching time increased four hours in total, and an hour increase at a fasting break time. Children's watching time also showed the biggest increase, in line with the growth in number. Children spent six hours longer to watch TV which increased their watching time to 36 hours during the first half of fasting month. Meanwhile, female 15+ and male 15+ watched three hours longer to 39 hours and 33 hours consecutively. The sinetron along with slapstick comedy shows, sermons and Koran analysis sessions as well as religious music, were several programs that television stations offered to attract audience during the fasting month (Shahab, 2006). With more religious programs, TV viewers also spent more time to watch the programs. Audience spent 1.5 hours in total to watch religious program, or 55 minutes longer than regular days. One hour of which was spent during the fasting break. Though soap opera series and comedy broadcast hours did not increase as much as variety show or religious programs, both programs lead the top most watched programs at sahur and fasting break time in the first half month of Ramadhan (Nielsen, 2010).

5.1.4 The Influence of Regulators Throughout the course of authoritarian era, the government-controlled broadcast media were dominant in Indonesia. From the period of 1974 to 1998, radio and television were liable to strict control by Suharto's administration. Only state radio station, Radio 56 For example, in 2010, popular entertainment programs consisting of 75 hours of variety shows, e.g. Opera Van Java, New Star, Gado Gado Teamlo, Pesiar Sahur, etc, and 32 hours of comedy, e.g. Saatnya Kita Sahur, Sketsa, and Kolak Komedi Lawak. Republik Indonesia (RRI) was permitted to air news programs. Consistently it broadcasts news programs and it is mandatory for every single other station to relay them. From 1989 to 1995, the government allowed the opening of private television stations and the larger part of

those stations' shares were controlled **by** the family of **President Suharto** **and**

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his internal circle; henceforth the

content of telecasts **was controlled in** accordance **with their interests**

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(Combine Resource Institution, 2009). In the era of democracy, regulators control media content and, as explained in Chapter two, a media regulator could be an independent body or a

government agency responsible for exercising autonomous authority **over**

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media activities

in a regulatory or supervisory capacity. An independent media regulator **is a regulatory agency that is independent from other branches or arms of the government. In** countries where **the**

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media are largely privately owned like in Indonesia, the media are free to operate within the limits of the law, so regulators' controls are exerted through various regulations while in countries where the media are primarily government owned, control is exerted through media financing. This part of research focuses on how regulators influence television content during Indonesia post-authoritarian era through laws and regulations, and how television workers adapt their content to demands of laws and regulation. The Indonesian broadcast industry is currently regulated by the 2002 Broadcasting Law that outlines the functions of the

Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) as an independent regulatory **body. The**

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law stated that... The KPI has the authorities to set a standard of broadcast programs; set regulations and guidance of broadcasting ethical; supervise the implementation of regulations and guidance as well as the standard of broadcast programs; give sanctions to those who violate the regulations and guidance as well as the standard of broadcast programs; coordinate and/or cooperate with the government, broadcast institutions, and the people.⁵⁷ Therefore, KPI has formulated and set the Guidance of Broadcasting Ethics and Broadcast Program Standard (P3SPS). This is a standard guide for broadcasting in Indonesia. ⁵⁷ Translation of broadcasting law by KPI; see The Indonesia Broadcasting Commission. Retrieved from www.kpi.go.id/download/2012_KPI_engprofil.pdf According to KPI, "P3SPS is a parameter of what may and may not be broadcast, not to reduce the freedom of the press; instead to dignify broadcast content as not everything is worth broadcast and presented to the public." (KPI, 2012). Television workers interviewed throughout this research said the KPI was quite influential in shaping the program content. They said the broadcasting commission constantly monitored television content and -in case the content breached broadcasting ethics and laws- gave a reprimand letter to the station concerned. After being warned several times and no corrections have been made by the stations, the KPI has the power to halt television programs. Television workers who worked at two television stations under Trans Corp

(Trans TV and Trans 7) owned by businessman **Chairul**

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Tandjung said KPI played important role in shaping their program content. Mardhatillah, an Executive Producer at television station Trans 7 said the KPI banned her popular talk-show program Empat Mata (face-to-face) in 2008. According to the KPI, Empat Mata had breached several guidelines. KPI considered the program's host, a comedian Tukul Arwana, was disrespectful and exploitative toward female guests. The host often touched, groped and kissed cheek to cheek his female guests, such manners considered very impolite and inappropriate. In Indonesia, when female friends meet, they often greet each other by kissing cheek to cheek, but not male to his female friend as demonstrated by Tukul Arwana. But the ultimate mistake made by the program presented Sumanto as a guest. The infamous Sumanto was jailed for five years for stealing and literally eating the corpse of an old woman in 2003, and he was released in 2006. During the television show, Sumanto demonstrated how he ate a living frog, such act sparked public protests prompting KPI to halt the show for a month. However, after a short-live ban, the Empat Mata show subsequently resumed broadcast under a new name Bukan Empat Mata, adding a new word into the program's name "bukan" being the Indonesian word for "not". After several warnings from KPI, Empat Mata changed significantly in the way the host presented the show among others: no kissing cheeks and no vulgar jokes. Informants at Trans TV interviewed during this research reported that the station received another warning letter from KPI for airing a program called Super Trap, a weekly prank show, which the commission deemed as intruding into people's privacy. In one episode of the show, which was broadcast on November 25, 2012, Super Trap demonstrated a section in which unconscious people were deceived into

utilizing a public toilet outfitted with concealed cameras. Once an unaware victim was inside it and utilized the personal facility, the toilet walls caved in and uncovered the baffled and humiliated individual inside. As opposed to creating giggles, the trap drew anger and numerous tirades from the audience. KPI said in a statement it had received hundreds of complaints from audience soon after the Super Trap show, and the commission ordered the station to air a public apology. KPI stated that Trans TV had violated Broadcasting Guidelines and Program Standards, which oblige TV to keep up politeness and good manners in their content. The KPI also asserted that Trans TV had encroached individual privacy protection by installing hidden cameras in a public toilet. In response to KPI's warning, Trans TV said it would evaluate its prank show in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future. "Evaluation will be made to improve the show" the station said. Responding to the KPI's reprimand, Trans TV made a public apology by airing announcements in the form of running text in the station's programs. The channel also runs the same text during the next show of Super Trap episode. However, despite public outcry criticizing Super Trap, the station did not terminate the program. "The criticism means that the program is watched by a lot of people," a spokesman with the station said ("Commission reprimands," 2012). Television workers at Trans TV interviewed during this research reported that Super Trap and Empat Mata were two programs among several other programs which were rebuked by the KPI due to indecent content. KPI previously warned Trans TV for running a program called Reportase Investigasi (Investigative Reportage). In one episode, the program showed in detail how to blend illicit drugs when most youngsters could be expected to be viewing the program. The commission reproached the station once again for its program entitled Sexophone which KPI described as "the promotion of excessive sexuality". For Trans TV, the regulator was perhaps the most important influence on its program content. Television workers at the station frequently changed their program content because of the streams of warning letters it received from the media watchdog. KPI said in its reports that Trans TV in 2012 topped the list of televisions violating broadcasting regulations and norms (KPI, 2012). Recently in September 2013, the station's cooking program also got a rebuke from KPI since the host, a 148 sexy celebrity chef Farah Quinn, wearing clothing that was considered exposing the upper part of her body. The KPI said in a statement that on July 28, 2013 Farah Quinn was wearing clothing that was somewhat showing her mid-section body, therefore plainly revealing the host's breast zone during the entire program (KPI, 2013). Following the warning, the television improved the program content, especially with regard to the outfits worn by the host. At another television station, Dian Purba, Executive Producer at SCTV, said that she was frequently reprimanded by the KPI because her music program showing the female host who wore a very sexy outfit. She said (D. Purba, personal communication, September 12, 2013): "Sering (ditegur), dulu ketika memegang Inbox pernah juga namun sifatnya teguran halus pada saat itu dikarenakan kostum host terlalu minim". (I was warned frequently, when I was still supervising the Inbox (program), but I think it was just a mild warning because the host's outfit was too open). Television workers at RCTI said KPI suspended the station's entertainment news program (infotainment) Silet in December 2010 for violating the Broadcasting Law. The commission even reported RCTI's president director Hary Tanoesoedibjo to the National Police saying Hary, as the person responsible for the content of the station's programs, had dispersed false and misleading information through the gossip program Silet. Following a volcanic eruption of mount Merapi in central Java in October 2010 killing more than 100 lives, the program reported on Sunday of possible another tragedy the next day in the nearby city of Yogyakarta. Based on a fortune teller's prediction, the program's host Fenny Rose, reported the volcano was expected to erupt with even greater intensity. The reports sparked unrest among those already affected by Merapi's eruptions and the inhabitants of Yogyakarta. Many people lodged complaints to KPI regarding Silet's content on likely greater eruptions of Merapi volcano in central Java. For some Javanese, the 3,000-meter high peak is an essential symbol in their traditional supernatural quality and cosmology, particularly for inhabitants of Yogyakarta. The city is regularly thought to be at the heart of Javanese society and culture. 149 Following public complaints on Silet, KPI suspended the program and ordered the station to take the program off the air until after the volcano's status of alert had been in downgraded to the safe level. Nevertheless, RCTI continued to air new infotainment show called Intens to supplant Silet. While the program had an alternate name and presenter, it had the same content with Silet. The airing of new program pushed KPI to strike back by filing a police report against the station on November 17, in an attempt to briefly renounce the station's permit for supposedly disobeying the suspension order. RCTI took the case to the State Administrative Court On Nov. 29. The station asked for the judges to cross out the suspension imposed by the commission. The court ruled in favor of RCTI after four months of hearings, referring to procedural oversights in the decision of KPI to force a suspension. Silet returned to RCTI on Feb. 25, 2011 including the same presenter, Fenny Rose. The show persisted on RCTI several years after the controversial case. Workers at a television station Indosiar reported that the station halted the emission of its Islamic drama series Sembilan Wali (Nine Propagators of Islam) in August 2012. KPI instructed Indosiar to stop Sembilan Wali because the program has offended people in Bali island whose inhabitants were mostly Hindus. Sembilan Wali's content was about the lives of nine Muslim propagators who spread Islam in Java during 14th and 15th centuries. The story was set during the period when Islam was first introduced in Indonesia's most populous island, which at the time was under the reign of Majapahit, a Hindu kingdom. The program portrayed the Muslim propagators as good people, while Hindus from the Majapahit Kingdom as evil. Horrific scenes of conflicts between Muslims and Hindus were added into the plot in order to spice up and exaggerate the story. The program was broadcast by Indosiar in observance of the Ramadan fasting month, and the station confided to televise the program because it had been approved by the Film Censorship Body (LSF). Following the emission of the program, dozens of Hindu students in Bali expressed their disagreement with the content. The program also sparked protests from Hindus elsewhere. Criticism was also voiced by scholars and historians, who said that the series was not based on historical fact. They said the story has the potential to create interfaith disharmony. KPI demanded Indosiar to stop the program amid Balinese public outcry prompting the station to change its program list and schedule. The station replaced Sembilan Wali with another program. Indosiar also apologized to all the Balinese. Apart from the above cases involving KPI intervention on television content, the commission constantly sent warning letters to most television stations due to various violations. Television workers at RCTI also reported that the station changed the content of

150 another program Dibayar Lunas (Paid in Cash) following RCTI's warning in June 2009 on the use of foul language and the exploitation of the poor. In the warning letters, KPI demanded RCTI to moderate the program content or have the programs taken off the air. Dibayar Lunas was a television reality show that features people who cannot afford to pay their debts, despite their efforts to earn money. A team from the show looks for donors, and then the team brings the cash from donors to the indebted participants. RCTI aired the show every Saturday and Sunday at 5:30 p.m. Along with Dibayar Lunas, several reality shows on other stations were also warned of the use of foul language and the exploitation of the poor.⁵⁸ Television workers said comedy shows on several stations were also reprimanded. They said KPI warned broadcasters because their programs showed vulgar and sexually suggestive content, or

featured a scene where a woman is sexually harassed,

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as well as

violence and blood and sensual looking women, in addition to close ups of women's body parts.

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The programs also showed domestic violence—for example, a program called

Suami-suami Takut Istri (Husbands afraid of Wives) showed wives hurted their spouses, and

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involved youngsters in a shameful setting. A few contents have exploited abnormal physical attributes of their talents by featuring dwarfs

and a woman with protruding front teeth. KPI said

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none of the content ought to be broadcast when kids might reasonably be expected to be staring at television. KPI's monitoring of television content increased when audience in the world's largest Muslim country intensify their worship, devotion and spiritual reflection during Ramadan, the holy Islamic fasting month. Throughout the time of Ramadan, prior to the first light of the day, Muslims in Indonesia wake up from their profound rest for a pre-sunrise meal, known as sahur, and they will stop doing their works for buka puasa or fast-breaking. As families flock for sahur or buka puasa and fill their stomach, televisions are also ready with programs to fill their view. During these two prime times, television stations broadcast special Ramadan shows. ⁵⁸ This including Termehek-Mehek ("Crying Out Loud") and "Orang Ke-3 ("Third Person") on Trans TV, and "Face to Face" on ANTV. While televisions are expected to honor the holiness of Ramadan by airing decent programs, every year KPI reprimanded television stations for programs deemed unsuitable for the holy month of Ramadan. Some stations broadcast religious programs, but more stations do their best to collect extra incomes by broadcast entertainment programs such as comedy, variety shows, and soap operas (sinetron) which considered not in line with the spirit of Ramadan. In 2012, there were only two Islamic programs Tafsir Al Misbah (The Light of the Qur'an) which features a renowned cleric Quraish Shihab on Metro TV and a television series that aired in many countries Omar on MNC TV. Apart from the two programs, according to the broadcasting commission, many television stations broadcast programs that didn't reflect the spirit of Ramadan and most of them violated the standard rules of broadcasting. In 2012, after monitoring television shows during Ramadan, particularly comedies televised by the stations during dawn or dusk, the KPI found some violations made by the broadcasters. The KPI said the violations encompassed showing verbal and physical violence against individuals with handicaps and dissimilar sexual orientation; showing programs unsuitable for minors; showing comedians and actors verbally abused each other and exchanged sexually themed jokes. The broadcast watchdog said the shows are generally aired during fast-breaking and pre-sunrise suppers, which implies that young children in Muslim families could likewise watch them. The findings prompted the commission to impose sanctions on several programs for various violations, including Trans TV's Waktunya Kita Sahur and Ngabuburit and SCTV's Sabarr, RCTI's Kampung Sahur Bejo. Meanwhile, Indonesian religious leaders called for the boycott of Ramadan television shows that used bawdy humor or foul language. The Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI) said these comedy shows contorted the true meaning of the holy month. Television workers interviewed for this research said sanctions imposed by KPI in 2012 had put pressure on some stations to cut down its vulgar comedy shows in the following year's Ramadan programming. For example, RCTI chose to drop the two-hour variety comedy show Kampung Sahur Bejo from its day break programs and replaced it instead with a light religious drama Anak-anak Manusia (Children of Man) about daily life. With regard to comedy, the station only aired a 15-minute comedy sketch in Ramadan 2013. Trans TV also scrapped its comedy program Ngabuburit (Waiting for breaking the fast) following KPI's sanction on the program in 2012, leaving only one comedy show during Ramadan 2013. As a substitution, Trans TV was showing a program about Islam knowledge 152 Cahaya Timur (Eastern Light) and a news-documentary about an inspiring Indonesian Muslim lady 'Khadijah' (Arditya, 2013). SCTV was likewise discontinuing its musical comedy Sabarr which was also reviled by the KPI. SCTV is staying with its high-rating Ramadan show, Para Pencari Tuhan (God Seekers), an Islamic sinetron, which is entering its seventh season in 2013 (Arditya, 2013). Although most broadcasters accepted their mistake, some of them complained about the reprimand they have received from KPI since the commission's argument about the violation was sometimes confusing and hard to accept. They said KPI had a different way in viewing whether or not the program content violated the guidance of

broadcasting ethics and program standard. Executive Producer at Trans TV, Zudaris Elira, said in an interview that she was once summoned by KPI because a segment of her program, according to the commission, revealed impolite manners while on the contrary she thought there was no wrong with the program content. Zudaris Elira said (personal communication, July 23, 2013) : "Pada suatu ketika ada wawancara yang menurut KPI (ada perkataan yang) kurang sopan, sedangkan menurut kami perkataan tersebut masih dalam hal yang wajar. Sehingga saya dipanggil ke KPI" (On one occasion, there was an interview program that KPI considered the remarks as impolite; on contrary we considered the remarks were still normal. I was summoned by KPI). A television producer said the KPI sometimes invited broadcasters to discuss television programs which were still in planning or production process. The objective of the discussion with the KPI was to make sure that the program won't breach broadcasting ethics once it was broadcast. The seemingly intervention of the KPI on content, even at the initial production stage, was accepted by some broadcasters in an attempt to gain a guarantee that there will be no warnings again for them to change the program content when the program had gone on air. According to Cornel Pangaribuan, a producer at SCTV, he was once invited by KPI to discuss his new program while it was still in the production process. Pangaribuan said in an interview that he accepted the idea due to concerns of possible reprimand and program change in the future. He explained (C. Pangaribuan, personal communication, August 8, 2013): Kita diajak berkomunikasi atau diajak share agar program yang akan kita tawarkan atau dalam produksi itu tidak menyimpang dari keputusan- keputusan yang diberikan KPI. Kita diajak share biar nanti setelah tayang atau sebelum produksi tidak menyimpang dari hal-hal yang sudah diputuskan KPI atau Komisi Penyiaran. Kalau kita sudah berkoordinasi dan share dengan pihak KPI artinya program kita tidak mungkin akan diubah. Jadi kita membuat program dari awal, hal-hal apa saja yang boleh dan hal-hal apa saja yang tidak boleh jadi kita tidak mengubah lagi dalam hal konsep dan pembuatan teknisnya (We were invited to communicate or share the idea [with the KPI] in order the program, which was still in production stage, won't violate KPI's decisions. We were sharing, in order the program won't breach the regulation of broadcasting commission whenever it goes on air. After coordination and sharing with the KPI, our program won't be changed. So from the beginning, we determined which things were allowed and not allowed, so there will be no more change in the concept and its technical production). The KPI has issued hundreds reprimands so far to different broadcasters over television programs, commercials and news programs, deemed to have breached programming standards and the broadcasting code of conduct. Some of the reprimands were issued based on prior public complaints received by the commission. The increase in public complaints either shows that the media audience has become more critical about what constitutes good programming, or that the broadcast content is getting worse. Broadcasters' ambitions to pursue the highest rating possible and unprofessional reporting seem to remain barriers to television quality and ethical programs.

5.1.5 The Influence of Politicians Politicians were attracted to television because of its ability to simultaneously communicate with millions of people. The media are instruments for politicians to sell their idea and image to achieve their political goal. Politicians need to appear in the media to introduce their political platform and to be recalled by the voter audience at the time they cast ballots on Election Day. However the relationship between media and politicians is not one- sided. The interplay between them is based on a mutual need. The media need politicians because they may attract voter audience who wants to know authority figures or those who will represent them in the legislative bodies. Since

mass media became key instruments in producing and circulating political symbolism,

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no wonder politicians became enmeshed with the mass media. Television workers who were interviewed for this research said that politicians played important role in shaping the program content, and the relationship between politicians and their media intensified during a political campaign ahead of the election. The following descriptions are highlights of politicians and television relationship at the times when four elections held during the post-authoritarian era in Indonesia in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014.

5.1.5.1 Political influence in the 1999 Election Since the downfall of Indonesian last authoritarian ruler in May 1998, his successor President B.J. Habibie, held an election on 7 June 1999, the first general

election after the fall of Suharto regime. The election

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was held to select the new member of parliaments with some 48 political parties participated. Under the former constitution, it was the parliament that elected a president. Abdurrahman Wahid, from the National Awakening Party, the fourth largest party in parliament, was elected president while Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose party the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle reaped the largest vote, became Vice-President. The Golkar Party, the former ruling party

under Suharto's New Order regime (1966- 1998)

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and the brief presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) came second in the 1999 election, despite alleged support from several television stations. During the New Order era, Golkar backed previous government of president Suharto, winning greater votes in six consecutive election races. On the other hand, in 1999, Golkar was censured because the party was considered one of the main proponents of the authoritarian regime. Television coverage during the 1999 elections was considered unfair and partial since the reporting only favored Golkar Party. Throughout these early reform days most television stations continued to support Golkar. Private televisions that were broadcast in 1999 were considered impartial while state television TVRI acted very obviously as a pro - Golkar channel (Tomsa, 2008). A research on television coverage during the

1999 election conducted by a non-profit

non-governmental organization The Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information (ISAI)

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described its findings on television reportage during the 1999 election with the following remarks (Saptono, 2005). Pemantauan yang dilakukan menunjukkan, liputan-liputan media televisi sangat menguntungkan partai Golkar. Kegiatan-kegiatan Partai Golkar mendapatkan liputan paling tinggi diantara partai lain. Narasumber dari partai Golkar atau yang bersimpati kepadanya juga mendapatkan porsi kutipan yang jauh lebih besar daripada narasumber yang kritis terhadap Golkar. Bertolak belakang dengan opini yang berkembang, media televisi menampilkan citra Golkar sebagai partai yang toleran, cinta damai, serta partai yang pro reformasi dan menolak keberadaan status quo. (Monitoring showed television coverage gave much advantage to Golkar party. The activities of Golkar party received the largest coverage compared with other parties. Sources from Golkar party or from those who were sympathetic with it were quoted in much larger proportion compared to those who were critical of it. On contrary to the lingering public opinion, television displayed Golkar party with image of tolerant, peaceful, reformist and anti-status quo) The unfair coverage of the 1999 election from several televisions was almost not surprising since they were still under the influence of Suharto's companions,

and most of them still maintained direct or indirect links to Golkar.

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Even though the Suharto regime had fallen out in 1998, the

uncertainty about the future of Indonesia's transition obviously

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pushed television owners to remain loyal to the party they had backed up for so many years. Two private televisions, ANTV and Indosiar, for example, belonged to Bakrie Group and Salim Group respectively. These two business empires had very close links to the Suharto clan. Another big television SCTV was controlled by Suharto's cousin Sudwikatmono who held

major shareholders. TPI was owned by

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Siti Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana (popularly known as mbak Tutut), Suharto's

oldest daughter and former Golkar Chairperson.

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Last but not least,

a company owned by Suharto's son and former Golkar dignitary Bambang Trihatmodjo

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control RCTI, the oldest private television in Indonesia (Tomsa, 2008). For the television executives, Golkar was

still regarded as better suited to defend their interests

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and those who inherited prosperity from the New Order regime. For example, former RCTI's deputy chief editor, Desi Anwar, said the news division couldn't be completely autonomous, particularly in the

New Order era. "We could not be 100 percent independent. We should consider who owns the station... who owns the shares," Desi said, referring to the relatives of former president

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Suharto ("RCTI editorial staff", 1999). In the wake of the 1999 election, Desi Anwar and other executives in RCTI's editorial board, including chief editor Chrys Kelana and his other deputy Adolf Posuma, were protested by RCTI's employees, mostly their subordinates. In the spirit of democratization after the fall of former president Suharto, at least 41 employees of RCTI's editorial department threatened to go on strike if the department's three head editors did not resign. The employees urged the three members of editorial board to resign on the grounds that the three were viewed as incompetence at doing their employments. The

employees submitted to the management a no-confidence petition against the three

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members. They urged the management to audit the editors since they were viewed as unequipped for creating a favorable workplace. The editors were thought to be unequipped for directing an autonomous and ethical news department since they were very pro-Golkar. However, journalists from SCTV and ANTV denied the allegations that their television stations were not impartial. They also declined accusations that their station supported Golkar in the 1999 election. They said journalists who worked at the three television stations were not under pressure from media owners to take sides on certain political parties. Johnny Arman, a former news producer at ANTV, a television station owned by the Bakrie family, said (personal communication, July 7, 2013): Sepengetahuan saya, kami tidak berpihak. Kita tidak berada di bawah tekanan untuk berpihak pada satu partai politik tertentu. Pada masa saya, saya tidak merasakan adanya tekanan itu. Saya merasa Redaksi sangat bebas untuk membuat berita apapun. Setahu saya liputan kami cukup berimbang. (As far as I know, we were not partisan. We were not under pressure to take sides on certain political parties. In my era, I didn't feel pressure. I felt editorial board was independent to make any stories. As far as I know, our news coverage was quite balanced) Syaiful Halim, a senior news producer at SCTV, said in an interview, his television didn't set an agenda from the beginning to support Golkar. He said SCTV seemed to give more coverage on Golkar because the party held more campaign events that can be reported compared to other political parties with less campaign activities (S. Halim, personal communication, March 24, 2013). Golkar was the most established, the most experienced, and even the most well financed political parties in the 1999 election, which allowed the party to creatively conduct various campaigns and received more media coverage. He said media tended to pay more attention to political parties with more political spectacles because there were more events to report and, moreover, Indonesian journalists used to receive gifts from those who invited them, including political party, to cover their events in a news story. Syaiful Halim added that owners of SCTV, Henry Pribadi and Sudwikatmono, two businessmen who had close links with Suharto's family, once reprimanded SCTV's chief editor, Riza Primadi because of his unfavorable news coverage on Golkar. According to Syaiful Halim, judging from SCTV's news stories ahead of the 1999 election, Riza Primadi seemed to support the

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) led by Megawati Sukarnoputri

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who became opposed to the New Order Government. "Ahead of the 1999 election, Riza was reprimanded by the television owners because he was too harsh toward Golkar," Syaiful Halim said, adding that SCTV has been no longer critical toward Golkar ever since, while the station gave ample publicity for Golkar's political campaigns (S. Halim, personal communication, March 24, 2013). However, despite support from televisions, Golkar showed poor performance in the

1999 general elections, coming second after the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).

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The former ruling party secured only 24 percent of overall votes compared to 74 percent when the party showed its best performance in the 1992 elections.59 5.1.5.2 Political influence in the 2004 Election Direct election

of the President and Vice President became imminent in Indonesia following the amendments of the

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constitution, and the influence of politicians reached its unprecedented level in 2004 when the country's first-ever direct presidential election were held in post-authoritarian era. For this reason, this research about the relationship between politicians and media, especially television, pays its attention mostly during the time of the election either legislative or presidential. During important political events like election, politicians frequently used cultural symbols, especially popular culture, to attract voters' attention and win their heart. Television played very important role in combining the worlds of popular culture and politics. However, it is also important to understand the politician-television relationship during the non-election periods. This research shows how politicians played their role in utilizing media, and how media in turn used politicians for their advantages during the post authoritarian era. A significant part of the election race occurred in television media, in party messages and advertisements as well as talk shows and entertainment programs (Lindsay, 2005). During the campaign period politics and popular culture blended more perfectly than ever before where the role of television was central to this process. The blend between popular culture and politics has never been as intense as it is in the period of presidential campaigns when Indonesian people for the first time had a chance to select directly their new leaders. The public saw something new during the 2004 election, especially in legislative ballots, a noticeable rise in the participation of artists in politics. They had been well known 59 It was clear Indonesian voters got fed up with Golkar. Another reason for Golkar's lost in 1999 election because of its loyal supporters, the

armed forces (ABRI) and the bureaucracy (Civil servants),

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had been removed from the party's membership immediately after the

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downfall of

Suharto and the New Order government in 1998. See Azwar, R.C. (2009).

Politik Komunikasi Partai Golkar di Tiga Era (Communication Politics of Golkar Party under Three Different Leaderships),

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Grasindo. Also see Razak, I (2009, April 19).

An insider's look at Golkar's ups and downs (2009, April 19). **The Jakarta Post.**

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Retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/>

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to Indonesian audiences through their performance on televisions, and in April 2004 they saw the artists stood as legislative candidates. Media enthusiasm for candidates who were artists was high and they became the center of media attention for their political position. For instance, television programs like "Topik Minggu Ini" on SCTV talked with candidates who were popular artist, and viewers then phoned in their "vote". In the July 2004 presidential campaign, there were five teams of personages

in the first round of presidential elections:

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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla; Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi; Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo; Wiranto and

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Salahuddin Wahid and;

Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar. Televisions **were**

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eagerly reporting artists' choices of presidential candidates, especially for infotainment programs. On the other side, the artist-turned-politicians also strived for appearing on television screens to show their support for their favored candidates. Infotainment programs on many private televisions chased the most recent news of celebrities pronouncing their backing on certain candidates. On 19 June 2004, Indosiar aired the Grand Final of a national talent show Akademi Fantasi Indonesia (AFI). Based on Mexican La Academia, the popular television program allowed audience members to vote for their favorite singer. Presidential candidates Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Wiranto attended and performed during the show as special guests. They showed the audiences their skills in singing songs. After they were performing, a group of three commentators offered their remarks on the appearance of their politically-important guests. They were treated in the same way as other contestants. SCTV aired a talk-show with a panel of celebrities contending their backing for presidential candidates, the show format of which was like the previous SCTV program when artists turned legislative candidates were interviewed. The station likewise telecasts celebrities debate held as a public event at a bistro in Jakarta (Lindsay, 2005). Metro TV broadcast a program "Tribute to Indonesia" on July 4, less than 12 hours prior to the polls opening. The program pledged to present all the presidential and vice presidential candidates. Six contenders consented to participate in the show. At the end of their exhausting campaign all contenders came to the show, where they were requested to perform, sing and tell stories about themselves. In 2004, there were 24 political parties which competed with each other for voters' attention, allowing televisions to enjoy more revenues from political advertisements. For example, the presidential candidate Megawati, who was incumbent at that time and her

political party, The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P),

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was reportedly spent around 50 billion rupiah (US\$5.5 million) for television political advertisements (Sumarkidjo, 159 2011). Commenting on political party's expenditure during the 2004 campaigns, former RCTI's Deputy Chief Editor Atmadji Sumarkidjo (personal communication, August, 20, 2013) said : Menjelang Pemilihan Presiden 2004, stasiun-stasiun televisi semakin menikmati porsi iklan

dari para calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden yang

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bersaing...Stasiun-stasiun televisi berlomba-lomba untuk dapat melakukan talk-show eksklusif dengan para calon presiden dan calon wakil presiden. (Ahead of the presidential election in 2004, television stations were enjoying a lot more of advertisements from the competing presidential and vice presidential candidates. Television stations were vying to hold exclusive talk- shows with the presidential and vice presidential candidates). Politicians devised a strategy for launching their campaign programs on television. They didn't

rely merely on the so-second spot advertisements to promote themselves and their political parties, politicians wanted more exposure to televisions by buying special time, known as "blocking time" for their campaigns. In the blocking time contract -much more expensive than regular advertisement- television helps politicians, on their request, to create their own program, for example special talk shows or others, or use the existing television program to be dedicated for campaigning of politicians who paid for their appearance in the program. In this regard, Sumarkidjo (personal communication, August, 20, 2013) said: Iklan yang dipasang tentunya tidak cukup karena itu dikenal juga istilah blocking time, jam siaran tertentu yang dibeli untuk kepentingan si pembeli. Jam siaran yang dibeli bervariasi antara 30 menit sampai 60 menit biasanya diselubungi dengan bentuk talk show dan disertai pesan-pesan sponsor terselip di dalamnya. Selain itu para Capres juga rajin hadir dalam berbagai acara di televisi mulai dari talk-show bernafas keagamaan yang populer yang dipandu da'i kondang Aa Gym di stasiun RCTI hingga acara show musik seperti Indonesian Idol atau AFI. (Advertisements only were not enough, so blocking time was also recognized; certain air time was bought for the interest of the buyer. The purchased air time was varied between 30 to 60 minutes normally in the guise of talk-show format where messages from the sponsors were set in the program. Apart from that, the presidential candidates were also persistent in showing up in various television programs, starting from a popular religious talk-shows hosted by the famous preacher Aa Gym in RCTI up to music programs like Indonesian Idol or AFI) Contrary to blocking programs where politicians spent a large amount of money to buy air time, televisions sporadically invited politicians to join political talk-show programs for almost free of charge. Televisions pampered politicians by giving them adequate air time in an interview program during the 2004 campaigns period, and the electronic media even vied with each other to have exclusive interviews with each individual candidate who took advantage of televisions' enthusiasm in exposing voluntarily the candidates to their audience. On the whole, the television coverage during the 2004 elections was considered fair and impartial, both for the General and Presidential Elections. On contrary to the 1999 election, all political parties were covered in most of the televisions. According to the

European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) which was invited by the

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Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU) to observe the 2004 Elections in Indonesia, the tone dedicated to political parties and news distribution throughout the election was fair, reasonable and nonpartisan. Sissener (2004) who wrote a report on behalf of EU EOM said

For the General Elections, the EU EOM assessed that the media coverage of the political parties during the elections was fair and impartial. All 24 parties were covered in most of the electronic and print media monitored by the EU EOM. The tone devoted to political parties and distribution of news was fair and neutral. All in all, the

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contending candidates were seen as being provided with opportunities to share their vision, mission and working programs with the public

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(p22) According to EU EOM, only Metro TV performed the worst. The stations

received a warning from the Broadcasting Commission about too much advertising in supporting Surya Paloh (Golkar) and Megawati (PDI-P).

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Megawati led television coverage because

of her team' s capability to buy more advertising time.

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Broadcasters at Metro TV showed a reasonable inclination towards President Megawati in their news program. However, this bias considered to have restricted effect

on the voters due to the program's lower ratings.

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With everything considered, all

contending candidates were seen as being furnished with equivalent chances to share their vision, mission and working

14

programs (Sissener, 2004). Meanwhile, European Parliament (2004) authorised a delegation composed of

five members to observe the second

round of the presidential elections to be held in Indonesia

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on 20 September 2004. According to European Parliament, by and large the media assumed a positive role in spreading data about the candidates and all their electoral activities, and by highlighting conceivable campaign infringements. Private televisions, specifically SCTV and RCTI, gave more impartial access to the two competitors than the state channel, especially in news. In the weeks running up to the election races, Metro TV started to demonstrate a 161 predisposition for SBY, in contrast to the past round, when it favored Megawati (European Parliament, 2004, p9-10) A report by the

Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information (ISAI)

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that studied television news coverage during the 2004 election campaign revealed televisions' better performance in three genres: news feature, talk-show, and news bulletin (Saptono, 2005). ISAI said televisions were no longer megaphones or partisans of certain groups or political parties during the 2004 election especially with regard to a feature story, or a television news package containing journalistic report that covers a selected issue in-depth.⁶⁰ According to the media research organization, the television feature stories were not focusing any more on one political party or one pair of presidential or vice presidential candidates as the televisions did during the 1999 election. However, ISAI found the talk-show programs were mostly lacking in diversity of sources and content. The talk-shows tended to use similar and repeated topics, since they just followed the development of news trend while the same sources were used frequently in a road show, appearing on one television show to another. Pertaining to the news bulletin, televisions have a tendency to give priority to several large political parties by covering their campaign ceremonies, or reporting about their elite members with a tendency to sensationalize them. Despite being stigmatized as the

spoilt rulers' party after over 30 years of relationship with the then ruling New Order government,

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Golkar Party hit back to win the 2004 general election. The outcomes

of the legislative election indicated that the former president Soeharto's Golkar Party returned to power in the

62

parliament

with 128 of 550 seats. The triumph was an inversion of fortune for Golkar, which lost to the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in the 1999 elections, the first time it had been out of power since 1970.

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5.1.5.3 Political Influence in the 2009 Election The 2009 election campaign was characterized by entertainment more than political education and propaganda. Entertainment was the main engine for politicians to obtain people's attention. Traditional and modern genres of performance were deployed through various media, from a musical stage performance in kampongs to the fanfare of political entertainment on national televisions. Those performances were held by politicians to gather 60 On television newscasts, a news package is usually the longest type of storytelling. A package is a taped news report. Usually, the news presenter will read an introduction live, followed by the pre-recorded story. masses, to a greater extent than in previous elections. Of all the entertainment formats derived from television programs, Indonesian Idol was the one that appealed most to campaigners in the 2009 elections (Heryanto, 2010). However, despite the extravaganza of political entertainments on televisions, the election campaigns were considered successful and televisions displayed their fair role to all contestants. Without precedent for Indonesia's post-authoritarian time, the country had the opportunity to unbiasedly

rate the competence and capacities of the presidential candidates in a series of debates

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held in mid June 2009. Unlike 2004 election when televisions vied with each other to hold exclusive interviews with each individual presidential candidate; in the 2009 election, televisions worked together to broadcast the head-to-head presidential debates live throughout the country. Coordinated

by the General Elections Commission (KPU),

197

five private television stations owned by five media moguls worked together to organize the debates featuring all three presidential candidates –

Jusuf Kalla of the Golkar Party, Megawati Soekarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P),

128

and

incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party (PD).

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There were a total five debates, three for presidential candidates and two for vice presidential candidates. Trans TV kicked off the premier televised debate at its studio, which also broadcast on four other television stations: Metro TV, RCTI, SCTV, TV One. Commenting on the change, a media analyst and former RCTI's deputy chief editor, Atmadji Sumarkidjo said (personal communication, August 26, 2013): Apabila pada Pemilu 2004, stasiun-stasiun televisi berlomba-lomba untuk dapat melakukan talk-show eksklusif dengan para calon presiden dan calon wakil presiden; maka pada Pemilu 2009, talk-show dan debat publik para Capres itu diselenggarakan oleh Komisi Pemilihan Umum bekerjasama dengan seluruh stasiun televisi nasional dengan sistem TV pool (While in 2004 election, television stations were competing with each other to hold exclusive interviews with presidential and vice presidential candidates; so in 2009 election, talk-shows and public debates among the candidates were organized

by The General Elections Commission (KPU) in cooperation with all the

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national television station through a TV pool system) The TV pool system allowed each television station to act as a host in turn for the debate which was relayed by other television stations. Unlike the 2004 election, when every television conducted their own exclusive interviews, the pool system enabled every contestant to have an equal opportunity for television access. Learning from mistakes made during the first 2004 direct presidential election, KPI banned blocking time or any other form 163 of campaigns disguised in a television program during 2009 election. The advertisement was the only acceptable vehicle which politicians could use to deliver their messages during campaigns. Atmadji Sumarkidjo said that the 2004 direct presidential election was the first experience for Indonesians so the mistakes were understandable. Television watchdog, the National Broadcasting Commission (KPI), appreciated the cooperation shown by the five private televisions in promoting the 2009 election especially the successful presidential and vice presidential debates. KPI said the private stations had displayed their commitment to work together to broadcast the events in a bid to give a good political education to the public. KPI (2009) said in a statement:

KPI juga menilai TV telah menjadi lembaga yang paling besar peran dan pengaruhnya dalam proses sosialisasi dan opini selama kampanye capres berlangsung. Peran tersebut bisa berbentuk program yang dibuat masing-masing televisi, mulai pemberitaan, talkshow, dan lainnya. TV telah berperan besar dalam proses demokrasi di Indonesia dengan memindahkan konflik dari tataran masyarakat akar rumput (grass root) menjadi konflik yang lebih sehat di media. (KPI

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also judged that television had become an institution with the biggest role and influence in socialization process and opinions during the presidential campaigns. The role was implemented in various television programs starting from news programs, talk-shows and others. Television played its big role in democratization process in Indonesia by transferring conflict from the grass root level to conflicts in media which considered healthier) Media analysts considered most televisions had conducted a relatively fair coverage during the 2009 election campaigns both for the legislative and presidential election. They said televisions were able to keep their distance from political parties and presidential candidates. Atmadji Sumarkidjo said he didn't see televisions, through the reportage they made, blatantly expressed support or sympathy, to a certain candidate during the 2009 election. He observed that most television owners supported the incumbent presidential candidate, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), however, they managed not to intervene in stations' news policy, allowing people in the news department to do their job quite independently. Atmadji Sumarkidjo added television owners supported the incumbent candidate because of his prospect for being reelected in 2009 election given good performance of his past government. Pilpres 2009, hampir semua pengusaha pemilik stasiun televisi mendukung SBY, tetapi tidak melalui pemberitaan melainkan dengan berbagai cara lain seperti memberikan kontribusi dana atau membantu acara kampanye [Sumarkidjo, personal communication, August 26, 2013] (The 2009 presidential election, most television owners supported SBY, but not through editorial policy, but through any other means like fund contributions or helping campaigns ceremonies) Television workers at two television stations owned by Chairul Tanjung, Trans TV and Trans 7, said the owner supported the incumbent candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (abbreviated as SBY) and his running mate Boediono before and during the 2009 presidential election. They said Chairul Tanjung showed his support to SBY-Boediono by providing popular artists when the couple addressed an election rally at Senayan stadium. Tanjung also broadcast the rally live through his two television channels. However, apart from this type of support, Tanjung didn't impose his will on journalists at his two televisions. He didn't demand the journalists for also supporting SBY-Boediono. Atmadji Sumarkidjo said the television coverage on 2009 election considered

relatively fair and neutral. The fairness and neutrality of television reportage could be seen from the lack of protests from the losing contestants with regard to the media fairness in covering the election campaigns. The losing contestants never accused televisions had taken the side of SBY-Boediono that allowed them to win the election. "Until the inauguration

of the elect President and Vice President in October 2009, there was

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no accusation from the losing candidates that accused media were impartial or treated them in an unfair way," Sumarkidjo said. On the whole, voters in Indonesia obtained the ample opportunity to access non-biased information thanks to the country's highly dynamic media landscape with almost a dozen national television channels covering the election, reporting on both the government and opposition parties. However, despite the general fairness and neutrality shown by most televisions during the 2009 election, Metro TV was the exception. The station was criticized for broadcasting too much coverage of its owner, Surya Paloh, and the Golkar Party, of which he was still the advisory board chairman. Metro TV was clearly favoring Surya Paloh and his party. During 2009 election, Metro TV with TV One reserved most programming time for the elections, branding the televisions as the 2009 election channel. Concerns loomed about the independence of the two televisions since both stations were owned by top members of the Golkar party; TV One owned by the Bakrie family and Metro TV by Surya Paloh. However the two businessmen were known to be bitter rivals who had vied with each other for the Golkar leadership (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010). Elman Saragih, Metro TV's editor-in-chief, said that his will to maintain independence was always alive and well, but in reality, 165 that was not always the case. "We keep trying to reduce the interference [from Surya Paloh] though it is not always that easy," Elman said in his defense ("Metro TV Criticized", 2009). He said in reality, there was almost no media organization that was free of special interests. However, he added, Metro TV did maintain impartiality toward other political figures. 5.1.5.4 Political Influence in the 2014 Elections Following the 2009 elections, Indonesian political life faced new development as media moguls, with their vibrant soul and powerful financial backup, prepared to vie with each other for political power ahead of the 2014 elections. Three of five media moguls who control 10 national television channels in Indonesia were elected as chairman or senior member of three different political parties. Aburizal Bakrie was elected as Golkar Party's chairman in October 2009; in January 2013, Surya Paloh were elected as a chairman of Nasdem Party, and Hary Tanoesoedibjo joined the People's Conscience Party (Hanura) on February 2013. The three media moguls have one thing in common, a strong political ambition. They displayed their strong political desire to become presidential candidates in the 2014 elections through their respective political vehicle. Aburizal Bakrie declared himself a Golkar Party's presidential candidate in July 2012; Hary Tanoesoedibjo was nominated by his new political party

as vice presidential candidate running with Hanura's chairman, Wiranto,

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who declared himself a presidential candidate. Surya Paloh said he would soon declare himself presidential candidate pending the outcome of vote number obtained by his Nasdem Party in the 2014 election. Hary Tanoesoedibjo owns the longest and largest chain of media networks. He

owns media giant PT Media Nusantara Citra, which runs 20 television stations, including three national free-to-air stations MNC TV, RCTI, and Global TV.

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In Hanura, Hary was entrusted with position of election campaign chairman. Meanwhile, head of Golkar Party,

Aburizal Bakrie, has two television stations, ANTV and TV One, while Nasdem chairman Surya Paloh runs Metro TV, a news-based television channel.

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For some media analysts the trend of media moguls entered the presidential race was worrying as there would be a monopoly of information in the 2014 elections because these moguls control the most powerful media in the country. In light of

data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), TV is still the main wellspring of news and excitement for most Indonesians. The data from 2012 indicated that 91.7 percent of all Indonesians over the age of 10 watched television, while 18.57 percent listened to the 166 radio and just 17.66 percent read daily papers and magazines

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("Stricter rules sought", 2013). The media moguls can use their television channels and other kinds of media they have to frequently broadcast their political campaigns. Given the fact that TV was still primary wellspring of data for most Indonesians, so political parties with strong media affiliations would take an

advantage to influence political choices among the public. A political party, whose presidential or vice presidential candidate, is a media mogul have ample chances to show up on their television shows, not just amid the political campaign period but also in regular programs beyond campaign period. Since the end of the 2009 elections, media owner-cum-politicians prepared their respective political strategy in preparation for the 2014 elections. Aburizal Bakrie and his Golkar Party opted to cooperate with the government by joining a political coalition to support President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono whose political party, the Democratic Party reaped the largest vote in the previous elections. Golkar received, in return, several ministerial posts from President Yudhoyono's cabinet. The alliance between the two parties made the two television channels, ANTV and TV One, controlled by the Bakrie family became less critical toward the coalition government. It was in stark contrast to Metro TV belongs to Surya Paloh whose Nasdem Party became opposition and very critical of the government. Metro TV repeatedly attacked other political parties, especially President Yudhoyono's Democratic Party and other coalition member parties. Democratic Party has accused the stations of intentionally undermining the party's popularity by continuously reporting on the scandals implicating its members. Metro TV repeatedly attacked members of the Democratic Party, through its biased and unbalanced reporting. They said the biased reports were made in a bid to support Surya Paloh's presidential ambition. They also said there was a tendency for the television to be used to benefit the owner. The television was utilized by Paloh to attack political rivals. However, the party itself has been in troublesome times resulting from corruption allegations aimed at some of its key members. Television workers, especially journalists, at Metro TV said they felt exasperates by their station's solid link with a certain political party, indicating that their editorial autonomy was now and again "debated" when they broadcast about specific issues, particularly on news in regards to the partnered political party. In the era of post-authoritarian Indonesia, the 2014 election is likely to be remembered as the fiercest and most confrontational campaign due partly to the role of televisions. The media were blamed for running biased coverage of both legislative and especially presidential 167 race. Indonesians

went to the polls to elect a new president

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on 9 July after legislative elections held earlier on 9 April. Some 46 political parties registered to participate, but only 12 eligible to contest 560 seats in the parliament. The number was a significant decline compared to the 2009 election contended by 34 parties.

The results of the legislative elections indicated that the

411

main opposition party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P),

331

was the most successful. PDI-P gained the largest 18.9 percent of the votes (109 seats in parliament). Golkar Party controlled by televisions owner Aburizal Bakrie obtained 14.8 percent of the votes (91 seats), it became PDI-P's closest rival, while

Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) led by former army general Prabowo Subianto came the

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third place with 11.8 percent (73 seats). Meanwhile, Democratic Party led by the incumbent

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who must step down in 2014 after serving two

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terms, suffered a sharp decline following a series of graft cases the previous year. His party's share of the vote fell to only 10.2 percent (61 seats) from above 20 percent in the 2009 election. Following the legislative election, two names emerged as the strongest candidates for the presidency: Prabowo Subianto, chief of Gerindra Party and Joko Widodo from PDI-P.

Prabowo Subianto was a former Lieutenant General in the Indonesian National Armed Forces. He was the

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former Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) commander who was fired from his position due to his complicity

in the kidnapping of pro -democracy activists in 1998.

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He became a businessman afterward, and ran for the vice-presidency in the 2009 election accompanying Megawati Sukarnoputri, chairperson of PDI-P, who ran for president. Joko Widodo, or better known by the abbreviated name Jokowi, is a politician from PDI- P. Since Jokowi ran public offices as mayor of Surakarta (2005) and governor of Jakarta (2012) he was very popular among other Indonesian politicians. He

managed to grab media's attention, which constantly runs stories about him.

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He topped many surveys on potential presidential candidates for the 2014 election. Despite his status as a junior politician in PDI-P, the public was eager to see him as Indonesia presidential hopeful, but a question loomed whether Megawati Sukarnoputri, the long-time head of the party, would like to put aside her own ambitions to return to the presidential palace after she lost in the 2009 election at the time her party nominated presidential candidate. Public looked forward to Megawati's final say on a presidential ticket from her party for the 2014 election. After keeping Jokowi's admirers nervously waiting for weeks, Megawati finally agreed to give a mandate to Jokowi to run in the 2014 Presidential race. Jokowi was a rising star and his stardom managed to put aside ambitions of his party's chief. Megawati's move paved the way for her junior party member to lead the world's largest Muslim country. However, the number of votes gained by Gerindra and PDI-P during the 2014 legislative election was still insufficient to put forward their respective candidates. In order to qualify to run in the presidential race, both Jokowi and Prabowo were required to establish a coalition of parties that supported their candidacy. Neither Gerindra nor PDI-P gained enough votes in April's legislative election to do so on their own. Both Joko Widodo and Prabowo are unlikely to run as president without a coalition with other political parties. PDI-P quickly gained support from other political parties, including from the small National Democrat (NasDem) party controlled by media magnate Surya Paloh, which won 6.7 percent of the votes. At the end, Jokowi managed to garner more parties that support him including NasDem and his own

PDI-P, and the National Awakening Party (PKB) as well as the People's Conscience Party,

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led by former Armed Forces Commander Wiranto. With regard to companionship, PDI-P and its coalition parties agreed to appoint former Golkar Party chairman Jusuf Kalla as Jokowi's running mate. Carlyle was a former Vice President during the Yudhoyono's first period of the presidency from 2004 till 2009. Kalla is a wealthy businessman and a senior politician who has a vast government experience. Prabowo was backed by the six parties, including Golkar Party led by Aburizal Bakrie whose family controlled two television stations. Prabowo picked Hatta Radjasa, a member of his party coalition, as his running mate. Radjasa was a prominent minister and chairman of National Mandate Party (PAN), a small, moderate Islamist party that is part of President Yudhoyono's ruling coalition. Radjasa and Yudhoyono have become a relative by marriage since Radjasa's daughter got married to Yudhoyono's son. Prabowo was also backed by a media tycoon Hary Tanoesoedibjo, the

president and CEO of Media Nusantara Citra (MNC) Group, which controls three national television

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stations and other kind of media outlets. Tanoesoedibjo was a member of the NasDem Party before severing his ties with the party and joining Hanura which nominated him as vice president candidate accompanying chairman Gen. (Ret) Wiranto, who ran as a presidential candidate for the 2014 election, but the hope was dashed when the party showed poor performance in the legislative election, ranked only 10th. After the legislative election, Tanoesoedibjo was in disagreement with Wiranto about who should receive support from Hanura party. Wiranto declared his support to the presidential pair from PDI-P, Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla. Tanoesoedibjo disagreed since he opted for Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa in the presidential election, and he resigned 169 from Hanura Party. Tanoesoedibjo said he supported Prabowo-Hatta because the two had similar visions in advancing the country's economy. Following Tanoesoedibjo's pledge

to support Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa in the presidential election,

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the nation saw a fierce political battle began involving media magnates. With Tanoesoedibjo's support, Prabowo received a significant campaign boost. Tanoesoedibjo has the

biggest share of the free-to-air market with three television stations: RCTI, MNCTV and Global TV. The group also has three pay television networks.

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Aside from that, Hary controls a handful of radio stations and Koran Sindo newspaper. Apart from Tanoesoedibjo's media outlets, Prabowo will benefit from his coalition with the Golkar Party, whose chairman Aburizal Bakrie and his family own

PT Visi Media Asia (VIVA), which manages two television stations — ANTV and TVOne — as well as online portal

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Viva news. Jokowi, on the other side, received media support from NasDem's chairman Surya Paloh who

has just 3 percent of the country's viewership, compared to 44 percent for the five stations that are pro-Prabowo

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(Nangoy & Fabi, 2014).

In terms of television stations, Prabowo's camp has much more power than Jokowi's.

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In the 2014 election, the use of media in political campaigns is much more intense compared to the other previous elections

and the partisanship is much more obvious because television owners are involved.

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Television campaign coverage was a reflection of the political preferences of station owners. Some television station owners had sided with Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla pairing, while others chose the Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa team. Several television stations gave excessive coverage and advertising spots to their respective affiliated parties. Television channels belonging to Tanoesudibyo, Paloh, and Bakrie showed special attention to their political parties in the lead up to the legislative and presidential election. For example, TV One and MNC Group had dedicated a higher percentage of presidential election coverage to Prabowo-Hatta's campaign, while Metro TV had given more airtime to Jokowi-Kalla. TV One devoted a large portion of its news programs to the campaigns of Prabowo by showing his videos of political rallies over and over again, highlighting the career of former general, and talking with supporters. There was no such scope for Jokowi on TV One. On the same day, Paloh's Metro TV broadcast live report of Jokowi's speech at a different campaign locations,

while Bakrie's TVOne refused those event, keeping a talk-show

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program. Some stations use various programs, including soap operas,

quizzes, reality-shows, and even religious content for campaigns and political

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ads. 61 Ahead of the vote, the two candidates showed little difference in the standing of opinion polls as Jokowi lost an immense early lead despite smear campaigns particularly over his religion and racial identity. A contrived libelous tabloid *Obor Rakyat* was distributed free-of-charge to several Islamic boarding schools across Java publishing false claims that Jokowi is a Christian of Chinese descent, not a Javanese Muslim. The black campaigns prompted Jokowi to visit several Islamic boarding schools to fend off persistent rumors that he is actually a Christian. In the Election Day on July 9, 2014 television stations broadcast the results of quick count surveys of the vote from at least a dozen polling companies which took samples from selected polling stations. Some five pro Subianto television channels broadcast live polling results only from polling agencies that predicted Subianto will win the election, while Metro TV only broadcast results from agencies that gave a victory to Jokowi. Eight polling companies have Jokowi-Kalla winning with 52 percent of the vote, but four other polling agencies -suspected to be aligned with Subianto- have called him the winner. Both presidential candidates claimed victory on the basis of different quick count results. Tensions flared after televisions showed different polling results that led to victory claims from both contenders. Jokowi announced his victory after results of progressing quick counts broadcast on Metro TV showed his leading position with 52 percent of the vote against Subianto. Other television channels whose owners do not show any blatant political disposition, including SCTV, Indosiar and Trans Corp (Trans TV and Trans 7) also showed Jokowi's leading position in their quick count programs. Later, Subianto also claimed victory after quick counts from four polling agencies showed him leading with 52 percent of the vote. The self-claimed victory announced by both presidential hopefuls prompted concerns over possible clashes between grassroots supporters. Police were on alert as supporters from different camps celebrated victories. Tensions were high and the police were instructed to take assertive action to avoid clashes at least until the confirmed election results from the Election Commission announced on July 22, 2014. 61 Based on the KPI monitoring that lasted from May 19-25, 2014 Prabowo-Hatta coverage at Metro TV was aired only on 110 occasions during the period, lower than Jokowi-Kalla's figure of 187. Conversely, at TV One, the Jokowi-Kalla campaign garnered just 79 while there were 153 examples of Prabowo-Hatta campaign coverage. At RCTI, the gap was even greater, with Prabowo-Hatta appearing 30 times compared to seven times for Jokowi-Kalla. Television workers interviewed during this research said the unbalanced coverage produced by their television channels had pushed The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) to send out warning letters to their stations. They said KPI reprimanded their stations for the partisanship they displayed in the presidential race news coverage. Five television stations were under attack: TV One, Metro TV and three stations controlled by Media Nusantara Citra (MNC) Group: Global TV, MNC TV and RCTI. Television and other media channels were used by media magnates-cum-politicians to produce and promote political

promotions for their political parties and personalities. They even had started to produce and broadcast their political gimmicks a year earlier when the campaign period was not officially opened. Since then, they kept on airing different types of contents to promote their political party and themselves. For example, MNC Group through its several television stations produced various promotional gimmicks to hype Tanoesoedibjo and Wiranto. The stations had much reportage on their Hanura party, and especially about themselves. Wiranto was given a role in a

sinetron (soap opera) program *Tukang Bubur Naik Haji (The Porridge Man Goes on the Haj)* broadcast on the

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RCTI. On another television show, the former military commander played in a reality television show, acting as the

Everyman character of a *becak* (pedicab) driver. On Metro TV, *Surya Paloh* got to be known for giving his prolonged political briefings while on TV

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One

and ANTV, numerous hours were devoted to *Aburizal Bakrie*, for

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covering his speeches and political safari across the nation as well as various aspects of his public life. Since the owners of the television channels have joined with presidential candidate's coalitions, the channels showed the most obvious cases of biased reporting. Television workers whose station owners joined with one of presidential coalitions said they were asked, forced and even intimidated by their superiors to run unbalanced stories during legislative and presidential campaign. In interviews for this research, several television workers said the station owners through their superiors demanded reporters to run stories that support one of the presidential candidates. Television reporters who work at several stations that support Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Radjasa said they must support the pairing by running favorable stories about them. One reporter who worked at Global TV, a station under MNC Group that support Prabowo-Hatta, who declined to be named said (personal communication, July 23, 2014): "Pokoknya kita tidak boleh menyiarkan berita tentang Jokowi dan Jusuf Kalla. Di stasiun televisi saya, di Global TV, setiap reporter wajib menyiarkan berita mengenai Prabowo- Hatta dan hanya Prabowo-Hatta. Kita diwajibkan untuk membela Prabowo ketika membuat berita Pemilu di televisi. Kita harus mau jika masih ingin bekerja di Global TV" (There was no room for stories from their contenders, Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla. In my station, it is mandatory for all reporters to cover the news story about Prabowo-Hatta, and only about Prabowo-Hatta. We have to be pro Prabowo in reporting election stories for the television. We have to do it if we still want to secure our job at Global TV) Television workers at TV One and ANTV said they were threatened with losing their jobs by the station management if they dared to broadcast content about Jokowi who was opposed by Aburizal Bakrie and his political coalition. The two stations controlled by a holding media company Viva Group owned by Bakrie family. The group also operates a news portal company Viva News. Television workers at the two stations said, one day before election day, they heard how Aburizal Bakrie's son, the CEO of TV One and Viva Group, was upset by Viva News running ads supporting Jokowi. Ardi Bakrie reportedly menaced members of Viva News

management with losing their jobs over the incident

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which sparked concerns among television workers in the group. In the 2014 election, it was obvious that televisions predisposed at certain presidential candidate due to political affiliation of the media owners. Tremendous amount of news were diverted by media owners' political preferences even at those television outlets that doesn't belong to politicians although they didn't show a vulgar partisan attitude. Television worker at SCTV, whose owners do not affiliate with any political parties, said the station was consciously partial and it built information with the objective to affect viewers to vote for a certain candidate that the station's owners support in the form of continuous news broadcasting of the preferred candidate. Raymond Kaya, a senior news producer at SCTV, testified as the following: Delapan hari sebelum hari pemilihan, pemilik SCTV melalui pimpinan stasiun memberikan instruksi kepada dewan redaksi untuk memberikan dukungan kepada Jokowi. Liputan pemilu presiden di SCTV harus tiga banding satu untuk Jokowi, artinya tiga berita harus mengenai Jokowi dan hanya satu berita mengenai Prabowo. Pemilik SCTV, yaitu pak Eddy, mendukung Jokowi karena ia memiliki kedekatan dengan PDI-P sejak lama (Eight days before the election day, the owners of SCTV through the station's managers instructed the chief editor to support Jokowi. The television's election coverage ratio must be three-to-one for Jokowi, which means three stories must be dedicated for Jokowi, and only one story for Prabowo. The owner of SCTV, pak Eddy, support Jokowi because he once had a close relation with PDIP). The 2014 election could be seen as one of the most marked event in history of Indonesian media. During the campaign, it was not easy for television viewers to find objective information, especially political news, that could be accounted for. Among the contenders of the 2014 elections, three of them led political parties and they also controlled media networks:

***Surya Paloh* of the NasDem Party, *Aburizal Bakrie* of the Golkar Party,**

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and many **radioesoeuiojo of the manura Party. The three media** parons utilized
their media outlets to produce and promote political content and advertisements
for their parties and

personal extravaganza. Those who used influence as owners of media networks assumed

that media content showing **their faces would turn into votes in the**
election.

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They hoped that the more content was produced, the more public sympathy and influence they would get. But their hopes were not not the same as the reality. Political

parties with wide support from their media were not automatically
successful in getting large votes.

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Prabowo Subianto who gained the largest obvious support from the affiliated five national television stations eventually suffered a defeat against Jokowi who was backed up by lesser media supports. The media should face mounting pressure to restore public confidence and rebuild its accountability to strive for the public interest.

5.2 Measuring The Most Influential Factors In this study, questionnaires had been distributed to 100 respondents who were working or had once worked at the 10 national private television stations which became the object of this research. Questionnaire distributions apparently had been running well and generated sufficient data. The television workers who became respondents of this study consisted of various levels of positions, whether they were newcomers in television business or those who had been working for years; whether they were still working or no longer working at television stations. In essence, each respondent was asked to give his or her opinions based on their experiences with regard to the various economic and political factors that affect their professional works and eventually influenced the content they produced. Statements in the questionnaire were devised with reference to the various influencing factors that may affect the determination of media content consisting of five dimensions: media owners, advertisers, media regulators, audience, and politicians. The results of the data collection obtained from the questionnaires are presented in the following five tables. The first political-economy factor measured in this study is the influence of media owners toward television program content. A total of three statements has been listed in the questionnaire to indicate owners influence on the chores of television workers that eventually affect program content. The following statements were listed in the questionnaire: 1) Media owners contribute their idea for programming content; 2) The media owners or your boss rejected content considered incompatible with your media policy; 3) You or your colleagues were told not to broadcast content since it may harm the owners' interests. Respondents' feedback on the statements were shown in Table 5.1 Of 100 television workers who had responded to the statement 'media owners contribute their ideas to programming content' and filled the questionnaires as many as 43 respondents stated that they found their media owners frequently or very frequently influenced them and their television program content in the form of suggesting or giving ideas, while the remainder of respondents expressed neutral, rare or very rare. With regard to the statement 'the media owners or your boss rejected content considered incompatible with your media policy' as many as 37 television workers said television owners were often or very often rejected program content considered inappropriate or contrary to the company's policy. While statement 'owners influence on television workers for not broadcast anything that may harm the owners' interest', as many as 37 workers said they were experiencing that situation frequently or very frequently, while the remainder of the respondents expressed neutral, rare or very rare. On average, owners affect frequently or very frequently some 37 respondents. The influence of advertisers is measured by five indicative statements posed to the respondents in the questionnaire as the followings: 1) Advertisers/sponsors contribute their idea to content; 2) Media content policy accommodate advertisers' or sponsors' needs; 3) Station's programming planning and scheduling accommodate advertisers' or sponsors' interests; 4) Advertisers or sponsors asked the station to report their activities; 5) Media did report advertisers' activities if they asked; 6) Commercial or promotional messages were 175 inserted in the program content. Replies from respondents on the statements were shown in Table 5.2 Table 5. 2 indicates that as many as 30 respondents said advertiser/sponsor were very often or often participated and gave their views with regard to program content while as many as 36 television workers stated that their media were very often or often considered advertisers' will in their programming; Some 41 television workers stated that their program planning and scheduling accommodated the interests of advertisers or sponsors frequently or very frequently; Some 45 respondents said the advertisers/sponsors were frequently or very frequently asked the station to broadcast news reports on their campaign program and; some 43 television workers said they reported frequently or very frequently advertisers' promotional messages into content if advertisers asked for it; while some 52 said they inserted promotional messages into their program content frequently or very frequently. On average, advertisers affect frequently or very frequently some 41.2 respondents. Audience influence on program content is measured through the following five statements: 1) Media owner demanded a rating rise; 2) Media owners once said that program rating is important; 3) Decision on program continuity depends on its rating performance; 4) Program rating influenced your careers and incomes; 5) Program improvements were made based on the up-and-down of rating reports. Replies from respondents on the statements were shown in Table 5.3 Table 5.3 indicates that 69 television workers said owners or management of the television station in which they work were frequently or very frequently asked them to improve their program rating; as many as 61 television workers said owners or their superiors were frequently or very frequently said the program rating is important; some 64 respondents said the decision of

the television program were frequently or very frequently determined by the program rating, some 30 television workers said program rating was frequently or very frequently affect their career and income and 74 respondents said program improvements were made based on the rise and fall of rating reports. On average, audience affect frequently or very frequently some 65.2 respondents. In this study the effect of the regulator on television program content is measured by two indicators: 1) The regulator [KPI] frequently reprimanded your program with regard to its content; 2) your program content was frequently being changed because of reprimand from the regulator. Feedbacks from respondent were shown in Table 5.4 Based on data from the questionnaires distributed to 100 television workers, some 14 respondents (14%) said the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission or KPI as the regulator was frequent or very frequent cast warnings to television workers regarding their content that violates broadcasting regulations and; as many as 25 percent of workers said they frequently or very frequently changed their program contents in connection with warning letters the stations received from the KPI . On average, regulators affect frequently or very frequently some 19.5 respondents. The influence of politicians on program content is measured by the following three statements in the questionnaire; 1) your media owners or superiors once mentioned his/her support of certain politicians or political parties; 2) my media once supported certain political parties; 3) my media once conflicted with politicians or political parties. Feedbacks from respondent were shown in Table 5.5 Table 5.5 indicates that as many as 24 percent of television workers said television owners or the television management were very frequent or frequent expressing their support for certain politicians or political parties; Some 37 percent said the television stations where they worked were very frequent or frequent supporting certain political parties while some 22 percent workers stated that their stations were very frequent or frequent involving in a conflict with politicians or political parties. On average, politicians affect frequently or very frequently some 27.6 respondents. Number of television workers affected frequently of very frequently on political and economy factors Political economy factors Number of television workers affected Percentage (%) Media owners 39.0 20.3 Advertisers 41.2 21.4 Audience 65.2 33.9 Regulators 19.5 10.1 Politicians 27.6 14.3 Total 192.5 100 Based on the feedbacks from television workers, it can be concluded that audience is the most influential factor since it affected the most 33.9 percent television workers employed at 10 national private television stations in Indonesia. Television workers considered audience as the greatest influence on their works among other political, economic pressures that influenced them in shaping the program content. They said the influence was recognized from the rating reports obtained from a rating agency. The second most influential political economic factors on program content were occupied by two factors, each of which has almost the same proportion: the advertiser (21.4%) and owners (20.3%), while politicians came the third (14.3%) and the last is regulators (10.1%). Regulators appear the least influence on program content on daily basis. However, the influence of politicians increased significantly ahead of elections. The impact of the political economy factors discussed above is not the same among television channels. There are stations where the workers said that they were affected mostly by audience while workers at other stations said they were less affected by owners but mostly by owners. Table 6.1 shows the magnitude of each political economy variables on television workers in shaping content in each television channels. Table 6.1 : Analysis of the weight of political economy influences in each TV stations observed Stations Leading programs Owners Advertisers Audience Regulators Politicians RCTI Soap opera ***** SCTV Soap opera ***** Trans TV Variety show ***** MNC TV Local music ***** Trans 7 Reality show ***** Indosiar Reality show ***** Global TV Movies ***** ANTV Sport ***** TV One News ***** Metro TV News ***** = Very strong influence, **** = Strong influence, *** = Moderate influence ** = Less influence * = Almost no influence _____ CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 6.1 Discussions Based on research findings in chapter 5, this section discusses and analyzes the dynamics of development of Indonesian television industry which were very much influenced by the political-economy factors. This part also discusses how those dynamics characterize the ways people exercise their rights to media. In this discussion, the political-economy perspective and other media theories are used as its basis of analysis, especially the frameworks put forward by Vincent Mosco (1996) and

Edward S. Herman's and Noam Chomsky (1988). Hence, the discussion will explore the 354

aspects of television that has affected the lives of society, both for their advantages, and possible negative outcomes. The frameworks of the two scholars are used in this analysis to portray the landscape of Indonesia's television industry development since the fall of the country's last authoritarian ruler

and how this has affected citizen participation in the media. 204

During Indonesia authoritarian era where the power was in the hands of a state bureaucracy, and the media were controlled by the government in a monopolistic way, while official censorship were sometimes imposed, it was clear that the media have no choice but worked in supporting the regime's propaganda and served the interests of those who hold the power. However,

it is more difficult to see the propaganda system at work 29

when formal censorship is almost nothing and most of the media is privately owned as Indonesia today when five large business groups currently control all of Indonesia's 10 private free-to-air national television channels. Since political liberalization takes place in Indonesia, big businessmen with capital interest drive media industry development that prompt concentration of ownership through mergers and acquisitions, an

inevitable consequence in the media industry. As a distributor of content (especially news) to the audience, hence a tool of political power, Indonesian television has been suffering an inevitable bias since owners occasionally intervene deliberately into media's editorial policy which includes favoring corporate policies and government. Using the notion from Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model (1988), mass media owners in Indonesia, supported the societal power blocks through the first filter: concentrate ownership of the dominant mass media firms for profit motives. Media need capital-intensive technology to reach a mass audience so large firms controls the dominant mass-media outlets operated for profit.

The size of the companies is a necessary consequence of the capital requirements. Therefore, the

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financial interest of media owners must be served first. Accordingly, people's rights to access information to the media become the privilege of industry. Televisions manufacture and produce information, and in the meantime challenge it with

other media. As a result, audiences are presented to a more restricted information range because most important social, political, financial, cultural issues are selectively telecasted by the media.

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In the beginning of reform era in, few years after the fall of Indonesian last authoritarian regime, the propaganda launched by private televisions was difficult to detect, especially because the media was actively competing against each other, aggressively depicted themselves as representatives of free speech and proponents of the general community interest and sporadically exposed and attacked governmental and corporate misconduct. This is especially true for two TV stations; Metro TV and TV One, once pride themselves for their journalistic values and principles, but finally compromised their journalistic ideals for political motives. It is the impartiality of the country's two 'news channels' that is particularly worrying, although a number of other TV stations are also guilty of foul play. Entering television industry in 2000, Metro TV was the country's first channel to focus its 24-hour broadcasts solely on news. Meanwhile, TV One was launched some eight years later, and quickly made its presence with its dynamic reporting. It is fair enough to say, as far as television branding is concerned, that these two channels can be relied on as a prime and the most important source for news. Despite a few occasional technical flaws, the two stations generally rarely disappointed viewers in their news services. Their reports are fair, fast, and accurate, seems to stick firmly to the principle of journalistic as they used to cover both sides of the stories. Above all, the two news channels had the biggest appeal of displaying discussions and debates, where they invite representatives from every related party allowing them to argue openly their case, often leading to heated exchanges, resulted in a truly democratic scene. However, as the 2014 elections have drawn closer, the audience noticed something was not quite right with these two channels. It is easy to notice that televisions were partial and less objective in their stories because of the political affiliation of the media owners. One of the most noticeable changes in the two TV stations was news selection. With regard to the types of news presented to the viewers there was a definite pattern. The two channels bombarded the audience with positive stories about their respective presidential nominees that they endured. Metro TV reported 182 good news, in a high intensity, about Jokowi. Highlighting his popularity and achievements as governor. On the other hand, TV One persistently supplied viewers with well-prepared reports of Prabowo, including his speech skill and fluency in English. It became apparent that the two news channels have sacrificed their journalistic ideals for political motives. In term of the gatekeeping theory, the gatekeepers in Indonesian television stations

can squelch new ideas and suppress the news of events that others might find important.

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Although, gatekeeping actions by media executives in Indonesian television are rampant, there is no evidence that their audience leaves for other media. The invisible self-censorship works in Indonesia where there is supposedly freedom of expression. Television workers realize what is permissible, and what is not permissible, pushing them to pre-edit their own work to be consistent with the policy of their own respective stations. With regard to the agenda-setting function, the way Indonesian televisions frame certain issue plays a part in gaining public support. For example, televisions

gave a lot of attention on the issues of the

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death penalty for drug offenders. Claiming Indonesia is facing the drug emergency, Indonesian government refused all requests for pardon from dealers of drug sentenced to death. The media reinforces a myth that death penalty imposed on drug dealers would be a remedy that falsely claims to solve every social problems ever. Despite a lack of evidence that death penalty deters escalation of drug abuse, Indonesian televisions overwhelmingly support capital punishment on drug dealers for serious crime. Televisions used legal arguments to frame the

death penalty for drug offenders in support of the capital punishment.

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within this frame,

the myths attached to the death penalty can not be dispelled by opposing arguments, either based on lack of evidence for crime deterrence, human rights grounds or political agendas (Wibowo, 2015) Political media agendas is seen interfering television content especially news since media ownership structure still enmeshed with political motivation. Political motives mixes with corporate media ownership

to create challenges for independent journalists.

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Press freedom is still

under threat from political impedance in the newsroom, self-oversight and

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irreconcilable situations. Sixteen years after the fall of Indonesian last authoritarian ruler, freedom of the press in the newsroom is still under threat from political intervention, self-censorship and conflicts of interest. As of today, it is not easy to find national televisions outlets that take their democratic functions seriously. Due to conflict of interests, the agenda-setting role of the media sometimes contain less criticism over those who hold power as more Indonesian television owners join political party-related elites. 183 At the point when the media are dealt with for the most part as a tool to accumulate capital, or the menace of media commodification as cautioned

by Mosco (1996), it impeccably overlaps with the political parallelism today that could pervasively injure intelligent deliberation on public agenda in the public sphere. When media are primarily controlled by party-affiliated individuals so political parallelism

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develops (Simarmata, 2012, February 16). Consequently, political parallelism would bring about closeness of interests

between what are viewed as party's interests as media's interests, and compel those to be the

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interest of society. It is all-important to realize that Indonesian media play two basic functions during elections. Foremost, it supplies basic info on the track record of each candidate and about presidential election mechanisms. This kind of info is the groundwork for people to determine their political choices. Second, televisions in Indonesia are deliberately one-sided and build information with the aim to impact viewers to vote in favor of the candidate they support. Television persistently broadcasts positive news about its preferred candidate while showing the negative side of the competitor. Regrettably, this media favoritism works by abusing the journalistic code of moral philosophy. Particularly during the 2014 presidential election, this influence function exceeded the target role of offering data to citizens. The bulk of the media showed an obvious partisan attitude. It was obviously not a serious political education for public. The one-sided television coverage certainly ran counter to obligation of journalism to serve the interest of the public. Freedom of the press should give the media a room to work objectively and impartially, but now it is misapplied as a propaganda instrument for promoting certain political interests. Owners simply turn their media content

into a commodity, with the audience being treated as mere consumers or a market rather than rightful citizens.

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Today, if it was not about politics, televisions showed a fragile line between the news and entertainment program. Television news programs seem to depend more on sensationalism than quality coverage, adopting many of its tricks from popular infotainment programs. This is particularly true when television is reporting, for instance, a natural disaster. Television has opted for a melodramatic coverage instead of paying attention to natural disaster mitigation by giving correct information. News program used to play mournful background music as viewers watch the suffering of the victims, adding deliberately to the feeling of melancholy. Sad music was played in order to enhance the coverage's melodramatic nuance combined with footage of witness and survivor accounts. Reports were personalized by showing victim's pain individually. The pain has a value only 184 if it overwhelm or fascinates the audience. From time to time television stations transmit this similar most dramatic video from the ravaged areas. Televisions are scrambling for content to attract a larger audience and rating by exaggerating their coverage, especially when natural disaster occurs in Indonesia. The media used to produce a steady stream of exploitative news by playing those tragic footage and sounds over and over again in a steady way, 24 hours a day. Instead of giving information to audience about how to response to the crisis, televisions are even bolted into their business pattern, using disaster stories to create a valuable news commodity. This is a prime example of how the media fabricate natural disasters into something valuable in term of economy. Vincent Mosco (1996)

called this process as commodification, or the procedure of changing

use values into trade values, of changing products whose value is dictated by their capacity to meet individual and social needs into items whose value is set by what they can carry into the market. Commodification is the term for a

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procedure to change use value - or

a product's value obtained from human needs or need- into trade value, the value it could obtain from exchange (Mosco, 1996, p.141). A sample of this in connection to the mass communications would be the commodification of program content and

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audiences. Before the election took place in 2014, many expressed their concern on possible interventions by some television owners-cum-politicians on their media program content. Owners may use their media outlets to influence voters in order to grab as much as people's votes in the election. Despite these political campaigns were disguised by election contestants who are media owners

as news and other forms of current affairs,

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but they were still

seen as revoking public space for private interests and not

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helpful for endeavors in enhancing press role

as an open space for public debate in a democracy.

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Those who are against editorial intervention complain that the intervention may hit public interests for objective and impartial news reports. They said television channels use public frequency so the channels must be just for balanced and fair space for all candidates. They consider television is, to a great degree, very persuasive in advancing the electability of political parties or presidential candidate. They demonstrated their tension over the role of media proprietors who seriously campaign utilizing their media networks. Media activists and observers tended to fault the government for not daring to seriously evaluate television stations' license of use frequency since many of them were found liable of culpable the principle of fair reporting. This is particularly true for the rights of the public and audience to access objective and independent news and also because of television's high viewing rate in Indonesia, which nears 90 percent of the population. However, despite these pressures and warnings, the media owners seem undisturbed, and

they don't really care about the warnings since they

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rescue hundreds of strategies to avoid sanctions. But what that they don't acknowledge that the great unwashed are not so easily fooled in today's open information era especially during the 2014 election. In the 2014 election, there were four television owner-cum-political leaders

who used their media to campaign for the legislative and presidential elections,

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but none of them dominated the majority of votes. Indonesian main opposition party, the

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI- P), was successful to top the votes, in spite of the

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fact that its leaders don't have

any media network. The Golkar Party, whose leader Aburizal Bakrie has two television stations, came second regardless of intense utilization of his two television channels.

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These two parties are followed by another six political

parties that don't own media outlets. 62 The leader of the NasDem Party 10

has a media group,

but rank outside the big seven in the election results. 10

The Hanura Party got a strong backing from the country's biggest media group, but succumbed to becoming the smallest vote. Is it campaigning in one's

own media outlets does not increase the votes of one's political party? 10

It is not a strategic advantage for the political party to appear continuously on one's own media outlets without considering the feedback of other mass media. Blasting campaign brimming with self acclaim, clearly counter the proposed impact of boosting, if other media like to depict the party or candidate in a more negative manners. Various media involve in the reality of competition through public discourse and news tendencies. In this context public space in Indonesia is fulfilled with so many contradictory arguments and ideas to support certain hegemonies, or, according to Mosco (1996), the common sense,

taken-for-granted, and naturalized ways of thinking about the world 107

that are both contested and incorporated in everyday life. Democracy has not possessed the capacity to break the discretionary misuse of media proprietors of their media channels, the political dependency of maybe a couple media outlets remains an issue considering how they ought to work, but democracy makes it conceivable an extensive plurality among owners of

media industry. It is the competition among them, which makes the checks and 10

counterbalances. Television workers may be less critical of the media 62 The

Democratic Party, the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the United Development Party (PPP). 10

proprietors who are also political leaders, but many other media will be highly critical to this character of media owners. Accordingly, dependency on maybe a couple

media outlets is counteracted by the freedom of other media outlets within the same political system. The plurality of media 10

owners and actors is no less than an advantage of

democracy which brings differing qualities of information, perspectives and political leanings within an adjustment of media freedom 10

People's political choices are influenced

by many genes. In determining their political picks, people do not only 10

pass judgment based on how often

a political party appears on TV. They also notice what they know of its accomplishments, leaders and leaders' ability, their experience, 10

party members, campaigners and so on. Numerous voters are only negotiable and transactional, selecting the parties constituting the greatest contributions. This thoroughly demonstrates the society or public in general as moderately independent, retaining yet not continually

accepting the media messages with respect to political candidates, as 10

they meet information from different creators. they

sometimes consider the candidates' demographic position like faith and ethnicity; quite separated from quality and credibility. The public are not just blank canvases that can be coloured upon the wishes of politicians who control mass media. In this case, Indonesian voters are smart and competent enough in giving feedback. The 2014 election case brings a lesson to politicians that they would need to reevaluate the position that public are just quiet and passive media audiences. Some television shows have the solitary purpose of entertainment altogether and use comedy as an access to boost ratings, but unfortunately the use of clowning in the television shows is not with any specific moral message or knowledge issues as a matter. In any case, the substance of these shows is trivial and shallow, but they've succeeded in producing a fun atmosphere for audiences in the pastime of leisure. In the course of its journey, Indonesian television comedy has been changed from just a type of amusement for the public into an important entertainment biz. During Suharto's New Order era, when there was only one television channel, comedy shows were an outlet to loosen up from the exceptional securitisation, if not to be sure militarization, of society. The prevalence of the armed forces was evident in many entertainment programs in which the venue of the show more often than not was a military institution. In numerous shows, it was common for the hosts, who were not military members, to wear certain military outfits depending upon which military unit financed the weekly program. Post-authoritarian television comedies, currently aired on various channels, are 187 tormented with moral and ethical problems, which have persistently annoyed the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI). Today, comedy shows were characterized by performers who act as object of suffering, or the object of degradation and abasement. Their physical appearances become a target of jokes. People who are bald, fat, short, buck-toothed, and small- or flat nosed appear to be the most favorable target of disgrace. Individuals' bodily parts and faces are continuous likened with any items, for example, toilets, floor mats, buckets, voodoo dolls and even animals. Gender also become issue on Indonesian television shows although it is not significant. Televisions illustrate women in postures and situations of subordination,

and that women were mostly characterized as weak companion to men.
The presentation of

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women's bodies on televisions is considered as important instrument for the economic and social viability of the media. Televisions showcased the female body as the main attraction and sold as a commodity. Televisions consider attractive women as the breath of life. In the process of distribution of a product produced by advertisers female body become a tool and constructed deliberately by the media. The body becomes a commodity for many entertainment, and image of women on a television program had economic interests (Chaplin, 1994:219). A standard ideal women body was made and televisions create female figures that match men's fantasies about beautiful and sexy women. A study found that female talents in an Indonesian popular talk show used to sit cross- legged, and since they wear mini skirt their leg become the main focus of the first seen by the audience. The women body is constructed as a shared object while women still generally occupy an inferior position and people see this stereotypical portrayal of women on television (Santayaputri, 2014). Many entertainment shows experience the ill effects of improper content esteemed suitable just for grown-ups that comes in different structures: bodily gestures, facial expressions, sexually insinuating jokes and anecdotes. There is also an inclination to humiliate individuals with distinctive sexual orientations and propensities, for example male effeminates. These all proved that television contents have yet been sensitive to the most essential ethical principles about making fun of individuals with handicaps, poor people and low wage workers. Marks, for example, gila (insane), cacat (crippled), or miskin (poor) is scattered in numerous program, strikingly comedies and variety shows. The way capitalism and the free market generally work is clearly seen in the television entertainment shows which focus singularly on the supply of enjoyment the viewers request with almost no thought for making them more brilliant. Every program 188 content must be blended with entertainment elements with the intended goal is to reach the highest level of marketability, accessibility, and comprehensibility. This mixture finally produces a dumbing-down effect, or the deliberate diminution of the intellectual level of program contents to ensure mass acceptability.⁶³ The reason behind this mode of thinking is because the uncritical masses can relate to it more easily than they would otherwise. In short, the idea suggests that the dumber a program content is the better. Perhaps the dumbest program content Indonesian television channel ever made is the airing of the wedding ceremonies of Indonesian celebrities. There is a trend among television channels to air this type of program. For example, two television channels, Trans TV and RCTI, in October 2014 broadcast live the

wedding ceremony of Indonesian artists, Raffi Ahmad and Nagita Slavina
Tengker,

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for three days in a row, 14 hours each day. This type of program content could not be justified since it was not suitable for public viewing and had violated the public interest. The program

violated the public's right to enjoy good programming

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and televisions misused public frequencies.⁶⁴ However, such abuses have occurred many times. Previously RCTI aired similar program content when it broadcasts the

wedding party of pop singers Anang Hermansyah and Ashanti when

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the two tied the knot.

Anang's second wedding was aired for three hours on May 20, 2012.

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In order to boost ratings, the entertainment approach with the dumbing-down effect can also be found in religious program or Dakwahtainment. This is Islamic televangelism that combines Islamic propagation (dakwah) with entertainment. The typical Dakwahtainment show ordinarily includes no less than one religious preacher accompanied by a comedian, actress or other celebrities acting as the host of the programs. The program systematically mixes entertainment and spiritual enlightenment to the detriment of the essence of the religious message. The whole commodification of Dakwahtainment has been a fundamental astute for these type of content to thrive in television, thus shielding the enthusiasm of the supposedly uncritical and idiotic public. Most Indonesian televisions allude to rating reports as a means to produce content. A television station that manages to broadcast the highest-rated program bears a potential to be 63 The term 'dumbing down' was originally used by film screenwriters in 1930s as a slang expression to mean "revising [the script] so as to appeal to those of lower education or intelligence." See

Hagopian, J (2014). The dumbing down of America – By design.

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Global Research. Retrieved from

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-dumbing-down-of-america-by-design/5395928>.

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64 The Indonesian Broadcast Commission (KPI) has warned television stations over its alleged violation of broadcasting rules by airing the wedding of artists. replicated by the other broadcast stations, resulting in content duplication. This is particularly true for television drama, locally known as sinetron, with stories generated from duplications of the same old stories concerning scandals and family hatred. Having a weak story, the appeal of sinetron was established through pathetic and exaggerated acting that fails miserably. In addition to that, details and story rationale are frequently neglected. The naturalness of the acting or attention to detail become the weakest part of Indonesian most popular television drama. In brief, Indonesian current sinetron do not excel in story content. Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, Indonesian sinetrons are still being watched and profit from their target viewers: adult female audience mostly from the middle to lower social class. It looks that the audiences are to passively absorb and merely live with whatever the television offers. This indicates how uncritical and unintelligent the audience is toward whatever they watch from television. In another part, the persistent high ratings for the low quality television drama indicate that the viewers demand is still there and when demand exists, so does supply. Ironically, people at this tier of society are not even aware of being used and manipulated by the financial backers of the sinetron. Herman and Chomsky (1988) suspected that the viewer's interest in low quality program content was backed up by sponsors and advertisers whose will is to avoid programs with serious complexities. Advertisers shun serious and controversial content since they may distract consumers' buying mood. Large corporate advertisers are not interested in sponsoring programs that involve in heavy critique toward corporate activities including the issue of environmental degradation and corporate backing of and advantages from Third World's authoritarian governments. Commercial televisions are seen to gradually increase the advertising time with the expense of significant public-affairs content which will be more marginalized or even rejected entirely. This is particularly true with the increasing market pressure for a better financial performance, the hike in the cost of advertising spots and the diminishing constraints from regulation. This is the reason why advertisers tend look for television content that will lightly amuse the audience and thus fit in with the main goal of program buying namely the spreading of a marketing message. In order to sustain advertising and revenue, Indonesian television firms today are fully aware of the crucial importance of advertisers. They adjust themselves to advertisers and become aware of the way advertisers work. Herman and Chomsky (1988) called advertisers as the second filter for content production. They said the powerful influence of advertisers over television content comes from the straightforward truth that they pay for and buy the contents. Advertisers and sponsors are financial backers who subsidize television. For this reason, televisions compete for their patronage. Most television management in Indonesia hires account executives and specialized staffs to explain the advertisers how their programs serve their interests and eventually persuade them to buy commercial spots in their television programs. The successful pursuit of the precious advertisers' is a must since it greatly affects the welfare of the media. This leads the advertisers to become the ultimate patron whose demands and requirements the televisions must comply if they want to prosper. For a television channel, the rise or fall in the Nielsen ratings, even for only one percentage point, translates into a change in advertising revenue. The stakes in demographic composition and audience size are thus extremely large, and there is a strong tendency in Indonesian television industry for such considerations to affect policy deeply. Most television workers, including editorial staffs, were aware of the institutional pressures imposed on them to focus on the bottom line. Apparently, the television tends to work along the logic of fabricating audiences' need and then claiming that the program it produces represents the viewers' demand. This is the manner by which televisions shape public opinions and interest on numerous issues. So, the Indonesian television industry has turned out to be

more a profit-oriented business organization than a medium

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that serve society. Television mediates what people know and see from the media as reality. Most audiences believe that television is only reflective of society, but they are unaware that television very much dictates and constructs their reality, and within it exists ideology. The system of values and beliefs are displayed on television and hegemony is greatly showcased. It is the way those who own television to maintain the control over those who don't own the media. In other words, it is the way those in power, or the dominant class, to maintain the control over those who don't hold power. Television is the most important tool for ruling elites. They use it to maintain their status, power and wealth by making popular their own philosophy, culture, and morality. Indonesia currently has 10 private televisions with nationwide coverage. The 10 television channels previously owned by 10 different possessors, but as merger and acquisition activity has been intense

over the past few years, the number of

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owners shrinks to five major entities that control the same 10 private televisions. Hary Tanoesoedibjo through his holding company PT Bhakti Investama has stakes in MNC TV, RCTI and Global TV. CT Corp, a conglomerate owned by Chairul Tanjung, has Trans 7 and Trans TV, while PT Elang 191 Mahkota Teknologi has Indosiar and SCTV. Elang Mahkota is directed by family of Fofa Sariaatmadja. Diversified holding company Media Group, controlled by Surya Paloh, running MetroTV. Lastly, The Bakrie family has a controlling stake in the Viva Group, which operates ANTV and TVOne. The desire to reduce risks and increase profits has led to an oligopolization of the Indonesian media industry, especially television, by the five Indonesian media moguls through a large number of mergers and acquisitions mainly over the last 15 years. According to Mosco (1996, p173), this process of mergers and acquisitions is part of spatialization, or the

process of overcoming the constraints of space and time in social life.

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The political economy of communication particularly examines spatialization

mostly as far as corporate force expansion in the media business.

This is exhibited in the sheer growth in the span of media organizations, measured by incomes, profit, assets, resources, workers and share value.

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Political economy has particularly analyzed growth by taking up diverse types of corporate concentration (Mosco 1996: 175).

In this discussion, the concept of spatialization can be utilized to catch the changing structure of the Indonesian media industry regarding its

specific form of integration measured along the principal spatial variables: vertical and horizontal. Horizontal integration means cross-media

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proprietorship when one firm purchases another company with different business.

Vertical integration depicts the procedure of one firm taking control over another

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company with similar business line. Such a structure is expected to diminish market uncertainty and reduce competition. In Indonesia, the five major entities that control some 10 private televisions in the country committed both horizontal and vertical integration in their business. Beside television business, they also own other companies which run various businesses including property, retail, plantation, hotel etc. Consolidation, through merger and acquisition, in the television industry has facilitated relentless rivalry among the large number of stations competing for a bit of the advertising pie. Consolidation implies that all assets, including technology, human resources, and infrastructure of network as well as creative power are combined. Until now, the consolidation in Indonesian television industry has yet to see the ascent of monopolies which occur when rivalry is limited, resulting on the one and only ruling entity. The Indonesian television industry has advanced from an atmosphere of self-oversight and the subtle art of perusing-between-lines during the tyrant period to become a completely entertaining, amusing and critical facet of democratic life.. Indonesia is presently moving 192 from its transition era into consolidation of democracy. However, the ascent of political conglomerates and the evolution of media possession added to the media turn from an asset to a liability for

one of the world's largest democracy. Media owners and managers can produce and

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reproduce content favorable to them far more easily than other social groups because they control the key

social class. Their ownership on television guarantees their points of view to be consistent and ultimately feed into the public area. The domination of one social class over others speaks to financial and political control, as well as the

ability of the dominant class to portray **its own** viewpoint **of seeing the world so that** the individuals **who are**

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under their control acknowledge it as 'common sense' and 'natural' Political economy of media consider the system of media as an important factor to understand how societies work. Those who involve in the political economy study don't trust that the existing system of media is natural or inevitable. According to them, the media system is established through policies designed by the ruling elite for protecting their interests. The important question is whether the system of media serves to undermine or promote people's interests, principles and practices of democracy? Are media a power for oligarchy or social justice? In the case of Indonesia, the current media system still functions to hurt principles and practices of democracy, and media still a power for oligarchy. This research suggests that media industry development needs literacy of media

among citizens. The **media development should be** focused on building a **well-informed**

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and educated audience. This can be achieved by providing and establishing a public-oriented information and public spaces that allow participation of public. One of the solutions is to revitalize

public media in Indonesia. Therefore, **the state-owned television and radio** TVRI and **RRI** need to

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be reformed for a fundamental change and to be rejuvenated

as national community media. This need is crucial **to ensure not only literacy** of media **among** Indonesians, **but also the** attainment **of** people's **rights to media.** Only when **the**

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industry serves public's rights to

information and does so in a more public-oriented manner, **can we** hope **to see** television stations **play a more** important **role as public**

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media. 6.2

Conclusions In the introduction **of** this thesis, **it**

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has been stated the objectives that this research intended to accomplish and the two research questions this thesis planned to answer. In this 193 concluding part, it will be summarized how the research goals be accomplished by answering the two research questions. To memorize, the following two research questions have been central to the research of which this thesis reported. The key research questions of this thesis are: 1) How do political economy factors influence television workers in shaping their content?; 2) What is the most influential political economic factors that affect television workers in shaping their content? There are various factors that influence television workers in shaping their program content, but the political and economic factors consisting of media owners, advertisers, audience, regulators and politicians are considered the most influential among television workers. In this thesis, using an empirical study of individual television workers and their experiences, the first research question has been answered in the research findings section (Chapter V), and the conclusions can be drawn as the followings: 1. Television owners control, directly or indirectly, television workers in shaping the program content. The indirect control was made through senior executives who hold strategic positions in the programming department and especially in the media editorial board. The owners brief their editorial executives about any rule they wish to impose. The executives then talk to reporters and other television workers about the owners' will which must be obeyed by those who involved in news production. Reporters were advised about how stories should be worded. Owners-cum-politician enjoy the advantage of full coverage of their media. Television workers were instructed to broadcast any events that involved the owners. Owners sometimes involved directly in shaping content, especially entertainment program. The owners used to come to a programming meeting where they lead and direct television workers. Owners evaluated the performance of the ongoing program and giving suggestions about what should be done to sustain the program success. 2. Advertiser played significant role in shaping the program content. It is common for television stations to get advertisers to help produce programs. Stations may design sponsorship programs and directly solicit advertisers to provide funding for the program to produce. Stations may also provide time slots for advertisers to promote their cause on existing programs. Advertisers were allowed to shape the program content they financed. Advertisers who held full sponsorship had a chance to determine up to 80% of program content. News program sometimes

produce a news story from advertisers as a result of the engagement between advertisers and the television marketing department. Advertisers contribute ideas to the text that must be written or the video that must be displayed. Although advertisers assume important role in molding television content and contributing revenues for the station's prosperity, however their influence are not unlimited especially when their missions go against the owners. 3. Audience influence on television content is best presented on the use of rating reports in developing the program content. In Indonesia, competition among commercial televisions is fierce, and for this reason audience measurement is important for television broadcasters and advertisers in this rating-obsessed industry. Most advertisers and television broadcasters depend on this audience feedback managed and issued by the rating agency. A low rating program brings consequences repairing or changing the program content and if the rating is still low the program would be removed since the possibilities of getting advertisers for the program would be thin. 4. Pertaining to news, television workers used to prioritize and broadcast more stories that could boost audience numbers in their news programs. Every program content must be blended with entertainment elements with the intended goal is to reach the highest level of marketability, accessibility, and comprehensibility. This mixture finally produces a dumbing-down effect, or the deliberate diminution of the intellectual level of program contents to ensure mass acceptability. 5. Broadcast regulator is influential in shaping the program content. The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) is a regulator in term of program content. The KPI plays important role in shaping the television program content. KPI has a power to ban the television show. The television watchdog constantly monitors, television content and -in case the content breached broadcasting ethics and laws- gave a reprimand letter to the station concerned. After being warned several times and no corrections have been made, the KPI has the power to halt the program. For some televisions, the regulator was perhaps the most important influence on its program content. Broadcasters frequently changed their program content after a stream of warning letters they received from the KPI. The KPI sometimes invited broadcasters to discuss programs which were still in planning or production process to make sure that the program eligible to broadcast. 6. Politicians played important role in shaping the program content, and the relationship between politicians and the media intensified during a political campaign. Of four elections held in the post-authoritarian era, politicians played important role in shaping the political related program content especially news. Most televisions had conducted a relatively fair coverage of the 2004 and 2009 election, but unfair and partisan in the 1999 and 2014 elections. Indonesian political life faced new development in 2014 as media moguls jumped into the political arena and vied with each other for political power. The result is the fiercest and most confrontational campaign Indonesian people ever remembered due partly to the role of televisions. Television was blamed for running biased coverage of both legislative and especially presidential race. Television coverage of political campaigns had a tendency to be bias, most likely a manifestation of the political inclinations of the station proprietors. 7. Audience through its inferential feedback (rating reports) constitutes the most influential factor on program content. Audience affected 34 percent television workers employed at 10 national private television stations in Indonesia. The second and third most influential political economic factors were occupied by advertiser (22%) and television owners (20 %). Politicians (14%) trail in number four. However, the influence of politicians increased significantly ahead of elections. Regulators showed the least influence on program content since they affected only 10% television workers on a daily basis. 6.3 Recommendations This research suggests that media industry development needs literacy of media among audiences. Media development ought to be anticipated towards setting up an all around educated and well-informed audiences and society. This can be accomplished by maintaining a public-oriented information and open spaces for participation of public. One of the arrangements is to rejuvenate

public media in Indonesia. Consequently, **the state-owned** broadcast media **TVRI and RRI** need to experience **fundamental** change **and to be** renewed as **national community media.** This efforts are essential to guarantee **media literacy** 5

as well as the attainment of audiences' rights to media. Just when television industry serves audiences' rights to

information and does as such **in a more public-oriented way,** would **we** be **able to** hope to **see** television stations assume **a more** important **role as public** 5

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